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Stefan Heidemann
Introduction: Transregional and Regional
Elites – Connecting the Early Islamic
Empire
The Project of the ‘Early Islamic Empire at Work’
Our knowledge about the working of the early Islamic Empire is still rather im-
balanced. The caliphate ruled an expanse from Central Asia to North Africa for
about 300 years until the 940s, creating in the process a distinct civilization and
culture. Research on the early Islamic Empire, and consequently our knowledge
thereof, is still dominated by the perspective of the sources.Whilst unsurprising,
the tendency of researchers to rely upon the viewpoint of the major historians of
the Islamic Empire has led them to adopt the same geographical biases that
these historians maintained. The most important of these is al-Ṭabarī (d. 923),
who provides us with a monumental history of the world and the Islamic Empire
until the time when its power was waning. As informative as al-Ṭabarī is, even
about the far regions of the empire, his primary concern is the developments
of its political and economic center, Greater Mesopotamia. This region, which
comprised important metropolises such as al-Kūfa, al-Baṣra, Wāsiṭ, Baghdād,
Sāmarrāʾ, and al-Mawṣil, was tightly controlled and taxed. It also served as
the power base of the Sasanians, an imperial tradition on which the Islamic Em-
pire subsequently built. Historians have often transposed the information pro-
vided by al-Ṭabarī and others regarding this economic, agricultural, and political
heartland to the empire as a whole. It became the governing paradigm for the
narrative of the empire.
The questioning of this assumption was the starting point of the European
Research Council project ‘The Early Islamic Empire at Work’, which ran from
April 2014 to September 2019. In investigating how the vast and diverse Islamic
Empire was governed, the project critiques the reigning ‘top-down’ conceptuali-
zation, according to which the caliph and his court constitute the center from
which imperial power, politics, and indeed history were transmitted. Instead,
it posited a ‘View from the Regions Toward the Center’, which, inspired by schol-
ars of European Medieval Studies such as Peter Thorau¹ and Chris Wickham,²
 Thorau 1998, 4–5
 Wickham 2011.
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connects regional histories to find coherence between imperial dynastic history
and regional events. Five key regions were selected for the project, based on the
diversity of their people, languages, religions and cultures, and history. These
were Ifrīqiya, al-Shām (Syria), the Jazīra (Northern Mesopotamia), Fārs, and
Khurāsān (eastern Iran). Through a combination of in-depth regional analyses
and interregional comparisons, the project thus sought to explain the working
of the early Islamic Empire from a regional perspective.
The Question of Elites
A key factor in understanding governance with regard to the early Islamic Em-
pire are the various elites who were essential for the processes of regional inte-
gration and imperial cohesion.When acts of imperial governance are contextual-
ized within the stream of regional and transregional events, against a backdrop
of the movements of elites and individuals, the functioning of the empire within
its legal and institutional framework becomes apparent, embedded in a network
of reciprocal relations, dependencies, and permeations. These layers of imperial
government, regional, and transregional activity, can then be synthesized into a
comprehensive imperial history.
Relations between an empire and its subjected regions are never unilateral.
No pre-modern empire could be ruled through the threat of military force alone.
Significant sections of the provincial elites often consented to being part of an
empire because of the advantages that it could provide, such as reliable commu-
nication and transportation lines, and an enforceable common legal framework.
The regional elites were usually culturally, historically, socially, and economical-
ly rooted in their regions. Those who joined the empire’s ranks were positioned
between its demand for taxes and loyalty on the one hand, and the agricultural
workforce, comprising the demographic majority in pre-modern societies, on the
other. In every empire, the regions were burdened with taxes and other contribu-
tions to the maintenance of the central administration, its capital, courts, and
military, and the privileges of the upper echelons of the regions and the imperial
center. While the Islamic Empire seems to have been at the same time both bu-
reaucratic, at least in its fiscal administration, and ‘informal’, meaning without
any discernable formal ‘Byzantine’ hierarchy, the diversity of the regions and its
elites entailed variations of governance, almost as a pattern. Practices differed
from region to region, but so too did the resulting interactions with the elites
in these regions.
The question of who constituted these elites, and the need to forge an opera-
tional terminology strong enough to analyze their identity and function, became
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a driving question at an early stage in the project. Rather than focusing on insti-
tutions, we pursued an actor-driven approach to understand the role played by
persons (whether groups or individuals) and their networks in the Islamic Em-
pire.
The elites we were most interested in are ‘functional’ elites. This category in-
cludes mainly political and economic elites who were crucial to the empire’s sta-
bility. This still vague definition includes all administrative, and military elites,
but also judicial elites. For questions of governance, the ‘economic elites’ mainly
comprise the landholding elites. Although this group also includes the leaders of
urban artisans and merchants, the sūqa and bayʿa, and the long-distance mer-
chants (tujjār), it was the landholding elites, a group which was often closely
connected with the administration and the fisc, that were more relevant for
our project. Old regional elites were often marked by their possession of land,
and the new elites of the empire were investing their gains in landholding.
By design, the project’s approach placed less emphasis on the importance of
those elites who defined religion, religious-political ideology, and intellectual
culture, such as theologians, and urban literates, although clerics and qāḍīs
who served in the regional administrations are included in the category of func-
tional elites mentioned above.
The qualifier for functional elites is the terminological pair ‘transregional’
and ‘regional’. The two terms comprise large and diverse groups which serve var-
ious functions, but they highlight mobility as a crucial trait of those elites. The
term transregional refers to highly mobile elites operating across the empire
and connecting its various regions. Examples of this category are governor fam-
ilies, military groups, legal scholars and other officials, as well as investors of
large estates or long-distance merchants. Transregional elites and groups were
vital for the maintenance of the Islamic Empire and for the creation of a specific
imperial culture.
By contrast, regional elites tended to originate from the specific region in
which they were active. It was in these regions where their influence was stron-
gest. The regional elites rarely held leading positions in the caliphal administra-
tive centers or at the caliph’s court and it was the transregional rather than the
regional elites who maintained the links between the court and the regions. The
status of the regional elites often pre-dated the Islamic Empire and was based on
various factors such as local military forces (e.g., Daylamites or Berbers), posses-
sion of strongholds, extended landholdings, or a position within religious hier-
archies. Examples of such regional elites are the Sogdian nobility or high-rank-
ing Christian clergy. The example of the Christian clergy, however, also
underlines the potential for an intermediary group or a partial overlap between
the two categories: bishops often studied outside their home regions but in
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Christian centers, appointments to different dioceses resulted in a high degree of
mobility within the regions, and those who were elected as patriarchs not infre-
quently occupied positions of influence with the caliph.
As a rule, regional elites were stronger in places where the fiscal and admin-
istrative interest of the empire was clearly present, but not yet firmly established.
The regional elite frequently took over judicial and tax-collecting functions, as
Petra Sijpesteijn and Philip Wood show in their contributions to this volume.
Other elites and groups within the regions were more loosely connected with
the empire, or even opposed it. Examples include the Ibāḍī Berbers in North Af-
rica, nomad tribes, or old Iranian nobility in their own strongholds and castles.
A second look, however, offers an even more complex picture. Regional
elites could evolve into transregional elites, such as the Sogdian nobility in
the Iraqi centers. Vice versa, the founder of the Aghlabids, Ibrāhīm b. Aghlab,
was a Khurāsānī Arab who grew up in Egypt and was evidently part of the trans-
regional elite. During the war of succession between al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn
(809–813) he built up an autonomous regional emirate in Ifrīqiya which his fam-
ily ruled for generations, making them part of a regional elite. Similarly, the Arab
garrisons of Fusṭāṭ in Egypt, originally a transregional military and elite group,
underwent a process of ‘regionalization’ when the province was taken over by
new Khurāsānian troops and their commanders.
Looking at the military, administrative, and political elites, we can distin-
guish fundamental shifts within the elite structure of the empire over time, a fea-
ture which sets the early Islamic Empire apart from its Roman and Sasanian
predecessors. Every two to three generations, a new distinct class of elites
took over the most important key positions. They each differed in terms of
their geographical, ethnic, and social backgrounds. These new elites emerged
largely by promotion and by privilege, from the top rather than by bottom-up so-
cial mobility or through revolutionary changes. This is most evident in the crea-
tion of the class of the administrators (kuttāb) or the Central Asian elite and
‘bonded military’ in the period following al-Muʿtaṣim billāh (r. 833–842).
The integration of the new elites into the administrative and military struc-
tures occurred through conversion to the privileged imperial religion, Islam.
Islam as the religion of the empire had transcended ethnic privileges, but this
did not preclude ethnic prejudices within the elite society (e.g., shuʿūbiyya), re-
gional bonds, and/or power struggles between ethnically or regionally defined
groups. The rise of the ʿAbbāsids, for instance, was largely seen as the waning
of the elite of the Arab conquerors and their descendants. Only the position of
the caliph remained reserved for a member of Quraysh, or more specifically, a
member of the ʿAbbāsid family.
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Three major shifts in the structure of the military transregional elite can be
observed. Under the Umayyads, the military consisted almost entirely of Muslim
Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula and Syria who retained important governor
positions, especially in Syria and Northern Mesopotamia, until the time of
Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Amīn (c. 660s to 820s). Between 750 and 820, they
were gradually replaced by Khurāsānī amīrs and their armies, who took up
key positions at the nodes of the empire. Among the Khurāsānians, Persianized
Arabs and Arabized Iranians were almost indistinguishable from one another,
due to the common Persian-Arab heritage that both shared. Between the 820s
and 860s, the Khurāsānians were replaced in key positions by Central Asians,
Sogdians, Turkish nobility and bonded military (ghulāms or mamlūks), a shift in-
itiated by al-Maʾmūn, al-Muʿtaṣim billāh, and al-Mutawakkil ʿalā Allāh. The new
Central Asian military elites and their armies were not only deployed in large gar-
rison cities in the agglomerations of Baghdād, Sāmarrāʾ, and al-Mutawakkiliyya,
but were also stationed in key provinces such as Egypt.
These shifts, initiated from the top, occurred gradually rather than as a sud-
den disruption. This does not imply however, that the transitions from pre-Islam-
ic to Islamic, from Arab to Khurāsānian to Central Asian elites were frictionless.
They were often the backdrop of major rebellions, mainly orchestrated by those
individuals or groups who saw their interests or status being threatened. Under
certain circumstances they could – and did – mobilize support from the wider
populace. Examples include the uprisings in Eastern Iran³ or in Egypt at the
time of al-Maʾmūn.
The advantage of the use of the qualifiers ‘transregional’ and ‘regional’ over
others – such as ‘imperial’, ‘Muslim’, ‘religious’, or ‘administrative’ – is that they
are verifiable, and respond to the question of the integration of the regions into
the wider empire. Prosopographical research into the careers of individuals and
groups reveals their movements across the empire and/or their regional impor-
tance (see the contributions of Khan, Hagemann, and Gundelfinger/Verkinde-
ren). A term such as ‘imperial elites’ can hardly be made operational; it may
refer to entitlement and privilege granted by the caliphal administration, but
it can describe either transregional or regional actors. Dionysius of Tall Maḥrē,
for example, the West Syrian patriarch from c. 818–846, was a representative
of the regional Jazīran elite, but cultivated close connections to the caliphal
court, as Philip Wood shows. Appointments of qāḍīs from the regional elite, Ha-
gemann shows, were also carried out by the caliph. The term ‘transregional
 Crone 2012.
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elites’ avoids such difficulties and emphasizes an elite’s function in the integra-
tion of the empire.
A terminological differentiation between ‘Islamic’ and ‘non-Islamic’ elites,
such as Zoroastrian priests, Christian clergy, Jewish Geonim, and Buddhist lead-
ers, would also not reveal much about their function within the empire. These
groups include administrative, economic, intellectual, legal, and theological
elites, but they were not static. Bishops, for example, fulfilled vital functions
within the provinces: they dispensed justice and were involved in the taxation
practices (see Wood and Sijpesteijn). Certain Muslim elites, on the other hand,
were not involved in running the empire. On the contrary; the leaders of the pre-
dominantly anti-imperial Khārijites sometimes came from elite families or were
former holders of positions in the imperial military.
The importance of understanding the role of elites becomes even more ap-
parent when we look at how the provinces and regions functioned. Unlike stud-
ies of the Roman Empire, research on the Islamic Empire does not operate on an
agreed concept of territoriality. The ‘Early Islamic Empire’ project generally ques-
tioned the concept of territoriality regarding the provinces of the empire. As
Stuart Elden has argued, territoriality is the condition of being a territory,
which is a “bounded space under the control of people, usually a state, [and]
therefore is historically produced”. It usually implies that the state can enforce
its rules across its entire territory.⁴
Studies of the Roman Empire tend to use the concept of territoriality within a
vision of empire based on the clear demarcation of provinces and dioceses under
imperial control, expressed through established provincial borders that were
often marked with boundary stones. Territoriality necessitates a very high level
of control, suitable in a situation where a densely populated, continuous agricul-
tural landscape had to be divided for administrative purposes such as tax collec-
tion or property rights on land. In the case of the early Islamic Empire, this form
of territoriality is less evident and can only be reasonably assumed in densely
populated areas, such as Greater Mesopotamia and perhaps Egypt.⁵ On the
macro level, territoriality does not seem to have been a defining category for
the provinces of the Islamic Empire, which covered almost all of the Old
World Dry Belt, a mostly arid zone with oases, river and valley systems, and
were mainly separated from each other by natural boundaries like steppes, de-
serts, mountain ridges, and large rivers. In Arabic geographic descriptions of the
regions it is not boundaries which are marked, but roads and realms (al-masālik
 For a broad discussion of the concept of territoriality, see Elden 2013, esp. 322.
 For a comparison with the Sasanian Empire, see Payne 2017.
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wa-l-mamālik).⁶ For this reason, our research group laid less emphasis on terri-
tory as a basis for understanding administration and worked instead with a lay-
ered, but not necessarily hierarchical structure of authority within each prov-
ince/region studied within the project.
The default concept of a province is a layered structure of transregional
elites projecting and concentrating imperial power into a region, which is de-
fined as a larger geographic entity. By virtue of the geographical setting, its peo-
ple might have had a shared common history, religion, or language. This differs
from an administrative concept of a province. The transregional elites functioned
as conduits of imperial power. They were located in key cities that were often sit-
uated amidst a fertile, tax-rich agricultural hinterland. The projection of power
was implemented through the governor and the deployment of garrisons of
large transregional armies. Thus the provinces were formed mostly for the provi-
sioning of state institutions, the administration, the military, and those transre-
gional elites. A highly developed accounting system recorded in the caliphal ad-
ministrative centers is evidence of tight control over those taxable areas.Where a
governor could not subject sub-regions such as neighboring oases to his direct
control, he appointed wālīs or ʿāmils. Those areas or zones could still be quite
closely connected to the provincial administration by taxation and military con-
trol. The junds in al-Shām or the Zāb in Ifrīqiya are such cases. Rebellions and
uprisings against the governor testify to this tighter control, thus affirming the
expanding power of the provincial administration within the region.
Outside these core regions, many forms of integration or co-optation of re-
gional groups, nomads, mountain dwellers, and other regional populations ex-
isted. Numerous regional rulers, vassals at best and rebels at worst, nobilities,
and self-governed communities were present across the imperial landscape.
They often held onto their pre-Islamic positions and privileges, ruling large
swathes of a region while its main cities were usually administered by Muslim
governors. Examples are the Sogdian Bukhārkhōdās in the Bukhārā Oasis and
the Ikhshīds in Samarqand.⁷ How exactly they shared power with the transre-
gional elites should be analyzed on a case to case basis.
When direct taxation was not feasible, tribute from the vassal zone to the
state coffers provided assurance of the former’s commitment, whilst a gift
from the governor could ensure the loyalty of an unpredictable local ruler. Jürgen
 Brauer 1995.
 See for example Kennedy 2010.
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Paul describes a layered structure for the Seljūq period and sees centralized tax-
ation in money as a legacy of the ʿAbbāsid administration.⁸
The autonomy of nomads and mountain dwellers was even more pro-
nounced. The Berber Khārijites, who lived in the Atlas mountains, remained at
the fringes of the administration and could be ignored at length. The same
can be said for those living in mountain fortresses or in the steppes with their
livestock. Pre-Islamic belief systems continued or even survived in these zones
for long periods, but were transformed by the Islamic culture of the empire
over time. These zones were hardly taxed if at all and often kept militarily at
bay, but they lay within the commercial and cultural reach of the empire.
The task of the provincial governor was therefore to manage this layered
structure of the region for the tax benefit of the empire rather than to impose
the rule of the caliph in a defined territory. The regional elites played an impor-
tant role in the management of the empire.
The Conference and this Volume
In order to explore the subject of elites and their role in imperial governance in
more detail, the ‘Early Islamic Empire’ project held a conference on 7–8 October
2016 dedicated to ‘Regional and Transregional Elites’. The conference sought to
address a number of core issues such as, who were the various elites of a given
region? How did these regional elites interact with the empire, what mechanisms
and strategies did they employ, and (how) did they change in the course of in-
teraction? How were transregional elites influenced by their interaction with re-
gional elites, and how did they balance their relationships with both the latter
and the central caliphal authorities? Where and how were transregional elites
recruited, and was the shift from one such elite to another a sign of failure or
were some elites ‘simply’ better at reproducing themselves? Which existing net-
works and emerging institutions helped elites to connect the empire and its di-
verse regions (e.g., tribal affiliations, family policies, strategic appointments, ec-
clesiastical hierarchies)?
It quickly became evident that the term ‘elite’ itself was used differently by
the participants. The concluding roundtable discussion highlighted the lack of a
terminology of elites common to our field as a whole, applicable irrespective of
geographical or historical specificities, and with interdisciplinary relevance. The
first chapter of the present volume picks up from this discussion and seeks to
 Paul 2015.
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respond to the identified gap. “Studying Elites in Early Islamic History” by Han-
nah-Lena Hagemann, Katharina Mewes, and Peter Verkinderen explores the term
elite and its conceptualization for the study of early Islamic history. In addition
to reviewing the terminology used to refer to socially dominant groups in Arabic
and Persian sources, Hagemann et al. also examine the development of ‘elite
studies’ in the social sciences and related fields. In discussing its suitability
for the field of Islamic Studies, they identify a number of problems that lead
them to question the applicability of terms for socially dominant groups as de-
fined in other disciplines to Islamic Studies.
Instead, the authors put forward their own working definition of ‘elite’ in an
early Islamic context. They define elites “as individuals and groups of individu-
als who were in a position or had the potential to influence social, political, eco-
nomic, and religious processes and decision-making in their communities.”
These people enjoyed an elevated (political, military, judicial, religious, and/
or economic) status that entitled them to power, wealth, influence, and other no-
table benefits. The status of elites depended on conceptions of merit, perfor-
mance, ethnicity, ancestry, wealth, military prowess, religion, education, social
capital, and other forms of privilege. These categories are entangled and can
hardly be separated from each other, but predominant categories can often be
discerned.
The case studies that follow are roughly organized according to geography,
beginning with Arabia as the cradle of the empire and continuing with Iraq as
the imperial center in the period most contributions focus on. These are followed
by studies on regions of the Iranian east, which share a Sasanian past, followed
by the Eastern Mediterranean and the north of the empire as former Byzantine
territories with a strong Christian heritage. North Africa, with its Roman-Latin
heritage, concludes the volume.
Most conference participants began with the assumption that their region
forms a specific exception to the Greater Mesopotamian paradigm. However,
the chapters of this volume reveal that it may in fact have been Greater Mesopo-
tamia which formed the exception. The regions’ geographical outlooks, their
many cultures and religions, seemed at first to be too different to perceive any
common ground for interregional comparisons and parallels; the sources differ
for each region in scope, wealth of information, and emphasis. Despite the rela-
tionships and interactions between regional and transregional elites differing
from region to region, however, the case studies in this volume exhibit certain
common patterns in the case studies from North Africa to Khurāsān, for instance
regarding the importance of informal governance structures or forms of social or-
ganization.
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Georg Leube, “Insult the Caliph, Marry al-Ḥasan, and Redeem Your King-
dom: Freiheitsgrade of Kindī Elites During the 7th – 9th Centuries”, investigates
the regional networks of the Kinda tribe. Al-Ashʿath, a descendant of the kings
of the South Arabian tribe of Kinda, was able to elevate his family to the highest
echelons of the fledgling Islamic Empire through marriage ties. However, in a
later stage, the significance of tribal networks was reduced to a regional level,
at least in the case of the Kinda. His grandson, Ibn al-Ashʿath, attempted
again to interfere in transregional affairs and led the revolt of the Iraqi tribes
against ʿAbd al-Malik. He mobilized the Iraqi milieu of pious Qurʾān readers
(qurrāʾ), who were opposed to the state building efforts of the Islamic adminis-
tration, for which Ibn al-Ashʿath used religious claims and downplayed his tribal
affiliations.
Noëmie Lucas, “Landowners in Lower-Iraq During the 8th Century: Types and
Interplays”, analyzes social shifts in the landholding class of Lower Iraq. She de-
fines a number of types of landowners, local Jews and Christians alongside Per-
sian landowners (dahāqīn) and the new landed Islamic transregional elites in-
vesting in land. She looks into the advancing concentration of land in the
hands of the latter in particular. These owners of large estates were often mem-
bers of the Baghdādī elite and the ʿAbbāsid family. Their growth was at the ex-
pense of small, local landowners. Her study also provides examples of transre-
gional elites ‘going regional’, however.
Hugh Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid Political and Milita-
ry Elite”, shifts attention to the transregional military elites. He takes up the
question of their changing origins and al-Manṣūr’s creation of the Khurāsānī
military. He observes that in the early ʿAbbāsid Empire, the inner core provinces,
such as Iraq, the Jazīra, and Syria, remained reserved for members of the ʿAbbā-
sid family, while the newly created class of quwwād went to the threatened fron-
tiers of Ifrīqiya, Armīniya, and Khurāsān. Almost all of them came from Khurā-
sān, but not exclusively. As a transregional elite by imperial privilege close to the
court, these men were geographically mobile, returning to Baghdād after their
assignment, before again receiving new provincial appointments. Their status
was almost hereditary. Their leaders, such as Khuzayma b. Khāzim, served
their retainers as conduits of royal patronage and influence. This newly created
ʿAbbāsid elite of quwwād lasted at most three generations. Their dominance
ended in the war of succession between al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn in 813–814.
Kennedy also takes up the case of the Kinda, whose leaders frequently served
as governors of al-Kūfa under the ʿAbbāsids, from Georg Leube.
Jürgen Paul, “Who Were the Mulūk Fārs?”, returns to the discussion on land-
ed regional elites, but from a different angle compared to Noëmie Lucas. He
looks into a section of the elite that is usually difficult to pin down in the avail-
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able sources: local lords in Iran. Using al-Iṣṭakhrī’s discussion of the mulūk Fārs
as a starting point, he lays out the characteristics of this class. As a case study,
he presents the Arab family of Muḥammad b. Wāṣil, who moved to Fārs in the
late 7th century and became part of the regional land-holding elite.
Ahmad Khan, “An Empire of Elites: Mobility in the Early Islamic Empire”,
studies prosopographies pertaining to political and mostly transregional elites
in order to examine patterns of social mobility, professional circulation, and
structures of imperial rule in the ʿAbbāsid Empire during the 8th and 9th centu-
ries. He comes to an important conclusion hinting at seemingly contradictory
patterns. At least in the cases that he analyzes, it can be seen that the early ʿAb-
bāsid empire was dominated by informal patterns of rule that depended dispro-
portionately on personal retainers as well as governor and military families to
maintain structures, while the empire appears as a bureaucratic centralized em-
pire with regard to the fiscal administration.
Amikam Elad, “Preliminary Notes on the Term and Institution of al-Shākir-
iyya in Early Islam”, addresses the problem of contemporary terminology for
transregional military forces and elites in Arabic sources. He focuses on the
case of the shākiriyya. In a close examination of references pertaining to this
military group in primary sources up to the reign of al-Maʾmūn, he challenges
the current scholarship regarding this term. According to his interpretation,
the term denotes different groups in varying contexts. Sometimes, it refers to a
group of people with a military character, such as armed guards or a fighting
force on the battlefield. In other contexts, no military connection is apparent,
and the shākiriyya in question appear to be simply servants or devoted followers.
A certain link with Khurāsānī/Central Asian practices seems apparent, but Elad
shows that both the institution and the meaning of its name could change when
moved to another context.
Alison Vacca’s contribution, “Khurāsānī and Transoxanian Ostikans of Early
ʿAbbāsid Armenia”, takes up some of the issues raised in Kennedy’s study.With
her entry, the volume enters a zone inhabited by a predominantly Christian pop-
ulation.Vacca uses Armenian and Arabic sources to analyze Armenia’s multilay-
ered provincial structure. The presence of Khurāsānī governors (ostikans) and
troops in Armenia challenges the idea that Armenia was separated or isolated
from developments in the Islamic Empire; on the contrary, Armenia was not in-
frequently the scene of conflicts between different segments of the Khurāsānī
elite. A familiar pattern also emerges in her study of a layered structure of a pro-
vincial region and the (occasional) projection of power from the caliphal center
via governors and garrisons.
Peter Verkinderen and Simon Gundelfinger’s chapter, “Governors of the
Early Islamic Empire – A Comparative Regional Perspective”, analyzes the ap-
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pointments of governors in Fārs and al-Shām on several levels until the reign of
al-Muʿtamid ʿalā Allāh (r. 870–892). Due to the lack of a distinct contemporary
hierarchical terminology in the sources, these individuals were classified using
the terms governor, super-governor, and sub-governor. By examining their back-
grounds, Gundelfinger and Verkinderen identify appointment patterns, which
differed clearly between Fārs and al-Shām. Al-Shām under the Umayyads was
the seat of government, and its administration was presumably organized in
the environment of the court, while Fārs was part of the super-province of al-
Baṣra. Appointment patterns changed over time, but they did not follow the pe-
riodization of Sufyānid, Zubayrid, Marwānid, early ʿAbbāsid, or pre-Sāmarran
and Sāmarran eras that is often applied to the empire as a whole. The authors
discuss the tribal patterns of appointments of Arab governors in the Umayyad
period, the involvement of Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid family members in governing
the provinces, and the decline of their influence towards the end of the period
under study. The different patterns of appointments and the modes of gover-
nance, such as the super-provinces, display a common strategy for brief periods;
more often policies were tailored according to the situation of the province. Their
conclusions thus tie well into what Ahmad Khan calls informal structures of gov-
ernment.
Hannah-Lena Hagemann, “Muslim Elites in the Early Islamic Jazīra: The
Qāḍīs of Ḥarrān, al-Raqqa, and al-Mawṣil”, looks into the local and regional net-
works of power within the province of al-Jazīra during the Umayyad and early
ʿAbbāsid period. She also applies a prosopographical approach, focusing on
the office of the qāḍī as an intersection of imperial and provincial authority.
Using the cities of Ḥarrān, al-Raqqa, and al-Mawṣil as case studies, a compara-
tive analysis of the individuals appointed to the qāḍīship reveals some common-
alities in their backgrounds, but also clear differences in the appointment pat-
terns. For example, the judges of Ḥarrān formed part of the local elite, had a
local power base, and were thus more independent from court patronage. In con-
trast, the qāḍīs of al-Raqqa were frequently appointed from the transregional
elites. The judges of al-Mawṣil, on the other hand, feature instances of appoint-
ments of local, regional, and transregional representatives. The variance was
likely due to political and administrative factors in each of the cities and appears
to have been a constant feature of the early Islamic period.
Philip Wood studies the “Christian Elite Networks in the Jazīra, c.730–850”.
He looks at the same geographical area but focuses on a different group of elites.
He uses Chris Wickham’s definition of aristocracy as comprising individuals and
groups possessing memory of ancestry, land, office, lifestyle, mutual recogni-
tion, and proximity to royal patronage to describe the episcopal and monastic
networks of different denominations in the Jazīra. This Christian ‘aristocratic’
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elite had its roots in the Roman Near East. Drawing on the information of the
Chronicle of Michael the Syrian in particular,Wood argues that the caliphate be-
came an increasingly hostile environment for Christian landed lay elites, incen-
tivizing powerful families to take roles in the state’s administration or within the
church as bishops. Using examples from the Jacobite church, most famously Di-
onysius of Tall Mahrē, Wood argues that the state acted through the regional in-
stitutions of the church. It became increasingly involved in the governance of the
church by publicly endorsing the patriarch and his ability to raise revenues from
Christians, and also by supporting him against rival clerics. In the early ʿAbbāsid
period, the empire thus became involved in church matters as a part of its rep-
ertoire of governance.
Petra Sijpesteijn presents a similar case for Egypt, which shares a Roman
Christian past and the perseverance of ecclesiastical networks with the Jazīra.
Her main argument relates to “Establishing Local Elite Authority in Egypt
through Arbitration and Mediation”. She uses evidence from Arabic, Coptic,
and Greek papyri to examine the role of individuals involved in mediation during
the first four centuries following the Muslim conquest of Egypt. Her focus lies on
the strategies of conflict resolution, the regional and transregional actors in-
volved, and the question of whether these processes took place in an institution-
al framework or in a more informal environment. Sijpesteijn shows how these
processes can inform us about changing power relations within the province.
On a local level, arbitration and dispute resolution was sought from bishops,
Muslim governors, and later qāḍīs alike. Hence, arbitration was to be found with-
in a community, offering a strong alternative to a complicated and expensive Is-
lamic legal system. Christian, Jewish, and Muslim community leaders continued
to serve the needs of their specific constituencies. The authority inherent in con-
flict mediation itself created and affirmed local elite status. She discusses the
changes in the composition of Egypt’s elite, as they emerge from the analysis
of local processes of conflict resolution, and how these changes can be connect-
ed to developments at the caliphal center.
Yaacov Lev, “The Civilian Ruling Elite of the Ṭūlūnid Ikhshīdid Period”, also
looks at the situation in Egypt, but shifts the attention to different Muslim elites.
His contribution is divided into two parts. In the first, Lev studies the terminol-
ogy employed by the Arabic sources to refer to subjects and elite groups alike.
Certain terms, such as ṣinf (pl. aṣnāf), firqa (pl. firaq), ṭāʾifa (pl. ṭawāʾif), and
ṭabaqa (pl. ṭibāq), appear to have applied to more or less distinct social groups,
but on the whole the primary sources seem to have conceived of society as po-
larized between the general categories of khāṣṣa (elite) and ʿāmma (commoners).
In the second part, Lev examines the participation of the civilian elites of the
Ikhshīdid period in the succession crises of 946 and 961.
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In his contribution, “Connecting the Ibāḍī Network in North Africa with the
Empire (2nd/8th – 3rd/9th Century)”, Cyrille Aillet looks at a region which was one
of the first to slip out of ʿAbbāsid control during the war of succession between
al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn. At first sight, North African Ibāḍism emerged during the
Berber uprisings against Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid rule and seemingly stayed at
the margins of the empire. However, during the 8th and 9th centuries the civilian
transregional elite of Ibāḍī merchants served as a conduit of imperial Islamic
culture and the economy of the empire, albeit not of caliphal government.
North African Ibāḍīs remained under the influence of their eastern strongholds,
particularly al-Baṣra, where the Ibāḍī elite was integrated into ʿAbbāsid society.
Al-Baṣra was an important emporium and Ibāḍī merchants circulated widely be-
tween the ʿAbbāsid realm and its western fringes. Trans-Saharan trade, including
slaves and gold, was presumably initiated by demand from within the empire,
connecting the regional economies of North Africa with that of the imperial sys-
tem. Intense scholarly exchange also linked west and east, thanks to intermedi-
ary meeting points such as Mecca, particularly during the ḥajj, and Fusṭāṭ.
Some of the papers that were presented at the conference will be published
in other venues, but contributed immensely to our discussion. Matthew Gordon
and Luke Treadwell took contrasting attitudes towards the Sāmarran establish-
ment. Matthew Gordon, in his talk on “Sāmarran Politics and the ʿAbbāsid
Provinces”, set the career of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn in the context of what he termed
‘Sāmarran politics.’ Ibn Ṭūlūn conducted himself very much in the manner of
his peers in the Sāmarran military elite, at the heart of whose efforts lay twin
goals: securing lucrative interests, including authority over appointments to
Egypt, and maintaining an upper hand over the ʿAbbāsid court in Sāmarrāʾ.
As Gordon puts it: Ibn Ṭūlūn “overplayed his hand” trying to balance his interest
in Sāmarrāʾ and in his own powerbase in Syria and Egypt, until he became an
enemy of the all-powerful regent al-Muwaffaq and his successors.
Luke Treadwell’s talk on “Muṭṭawwiʿī and Mamlūk: Military Elites in
Sāmānid Central Asia and Beyond”, looked at the case of Ibn Ṭūlūn’s contempo-
raries, the Sāmānids, a family that had already emerged as a regional elite in the
820, when al-Maʾmūn moved to Baghdād. In striking contrast to the Ṭūlūnids in
Egypt, the Sāmānids never strove for caliphal patronage or positions at court, far
from it: when they became actual rulers of Transoxania and Khurāsān, their geo-
graphical outlook differed tremendously from that of the ʿAbbāsid Empire. They
were focused northwards toward the steppes, and their commercial enterprise
even reached via the Volga to the Baltic Sea. One reason for their seemingly atyp-
ical behavior might be that they were content with their status in the empire,
viewing themselves almost as equals of the ʿAbbāsids, without challenging
their position in Baghdād nor ‘stepping on their carpet’ as clients.
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What Remains to be Done?
The roundtable discussion that followed the presentations highlighted the im-
portance of studying the provinces of the empire individually and from a compa-
rative perspective. Studying a particular province in isolation carries the risk of
ignoring the effects of how developments in one province affected those in oth-
ers, which can obscure broader patterns of imperial rule. An integrative ap-
proach promises insights into the structures and administration of the empire,
especially as we deal with layered structures of authority in each province.
This, in turn, brings into focus the role of elites and how their character and
function varied from province to province.
Certain themes and patterns recurred in several papers and the ensuing dis-
cussions, but the discussion also gave rise to new questions, whilst others re-
main unanswered. Questions of group formation and the identity of elites (as re-
gards ethnicity, military assignments, economic patterns, landowning, and
religious affiliations) have yet to be addressed, as do further conceptual ques-
tions relating to territoriality and elite governance. We hope that the contribu-
tions in this volume will serve as a foundation on which further research can
be based.
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Studying Elites in Early Islamic History:
Concepts and Terminology
Abstract: This paper conceptualizes the term elite for the study of early Islamic
history and aims to provide a usable definition for historians of early Islam. It
gives an overview of existing terminology referring to socially dominant groups
in Arabic and Persian sources as well as in the social sciences and related fields,
discussing and dismissing its suitability for the field of Islamic Studies. The ar-
ticle traces the development of the term elite in scholarly discourse from the 19th
century onward and presents its own definition suited to the complex organiza-
tional structure of early Islamic society, pointing out both the challenges of and
possible strategies for studying early Islamic elites.
Keywords: Elites; Islamic history; early Islamic Empire; Umayyads; ʿAbbāsids;
prosopography
Introduction
This paper is a collaborative effort by some of the team members working within
the ERC project “The Early Islamic Empire at Work—The View from the Regions
Toward the Center”, based at Hamburg University and led by Stefan Heidemann.
The project seeks to study the early Islamic Empire from the inception of the
Umayyad caliphate until the end of effective ʿAbbāsid rule in the mid-10th centu-
ry. It focuses not on the caliph (usually considered the lynchpin of the imperial
enterprise) and his court, but rather on five key provinces (Ifrīqiya, al-Shām, al-
Jazīra, Fārs, and Khurāsān) that serve as case studies illustrating the reciprocal
relations and power dynamics between the so-called center and periphery.
One of the subjects investigated within the framework of this project pertains
to early Islamic elites and their roles in connecting the empire across a vast ter-
ritory inhabited by highly diverse subject populations. The elites we are primarily
interested in are those who had a significant impact on the political dimension
of the empire. They represent a key—albeit not the only—factor in understanding
how the early Islamic Empire came into being and developed over time.
When we first began to study elites in our five provinces, we did not have a
clear concept or definition of what we actually meant by the word elite. The in-
dividual members of our team held sometimes significantly divergent views of
OpenAccess. © 2020 Hannah-Lena Hagemann, Katharina Mewes & Peter Verkinderen, published by De
Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No-
Derivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110669800-002
what elite status meant in an early Islamic context, and accordingly different
ideas of what groups we should investigate. Moreover, our views were mostly in-
formed by vague connotations of political power and wealth rather than a sys-
tematic approach to the issue. That this is true of the field of Islamic Studies
more generally became obvious following our conference on regional and trans-
regional elites in October 2016. Over the course of this conference, many fascinat-
ing and insightful papers were read and discussed. However, there were almost
no references to theories or concepts of the study of elites in the 17 papers that
were presented. The need for a more systematic approach to this subject was one
of the main topics discussed during the concluding round table. This paper is a
first step towards meeting this need. We seek to give an overview of how the
study of elites has impacted our own research. We also offer suggestions on
how to deal with this complex issue more generally, pointing out pertinent ques-
tions and difficulties as well as providing our own definition of socially domi-
nant groups and individuals in the context of the early Islamic Empire.
As stated above, this project primarily considers the political dimension of
the early Islamic Empire. We envision this dimension not as an abstract, rigid
structure of institutions, but as a collection of relations between people forming
overlapping networks. Three distinct but related levels are included: the judicia-
ry, the military, and the administration. The administration represents the form
in which the empire organized its claim to supremacy over its various subjects
and territories. One key element of the administration was the taxation system,
which represented “the principal point of contact between a state and its citi-
zens”¹ and was vital to the survival of the empire. The judiciary and the military
both served to enforce the imperial authorities’ claim to supremacy. However,
these last two were not simply imposed by the imperial state on its subject pop-
ulation; they also reflected a demand for justice and security on the part of said
subjects. This was particularly true of the judiciary, which was also less centrally
organized than the military and not as well structured.
Apart from a comparatively small number of works on statecraft (e.g. ‘mir-
rors for princes’ literature, legal treatises), the bulk of our primary sources pre-
dominantly talk about people, not institutions or offices per se. This works to our
advantage, as we are primarily interested in how the empire actually operated on
the ground rather than how it was ideally supposed to work.We thus approach
the early Islamic Empire from the perspective of those who held positions or of-
fices within the framework of its institutions. In other words, we do not pursue
an institutional approach focusing on the responsibilities and outputs of an of-
 Grey 2011, 181.
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fice as an end in itself, but rather an actor-oriented one that studies the concrete
actions of individuals holding a particular office. This better reflects the fluidity
and diversity of a system whose rules could change depending on individual of-
fice holders and whose institutions often did not constitute diachronically stable
and recognizable entities.
In this study, we look at two different (albeit sometimes overlapping) groups
of actors who engaged with the empire’s political dimension in all its forms. Pri-
marily, we investigate those who held official positions within this dimension.
However, we also study non-state actors, meaning individuals who were not ap-
pointed to a certain office or position by a member of the imperial apparatus but
who nevertheless could and often did organize their communities. In her contri-
bution to this volume, Petra Sijpesteijn highlights the role of non-state protago-
nists, both Muslim and non-Muslim, who were vital for the administration of jus-
tice on the local level in early Islamic Egypt. Such actors were instrumental in
facilitating the smooth operation of the empire, but under certain circumstances
they could also cause conflict. As engagement of any kind with the political di-
mension of the early Islamic Empire is the focus of our research, resistance to the
enforcement of imperial dominion and/or imperial organization is also specifi-
cally included.
On a secondary level, we also investigate the economic dimension of the
early Islamic Empire, i.e. the production of money and goods that kept the
state running. Taxation was the empire’s most important source of revenue.
The comprehensive breakdown of the flow of taxation to the caliphal center in
the so-called ‘period of anarchy’ contributed to the decline of ʿAbbāsid power
and the development of a polycentric Islamic Empire. That said, here we inves-
tigate economic structures and actors only as far as they are directly related to
the political dimension. Both the political and the economic dimensions were
present in varying degrees on every level of organization, from the village to
the caliphal capital.
Terminology
One problematic aspect in the study of socially dominant groups is terminology.
Any discussion of elites in the early Islamic period would be incomplete without
considering what contemporary authors have had to say on the matter. Classi-
cists often refer to elites by the terms used in their primary sources, but this is
not as common a practice in the field of early Islamic history. Our primary sour-
ces also use many different terms to refer to various groups of higher status.
Some ‘political’ texts develop a relatively complex classification of early Islamic
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society,² but the most general and widespread concept comprises a bipolar de-
scription consisting of the undefined masses (al-ʿāmma) and the distinguished
minorities (al-khāṣṣa). This distinction does not translate into a conceptualiza-
tion of elites.
One of the main reasons why Arabic/Islamic terminology for elites is not
often used by scholars in our field is that the terms’ various connotations
have overall not been studied in depth yet. The one exception is probably al-
khāṣṣa, which has been the subject of a number of short studies pointing out
that the term is often mentioned in conjunction with al-ʿāmma, “the general peo-
ple”. Together, they constitute the entire population of a city or state. In this con-
text, it can be translated as “the elite” or “the upper class”. In other contexts, the
term is variously used to indicate a ruler’s entourage or, in a more restrictive
sense, the caliphal family, “people of merit and quality” and “the rich and cul-
tivated people”.³
On the level below al-khāṣṣa, there are many terms describing leading
groups in society at large or within specific communities. Some (at least initially)
referred to specific criteria like honor (ashrāf) or ancestry (aṣīlān, ahl al-manāqib,
dhawī l-manāqib, buyūt(āt)), exemplariness (amāthil), or something that makes
the group proud (mafākhir, maḥāsin). Other terms are metaphors for being at the
front or top of a group (wujūh, ruʾasāʾ, aʿyān, ṣadr, taqaddum), for greatness
(kibār, akābir, ajilla, buzurgān), or for manliness/vigorousness (fuḥūl, sarāt).
Some of these terms, like ashrāf, have found their way into scholarship as des-
ignations of particular groups, but only in specific contexts (such as the upris-
ings by Iraqi tribal leaders called al-ashrāf against the Umayyads), not as a gen-
eral term for elites.⁴
While these terms appear to refer to certain (usually only loosely defined)
social groups, none of them are suitable to describe the superordinate modern
concepts of elites and their functions. For one, it seems difficult to relate any
of these terms to various levels of social organization (from the village to the
court, from military to religious groups). Some of them are too specific to one
particular group and cannot be applied to members of other groups; others
are too broad. Most of these terms are also value judgments (which we seek to
avoid) and are too focused on one or two aspects of social dominance (e.g.
 See e.g. Marlow 2016, I, 95– 128 (ps.-Māwardī’s Nasīḥat al-Mulūk).
 EI2, “Al-Khāṣṣa wa ‘l-ʿĀmma” (M.A.J. Beg); Van Renterghem 2004, 183–5.
 In South Asia, ‘ashrāf ’ was (and continues to be) used to indicate the Arab origin of immi-
grants. See Dumont 1980, 207ff. For discussions of ashrāf and other terms of social distinction
in pre-modern Islamic history, see Van Renterghem 2004; Marlow 2016; Durand-Guédy 2010;
and Yaacov Lev’s contribution in this volume.
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wealth, political power, ancestry). This excludes important groups that do not
fulfill the relevant criteria (e.g. merchants, scholars, elite women). Finally,
these terms for elites also have different meanings in different chronological
and geographical contexts, rendering them unhelpful for broader comparative
studies and for research examining the general mechanisms and structures un-
derlying the formation and development of socially dominant groups.
The term ‘elite’, which has been adopted in this paper, has become increas-
ingly popular in Islamic Studies since the 1980s (see Fig. 1 below), following in
the footsteps of academic disciplines such as history and the social sciences. It is
certainly not the only term used to describe socially dominant groups: aristocra-
cy, oligarchy, ruling class, notables, patricians, or upper class are just some of
the most common alternatives. These are often used interchangeably with elite
without proper distinction or clarification of their subject matter.⁵ Unfortunately,
there is also no general consensus on what exactly these concepts denote and
which phenomena they are meant to describe.
The term ‘aristocracy’ originally meant “rule of the excellent”. It has since
been used to describe vastly different social groups in vastly different contexts.
It can be applied very generally to denote more or less closed-off ruling groups,⁶
whose composition is based primarily on ancestry but also on other criteria such
as (landed) wealth and/or (hereditary) office. It implies recognition by other
dominant groups as well as a particular lifestyle.⁷ While the term has a certain
European ring to it, it can be used for some elite groups in early Islamic society,
but it is not a viable alternative to the more general term elites.
The term ‘patriciate’ originated in a Roman context, but well into the 20th
century it was used to describe urban ruling elites in different contexts. Patri-
cians were usually considered to constitute a social as well as a political
group, defined by an association with wealth, prestige, ancestry, and social
power. The distinction between the patriciate and the aristocracy is often un-
clear.⁸ The term was famously introduced into Islamic Studies by Richard Bulliet,
whose pioneering 1972 work Patricians of Nishapur drew much praise but also
criticism for its use of the term. The European connotations of the term have pro-
ven too strong for use in our field; Bulliet’s use of the term has not taken hold.
‘Oligarchy’ or the “rule of the few” is another term that is frequently used to
refer to dominant elites, focusing first and foremost on the ruling elite. The term
 Morris 1990, 10. See also Gunn 2007, 195.
 Dumolyn 2013, 5.
 Wickham 2005, 154. For examples of other definitions, each with its own slightly different
focus, see Fox 2014, 51, 52; Mitchell 1973, 27; Grey 2011, 122.
 Dumolyn 2013, 4–5.
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does not primarily denote social distinction but belongs to the field of politics,
and therefore cannot be used interchangeably with elite.⁹
The terms ‘nobility’ and ‘notables’ are still frequently encountered, but there
seems to be a lot of conceptual overlap between nobility and aristocracy, espe-
cially regarding the weight given to ancestry. Notably, French scholars have ar-
gued in favor of using notables (Weber’s “Honoratioren”) to describe elites be-
cause the term is relatively open and can be applied to every level of society.
The main criticism of this is that the term does not translate well, especially be-
cause in French academic discourse it is closely connected to specific historical
contexts.¹⁰
In the field of Islamic Studies, the notion of the “politics of notables” was
first introduced by Albert Hourani in 1981.¹¹ He applied this concept to the Otto-
man period, and while Boaz Shoshan later argued for its usage in pre-Ottoman
Islamic history,¹² both understood notables to refer to urban dignitaries who en-
gaged in ‘politics’ by “acting as intermediaries between the government and the
people”,¹³ usually without seeking autonomous rule for themselves. Both schol-
ars were interested in the status of provincial towns vis-à-vis the imperial centers
rather than the question of elite status and membership. Shoshan acknowledges
the difficulties involved in dealing with notables as a “mixed bag of social
groups”¹⁴ but leaves open the question of whether “one [can] reach precision
in treating the medieval Muslim ‘notables’”. He simply defines the term as
“standing for Arabic classificatory terms which suggest an elevated social posi-
tion”.¹⁵
Concepts such as ‘dominant’ or ‘ruling class’ have mostly gone out of fash-
ion as they are linked to Marxist theories that maintain the upper class should be
comprised of those who hold the primary means of production. Since the second
half of the 20th century this has increasingly limited the appeal of these concepts
to historians. Moreover, this particular definition does not apply fully to many
socially dominant groups in history, such as the medieval patriciate.¹⁶
 Beriou/Carraz 2015, 373.
 Cébeillac-Gervasoni 2003, 704.
 Hourani 1981.
 Shoshan 1986.
 Shoshan 1986, 181.
 Shoshan 1986, 180. On the problem of defining ‘notables’ as a social group, see also Khoury
1983, 12– 13, paraphrased in Shoshan 1986, 181.
 Shoshan 1986, 181.
 Dumolyn 2013, 5.
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Finally, German historiography puts forward the term Schicht (“stratum”), di-
viding society into an Oberschicht (“upper stratum”) of patricians, a Mittelschicht
(“middle stratum” of artisans and small merchants), and an Unterschicht (“lower
stratum” of proletarians). It also identifies a Führungsschicht (“ruling stratum”),
which can either be part of the Oberschicht or separate from it. This Führungs-
schicht has in turn been called a “political class” or a “power elite” by other so-
ciologists.¹⁷
This short overview illustrates the great variety and occasional confusion re-
garding how a society’s dominant social groups can be described. Here we use
the term elite rather than the alternatives just described because it appears less
influenced by specific historiographical approaches than other terms. Categories
such as aristocracy or patriciate, for instance, have other connotations in aca-
demic and in public discourse that are often closely tied to specific historical
contexts. Most of these connotations concern the right to rule, primarily in a po-
litical and military sense, and focus strongly on ancestry and wealth. Other (so-
cial, cultural, and religious) dimensions often fall by the wayside. Oligarchy is
another good example of this: by focusing on the top level of a seemingly obvi-
ous ruling elite, it frequently fails to acknowledge the complex socio-political
structures and hierarchies of medieval societies, with their often diffused sys-
tems of power.¹⁸ It also describes a type of government more than a group of peo-
ple sharing certain defining characteristics. Finally, it is questionable to what ex-
tent ideas and concepts regarding other societies, such as medieval western
European aristocracies, can be readily applied to pre-modern Islamic societies.
The term elite is not neutral either, and it does contain problematic aspects
inherent to both the concept itself and to how the concept has been employed in
elite studies.¹⁹ Normativity, for instance, is one such problem. In common usage,
the term elite has a number of connotations, mostly associated with notions of
excellence, upper-class status, privilege, and superiority. As current public dis-
course in the political sphere illustrates quite nicely, however, identifying some-
thing as elite can also take on negative associations very quickly. We thus want
to emphasize here that we do not use the term normatively, but only to describe
certain mechanisms and functions underlying social structures. As postulated by
Vilfredo Pareto, one of the founding fathers of elite theory, in our work the term
 Dumolyn 2013, 6–7.
 Dumolyn 2013, 6. See also Haldon 2004, 6.
 See e.g. the “areas of concern” identified by Gunn 2007, 195–198, and his suggestions for
how to deal with these concerns, ibid., 198–202.
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elite will be “treated as a value-free term meaning those who score highest on
scales measuring any social value or commodity”.²⁰
Systematic definitions of elite are few and far between not only in our field,
but also in many works of historical sociology and the various branches of his-
tory.²¹ In part, this is due to a lack of precision regarding the term and the ana-
lytical category of elite.²² This is aptly summarized in a well-known quote by the
political scientist George Marcus:
Clear in what it signifies but ambiguous as to its precise referents, the concept of elite in
general usage has a certain force; it locates agency in social events, by evoking the
image of a ruling, controlling few, while being intractably vague.²³
However, the vagueness of the term can also be viewed as an advantage:
Indeed, the notion of “elite” is often deliberately used because it is a vague one. Usually it
does not become really clear what the term exactly denotes and this gives the historian the
liberty to define it exactly as she or he wants to or, as is regrettably often the case, not to
define it at all.²⁴
Another advantage of employing the term elite to delineate socially dominant
groups is that it can be used across all levels of the social hierarchy,²⁵ highlight-
ing similarities between structures and processes that otherwise seem very differ-
ent.
Finally, it appears that elite has superseded, although not entirely replaced,
the other terms discussed above in the academic discourse of the last 30 years.²⁶
The Theoretical Study of Elites
Having decided to use the term elite, our first step towards a conceptualization of
early Islamic elites was a foray into the social sciences. The study of elites has
been a well-established field within the disciplines of sociology, political sci-
ence, psychology, and related subjects for about a century. Much of what has
 Zetterberg 1968, 8.
 Dreyer/Mittag 2011, 9– 10.
 Gunn 2007, 191.
 Marcus 1983, 7.
 Dumolyn 2013, 3. See also Settipani 2006, 14.
 Wickham 2004, 285; Couperus et al. 2004, x-xi.
 Dumolyn 2013, 4; Gunn 2007, 198.
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been done in that regard is not particularly useful for or applicable to early Is-
lamic history, as many theories were advanced on the basis of research into
the emerging elites of 18th- to early 20th-century European history. In fact, the
term elite appeared in Western social and political thought only in the late 19th
century: “the notion of elite is an academic and post-hoc construction. There
is little evidence that historically people have thought of themselves as members
of an elite per se.”²⁷ We cannot therefore simply impose definitions of elites de-
rived from the social sciences onto our own field of history.
Since antiquity, there have been discussions of social and moral distinction,
and the concept of elite (if not the term itself) is sometimes traced as far back as
Plato.²⁸ Its systematic development into a number of theoretical frameworks is
based in modern sociology, namely the works of Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano
Mosca, Max Weber, and C. Wright Mills (to mention some of the most prominent
early theoreticians). The conceptualization of modern sociological elite theory
developed in the 19th century in the aftermath of the social upheaval caused
by the French Revolution, in dialogue with and as a counterparadigm to Marx-
ism.²⁹
At the core of the sociological elite theories developed by 19th-century schol-
ars lies the assumption that elite rule is inevitable. Rather than economics and
class-like collectivities, it is elite choices and power competitions, and thus to a
certain degree the wider social order, that determine politics: “in the elite para-
digm… tiny but powerful minorities are made up of autonomous social and po-
litical actors who are interested in maintaining and enhancing their power.”³⁰
Since the early 20th century, an increasing number of sociologists have con-
tributed to the conceptualization of elites. Vilfredo Pareto distinguishes between
governing and non-governing elites. He further separates governing elites into
those who dominate by force and those who dominate by skills and persuasion.
In a number of works, the first of which was published in 1901,³¹ Pareto puts re-
gime change down to the “circulation of elites” as new elites constantly arise to
take the old elite’s place.³² His elite theory does not provide criteria of measuring
 Gunn 2007, 196.
 Dartmann et al. 2015, 37; Daloz 2010, 7–13.
 Dartmann et al. 2015, 37; Gunn 2007, 191–192.
 Higley/Pakulski 2012, 321.
 Pareto 1968.
 For Pareto, regime change does not occur because rulers are overthrown from below, but be-
cause one ruling elite replaces another. The functioning of elite and society depends on a con-
stant circulation of elites. Elite groups decline, degenerate, and die, decaying in numbers as well
as quality. This creates room for the entry of new elements from other parts of society, and the
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and distinguishing the superior qualities of its subjects, and it should be noted
that Pareto, though often reduced to his interest in elites, was mainly concerned
with social behavior.³³
In his 1939 book Ruling Class, Gaetano Mosca stresses the material condi-
tions as well as the intellectual and moral superiority of the ruling elite.³⁴ He
also points out the organizational skills that enabled elites to gain political
power. For Mosca, elite status is not hereditary in nature, but attainable by all
classes. Legitimizing the power of (governing) elites and constructing ideological
foundations to defend their rule thus forms an important part of Mosca’s work.³⁵
Max Weber does not use the term elite himself. He does refer to “leaders”
(Herren, Herrscher), their (administrative) “staff” ([Verwaltungs‐]Stab), and “rul-
ing minorities” as the apex of a bureaucratized state apparatus. Like many elite
theorists, Weber is concerned with effective governance. Through his focus on
power concentration and legitimacy of rule (closely related to mass consent)
he stresses the advantage of small numbers as an attribute of dominant groups.
A ruling minority, according to Weber, can communicate rapidly to organize its
own defense. Furthermore, it has the advantage of being able to keep its knowl-
edge, intentions, and decisions secret.³⁶ Authorized elites gain autonomy, which
is necessary for rational, consistent, and responsible ruling.Weber’s analyses of
the structure, integration, and dynamics of these ruling minorities and their mo-
nopoly on legitimate power have greatly influenced elite research and theory.
Additionally, his concepts of power and domination (through control exerted
mainly in the economic sphere and/or by virtue of authority) have become a fun-
damental pillar of current elite theories. They anticipate the work of those con-
temporary elite theorists who focus on elite structures, modern nation-state
based elites, elite integration, and ruling consensus.³⁷
After the Second World War, the concept of elites was developed further by
C. Wright Mills and other American scholars, who used the concept to criticize
the state of American democracy. In his book The Power Elite (1956), Mills dem-
onstrates the entanglement of interests of different elite groups in American so-
“circulation of elites” is set in motion. Only constant exchange and circulation between the gov-
erning elite and the governed society can ensure the rise of new elites capable of governing ac-
cording to the developing needs of that society and thus providing social stability. For a detailed
overview, see Kolegar 1967.
 López 2013, 2; Van Renterghem 2004, 75.
 Mosca 1939.
 Endruweit 1979, 38–39, 41–42.
 Weber 1922, 603–612.
 Pakulski 2012, 39–44.
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ciety. He describes the resulting power elite as consisting of “those political, eco-
nomic, and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share
decisions having at least national consequences.”³⁸ He does not regard the
power elite as one homogenous group, as factions and conflicts of interests do
exist. Nevertheless, the internal discipline and community of interest of the
power elite is more powerful than the divisions among them.³⁹ Whether or not
the members of the power elite make decisions is less important than their po-
tential to do so, due to their command of the major hierarchies and organizations
of society.⁴⁰
Since the mid-20th century, the literature on elites has grown exponentially in
the social sciences and in adjacent fields like history. The 1970s and 1980s saw a
debate in social history regarding whether class or elite was a more useful con-
cept, with the former often predominant. Historians came to different conclu-
sions regarding the nature of the political ruling class compared to the relative
power of wealthy groups like landowners or industrial magnates. These differen-
ces often turned on possession of wealth versus possession of office. However,
the period in question “also saw an increasingly self-conscious effort in urban
social history to bring the elite model and the class model into a more fruitful
rapprochement.”⁴¹
The conceptualizations and definitions of elite groups developed over the
past century vary greatly. Almost all theorists agree that the elite is a minority
consisting of those members of a social system who due to selective criteria con-
sider themselves superior to others and/or are considered superior by others.⁴²
Determining the nature of the selective criteria used heavily depends on the re-
searcher’s focus and approach. Function, moral qualities, or merits and achieve-
ments are just some of the possible elite characteristics considered.⁴³ Pareto’s
and Mosca’s theories, for instance, can both be classified as a positional ap-
proach, as they are mainly focused on status-based elites, i.e. elite status as de-
termined by one’s position within the socio-economic structures of a given soci-
ety. As the title of his main work implies, C.Wright Mill’s concept of elite follows
a power approach.Weber’s theory of socially dominant groups can be described
 Mills 2000, 18. See also Horowitz 1981, 376.
 Mills 2000, 283.
 Mills 2000, 286.
 Gunn 2007, 193.
 Endruweit 1979, 34.
 See e.g. Endruweit 1979, 36–37.
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as a functional approach, where elites are defined by their ability to preserve,
shape, and/or re-shape a social context.⁴⁴
Studying Elites in an Early Islamic Context
An analysis of the use of the term elite in book and paper titles in the Index Is-
lamicus, our field’s most important bibliographical database, shows that the
term elite came into vogue in the 1960s. However, it only took root in studies
on pre-16th-century Islamic history in the late 1990s (see Fig. 1). Of course this
does not mean that elites were not the focus of research prior to the 1990s.
Other terms were used instead to convey similar concepts, but since the 1990s
elite has become the main paradigm employed.⁴⁵
When previous research on early Islamic elites is more closely examined, the
first observation is that even in cases where the term elite is used, a theoretical
framework for it is often missing. This is no surprise: in comparison with Roman,
Greek, or medieval European history, Islamic history generally has only recently
begun to apply a theoretical framework to its work. This is partly due to the fact
that our discipline is very young compared to those fields and still lacks much
basic groundwork. Many sources (manuscripts, inscriptions, papyri) remain un-
edited or even unknown, most subjects have been studied only superficially,⁴⁶
and research tools indispensable in other fields are lacking in ours.⁴⁷ A second,
related problem is that the relevant theoretical frameworks and methodologies
have been developed within European milieus and are often not easily translated
to other contexts. Moreover, much of early elite research in our field was based
on the study of biographical dictionaries, producing work over-focused on reli-
gious scholars.⁴⁸
 Endruweit 1979, 38–39, 43–44.
 For example, in his famous pioneering study on the urban elite of Nishapur Richard Bulliet
decided against the use of the term elite. In his view the term does not “convey the important
concept of heredity that characterized the group” (Bulliet 1972, 20). He opted instead for ‘patri-
cians’.
 For example, Almut Höfert states that the catalogue of the library of the University of Basel
contains about 52 biographies of Charlemagne, while for the fifth Umayyad caliph ʿAbd al-Malik
b. Marwān only one biography exists (Höfert 2015, 60).
 For the study of elites, for instance, we lack onomastica and (diachronic and synchronic)
lists of functionaries, the basic tools of the study of elites in the Roman world.
 In Roy Mottahedeh’s words: “Ulamalogy is a noble science—at least we have to think so, be-
cause it is almost all the Islamic social history we will ever have.” (Mottahedeh 1975, 495.)
28 Hannah-Lena Hagemann, Katharina Mewes & Peter Verkinderen
The 1999 workshop on elites in the Byzantine and early Islamic Near East at
the University of Birmingham marks an important turning point in the history of
the study of early Islamic elites. The proceedings, which were edited by John Hal-
don and Lawrence Conrad and published in 2004,⁴⁹ contain a good overview of
the state of the subject at that point in time and a number of important case
studies. Both Haldon’s introduction and Chris Wickham’s conclusion provide a
valuable first attempt to place the study of elites in early Islamic history within
a theoretical framework.
Since then, a substantial amount of research has been conducted on early
Islamic elites of different types. Military, political, judiciary, religious, intellectu-
al,⁵⁰ Jewish and Christian,⁵¹ court, urban, and local elites⁵² have been the subject
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Fig. 1: Analysis of titles of articles and books from 1945–2015 listed in the Index Islamicus that
have “elite” in the title. The red columns mark the titles of studies that focus on pre-16th-century
history.
 Haldon/Conrad 2004.
 E.g. Kennedy 1981; Toru/Philips 2000; Van Steenbergen 2005; Hirschler 2008; Lev 2007;
Ahmed 2011; El Hour 2012; Nef 2004; Christys 2018.
 E.g. Payne 2015, 5–32.
 E.g. Fuess/Hartung 2011; Durand-Guédy 2010; Preiser-Kapeller 2018.
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lifestyles, sources of income,⁵³ and intra-elite social processes have all been
studied.
Unfortunately, most of these studies are thin on theory and conceptualiza-
tion. It remains to be seen whether the few meaningful exceptions will signifi-
cantly impact future scholarship in our field.⁵⁴ Concepts like ‘the ʿulamāʾ’, ‘the
army’, or ‘the political ruling class’ are often used as though they are self-explan-
atory and as though they self-evidently represent the only or primary elite of
early Islam. All too often the term elite is used in the singular, implying the ex-
istence of a single, somehow unified upper class.
Definitions
As discussed in the preceding section, one of the reasons we chose the term
elites is that it is relatively neutral compared to other designations. We must
now clearly outline our understanding of what it covers and the contexts in
which it is applied.
We define elites in the context of the early Islamic Empire as individuals and
groups of individuals who were in a position or had the potential to influence
social, political, economic, and religious processes and decision-making in
their communities. These communities existed on every level of organization,
from the village to the court, the Church to the army, and merchants to qāḍīs.
They gained influence through a combination of some or all of the following re-
sources:
– Ancestry (including [constructions of] ethnic, tribal, and family affiliation)
– Exceptional personal qualities (such as charisma, intelligence, strength, or
poetical/musical talent)





– Personal relations (retainers, clients, supporters, patronage, marriage pat-
terns)
 E.g. Kennedy 2011, 54–79.
 E.g. Van Renterghem 2004; Paul 1996; Paul 2016.
30 Hannah-Lena Hagemann, Katharina Mewes & Peter Verkinderen
We consider the first two criteria ‘internal factors’, not bestowed by outside
forces but inherent to an individual. The remaining resources we consider ‘exter-
nal’, in the sense that an individual would need the support or patronage of oth-
ers to achieve access to them.
The boundaries between these categories are not absolute, of course. The in-
tegration of an individual or a group into a more prestigious tribal faction, for
example, could improve access to other resources. Poetical talent needed to be
discovered, fostered, and honed, which almost always required the input of
teachers. Conversely, one could argue that being born into a wealthy family or
a family of scholars provided an individual with automatic access to these re-
sources. Nevertheless, we believe the difference between these two kinds of re-
sources significant enough to justify a formal distinction.
The above resources correspond roughly to what Mann calls the “sources of
social power”⁵⁵ and Bourdieu “types of capital” in his “field theory”⁵⁶ of interac-
tion between social actors. Resources are almost always interdependent, and ac-
cess to one usually facilitates access to others. Attaining them provides an indi-
vidual with access to networks and bestows status and privileges, consolidating
and advancing (potential) ability to influence processes and decision-making.
Status is a multifaceted concept, and it is often futile to attempt to boil down
each individual’s claim to elite status to one main factor. In one sense, it corre-
sponds to Bourdieu’s notion of “symbolic capital”, which is determined by how
other social actors perceive different types of capital (economic, political, etc.) in
an individual or a group. In our conceptualization of elites, such capital, whether
ideological or symbolic, is thus considered to derive from the basic resources just
mentioned. It is not a resource in and of itself. This is closely related to the issue
of representation. Elites do not legitimize themselves. They claim legitimacy on
the basis of a number of criteria such as descent or wealth. Bourdieu stresses
that elites use “taste” (in music, literature, food, clothing, etc.) and lifestyle as
a way to distinguish themselves from non-elites. The acceptance of the superior-
ity of these preferences by subordinate groups he considers a form of symbolic
violence.⁵⁷ This brings up an important point: whether or not elite status is be-
stowed depends on its acceptance by the target audience. Status is thus always
a process of (asymmetric) negotiation: “elites should be viewed not only as the
product of struggles between elites (Pareto’s ‘circulation’), but also a product of
 Mann 1986.
 Bourdieu 1979, 1986.
 Bourdieu 1979.
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struggles about the definition of eliteness, about what came to count as ‘elite’ at
any given historical juncture.”⁵⁸
We specifically stress both the vertical and the horizontal heterogeneity of
elites. Village elites often had very little standing in the next big city; urban no-
tables did not necessarily enjoy elite status at the caliphal court. Dorotheos of
Gaza, a 6th-century Christian monk, once remarked that a man who was a leader
in Gaza would be a lesser figure in Caesarea, a peasant in Antioch, and in Con-
stantinople a poor man.⁵⁹ Elites are thus not internally egalitarian, but can be
highly stratified.⁶⁰
On the other hand, several different elite groups could exist at the same level
of organization.⁶¹ A city or province, for example, will have many more or less
distinct groups claiming elite status, such as religious authorities (of all denomi-
nations), office holders (e.g. leaders of the army or armed forces; qāḍīs), and
economically dominant actors (e.g. landowners; rich merchants). There could
be and often was some overlap between the different elite groups.⁶² Moreover,
individuals could be part of more than one elite group or move from one elite
segment to another. One example is Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, the famous
‘Ḥanafī’ jurist: he was born into a prosperous family as the son of a military of-
ficer, but chose a religious career in the course of which he rose to the top of the
intellectual elite thanks to his erudition. This granted him access to official state
positions, and he was appointed as qāḍī of the caliphal capital al-Raqqa, with
direct access to Hārūn al-Rashīd.⁶³
It is thus important to recognize that “elites themselves were mobile and per-
meable, not the separate monoliths of sociological imagination.”⁶⁴ As indicated
in the introduction to this paper, we should view a pre-modern society in partic-
ular as:
…a fluid social space rather than as [a] fixed structure or hierarchy, in which individuals
and groups were in constant movement relative to others…[remembering] the porousness
 Gunn 2007, 200–201. See also Tacoma 2006, 159.
 Quoted in Wickham 2004, 285. See also Fox 2014, 52.
 Tacoma 2006, 13.
 See also Gunn 2007, 199.
 Couperus et al. 2007, xi.
 See also the example of Augustine of Hippo as described in Wickham 2004, 285, and the col-
lection of studies on local elites under Hellenistic kings in Dreyer/Mittag 2011, 290.
 Gunn 2007, 199.
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of the boundaries that divided elites from one another and the often fragmentary nature of
their networks.⁶⁵
We believe that a relatively wide definition of elite is necessary to indicate that
while the local contexts of different elites, and thus of their formation, develop-
ment, and functions, might vary, the underlying structures and patterns that gov-
ern elites are very similar. Finally, when talking about elite actors in the early Is-
lamic Empire, we will use the term in its plural form to emphasize the diversity
and complexity of early Islamic social structures and to acknowledge that the
term refers to very different social and historical contexts.⁶⁶
Operationalizing the Term Elite for Early Islamic History
The study of elites is of course based on the investigation of people. However, the
question of which people fall under this definition is far from straightforward.
The major issue of research on elites, and historical elites in particular, is selec-
tion.Which groups and actors are considered elites and selected for study? How
are defining characteristics such as power and influence displayed in the sour-
ces? Is an empirical study of these characteristics possible at all? What we
need to keep in mind is that definitions and categories “are not intrinsic to nar-
rative” but imposed by the researcher.⁶⁷ The selection and definition of elites
thus says as much about the scholar as it does about their subjects of study
and sources. Scholars need to be aware of how their own beliefs and theories
shape these very subjects of study:
In most cases, however, the target group is not a group in the sociological sense… The
group is created and analysed by the researcher himself, e.g. the power elite, the marginals,
the migrants etc. This is no problem as such but one has to avoid turning the target group
into a social group in itself with a distinctive characteristic and ‘group solidarity’.⁶⁸
Closely connected to the question of which groups and individuals should be
considered elites is the complex issue of how far to extend the boundaries of
 Gunn 2007, 199. Gunn is referring to urban Victorian societies, but his remarks certainly
apply to (pre-modern) societies in general. See also Tacoma 2006, 158– 160 (on the concept
of “cyclical mobility”), 271.
 Dumolyn 2013, 8; Bériou/Carraz 2015, 373.
 Robinson 2003, 57.
 Verboven et al. 2007, 51.
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an elite group. If we study office holding as a criterion of elite membership, for
example, should we investigate all office holders from the qāḍī l-quḍāt to local
prison administrators? What about prominent families; did all ʿAlids by virtue of
their claim to Prophetic descent possess elite status, regardless of their actual
status and real living conditions? Can we consider all Arab tribesmen of the con-
quest period to constitute one elite? How do we approach mawālī whose patrons
fulfilled the criteria just specified: does or should elite status extend to them?
Most often, context is the deciding factor in answering these questions.With-
in the framework of our project, we are primarily interested in those who were
based in our five key provinces and in a position to at least potentially influence
the political dimension of the empire. This influence could exist because they
held offices in the state apparatus or because the influence they exerted over
their communities had an effect on the functioning of the empire at the local,
regional, and/or imperial level. Rebels and non-Muslims are explicitly included
as potential elites.We investigate questions of loyalty and are especially interest-
ed in the reciprocal dynamics between the empire and its elites: to what extent
did the imperial level rely on regional elites? How important was imperial sup-
port for local and regional elites? What role did factors like kinship play in gain-
ing and maintaining elite status?
There are other difficulties involved in studying pre-modern Islamic elites.
As all historians of early Islam are very much aware, the sources at our disposal
can make the study of people and events somewhat difficult. Except for the high-
est positions in provincial administration, they provide information for only a
fraction of the people and groups we are interested in regarding our provinces.
Even on the highest level, that of the governor, surviving information is by no
means complete.⁶⁹ Moreover, certain groups, especially non-Muslims, hardly ap-
pear in the Muslim sources.
The project takes a prosopographical approach, which is well adapted to
dealing with scarce data: we focus on individuals, but also try to discern patterns
that give insight into phenomena that transcend individual lives. This is not to
say that all tax collectors, landowners, or army commanders will be treated as
coherent groups. Moreover, there is of course concern about generalizing pat-
terns from very incomplete information on far-from-complete samples: research
on the qāḍīs of three cities in the Jazīra, for instance, has revealed that the iden-
tified office holders sometimes differed significantly in terms of background, ed-
ucation, access to professional and official networks, and/or standing in their
 See e.g. the study of governors of al-Shām and Fārs by Simon Gundelfinger and Peter Ver-
kinderen in this volume.
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communities, to name just a few aspects.⁷⁰ Similar concerns apply to so-called
social categories like slaves or mawālī.⁷¹ However, we do think it is possible to
detect patterns that transcend the individual level, and this is borne out by
the evidence. Clear patterns can be discerned between the Jazīran cities regard-
ing the backgrounds of appointees, although they are at least in this case tied to
specific locations. Furthermore, while the Jazīran qāḍīs mentioned earlier all dif-
fered in their level of education and social mobility, almost all of them trained as
ḥadīth scholars before taking office.
Our investigations of the relevant individuals and groups also vary from
province to province. Ifrīqiya, with its Berber population, Ibāḍī rulers, and
heavy involvement in the slave trade, requires a different approach than, for in-
stance, the Jazīra or al-Shām, with their prominent Christian elites and more no-
ticeable state presence. Needless to say, each key province also has its own
source base, which we attempt to widen as much as possible. For example,
Ahmad Khan studied elites in the province of Khurāsān. His work is partially
based on a small but crucial corpus of documentary sources from 8th-century
Khurāsān. These documents pertain to a limited range of regions within the
province of Khurāsān, but they nevertheless provide fascinating and (most im-
portantly) direct and reliable insight into the workings of the early Islamic Em-
pire and the mobility of elites in a remote region.⁷²
Other regions boast a different set of sources. Christian works are a major
asset for the study of the early Islamic Jazīra and al-Shām. They offer a look at
administrative and legal structures that were parallel to and sometimes intersect-
ed with the caliphal state.⁷³ Just as significantly, Christian chronicles can also
serve as repositories of otherwise forgotten details of early Islamic history. The
local Arab lords that effectively controlled a considerable area of the Jazīra in
the 9th century appear on a few coins from Northern Mesopotamia, but we
have to turn to Bar Hebraeus (d. 1286) and Elias of Nisibis (d. 1046) for informa-
tion on their identity, actions, motivations, and ultimate fate. In Fārs, local lords
and Kurdish chieftains played an important role, but they are rarely mentioned
in the Islamic sources.We make an extra effort to thoroughly study the few that
are attested, following the example of Jürgen Paul’s investigation of Muḥammad
b. Wāṣil in his contribution to this volume. Ultimately, we seek not only to ex-
 See Hannah-Lena Hagemann’s contribution to this volume.
 The meaning of the term mawālī is controversial, in both primary sources and scholarship.
For an introductory discussion, see EI3, “Client” (J. Nawas) and the references listed there.
 See Ahmad Khan’s contribution to this volume.
 See Philip Wood’s contribution to this volume.
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pand the usual source base, but also to push the standard Muslim sources and
tease out information on underrepresented and understudied groups.
Studying Early Islamic Elites
There are many different ways of studying early Islamic elites. Due primarily to
the nature of our sources, the methods most commonly used are prosopography
and biography. Recent examples of the application of these methods can be
found in Asad Ahmed’s or Teresa Bernheimer’s research on genealogy and mar-
riage patterns and Van Renterghem’s study of Baghdādī elites in the Seljuk peri-
od. Within our own project, we are in the process of building up a database of
early Islamic personnel that will be made available to the public once the project
finishes.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, a complete ethnography of the empire or a full proso-
pography is not possible, as such a task requires more evenly-distributed bio-
graphical data than historians of early Islamic history have at their disposal.
Network analysis is another promising approach slowly being added to the
methodological toolkit of early Islamic history. It has yielded fascinating results
in neighboring disciplines such as Byzantine Studies and medieval European
history; Johannes Preiser-Kapeller has published most extensively on the use
of network analysis in Roman and Byzantine history.⁷⁵
Finally, the Digital Humanities have already provided many useful tools that
can be adapted to the study of early Islamic elites.⁷⁶ The groundbreaking work of
Maxim Romanov and the KITAB project led by Sarah Bowen-Savant have the po-
tential to give fresh impetus to researchers seeking new ways of understanding
the history of the early Islamic world.⁷⁷
To use our own work as an example, the most important issues concern the
selection of individuals to be studied and the kind of information we seek. Indi-
viduals and groups are chosen in a variety of ways. We look for all the incum-
 Beginning in the 1990s, similar databases were set up by a few other scholars, most notably
by Michael Lecker for his ongoing Jerusalem Prosopography Project (JPP), and by John Nawas
and Monique Bernards within the framework of the Netherlands Ulama Project (NUP; 1994–
2000). The former database is partially accessible to the public, but to our knowledge the latter
cannot be accessed. For more information on JPP, go to http://micro5.mscc.huji.ac.il:81/JPP/
homepage/ (last accessed 31 July 2018). On the Netherlands Ulama Project, see Nawas 1998.
 See Preiser-Kapeller 2012 and 2015.
 For an example of the use of digital tools within our own project, see Haro Peralta/Verkin-
deren 2016.
 See Romanov 2013; http://maximromanov.github.io; http://kitab-project.org (last accessed
31 July 2018).
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bents of certain offices discoverable in written and material sources (such as coin
collections). Using Jedli, the digital tool we developed for this project, we also
search for names and offices connected to certain places in our provinces.⁷⁸
On the basis of the lists thus compiled, we look for all the relevant contacts
of our chosen individuals to further expand our collection of early Islamic elites.
The primary features we investigate are family background, including the social
and professional careers of family members; social, geographical, and professio-
nal mobility including marriage patterns; education; networks of patronage,
commerce, religion, and so forth; and office holding and the tasks associated
with exercising said office(s). We are less interested in representations of elite
status in written and material culture. The question of representation is of course
not a purely literary issue independent from social practice, but as it is one of the
few reasonably well studied aspects of early Islamic elites we instead focus on
the features listed above.⁷⁹
One subject we are particularly interested in is that of changing elites. The
classic example is the military elite on the imperial level. Initially the military
consisted mostly of Arab tribesmen, who in the wake of the ʿAbbāsid revolution
were largely replaced by Khurāsānians, who were in turn superseded by Central
Asian (‘Turkish’) elites. We seek to detect similar structural changes on the pro-
vincial or local level of the empire that might or might not mirror developments
on the imperial plane. These can differ from region to region. In order to study
elite groups on these different levels, we use a rough classification of local, re-
gional, and transregional elites.
Under local elites, we subsume all those whose power, influence, and con-
tacts were mostly concentrated on the level of their own city or rural area. We
are forced to focus mostly on urban elites in the provincial cities, since with
few exceptions data on rural contexts is unfortunately scant for our regions.
As outlined in Hannah-Lena Hagemann’s contribution, a good example of this
type of elite are the qāḍīs of Ḥarrān, most of whom came from Ḥarrānī families
and were deeply involved in the network of ḥadīth transmitters in their city. The
ancestors and descendants of many of them can be shown to have been active in
Ḥarrān, but most of these qāḍīs are not attested to very far outside the city as
holding offices or pursuing education or trade. A clear-cut distinction between
the urban and the rural contexts does not exist, of course. Landlords often
lived in the city, but their influence certainly extended at least to their city’s hin-
 On Jedli, see Haro Peralta/Verkinderen 2016. To download Jedli, go to our website at https://
www.islamic-empire.uni-hamburg.de/en/publications-tools/digital-tools/jedli.html.
 See Genequand 2006; Fuess/Hartung 2011.
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terland. Nevertheless, our information on the rural population is very limited.
There are other difficult questions: how long did one have to have lived in one
place to count as local? How did the imperial administration, for example, iden-
tify local elites?⁸⁰ These and other issues mostly have to be investigated on a
case-by-case basis.
We call regional elites those whose influence was not limited to one specific
urban or rural area, but whose remit still did not spread far beyond the horizon
of the province (in our understanding, the province is the organizational form of
the region). This type of elite is exemplified by the figure of Muḥammad b.Wāṣil.
He belonged to a family of Arab immigrants in Fārs who had been settled there
for many generations. There they built up a regional power base, eventually con-
trolling about one third of the regional kharāj. Muḥammad b.Wāṣil stepped in to
fill a power vacuum in Fārs in the Samarran period, but never attempted to
spread his influence to other regions.⁸¹ It is often difficult to distinguish clearly
between local and regional elites, and indeed significant overlap between the
two was the norm.⁸²
Elites active in more than one province are called transregional elites. This
transregionality can be expressed in three major ways: transregional mobility
(e.g. Ibāḍī traders with bases in Baṣra and Ifrīqiya⁸³); transregional influence
(e.g. Muslim scholars with influence in different regions, though this did not
necessarily mean they were very mobile themselves—see figures such as
Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal); and transregional power (e.g. super-governors who headed
more than one province at the same time).
These terms—like the realities they describe—are very fluid and can be used
for both elite groups and individuals. It was possible to move between these dif-
ferent elite levels. For instance, the Aghlabids started out as a transregional elite,
but once entrenched in Ifrīqiya they became a regional one.
Conclusion
The paper at hand has suggested how early Islamic elites can be studied and
provided an overview of the difficulties involved in this pursuit. It aimed to illus-
trate some of the important questions that need to be asked and the ways in
 On problems concerning the study of local elites, see Dreyer/Mittag 2011, 7– 10.
 See Jürgen Paul’s contribution to this volume.
 For an example of the intertwined nature of local and regional elites in late antique Egypt,
see Tacoma 2006, 115– 116, 141, 149.
 See Cyrille Aillet’s contribution to this volume.
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which our sources can best be exploited in order to investigate socially dominant
groups within the early Islamic Empire. It also sought to draw attention to the
crucial need for terminology and definitions. We opted for the term elite, but
what matters is not so much what term is used but that its meaning within a par-
ticular research context is clearly defined. This is particularly important because
of the diversity of elite groups over both time and space, along a vertical and hor-
izontal continuum of social hierarchy.
Much of this paper has turned on questions of terminology, definitions, the-
ories, and concepts. These are rather dry subjects, and not least because of that
many historians are reluctant to make use of theories developed in other disci-
plines. Indeed, why use theory at all in historical research?
First and foremost, theory provides historians with a common language and
vocabulary. The point here is not for all historians to arrive at an absolute theo-
retical consensus—that will remain impossible. But historical sociology, for ex-
ample, offers models that might allow researchers to understand each other bet-
ter and facilitate larger comparative studies. It is not even necessary to agree on
the use of specific terms: one scholar’s patricians might be another’s notables
and yet another’s urban elite. However, an exchange on the subject of theory
can help specify and stabilize the contents of the terms we all use. This is partic-
ularly true in our field of early Islamic history, which is nowhere near establish-
ing a more or less coherent vocabulary of empire and elites. Comparability is an-
other factor. Often, historians insist on the uniqueness of the historical contexts
they investigate.While that is certainly true to an extent, some of this emphasis
on uniqueness is due to the fact that researchers are put off comparative work in
part by seemingly different terminology that in reality often describes similar
structures and processes.
Another reason why it makes good sense to engage with theory—and not just
when discussing elites—became obvious in the process of writing this paper. As
Mann puts it, “a strong sense of theory enables us to decide what might be the
key facts, what might be central and what marginal to an understanding of how
a particular society works.”⁸⁴ Just as importantly, we have to systematically con-
front our own preconceptions regarding the nature of the early Islamic Empire
and its elites: “If historians eschew theory of how societies operate, they impris-
on themselves in the commonsense notions of their own society.”⁸⁵
Finally, developing theoretical approaches within (early) Islamic Studies
does not only improve our understanding of (early) Islamic history, but also fos-
 Mann 1986, vii.
 Mann 1986, vii.
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ters a dialogue between our field and other disciplines such as Roman and By-
zantine Studies, Chinese and Indian Studies, ethnology, historical sociology, and
anthropology. Instead of isolating itself (from the field of history in particular)
with assertions of uniqueness,⁸⁶ Islamic history can thus fully participate in
the fruitful exchange of interdisciplinary research.
Nevertheless, despite the importance of a theoretical framework, it is of
course equally necessary for historians to build theories from the ground up,
basing ideas off their source material rather than simply imposing a model
upon their work. The great sociologist Michael Mann argues that this “zigzag-
ging” between data and theory is the only way to achieve a working and work-
able model of any historical society:
The real world (historical or contemporary) is messy and imperfectly documented; yet theo-
ry claims pattern and perfection. The match can never be exact. Too much scholarly atten-
tion to the facts makes one blind; too much listening to the rhythms of theory and world
history makes one deaf.⁸⁷
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Insult the Caliph, Marry al-Ḥasan, and
Redeem Your Kingdom: Freiheitsgrade of
Kindī Elites During the 7th to 9th Century
Abstract: This contribution aims to bring a tribal and provincial perspective to
the study of the early Islamic Empire. It begins with an exploration of the boun-
daries, functions and possible deployment of interpersonal networks formulated
in the terminology of common tribal affiliation during that period, building on
the author’s prosopographical study of the Arabic tribe (qabīla) of Kinda during
the first three generations of Islamic history. It then considers the perspective of
tribally founded elites, demonstrating and addressing their mainly local areas of
authority as compared to administrative structures founded on visions of central-
ized power. In its last part, this paper moves from a longue durée comparison of
the trajectories of families of different Kinda-affiliated tribal notables towards an
assessment of the sources of authority at the disposal of a tribally-based leader,
especially one in conflict with the central powers. On these three levels, this
paper aims to determine the amount of independence available to tribal elites
negotiating multiple roles. These roles included those of loyal provincial admin-
istrators, equal peers of global rulers and rebels contesting the legitimacy of the
early Islamic Empire’s ruling elites on a potentially apocalyptic scale.
Keywords: Prosopography; Kinda; tribe (qabīla); regional sources of authority;
early Islamic history
Among the words of the Prophet of God […] to the delegation of Kinda are the following:
God gave me the kingdom of Kinda, the fortresses of Ḥimyar and the treasures of the Per-
sian King and the Byzantines!¹
 Al-Hamdānī, al-Iklīl, 1, 66. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from Arabic are by the
author.
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Introduction
Two caveats must be stated at the outset of this article. First, it builds on a com-
prehensive prosopography of the Arabic tribe of Kinda established by reading,²
or at least perusing the tables of content and indices of,³ a wide array of Arabic
historiographical sources for the first three generations of Islamic history.⁴ All
were composed by authors who died before or around 350 H/962 CE. As a result,
the suggestions put forth here are firmly grounded regarding the tribe of Kinda
and the 1st century H/7th century CE, but become more tentative in character as
the source materials are supplemented with episodes from later periods.
The second caveat concerns the very concept of tribes and tribal elites. It has
fallen into disrepute over the last decades because of colonialist and culturist
usage. In this article, the term ‘tribe’ is used exclusively to designate the interper-
sonal network described as a qabīla in Arabic, connecting persons whose affili-
ation to this network is designated by means of a nisba or marker of tribal affili-
ation, as part of an individual’s names. This includes al-Kindī as well as the
nisba of subtribes such as al-Sakūnī, al-Saksakī and al-Tujībī. The individuals
so connected were in the course of the early Islamic conquests spread out
over the whole Islamic oecumene and seem to include all the trades and life-
styles early Muslims engaged in. In this context, ‘tribe’ does not indicate homo-
genous lifestyles or pejorative connotations. The word is used as a mechanical
selecting device, enabling the establishment of a broad prosopography spanning
a wide array of historical contexts, iconic episodes and historiographical sources
pertaining to the early Islamic world.
 Al-Azdī: Futūḥ al-Shām; al-Balādhurī: Ansāb al-ashrāf; Futūḥ al-buldān; Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam:
Futūḥ Miṣr wa-l-Maghrib; Ibn Aʿtham: Kitāb al-Futūḥ; Ibn Hishām: Al-Sīra al-nabawiyya; al-
Iṣfahānī: Maqātil al-Ṭālibiyyīn; Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ: Taʾrīkh; al-Kindī the Elder: Kitāb al-Wulāt
wa-l-quḍāt; al-Kindī the Younger: Faḍāʾil Miṣr; Naṣr b. Muzāḥim:Waqʿat Ṣiffīn; al-Ṭabarī:Taʾrīkh;
al-Wāqidī: Kitāb al-Maghāzī; Kitāb al-Ridda; al-Yaʿqūbī: Taʾrīkh.
 Abū Mikhnaf: Akhbār al-Mukhtār; Maqtal al-imām al-Ḥusayn; Abū Yūsuf: Kitāb al-Kharāj;
Agapius of Manbij / Maḥbūb al-Manbijī: Kitāb al-ʿUnwān; al-Azraqī: Akhbār Makka; al-Dīnawarī:
Akhbār al-ṭiwāl; Eutychius of Alexandria / Saʿīd b. al-Biṭrīq: Naẓm al-jawhar; al-Hamdānī: Kitāb
al-Iklīl; Ṣifat Jazīrat al-ʿArab; Ḥamza al-Iṣfahānī: Kitāb Taʾrīkh sinī mulūk al-arḍ wa-l-anbiyāʾ; Ibn
Ḥabīb: Kitāb al-Muḥabbar; Ibn Hishām: Kitāb al-Tījān; Ibn Saʿd: Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt; al-Iṣfahānī:
Kitāb al-Aghānī; al-Jahshiyārī: Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ wa-l-kuttāb; Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ: Kitāb al-Ṭaba-
qāt; al-Maqdisī: Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh; al-Masʿūdī: Akhbār al-zamān; Murūj al-dhahab; Al-
Tanbīh wa-l-ishrāf; Sayf b. ʿUmar: Kitāb al-Ridda wa-l-futūḥ wa-kitāb al-jamal wa-masīr ʿĀʾisha
wa-ʿAlī; al-Wāqidī: Futūḥ Bahnāsā; Futūḥ al-Shām.
 See Leube 2017.
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Boundaries and Functions of Tribally Formulated Networks
In the course of spirited polemical discussion sparked by Donner’s employment
of the ethnological fieldwork of Emrys Peters and others, with its concept of the
“segmentary lineage” supposedly underlying tribal structures in early Islamic
history,⁵ Lecker takes a skeptical stance regarding the utility of modern fieldwork
in reconstructing early Islamic conditions.
[…] it is possible that a camel can now carry the same load it could carry fourteen centuries
ago. But as regards the economic, social, and political aspects of life in ancient Arabia, we
have to rely, for the time being, on the evidence of the primary sources.⁶
Before embarking on a discussion of the possible modes in which early Islamic
Arab tribal networks could be employed by central and tribal elites, it is there-
fore a good idea to outline the structure and fixity of tribal affiliation as evinced
in the prosopography of Kinda.
Over the first three generations of Islamic history, affiliation to Kinda is often
expressed via a tribal nisba. The main instances in which individual affiliations
to Kinda (as opposed to another tribe) are ambiguous are those of the Egyptian
killers of the third caliph ʿUthmān and the fourth caliph ʿAlī. A contested Kindī
affiliation is given for Sūdān b. Ḥumrān,⁷ Kināna b. Bishr⁸ and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
 Donner 1981, passim and especially chapter 1, 11–49.
 Lecker 1989, xii.
 Sūdān b. Ḥumrān is designated as al-Sakūnī and therefore belonging to the Kindī subtribe of
al-Sakūn by Sayf b. ʿUmar, Ridda, 158, and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 248 and 745, and in the form of
Saʿd b. Ḥumrān al-Tujībī as belonging to the subtribe of al-Tujīb by al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 2, 380. He
is affiliated to the Madhḥijī subtribe of Murād by al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 4, 175, 184, 193 and 205;
Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 2, 203, 236, 238 and 246; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt 3, 47–48 and 54, and by al-
Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 761 and 775. An affiliation to the Ḥimyarī subtribe of the Banū dhū Aṣbaḥ
is given by al-Kindī,Wulāt, 17, where his name appears in the form of Sūdān b. Rūmān al-Aṣbaḥī,
and also in al-Maqrīzīs Khiṭaṭ according to footnote 5 of al-Kindī,Wulāt, 17, where he seems to be
called Sūdān b. Rayyān al-Aṣbaḥī. I have not been able to check this in the original. In al-Ṭabarī,
Taʾrīkh, 2, 248, a maximum of seven leaders of the rebellion against ʿUthmān are announced,
while eight names are given. One of these eight names is a certain Sawād b. Rūmān al-
Aṣbaḥī who is not mentioned anywhere else. This hapax legomenon may be explained as a du-
plicate of Sūdān b. Ḥumrān, who would accordingly have been affiliated to Ḥimyar in this nar-
rative as well. A further Aṣbaḥī is in this context mentioned by al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 775, as Nah-
rān al-Aṣbaḥī. He is also not mentioned elsewhere and can probably be explained as a duplicate
of Sūdān b. Ḥumrān.
 Kināna b. Bishr is identified as al-Kindī by al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 4, 205. He is affiliated to the
Kindī subtribe of al-Sakūn by al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 1, 49; 2, 219–220, and 4, 173. His affiliation to
the Kindī subtribe of al-Tujīb is mentioned by al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 1, 49; 2, 220; 4, 173– 174, 177,
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b. ʿUdays,⁹ who were implicated in the murder of the caliph ʿUthmān. It is also
given for the killer of ʿAlī commonly known as Ibn Muljam.¹⁰
As the deaths of these two rulers form iconic and contested moments in the
Islamic cultural memory of the first Islamic civil war, it is not altogether surpris-
ing to find the affiliation of the assassins contested as well. Statistically, the pro-
posed affiliations are summarized in Table 1, counting multiple affiliations via
nasab, ḥilf and ʿidād in the case of Ibn Muljam as separate complete affiliations
complete in themselves.
Table 1: Quantitative Distribution of Tribal Affiliations Alternating with Kinda
Name Kinda Ḥimyar Madhḥij Balī al-Layth
Sūdān b. Ḥumrān  (,%)  (,%)  (,%)
Kināna b. Bishr  (,%)  (,%)  (,%)
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUdays  (,%)  (,%)
Ibn Muljam  (,%)  (,%)  (,%)
While the variance in the tribal affiliations of these presumably well-known vil-
lains is certainly considerable, all remain within the sphere of Southern Arabic
tribes settling in Egypt after the early Islamic conquests. Otherwise, a Kindī af-
193 and 205; Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 2, 203, 211, and 213; al-Kindī, Wulāt, 17; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 745
and 775; and 3, 152. Differing affiliations are given for a Madhḥijī subtribe as al-Nakhaʿī by Ibn
Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 2, 236, and to al-Layth by Sayf b. ʿUmar, Ridda, 158.
 ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿUdays is only affiliated to Kinda via the subtribe of al-Tujīb by al-Ṭabarī,
Taʾrīkh, 2, 758, while being affiliated to Balī by al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 4, 174– 175 and 205; Ibn ʿAbd
al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 133– 134 and 337–338; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, 3, 47; al-Kindī,Wulāt, 17; al-Masʿūdī,
Murūj, 2, 380; Sayf b. ʿUmar, Ridda, 158; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 745, 751, 761, 766–767 and 787, and
al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 122.
 Ibn Muljam is called al-Murādī according to al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 2, 265; al-Dīnawarī, Akh-
bār, 197; Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 2, 255; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, 3, 24; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 193, and al-
Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 147.
In terms of multiple affiliations by nasab, ḥilf and ʿidād, the following versions are suggested:
min ḥimyar, while an ancestor fled to Murād according to al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 2, 259. Al-
ḥimyarī wa-ʿidāduhū fī murād wa-huwa ḥalīf banī jabala min kinda according to al-Balādhurī,
Ansāb, 2, 260. Al-murādī wa-huwa min ḥimyar wa-ʿidāduhū fī murād wa-huwa ḥalīf banī jabala
min kinda according to Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, 3, 25. Min murād, ʿidāduhū fī kinda by al-Iṣfahānī,
Maqātil, 32, and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 176. Min tujīb, ʿidāduhum fī murād by al-Masʿūdī, Murūj,
2, 457. Al-yaḥṣubī [subtribe of Ḥimyar: Caskel/Strenziok 1966, 2, 589] wa-ʿidāduhū fī murād ac-
cording to al-Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, 296. Finally, he is introduced as a ḥalīf of the Kindī subtribe of
al-Sakūn by al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 448.
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filiation is only contested in a handful of dispersed instances during the first
three generations of Islamic history.¹¹ Considering there are about 3,000 entries
for Kinda as a tribe and individuals affiliated to Kinda in the author’s prosopog-
raphy of this period, this handful of cases where affiliation is actually contested
or conflicted points to an impressive stability of tribal affiliation. Even in the con-
text of supra-tribal contingents of troops mobilized from two or more tribes typ-
ically living in the same vicinity, Kindīs continue to be identified as affiliated to
Kinda in their nisbas, rathern than to a supra-tribal entity combining Kinda and
its various partner-tribes in war.
As one nears the timeframe of the composition of the great collections of
early Islamic historiography, one would expect the percentage of disputed affili-
ations to further decrease in proportion to the decreasing formability of events in
the course of shorter periods of narrative transmission and embellishment. By
contrast, what does shift during the timeframe of the first three generations of
Islamic history is the particular level seen as relevant for tribal or subtribal affili-
ation and reference in the given nisba. In the case of Kinda, the most notable in-
stance of this phenomenon is the subtribe of al-Tujīb. This group mainly settled
in early Islamic Egypt. In the works of Egyptian historians such as Ibn ʿAbd al-
Ḥakam, their nisba is given as al-Tujībī, replacing the al-Kindī of more global Is-
lamic authors such as al-Ṭabarī. This trend of an increasingly independent Kindī
subtribe in Egypt and the Islamic West giving al-Tujīb as its tribal affiliation
seems to have increased during subsequent periods, as indicated by the dynasty
known as the Banū Tujīb which came to prominence during the later period of
Umayyad dominion over Islamic Spain in Catalayud and Zaragoza.
What are the functions pertaining to common tribal affiliation in the context
of Kinda as mentioned in the sources? It has already been argued that the supra-
tribal confederation of al-Yamaniyya, based on supposedly common South Ara-
 Mālik b. Hubayra is usually affiliated to the Kindī subtribe of al-Sakūn, but described as al-
Fazārī by Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, 127– 128 and 143. His nisba of al-Yashkurī in al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 3, 104,
is possibly a simple scribal error. Abū l-ʿAmarraṭa ʿUmayr b. Yazīd, a companion of the Kindī
ʿAlīd martyr Ḥujr b. ʿAdī, is usually described as al-Kindī (e.g. al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 3, 427–
428 and 441; and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 242–244), but affiliated to the tribe of Kalb as al-Kalbī
by al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, 17, 141. Al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays is in a single instance described as al-Kindī
by al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 3, 447, while elsewhere he is consistently called al-Fihrī. Zufar b. al-Ḥār-
ith is unanimously affiliated to the Banū Kilāb, but his supposed Kindī descent is mocked in
verses reported by al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 4, 382. Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, 7, 298, confesses that he is
not quite sure whether the Syrian transmitter of ḥadīth, Salama b. Nufayl, was affiliated to
Kinda or to Ḥaḍramawt. The possible Kindī descent of some of the pre-Islamic ancestors of a
group of clients of Quraysh in Mecca predates the timeframe of this paper and is therefore ex-
cluded from the present discussion.
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bic ancestry and usually including Kinda, was not as stable as later theories
would have us believe.¹² Additionally, this supra-tribal body does not seem to
have had a noticeable impact on events, as opposed to its near omnipresence
in rhetorical arguments reported by some historiographical sources.¹³ Other ex-
amples of supra-tribal cooperation between Kinda and other tribes are mainly
reported in the context of the mobilization of troops from Kufa during the first
three generations of Islamic history. These also appear unstable, as evinced by
the bewildering array of quarters, fifths and sixths enumerated in the sources,
which are frequently contradicted by the actual composition of Kufan troops. I
will accordingly now focus on the functions attached to common affiliation to
Kinda, rather than to some supra-tribal entity encompassing Kinda as well as
other tribes.
In his discussion of the role of Arab tribes in Egypt during the first three cen-
turies of Islamic history, al-Barrī describes the following fields in which tribal af-
filiation served as the main category of administration: the army,¹⁴ the organiza-
tion of the city quarters of al-Fusṭāṭ,¹⁵ the tribal list of the military administration
or dīwān,¹⁶ the organization of the spring pastures (murtabaʿ),¹⁷ the mosques¹⁸
and councils (majālis)¹⁹ of the tribes, the designation of a member of the tribe
responsible to the governor (ʿarīf)²⁰ and the appointment of a guardian inside
the tribal quarter.²¹ It is quite clear that these administrative functions were
part of interpersonal networks formulated in the terminology of common genea-
logical descent. They were also interdependent. Tribal contingents of the army
drew their pay as a group, were settled in common quarters and were mobilized
together. While the historical relevance of these networks during the period of
Muḥammad’s early successors is not as clear as their narrative importance in
the context of later Islamic cultural memory suggests, such tribal neighbor-
hood-networks are palpable from the time of the emerging Umayyads and
even seem to have outlasted the ascent of other networks that took away some
of their administrative importance.
 Caskel/Strenziok 1966, I, 33.
 Orthmann 2002, 287–292.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 282.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 283.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 283–285.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 285–286, based mainly on Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 286.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 286–287.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 287–288.
 Al-Barrī 1992, 288.
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Sketching the impact of common tribal affiliation in interactions beyond this
level of tribally organized neighborhood committees is not an easy task. Drawing
once again on the prosopography of Kinda, I will therefore discuss the circum-
stances of trans-regional cooperation between individuals affiliated to Kinda
as reported in the sources. The first type of cooperation between Kindīs from dif-
ferent regions that is presented as based on common tribal affiliation is the in-
tercession of Kindīs for members of their own tribe. Instances of such interces-
sions along Kindī tribal networks include the restitution of property²² and the
pardon of a captive²³ after the Battle of the Ḥarra. The latter case is especially
interesting since it is explicitly stated by al-Masʿūdī that the captive ʿAlī b. ʿAb-
dallāh b. al-ʿAbbās, the ancestor of the future ʿAbbāsid Caliphs, was pardoned
thanks to the intercession of his maternal uncles of the tribe of Kinda (akhwā-
luhū min Kinda)²⁴ and not due to the pleas of his Qurashī relatives. Probably
the clearest instance of such an intercession based solely on common tribal af-
filiation is reported in the following story:
ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAzīz al-Kindī rebelled [against the Umayyad governor in Iraq] and took his
little son Muḥammad with him… [When it became clear that the battle had been lost] he
called out: You people of Syria, is there anyone of Kinda among you? A number of men
went forward and answered: Yes, that’s us. He asked them: Take this your brother and
send him to your people in Kufa (ilā qawmikum bi-l-kūfa), for I am ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAzīz al-
Kindī! [After rejecting an offer to be personally spared, he fights alongside his comrades
until he dies.]²⁵
ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAzīz is obviously otherwise unrelated to his Syrian fellow Kindīs
and asks men who are strangers to him personally to return his son safely to
Kufa. This represents a clear instance of the employment of common tribal affili-
ation for trans-regional cooperation and cannot be explained by any other con-
nections between the personages involved.
An example of another way in which common tribal affiliations were acted
upon by Kindīs from different regions concerns the shelter given to the Egyptian
Ibn Muljam (as shown above, widely held to be affiliated to Kinda) by the leader
of Kinda in Kufa, al-Ashʿath b. Qays.²⁶ However, as al-Ashʿath and Ibn Muljam
 Al-Dīnawarī, Akhbār, 244.
 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 4, 10; Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 5, 299; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 3, 86, and al-
Masʿūdī, Tanbīh, 264.
 Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 3, 86.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 459.
 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 2, 262; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, 3, 26; al-Iṣfahānī, Maqātil, 33; al-Masʿūdī,
Murūj, 2, 458–459, and al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 147– 148.
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are among the most popular ‘villains’ of the first civil war, this sheltering of a
fellow tribesman abroad may also be explained from a narrative perspective
as a ‘logical addition’ ordering the otherwise quite complicated relationships be-
tween early Islamic ‘villains’ of the first civil war. As other trans-regional instan-
ces of interactions between Kindīs based on common tribal affiliation do not sur-
vive, this mode of trans-regional cooperation along tribal networks seems to
have been secondary in importance to the major role played by tribally formulat-
ed networks in the organization of local society, especially in garrison towns.
In conclusion, the tribal network of Kinda is surprisingly unambiguous in its
definition of Kindīness. The few cases where affiliation to Kinda is contested be-
long to early episodes of civil strife and may possibly be explained as the result
of a narrative shifting of blame over the course of transmission. The Kindīness so
defined serves mainly to facilitate mutually interdependent purposes of regional
administration and mobilization.
In contrast, instances of trans-regional utilization of tribal ties are few. Ac-
cordingly, the confrontation of the Kindīs of al-Shām and the Kindīs of Iraq dur-
ing the decisive phase of the Battle of Ṣiffīn can be seen less as an acute schism
in a closely-spun, interregional Kindī network relevant to the daily life of all of
its members, but rather as a traumatic manifestation of the regionalization of
Arab tribal networks some twenty years after the early Islamic conquests.²⁷
Foundations of Authority of Tribally Based Regional Elites
I will now examine the perspective of the families of Kindī elites and investigate
the origins of their authority. Following the research of Paul²⁸ and Franz²⁹, I pro-
pose to conceptualize locally based elites as negotiators between central author-
ities and local groups. Drawing once again on examples from the tribe of Kinda
but transcending the narrower focus of the first three generations of Islamic his-
tory contained in the systematic prosopography of Kinda, I will attempt to show
how claims to authority were maintained by the families of tribally based provin-
cial elites over several early Islamic generations.
The first case study of the foundation of the authority of provincial elites and
their integration in tribal networks is situated in early Islamic Egypt. Here, the
two most eminent Kindī families during the time of the Marwānid caliphs
 Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 3, 141, and Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 227.
 Paul 1996, passim.
 Franz 2007, passim.
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both claimed descent from heroes of the early Islamic conquests, namely Shur-
aḥbīl b. Ḥasana and Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj. Interestingly, these two founding fig-
ures of the families of Kindī aristocrats in Egypt came from diametrically op-
posed backgrounds. Shuraḥbīl grew up in Mecca as the son of a Kindī client
of Quraysh and appears to have been a close companion of Muḥammad, as
shown by his early. During the conquest of southern al-Shām he is depicted
as leading troops from tribes other than Kinda or, for that matter, Quraysh. Ac-
cordingly, his authority must have been based not on tribal backing but almost
solely on his ties to Muḥammad and his successors, the embodiment of central
Islamic authority. Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj, on the other hand, does not appear in the
vicinity of Muḥammad or his immediate successors and apparently owed his au-
thority solely to the backing of the Kindī troops he commanded during the early
Islamic conquests.
In the aftermath of the conquests, both Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj and the de-
scendants of Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana appear to have settled in Egypt. Several
sons of Shuraḥbīl are portrayed as owners of houses in al-Fusṭāṭ and leading fig-
ures among Egyptian ashrāf.³⁰ A house of Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj, also in al-Fusṭāṭ,
is mentioned by the historian al-Kindī as pulled down by political opponents
during the first civil war.³¹
Outside the context of their settlement in al-Fusṭāṭ, the sons of Shuraḥbīl re-
mained relatively obscure.³² Muʿāwiya, on the other hand, took an active role in
leading the Egyptian opposition to the returning killers of the third caliph ʿUth-
mān during the first civil war.³³ After moving out (kharaja) from the Egyptian gar-
rison town of al-Fusṭāṭ and calling for vengeance for the slain caliph, he and his
followers are described as ‘al-Khawārij’. This is the first chronological instance of
this designation in the source material evaluated for the prosopography of
Kinda.³⁴ Subsequently Muʿāwiya played a crucial role in the Sufyānid conquest
of Egypt.³⁵ Some years after the Sufyānid conquest of Egypt, he is reported to
have been appointed as its governor on the authority of al-Wāqidī and al-
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 135–136, 138.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 27.
 Only Rabīʿa b. Shuraḥbīl is mentioned in an isnād as reporting to his son Jaʿfar that his own
father Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana had bequeathed half his possessions to the caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭ-
ṭāb. See Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 175.
 E.g. al-Kindī, Wulāt, 18.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 145. Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 27 and 29, and al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 134, call the
supporters of Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj al-khārija.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 145. His deposition is reported by al-Ṭabarī Taʾrīkh, 3, 230.
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Madāʾinī,³⁶ however, this appointment is not confirmed in the accounts of Ibn
ʿAbd al-Ḥakam or al-Kindī who focus on Egypt and Egyptian affairs. He is
also held to have led several ghazawāt to Ifrīqiya and the Maghrib and is thereby
included in the lists of conquerors of North Africa.³⁷ A client (mawlā) of his (or
rather the descendant of a client of Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj) was deposed as gover-
nor of Tilimsān around 143 H/760–761 CE.³⁸
Despite the contrasting background of their founding fathers, the trajectories
of the families of Muʿāwiya and Shuraḥbīl converged in the time of their sons
and grandsons during the Marwānid restoration. In 86 H/705–706 CE, after
the long-time Marwānid governor of Egypt ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Marwān appointed
him ṣāḥib al-shuraṭ ³⁹ and then qāḍī,⁴⁰ ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj
was deposed and succeeded by ʿImrān b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shuraḥbīl, who
was also appointed qāḍī by the new governor.⁴¹ He was in turn deposed in 89
H/707–708 CE and succeeded as qāḍī of Egypt by the son of his predecessor,
ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya.⁴² The responsibilities of these
provincial notables appointed by centrally legitimized governors appear to
have included deputy control of the shuraṭ when the governor was absent
from al-Fusṭāṭ⁴³ and the supervision of the tribal ʿurafāʾ caring for the affairs
of orphans.⁴⁴
The intermediary position of such Kindī notables, constantly negotiating be-
tween local support and external governors, becomes evident when a new gov-
ernor sent to Egypt wished to appoint followers of his own to positions of author-
ity.
When [the new governor] ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Malik came to Egypt, he wished to replace
the agents (ʿummāl) of [his predecessor] ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. Accordingly, he wanted to depose
 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 8, 143– 144, and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 224.
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 351, and Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, 126– 127 and 295–296.
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 246.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 53.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 324. See also Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 264. For a general discussion of
later qāḍīs in Egypt, see the work of Mathieu Tillier, most notably Tillier 2011. For the general
context of qāḍīs under the Umayyads see most recently Judd 2015.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 58.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 60.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 64. This is probably the khilāfat al-Fusṭāṭ mentioned in the biography of
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya; al-Kindī,Wulāt, 324. Another instance of deputyship is mentioned
by Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 264, according to whom ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya informed
the governor daily about “the dead and other things” when the latter took refuge from a plague
raging in al-Fusṭāṭ.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 326.
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ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿāwiya from his positions as qāḍī and ṣāḥib al-shuraṭ. As he was un-
able to find anybody to field a complaint against him, however, he appointed him general
of the frontier guards of al-Iskandariyya, raised his salary and sent him away.⁴⁵
While it is explicitly stated in another version of this story that the new governor
wanted to “replace agents with agents and companions with companions”,⁴⁶
even the son of the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik was unable to depose ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
b. Muʿāwiya without a pretext and accordingly instead promoted him out of his
office. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān’s son ʿAbd al-Wāḥid was in turn dismissed when Qurra b.
Sharīk came to Egypt as the new governor.⁴⁷
While the family of Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj was not in any position to claim su-
periority over the Marwānid central administration, the descendants of Shuraḥ-
bīl b. Ḥasana were arguably able to advance claims of preeminence based on the
prestige of their ancestor as one of Muḥammad’s closest companions. In this
context, ʿImrān b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shuraḥbīl apparently overestimated the
strength of his position in dealing with the newly arrived Marwānid governor:
[There is widespread unrest in Egypt during the administration of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-
Malik.] ʿAbdallāh was told that ʿImrān [b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Shuraḥbīl] had helped [a fu-
gitive poet who had derided the governor] and had also taunted him himself with the fol-
lowing verses:
I, the son of my father of Badr, the hijra to Yathrib
and the hijra to the Negus, am most splendid.
I am exalted due to my largesse, have you forgotten the merit
of my fathers? While this one is called the offspring of Marwān.
When this was reported to ʿAbdallāh, he deposed him from his rank as qāḍī and ṣāḥib al-
shuraṭ.⁴⁸
A lampoon such as this would have been unthinkable from descendants of Muʿā-
wiya b. Ḥudayj. The claim to preeminence ʿImrān voiced is voided by the gover-
nor, who according to another rendering of the story even has ʿImrān jailed.⁴⁹
However, the conflict between ʿImrān and the governor is in another account
motivated by the judge’s intent to punish a secretary of ʿAbdallāh for drunken-
ness.⁵⁰ One is thus led to doubt the factual relevance of ʿImrān’s claim to preemi-
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 326. See also Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 266.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 58.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 330.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 327–328.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 60. See also Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 266.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 328.
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nence in a story that could be told without reference to poetry. In this case, the
verses could be explained as rhetorical embellishments, which were taken up by
traditionalists happy to see a Marwānid governor of Egypt lampooned by a pious
qāḍī.
It is tempting to speculate on ʿAbdallāh’s reason for appointing the son of
the predecessor of ʿImrān, ʿAbd al-Wāḥid b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, to be ʿImrān’s suc-
cessor as qāḍī in the light of ʿAbd al-Wāḥid’s patent unfitness for office. He is
described as a youngster (ghulām ḥadath)⁵¹ of 25 years⁵² and “not a faqīh”⁵³ by
al-Kindī. As the personal characteristics of the young man are clearly considered
negligible, his appointment may have been motivated by a desire to use ʿAbd al-
Wāḥid to mobilize the support of his tribal and other networks in al-Fusṭāṭ, not
least the support of his father, the former qāḍī and ṣāḥib al-shuraṭ.
In searching for foundations of transgenerational local authority among the
leading provincial families of Kinda, it is tempting to turn to the houses ascribed
to the descendants of Shuraḥbīl b. Ḥasana and Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj. These appa-
rently still formed familiar landmarks in the urban topography of al-Fusṭāṭ dur-
ing the time of Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam. The account of the tearing down of Muʿā-
wiya’s house in the course of his involvement in the first civil war is
paralleled inside the prosopography of Kinda by accounts of how al-Mukhtār
caused the house of Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath, the leader of Kinda in Kufa, to
be pulled down after his attempt to take Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath captive had
failed. In the course of this conflict between the locally based leader of Kinda
and the newly arrived ʿAlīd agitator, the holdings of Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath
are described as follows:
Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath b. Qays was in the village of al-Ashʿath near al-Qādisiyya. Al-
Mukhtār sent Ḥawshab, the guardian of the kursī, with a hundred men against him, saying:
Fly towards him, for you will find him playing and hunting, or standing confounded, mind-
less with fear or lying in ambush!⁵⁴ But if you catch him, bring me his head. [Ḥawshab] ac-
cordingly went out to his qaṣr and sieged it, but Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath escaped and
went to Muṣʿab [b. al-Zubayr]. So they sieged the qaṣr, thinking he was still inside, until
they entered, saw that he had escaped and returned to al-Mukhtār. He [al-Mukhtār] sent
word for [al-Ashʿath’s] house to be pulled down and for the house of [the former Kindī
Kufan leader of an abortive ʿAlīd revolt] Ḥujr b. ʿAdī al-Kindī to be rebuilt with the bricks
and stones of his house.⁵⁵
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 328.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 330.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 328.
 This part of al-Mukhtār’s speech is composed in the sajʿ or rhymed prose characteristic of al-
Mukhtār’s near-prophetical rank in the historiographical accounts.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 510.
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The settlement of Kufa is described as consisting of tribal quarters,with the quar-
ter of Kinda surrounding the house of Muḥammad’s father al-Ashʿath b. Qays as
the most eminent leader of Kinda in Iraq during the early Islamic conquests. It is
tempting to see the houses of the leading families in the early Islamic garrison
towns as representing the tribally grounded urban capital at the disposal of
the leading families of Kinda. Accordingly, the rebuilding of the house of Ḥujr
b. ʿAdī, another Kindī aspiring to tribal leadership in early Islamic Kufa who
was eventually decapitated near Damascus following an abortive revolt, takes
on a strong symbolic significance as the vindication of Ḥujr’s family of “good
Kindīs” in the re-founded Kufa after al-Mukhtār’s revolt.⁵⁶
Another material element of the prestige of the family of al-Ashʿath b. Qays
in Kufa that was transmitted over several generations is mentioned in the above
report as “the village of al-Ashʿath b. Qays.” This village, otherwise called Ṭīza-
nābād, is said to have been given to al-Ashʿath as an iqṭāʿ⁵⁷ or sold to him in ex-
change for some possessions of al-Ashʿath in Ḥaḍramawt by the third caliph
ʿUthmān.⁵⁸ It appears to have remained in al-Ashʿath’s family at least until the
time of his son Muḥammad, as evinced in the above account, and was a favorite
drinking venue among Kufans:
I never went past the vineyards of Ṭīzanābād
Without wondering who would want to drink water!⁵⁹
Another garden, called Shumārā and lying in the vicinity of al-Ḥīra, seems to
have remained in the possession of descendants of al-Ashʿath (baʿḍ al-ashāʿitha)
at least until the time of al-Rashīd.⁶⁰ It is tempting to speculate that similar es-
tates on a smaller scale underpinned the authority of Kinda’s leading families in
other regions as well.
Regarding the troubled history of the descendants of al-Ashʿath b. Qays dur-
ing the time of the unsuccessful revolt of his grandson ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Mu-
ḥammad b. al-Ashʿath (usually known as Ibn al-Ashʿath), it is at first glance
slightly surprising to find baʿḍ al-Ashāʿitha in continued possession of valuable
estates even after the suppression of the revolt. It may be possible to explain this
continued possession by re-interpreting the chronic infighting among the rela-
 Relatives of Ḥujr b. ʿAdī appear as supporters of al-Mukhtār in al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 4, 353,
and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 506.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 317–318.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 704.
 Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, 25, 147.
 Al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, 5, 189– 190.
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tives of Ibn al-Ashʿath during his revolt. From the long-term perspective of re-
gional leading families who wished to preserve their status, it would have
been a wise decision not to back any provincial revolt unambiguously (not
even the revolt of one of their own), but rather to hedge by maintaining their in-
volvement with both sides.
As the regional families perpetuated their prestige by means of the establish-
ment of landed estates, their backing in tribal networks became less tangible.
While reports of al-Ashʿath conquering Ādharbayjān are underpinned by the set-
tlement of Kindīs at Sarā in Ādharbayjān until the time of al-Balādhurī,⁶¹ and al-
Ashʿath himself settled amongst his network of supporters from Kinda and other
backgrounds in Kufa, there is no indication of Kinda being particularly involved
in the revolt of al-Ashʿath’s grandson against the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik. It is there-
fore crucial to distinguish between the generation of the early Islamic conquests,
when Kindī contingents were mobilized along tribal networks led by Kindī lead-
ers, and the time of the second civil war, when the leading families of the tribes
in Kufa to all appearances cooperated with Muṣʿab b. al-Zubayr against al-
Mukhtār as a collective body. I hesitate to discount the relevance of the formu-
lation of networks of support in a tribal terminology even in this context. Care
must be taken not to rigidly conceptualize local aristocrats active after the gen-
eration of the conquests as tribally founded. One should rather start by examin-
ing the different fields of authority available to local elites at the time and then
aim to ascertain the relative relevance of tribal and other support during the
event in question.
From the perspective of the various families among Kinda aspiring to local
eminence, it appears that notwithstanding the diverse backgrounds of their re-
spective founders, a fairly homogenous provincial aristocracy had emerged by
the time of the Marwānid restoration. Based on support from local Kindī net-
works and other provincial supporters, such families of ashrāf appear to have
owned important houses in the early Islamic garrison towns, and in some instan-
ces also landed estates. They transmitted these over several generations. While
members of these families were forthcoming as judges or administrators for
the centrally appointed provincial governors, they were in general unable to suc-
cessfully challenge a governor designated by the global Islamic authorities once
he had taken charge of his designated province.⁶²
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 376.
 Even in the pre-Marwānid anecdote where Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj succesfully rejects a governor
of Egypt, he is depicted as meeting the caliph’s candidate two journeys from Egypt and return-
ing together with him to the caliph Muʿāwiya. See al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 274–275.
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Sources of Authority at the Disposal of Kindī Elites in Conflict
with Central Authority
During the early Islamic conquests, Kindī leaders were frequently depicted as
equals of the Islamic elite of Medina. This holds especially true for al-Ashʿath
and his family. While a marriage planned between his sister and Muḥammad
seemingly did not take place,⁶³ al-Ashʿath himself married a sister of Abū
Bakr.⁶⁴ He later married daughters of his to sons of the caliphs ʿUthmān and
ʿAlī.⁶⁵ The daughter of al-Ashʿath married to al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī is said to have pois-
oned her husband, according to Ibn Aʿtham on the instigation of the arch-villain
Marwān.⁶⁶ However, this intermarriage of the family of al-Ashʿath with the high-
est echelons of early Islamic elites ceased during the next generation. The stra-
tegically most advantageous marriage his son Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath could re-
alize was that of a daughter to the longtime Umayyad governor of Iraq
ʿUbaydallāh b. Ziyād.⁶⁷
This shift in marriage patterns after the generation of the conquests corre-
sponds to a general descent of Kindī elites from global Islamic power to mere
provincial relevance in a number of other fields. On the level of court ceremony,
al-Ashʿath is portrayed as boasting of his eminence even as he is led captive in
front of the caliph Abū Bakr after the ridda of Kinda.⁶⁸ During the time of Muʿā-
wiya b. Abī Sufyān, the caliph is shown as treating the Kindī leaders Shuraḥbīl b.
al-Simṭ and Muʿāwiya b. Ḥudayj rather humbly when they visit his court in Dam-
ascus.⁶⁹ The latter is even reported to have beaten Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān when
the caliph considered cancelling military stipends.⁷⁰
In contrast, such claims to acceptance as peers by the central Islamic au-
thorities were routinely brushed off in the next generation. Muḥammad b. al-
Ashʿath was severely scolded and sent away when he attempted to seat himself
next to the caliph Muʿāwiya on his sarīr during an audience conducted between
Muʿāwiya and al-Aḥnaf.⁷¹ In other accounts, he was ordered around by the pro-
 Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, 95, and al-Ṭabarī Taʾrīkh, 2, 256.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 138 and 140; Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 1, 86–87, corresponding to al-Wāqidī,
Ridda, 319–320; Ibn Saʿd, Ṭabaqāt, 6, 99; al-Maqdisī, Kitāb al-Badʾ, 5, 156; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2,
357–357, and al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 90.
 Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 20, and Caskel/Strenziok 1966, II, 286 and 466.
 Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 4, 206–207.
 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 4, 47.
 See Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 1, 84, corresponding to al-Wāqidī, Ridda, 314.
 See Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, Ṣiffīn, 46–47.
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam, Futūḥ, 126–127.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 287.
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vincial governor of Iraq.⁷² We have already seen how ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muʿā-
wiya owed his honorable discharge merely to his positions as qāḍī and ṣāḥib
al-shuraṭ in al-Fusṭāṭ. Such a marginalization of Kindī elites, who appear to
have been reduced to a merely provincial relevance by the generation after the
conquests, is also apparent in the personal mobility of Kindī elites based on pro-
vincial tribal networks; they rarely if ever left their provinces.
In contrast to this decline in importance of the landed aristocrats founded by
Kindī leaders of tribal troops during the conquests, a new type of Kindī leaders
emerges in this period, commanding troops composed of different tribes based
on their appointment by central Umayyad authorities. This type continued to
act on a global Islamic scale in the early Islamic realms and includes figures
such as Mālik b. Hubayra, described as a frequent leader of expeditions fī arḍ
al-Rūm and a notable at the court of the Sufyānid caliphs, and Ḥuṣayn b. Nu-
mayr, who played a crucial role in the period of the second civil war and led
troops in the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Syria. Both are depicted as jointly de-
manding the region of al-Balqāʾ in today’s Jordan as an exclusively Kindī fief in
return for their support of Marwān b. al-Ḥakam.⁷³ This type of Kindī leaders ap-
pears to have been much less dependent on the support of their fellow Kindīs.
They led troops composed of a number of Arab tribes and may be better under-
stood as renegade generals in search of a central authority that would guarantee
their continued prestige than as tribally founded Kindī leaders.
The regional tribal networks of the families founded by the conquerors
sketched in the first part of this contribution appear to have played a significant
role in later times only during times of general upheaval, such as after the ʿAb-
bāsid conquest of al-Shām. The descendants of the conqueror of Ḥimṣ, al-Simṭ b.
al-Aswad al-Kindī, seem to have played a particularly significant role in repre-
senting local unrest by mobilizing support along tribal and regional networks,
as evinced by the surprising number of members of this family whose crucifixion
after abortive revolts is reported by Ibn Ḥabīb’s Kitāb al-Muḥabbar.⁷⁴
Otherwise, it appears that tribal networks of merely regional importance
were not sufficient to successfully challenge the central Islamic authorities.
The great revolts led by Kindī notables after the establishment of a stable
post-conquest order do not appear to have depended on the mobilizing potential
of common tribal affiliation. Kindīs are underrepresented among the followers of
the Kindī Ibn al-Ashʿath in his revolt against ʿAbd al-Malik. Instead, his revolt is
 E.g. al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, 17, 146– 147.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 421.
 Ibn Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Muḥabbar, 485–488.
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presented as backed by the Iraqi milieu of pious readers of the Qurʾān, or qurrāʾ,
who were opposed to the splendor of the centralized Islamic administration. In-
terestingly, a certain accordance of interests between the pious urban opposition
of the qurrāʾ (or for that matter, Khawārij) and the ambitions of the leading fam-
ily of Kinda in Kufa can be traced across three generations, from al-Ashʿath’s
leadership in the call for arbitration at Ṣiffīn via the singular inefficacy of his off-
spring sent out from Kufa against Khawārij in the surrounding countryside,⁷⁵ to
the backing given to Ibn al-Ashʿath’s revolt by the qurrāʾ.⁷⁶ Unfortunately the ex-
tent, internal composition and external functioning of such cross-tribal networks
of provincial opposition joining persons of different social background is diffi-
cult to ascertain due to the lack of a stable common identifier such as a tribal
nisba like the one underlying this study.
In renderings of the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath, one is also confronted with the
mobilizing potential of a challenge to existing Islamic order based on apocalyp-
tic claims. This use of apocalyptic iconography is frequently mentioned in histor-
iographical accounts of Ibn al-Ashʿath’s revolt,⁷⁷ and has even left material re-
mains in the form of Arabo-Sasanian dirhams minted during this revolt with
apocalyptic slogans and titles.⁷⁸ A similar use of a globally Islamic iconography
of apocalyptic renewal used in challenges to Qurashī central authority also ap-
pears in the revolts of the Kindī Ibāḍī leader ʿAbdallāh b. Yaḥyā, commonly
known as Ṭālib al-Ḥaqq, or ‘searcher of justice’, in 8th-century Southern Arabia,⁷⁹
as well as in the well-known revolt the later courtly poet al-Mutanabbī, literally
‘the one aspiring to be a prophet’, owed his nickname to.⁸⁰ I suggest interpreting
the use of such titles of globally Islamic relevance as an attempt to transcend the
limited regional potential of inherited tribally formulated networks. Kindī elites
could voice effective challenges to the Qurashī caliphs of early Islamic empires
only by leaving behind their uniquely Kindī tribal affiliations and presenting
themselves as redeemers of globally Islamic relevance, as exemplified in Ibn
al-Ashʿath’s speech to his troops before the decisive battle against the Umayyad
governor of Iraq.
 This is also remarked by Crone 1980, 110– 111.
 See Sayed 1977, passim.
 E.g. al-Maqdisī, Kitāb al-Badʾ, 6, 35.
 Gaube 1973, 32, 36 and 52.
 See the long account in al-Iṣfahānī, Aghānī, 23, 233–270, and al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 6, 172–
186.
 See Franz 2007, 95–103.
Insult the Caliph, Marry al-Ḥasan, and Redeem Your Kingdom 63
Then Ibn al-Ashʿath ascended a minbar in his camp,which he used to carry with him, prais-
ed God and proclaimed: You people! War is a contest in which the souls of men wither.⁸¹
Even the prophet of God, peace be upon him, never was victorious if victory was not
given to him and his companions. If this thing [hādhā l-amr, scilicet rule over Islam] is
among Quraysh, there is nothing to be done.⁸² If, however, it can rest on any other
among the Arab, then I am ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath b. Qays b. Maʿdī-
karib! […] Afterwards, the soldiers began to fight, but Ibn al-Ashʿath continued to stand on
his minbar while the misssiles were flying about him: He however did not in any way at-
tempt to shield himself from them or was in any way afraid.⁸³
Notwithstanding Ibn al-Ashʿath’s bravado, the subsequent battle was lost. In
conjunction with the frequent parallels drawn between his revolt and the later
ʿAbbāsid revolution,⁸⁴ it is tempting to consider the revolt of Ibn al-Ashʿath as
some sort of a high-water mark of upheaval focused on a non-Qurashī pretender
against central Qurashī authority. Personally qualified for rulership due to his
education and his descent from the pre-Islamic kings of Kinda,⁸⁵ Ibn al-Ashʿath
transcended the networks of his tribe to voice a universally relevant claim to op-
position. As the failure of his revolt became quite clear soon after his proud chal-
lenge of ʿAbd al-Malik, global Islamic authority remained invested in a Qurashī-
led central administration. Tribal networks of provincial elites remained impor-
tant only on a regional scale.
Conclusion
In the first part of this paper it has been shown that affiliation to the tribally for-
mulated network of Kinda as represented in the sources is remarkably stable. The
relevance of this network seems to be limited mainly to provincial or even urban
matters.While there is ample enough evidence of the administration of city quar-
ters being directed via tribal networks, cooperation along tribal ties is very rare
on a trans-regional scale.
Accordingly, the leaders of locally relevant tribal networks furnished suita-
ble personnel for provincial administration under a centrally appointed gover-
nor. They are best described as intermediaries between the official power of a
 This first passage of the speech is composed in rhymed prose or sajʿ.
 This passage is quite unclear. I translate ad sensum.
 Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 7, 139– 140; a shorter version of his speech is given by al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh,
3, 688.
 E.g. Ibn Aʿtham, Futūḥ, 7, 127–128, and al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 681.
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Ḥayawān, 5, 194– 195.
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global Islamic administration and the support given to them and frequently also
their ancestors and offspring by local networks formulated along tribal and other
lines.
According to the local scale of such tribal networks, a global or Islamic chal-
lenge to central authority could only be voiced in a terminology other than tribal
affiliation. A central role in such challenges voiced by Kindīs seems to have been
played by the personal character of the respective Kindī leader, frequently draw-
ing on apocalyptic or prophetic iconographies. When such a globally relevant
claims to counter-authority were voiced by Kindīs, however, Kinda was underre-
presented among the supporters of the challenge. It almost seems as if a rebel
such as Ibn al-Ashʿath had to leave behind the Kindī networks and regional pres-
tige underpinning his family’s status in early Islamic Kufa in order to claim the
universal Islamic authority of al-Manṣūr or al-Qaḥṭānī, disavowing his status as
the scion of one of the leading families of Iraq in order to transform himself into
a redeemer capable of challenging ʿAbd al-Malik himself.
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Landowners in Lower Iraq during the 8th
Century: Types and Interplays
Abstract: This paper aims to identify types of landowners in Lower Iraq, where
land was a social, political and economic issue, especially during the 8th century.
The focus on landholders determines the characterisation of the imperial as well
as regional Lower Iraqi elite. It takes into consideration Jewish and Christian
landowners (for example, ecclesiastical landed elites in the Nestorian communi-
ty), Persian landowners (for example, the dahāqīn who settled in the region be-
fore the Islamic conquest) and the landed Islamic elites (who are related to the
conquering group). With this typology, I shed light not only on the diversity of
landed elites in Lower Iraq but also on the subgroup of Islamic landowners.
Defining landowner groups is a prerequisite to the study of the interplay between
local and imperial elites over the course of the 8th century. This period is regard-
ed as that of the rise of Islamic elites. Researchers agree these elites were no lon-
ger specifically bound to military functions, a development with consequences
for other landed groups. Subsequent interplays took place in the context of
inter- and intra-group relationships. This paper seeks to offer a typology of
these interactions in order to understand the relationships and power ratios at
stake.
Keywords: Iraq; landholding; social conditions; Umayyads; ʿAbbāsids
Introduction
In Akhbār al-quḍāt,¹ Wakīʿ reports that between 173 H/789–90 CE and 181 H/
797–98 CE in al-Baṣra, then-judge ʿUmar b. Ḥabīb had to adjudicate a conflict
between Yaḥyā b. Khālid al-Barmakī and some inhabitants of al-Baṣra (probably
landowners) regarding the fraudulent appropriation of estates.² Yaḥyā was
This article is part of an ongoing doctoral research devoted to the power of land in Lower Iraq
during the 8th century. This research is conducted under the supervision of Prof. Anne-Marie
Eddé at Panthéon Sorbonne University (Paris).
 Judicature of ʿUmar b. Ḥabīb in al-Baṣra: 173 H/789–90 CE to 181 H/797–98 CE.
 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, 143– 144; Tillier 2009, 295; Sourdel 1960, I, 172.
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blamed, through his representative and intendant al-Qaṣabī, for appropriating
lands which already had owners. Eventually he failed to establish his claim.³
This story offers a point of access to landholding issues at the end of the
8th century. It also provides information about landowners in the region of
Lower Iraq. Yaḥyā b. Khālid al-Barmakī was part of the imperial elite during
the early ʿAbbāsid period. He and his relatives were major landlords in al-Baṣra’s
region⁴ and later also in Baghdad or al-Raqqa.⁵ They were not specifically tied to
the Lower Iraqi region, therefore they were imperial rather than regional land-
owners. The identity of the Baṣran landlords suffering from Yaḥyā’s actions is
not specified. Their religious, social or economic backgrounds are unknown
but one can assume that they were part of the Baṣran (local?) elite. Therefore,
the conflict in which Yaḥyā was involved opposed imperial and regional land-
owners and highlighted the competition for land between imperial and regional
elites. This story also shows that the purchase of Lower Iraqi lands may have oc-
curred at the imperial elite level as Yaḥyā bought (abtāʿa) lands from the caliph
Hārūn al-Rashīd.⁶ However, these lands may also have been personal posses-
sions of Hārūn al-Rashīd or have been part of the bayt al-māl.
This conflict exposes that landholding was a topic of discussion in Lower
Iraqi society and an economic and political issue during the 8th century. It
also proves that studying landholding in Lower Iraq is relevant to understanding
the formation of the Islamic imperial elite as well as the evolution of the regional
elites, especially during the 8th century.
The sources preserved from this period are sparse for the historian of early
Lower Iraqi society. The available materials produced at the end of the 8thcentury
are mainly legal works: for example, the Kitāb al-Kharāj written by Abū Yūsuf ⁷
and then Yaḥyā b. Ādam,⁸ or the Kitāb al-Amwāl of Ibn Sallām.⁹ These books—
devoted to Islamic finance, taxation systems and economic issues—contributed
to legal codification. They contain many significant questions related to lands
and land taxation or landownership. This importance shows the land-based con-
cerns of the ʿAbbāsid state (in formation at that time) and its desire for a system-
atized tax-system. The region of Lower Iraq is well depicted in these legal works;
al-Sawād is the subject of specific chapters. East Syrian sources, like the Judg-
 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, 144; the qāḍī decided in favor of the Baṣran population.
 Sourdel 1960, I, 154; many mentions in al-Jahshyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ, 189/229, 216–217/266.
 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ, 235/293.
 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, 143– 144.
 Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj.
 Yaḥyā b. Ādam, Kitāb al-Kharāj.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb al-Amwāl.
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ments of Henanishoʿ and more generally canonical judgments, along with Jewish
documentation like Geonic responsa, discuss land matters as they relate to inher-
itance or tax. These materials strengthen the relevance of studying landowners of
this time and confirm that landholding was a discussed topic in society and an
economic and political issue.
The formation of an urban Muslim aristocracy or a Muslim bourgeoisie can
be situated with or shortly before the composition of these sources.¹⁰ The 8th cen-
tury in Lower Iraq is often seen as the period of the formation of an Islamic elite
who were no longer specifically bound to military functions. Obviously this
change had much to do with lands and landholding. This rise is twofold, inas-
much as it accompanied the economic and cultural growth of the region. The
urban triangle of al-Baṣra, al-Kūfa and Wāsiṭ, with their respective sawād and
swamps (al-baṭāʾiḥ), played a key role in this formation of an elite as well.
The beginning of the period is marked by the suppression of Ibn al-Ashʿath
in 81–82 H/700–701 CE. Following this upheaval, al-Ḥajjāj founded Wāsiṭ, a
new administrative and military capital, and the two cities of al-Baṣra and al-
Kūfa were demilitarized. These circumstances did not prevent this area from
flourishing. This thriving situation can be observed until the 9th century, when
the Zanj revolt broke out in 255 H/869 CE. Its consequences were far-reaching.
However, the arrival of al-Maʾmūn in Baghdad in 204 H/819 CE is chosen here
as an end point. This is owing to the emigration of some members of the elite
from Lower Iraq to the capital and more broadly to the intensified centralization
of that time. The dynastic rupture of 132 H/750 CE has to be taken into account,
and consequent changes or continuity in landholding and landowners have to
be kept in mind.
Many aspects of the Lower Iraqi region were singular within the Islamic Em-
pire. The main region of settlement for the conquerors was Lower Iraq, due to the
foundation of the two amṣār al-Baṣra and al-Kūfa. It was an area previously in-
habited by important Jewish and East Syrian populations, mostly Aramaic but
also Arabic speakers, and to a lesser extent by Sasanian Zoroastrian groups.
These populations, who remained after the conquest owners of their lands,
were in the majority during most of if not the entire period we are concerned
with.
Lower Iraq is an alluvial land on the Euphrates and Tigris. Because of the
climate—hot and arid—even fertile agricultural areas had to be irrigated, entail-
ing the construction of irrigation canals. In 8 H/629 CE, just before the Islamic
conquest, dams breaking caused the Tigris to change its course and inundate
 Crone 1980, 51; Decobert 1991, 81.
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large parts of cultivated land. These became marshes.¹¹ In contrast, the area
close to the former course of the Tigris became a desert. This new swamp was
frequently called al-baṭīḥa. Heavy investment in the system of irrigation and
its upkeep were necessary, as well as the revival of dead lands and the clearance
of swamps in order to make land farmable. Despite that, Lower Iraq can be con-
sidered a cultivated area during this entire period and more specifically after the
foundation of Baghdad because it participated in the food supply of the capital.
A central region of the Islamic Empire during the period we are concerned
with, Lower Iraq witnessed a number of changes in imperial dynamics.Whereas
Lower Iraq was previously a province of the Umayyad Empire, whose capital was
located in Damascus in Syria, it became the heart of the ʿAbbāsid Empire with
the settlement of the dynasty in this area and with the foundation of Baghdad.
This movement toward Iraq had consequences. Lower Iraq was no longer periph-
eral to the capital; from now on it was situated in the area of influence of Bagh-
dad in Upper Iraq. Nevertheless the region remained distinct. For the purpose of
this study, these changes and the relationship between Lower Iraq and Baghdad
have to be considered in order to understand the implications for landholding
and landowners in the area.
This paper seeks to identify landowners in Lower Iraq during the 8th century.
In the abstract, trying to answer the question ‘who were the landowners in this
area during one century?’ forces us to pay particular attention to the evolution
and/or reproduction of landowners. One century after the conquest, it is neces-
sary to measure the changes or lack thereof brought by the end of Sasanian and
the emergence of Islamic rule. The building and politics of the Umayyad state
have to be taken into account. As far as the ʿAbbāsid takeover, it obviously ob-
liges us to consider the question of reproduction or modification. But in the
game of local vs. imperial dynamics, it seems more relevant to question land-
holding in terms of regional and/or imperial landowners. This serves as a way
to go beyond the use of religious or ethnic classifications—though they can
prove relevant. Moreover, one of the questions to arise from these categories
is: were Lower Iraqi landowners regional elites? In other words, were they tied
to the region? Did their properties make them part of Lower Iraqi society or not?
This consideration can be related to Claude Cahen’s theory regarding the
rural economic history of the medieval Middle East.¹² According to him, during
the 10th century a decline in small landholding and the assertion of power by big
landowners can be observed. The deterioration of the peasant condition could be
 Ibn Rusta, Kitāb al-Aʿlāq an-nafīsa, 95; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 292–293.
 Cahen 1953.
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seen as the result of a long process in which the iqṭāʿ and its wider enforcement
figured.¹³ Under that theory, the Būyid period would show a surge in property
being grabbed from small landowners.¹⁴
In my opinion, this appealing theory has to be put to the test—not to deny or
confirm it but in order to gain a better understanding of it. A study on landown-
ers in Lower Iraq during the 8thcentury, about two centuries before the Būyid pe-
riod, may be useful to gain a better view of the process of decline of small land-
holding, and to underline chronological ruptures and differences.
As is suggested by the title of this paper, I am going to focus mainly on land-
owners (that is, people) and not processes. This work is not about landholding as
such.¹⁵ I prefer to take a prosopographical approach—even one that is not sys-
tematic—and try to provide a classification. This prosopographical perspective
pertains to the characterization of Lower Iraqi elites, whether regional or impe-
rial, but also seeks to appraise the long process described by Cahen. The ‘people-
based’ point of view forms a useful basis to understanding inter-group and intra-
group relationships.
This work will offer a typology of Lower Iraqi landowners, using regional
and imperial elites as initial classifications. Obviously, the distinction between
the two categories is not rigid. The Arab conquerors who arrived in Iraq were par-
ticipating in the imperial project of the Islamic conquests. They were at first im-
perial elites, but since they settled in al-Baṣra and/or al-Kūfa with their families
and remained attached to the region, they can be considered by the 8th century
as regional elites. Such settlement in the region of Lower Iraq can be seen as an
indication of regional ties. On the other hand, imperial landowners may also
refer to trans-regional elites, that is to say, those who participated in the working
of the early Islamic Empire without being bonded to a specific region. The
Umayyad family can be regarded as part of this group of imperial landowners.
I am aware of the blurring dimensions of these categories and of the difficul-
ty in assigning one person to one box. The overlap between types will be to a
certain extent discussed and questiond in the course of this study. However, it
is useful to first identify these types separately in order to later examine the in-
terplays existing between each group. This interplay will be the focus of the sec-
ond part of this paper. In short, the pattern of Lower Iraqi landowners will be
 Cahen 1953.
 Cahen 1953, 34.
 I will not return to the debate on private landed property in the Islamic world; I predicate
that it existed though I am aware it is and has to be a subject of discussion. For landholding
in early Islamic Iraq and debates about private landed properties, see Morony 1981 and Kennedy
2014.
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drawn out, and then the way imperial and local forces met, intertwined or faced
will be taken into consideration.
Regional Landowners
Jewish and Christian landowners who inhabited Lower Iraq before the Islamic
conquest and continued to own their lands afterwards can be simply referred
to as non-Muslim elites. The situation of Zoroastrian landowners is more difficult
to comprehend. Islamic legal sources composed at the end of the 8th century fre-
quently debate the question of land status in al-Sawād with regard to the way the
region was conquered.
It is worth considering the context of composition for these sources and the
so-called historical narratives formulated in the associated treaties.¹⁶ Whatever
the narrative, the facts show that non-Muslim landowners continued to own
their lands after the conquest. This is corroborated by the study of ṣulḥan-ʿanwa-
tan traditions.¹⁷ East Syrian sources regarding this matter (for example, the Judg-
ments of Henanishoʿ) and Jewish sources¹⁸ reinforce that there were still non-
Muslim landowners in Lower Iraq at the end of the 8th century and beyond. In
this study, avoiding religious terminology is difficult given the available material
on these landowners. As the sources are from legal-religious backgrounds, they
promote the classification of regional landowners according to religious affilia-
 Knowing that the book of Abū Yūsuf was written at the request of the caliph confirms the
state desire for codification and systematization. The emergence of taxation literature at a
time when tax systems were systematized and re-organized forces us to draw a link between
composition and codification. The book of Yaḥyā b. Ādam was written at the same period or
shortly after the one of Abū Yūsuf. It might have been composed for his students (we do not
have detailed indications of the reasons behind the composition) but it was in line with Abū Yū-
suf ’s work. Ibn Sallām’s Kitāb al-Amwāl was not a commissioned work but its composition can
be related to land and tax cases Ibn Sallām dealt with at Ṭarsūs when he was qāḍī, and thus
considered indicative of his will to resolve various issues concerning Islamic finance. More gen-
erally, the composition of these treaties was concurrent with a general period of formation re-
garding administration and legal codification.
 See Noth 1974 (2008). In this article, A. Noth offers a study of these traditions, especially
those of the Sawād, and he corroborates that the ownership of the land of Sawād did not
pass to the Muslims after the conquest.
 See Sachau 1908, II, which contains the Judgments of Henanishoʿ and the Regulations for Ec-
clesiastical Judgments and Inheritance of Timothy I. As for responsa, according to Brody
(1998, 186) approximately 5,000– 10,000 responsa survive but only a small portion has been
published in the various collections of Geonic responsa. Examples of collections include
Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, and Neubauer, Mediaeval Jewish Chronicles and Chronological Notes.
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tion. However, a distinction has to be made between individual lay landowners
and ecclesiastical or religious properties that implied a non-individual owner-
ship.
Landowners within the Jewish Population
Prosopographical study of Jewish landowners in Lower Iraq is very sparse, but
some evidence suggests that a group were regional landowners during the 8th
century. At the end of the Sasanian period, the large Jewish population of
Lower Iraq was mainly settled to the north in the sawād of al-Kūfa,¹⁹ although
we can also find some in the region of Maysān.²⁰ A large number, especially
in the countryside, were farmers, either as owners of their lands or tenants. Larg-
er wealthy landowners, however, have to be taken into account. Newman²¹ has
provided a lot of information about them.²²
It is worth mentioning that during the last centuries of Sasanian rule, weal-
thy Jewish landowners took advantage of the difficulties faced by small Jewish
peasants and increased their own estates by buying up the debts of small land-
lords.²³ It means that at the time of the conquest some Jewish landowners owned
large estates and even villages in Lower Iraq. But it is also necessary to consider
the continued presence of smaller landlords. At the other chronological boun-
dary, the end of the 8th century, a Geonic decree (taqqanah) promulgated by
the academy of Sura and the Exilarch is indicative of the fact that Jewish land-
owners still owned estates in Lower Iraq while at the same time pointing out
some changes. ²⁴ This decree, dated 169– 170 H/786–787 CE, added some
changes to Talmudic laws regarding the collection of debts from the heirs of a
deceased debtor. Previously a creditor could only claim the landed property be-
longing to the deceased parent of orphans. Following the new ordinance, debts
could be collected from movable property as well. This taqqanah is often quoted
to indicate the diminishing numbers of landholding Jews at the end of the 8th
century. However, some responsa from the 9th and 10th centuries show that Jewish
 Morony 1984a, 309.
 Morony 1984a, 309.
 Newman 1932.
 Newman 1932, 33–46.
 Morony 1984a, 310.
 Lewin 1928– 1945, Ketubbot, Responsa, no. 535. About this decree: Brody 1998, 63; Morony
1984a, 312; Newman 1932, 35–36; Ackerman-Lieberman 2015.
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landowners still possessed lands at that time.²⁵ Without localization, it is hard to
know exactly which part or parts of the region saw a decrease in Jewish proper-
ties. If it seems immoderate to assume the total disappearance of Jewish land-
owners, this taqqanah associated with a responsum dating from the period of
the gaon of Sura, Moses b. Jacob (g. 214–226 H/829–841 CE), can instead lead
to the conclusion of a decrease in the numbers of small Jewish landowners.²⁶
It is important to highlight that communal properties existed,²⁷ as well as
some sort of “religious institutional ownership”. The revenue of the Geonic aca-
demies of Sura and Pumbedita partly derived from investments in real estate.²⁸
In those cases, the landowners were an institution and not a particular person.
It is also necessary to gain a better understanding of the lands owned by the Ex-
ilarchs, like those of the Bustanai family who monopolized this function over the
entire period in question.²⁹ Do we add them to lay landowners? Did they own
their lands in a private capacity or did their lands relate to the Exilarchate?
Christian/East Syrian Landowners
The history of the Sasanian period shows that the East Syrian population in
Lower Iraq was of ancient settlement; Kashkar was the oldest diocese known
in the area.³⁰ Two ecclesiastical provinces, Bēth Aramayē and Maysān, were
noted in the region both during the Sasanian period and after the Islamic con-
quest. Our knowledge of the history of East Syrian population after that conquest
is still incomplete.
In Lower Iraq, this lack of knowledge is partially because studies have main-
ly been made on the Church of the East and its catholicos³¹ or on monastic his-
tory. The lack of materials devoted to this region in comparison with what we are
 A query addressed to Hayy Gaon (g. 939– 1034) about “a Jew and a Gentile who took a field
in partnership” (mentioned in Gil, 2004, 597; reference Toratān shel re’s, II, 57 (no. 3)) and a
query addressed to Naḥshōn Gaon (g. 872–879) about “a Jew who took a field from someone
and his deed of sale was lost” (mentioned in Gil 2004, 598; reference Akargā: Resp. Shaʿarē ṣ,
53a (no. 53)).
 Ackerman-Lieberman 2015, reference of the taqqanah: Lewin, VII, no. 531.
 Morony 1984a, 313.
 Brody 1998, 15, 39. On the last page, Brody refers to a letter giving an indication of these
lands.
 Goode 1940.
 Fiey 1968, 151.
 For example, Putman 1975.
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able to trace for al-Jazīra also explains the information gap.³² It is, however, im-
portant to recall the ground-breaking works of Jean-Maurice Fiey,³³ who showed
that it is possible to gain information about ownership of lands and landowners
by leafing through chronicles or monastic histories.³⁴ It is also possible to resort
to the legal writings of Henanishoʿ (catholicos 65–73 H/685–693 CE),³⁵ or to the
ecclesiastical Regulations of Timothy I (catholicos 163–208 H/780–823 CE),³⁶
which deal for example with inheritance law and monastic property and thus
provide information about East Syrian landowners. East Syrian synods also
need to be taken into account, especially regarding Church properties.³⁷ This
documentation demonstrates that landholding was meaningful at that time,
and that land remained an important form of wealth. As Richard Payne wrote
in an inspiring article: “Bishops and Christian landed elites[…] dominated Chris-
tian communities in Mesopotamia and Fārs on the basis of authorities, institu-
tions and properties established during the Sasanian period[…]”³⁸ This is con-
firmed by the primary sources.
At the very end of the 7th century, much evidence about inheritance laws dur-
ing the patriarchate of Henanishoʿ can be found in the letters sent to him and
preserved in his Judgments. The case of Ahōnā is one such. Ahōnā came from
Karka d-Beit and married, in addition to his legitimate wife, another woman
in Ākōlā (=al-Kūfa).³⁹ When he died, his sons solicited an episcopal ruling on
whether or not the second wife was eligible to receive any inheritance. The letter
provides indications of the landed property belonging to Ahōnā, who owned not
only estates in Karka d-Beit but also in al-Kūfa.⁴⁰ The decision taken by Hena-
nishoʿ provides precious information about the conditions of private property.
One century later, catholicos Timothy I was also concerned with inheritance
issues and monastic property, as we can see from the 45 paragraphs (§44 to §99)
devoted to these matters in his Regulations for Ecclesiastical Judgments and In-
 See the study of Robinson 2000.
 Fiey 1968, 1980, 1990.
 Among them: Zuqnīn Chronicle; Īshōʿdnah, The Book of Chastity; Thomas of Marga, The Book
of Governors.
 Henanishoʿ, “Judgments”, in Sachau 1908, II, 1–51.
 Timothy I, “Regulations”, in Sachau 1908, II, 54– 117.
 Chabot 1902.
 Payne 2014, 4–5.
 Karka d-Beit was located in al-Jazīra outside of Lower Iraq and is usually referred to as Karka
d-Beit Slok according to Payne (2014, 4–5). I would like to thank Philip Wood who advised me
about the existence of another Karka: Karka de Ledan in Khūzistān.
 Henanishoʿ, “Judgments”, in Sachau 1908, II, 26–28.
Landowners in Lower Iraq during the 8th Century: Types and Interplays 77
heritance.⁴¹ It also proves that there were still East Syrian landowners at that
time. Timothy I begins his canonical rulings by explaining why he was late an-
swering the demands of Jacob, the metropolitan primate of Maysān, and those of
Rayy, Ḥabbībhā and many other laymen.⁴² The East Syrian population were ask-
ing for regulation and the answer of the catholicos fulfilled that need. As far as
inheritance law is concerned, it can be assumed that the ruling answered many
problems encountered by East Syrian landowners, such as keeping estates with-
in the community after the death of a male family head. The potential loss of es-
tates after the death of one notable may also help to understand why paragraph
§57 states that when a man or a woman had no heir, their inheritance was to be
given to the Church.⁴³ All these regulations may indicate changes that East Sy-
rian landowners had to face in Lower Iraq during the 8th century, and points
out a concurrent decrease in non-Muslim Jewish and Christian landowners. It
may also indicate an attempt by the East Syrian Church to enlarge its properties,
since the question of unclaimed lands was also discussed by Muslim jurists.
Institutional ownership or ecclesiastical landholding—meaning lands be-
longing to the Church, including monastic property—were discussed in East Sy-
rian legal documentation. There is no doubt that institutional ownership existed
at that time; church and monastery estates were registered as early as 554 CE.⁴⁴
The East Syrian Church, together with its monasteries, was an important land-
owner. In the Judgments of Henanishoʿ and in the Regulations of Timothy I,
many cases related to monasteries. Paragraph §78 of the Regulations of Timothy I
is about lands belonging to a deserted monastery. As there was no other monas-
tery in the city, the question was whether the church of the city or a foreign mon-
astery inherited the property of the deserted monastery.⁴⁵ The rule does not apply
to Lower Iraqi monasteries in particular but there were monasteries located in
Lower Iraq,⁴⁶ such as the monastery of Gabriel of Kashkar close to Dayr
Qunnā in the village of Karsa⁴⁷ or the monastery of Mār Sawrīshoʿ (Dayr Wāsiṭ).⁴⁸
Some landowners within the Christian population cannot be regarded as re-
gional landlords but rather as imperial or trans-regional landowners; Jibrīl
Bukhtīshūʿ was one of them, as was the entire Bukhtīshūʿ family. Both his father
 Timothy I, “Regulations”, in Sachau 1908, II, 88– 115.
 Timothy I, “Regulations”, in Sachau 1908, II, 56–57.
 Timothy I, “Regulations”, in Sachau 1908, II, 96–97.
 Morony 1981, 145.
 Timothy I, “Regulations”, in Sachau 1908, II, 108– 109.
 As evidenced by the Kitāb al-Diyarāt, written by Muslim authors like al-Shābushtī (d. 988).
 Fiey 1968, 170.
 Fiey 1968, 171.
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and his grandfather were directors of the Jundīshāpūr academy in Iran. Jibrīl was
first the physician of Yaḥyā b. Barmak, then of Hārūn al-Rashīd, and finally of al-
Amīn.⁴⁹ Thanks to Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, author of ʿUyūn al-anmāʾ fi ṭabaqāt al-aṭib-
bāʾ, we know that during the fratricidal war between al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn,
the houses and farms of Jibrīl in Baghdad, al-Baṣra and al-Ahwāz were sacked.⁵⁰
He thus owned properties in each of these areas. He also had multiple other es-
tates, notably in his home region of Khūzistān.
It is also necessary to ask to what extent the East Syrian Church and its of-
ficials were imperial landlords.
The Case of the Dahāqīn in Lower Iraq
Dahāqīn have to be added to the group of regional landowners in the same way
as the previously named landowners. It is complicated to classify them as a non-
Muslim group owing to the fact that a large number of them converted to Islam.⁵¹
However, we cannot exclude the possibility that some of them were Christian or
Zoroastrian, before or after the Islamic conquest.
They represented regional landowners in the sense that they were tied to the
land of this region. It is worth noting that during the Sasanian period, they could
be regarded as imperial landowners because they were part of the Sasanian aris-
tocracy—its lower caste, in charge of administration in the name of the Sasanian
kings. They were also responsible for the collection of taxes and more generally
were village heads. Not all of them were of Persian origin; we have found Ara-
maeans among them.⁵² As these Aramaean dahāqīn were regional landowners
and part of the Sasanian administration, they can be regarded as imperial elites
as well. This again blurs the lines between specific types.
If the 7th century can be seen as a golden age for the dahāqīn, the 8th century
was the period of their decline as landowners. Initially they took advantage of
the Islamic conquest to strengthen their administrative role on the one hand
and their estates on the other. Their conversion to Islam might explain this,
but not exclusively. In some cases, evidence indicates that they did not only
keep their lands, but also enlarged their estates by absorbing some of the former
 Putman 1975, 98– 101.
 Ibn Abī Usaybiʿa, ʿUyūn al-anmāʾ, 255.
 Morony 1984a, 205.
 For example Ṣalūba b. Nistūnā, who was lord of Quss al-Nāṭif and of most of the lands be-
tween the two branches of the Euphrates in the sawād of al-Ḥīra (al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 245; al-
Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, III, 367).
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Sasanian crown lands.⁵³ The beginning of the 8th century was a turning point in
their condition. As noted before, the upheaval of Ibn al-Ashʿath in 81–82 H/700–
701 CE was important to the history of Lower Iraq and especially to the dahāqīn
who may have supported the rebellion.⁵⁴ During this upheaval, the register of the
Sasanian crown lands, which had been recovered under Muʿāwiya thanks to ʿAb-
dallāh b. Darrāj,⁵⁵ was burned.⁵⁶ People then seized lands and made them their
own.
This anecdote, reported by al-Balādhurī, may be indicative of the dahāqīn’s
desire to keep the land they had seized after the conquest—land the Umayyad
state wanted to gain. The dahāqīn had suffered from the suppression of the up-
heaval, a suppression whose repercussions were far-reaching. Some dikes were
destroyed, making lands uncultivable, and al-Ḥajjāj refused to fix the irrigation
system, a decision which most probably ruined the dahāqīn.⁵⁷
Once again, this obvious decline may not have applied to the entire region of
al-Sawād. Al-Yaʿqūbī, who wrote his Kitāb al-Buldān during the 9th century, ex-
plained that Dayr ʿAqul (not far from Nahrawān), Jarjarāyā and Mādarāya
were all inhabited by Persian notables, specifying qawm dahāqīn ashrāf in the
case of Dayr ʿAqul.⁵⁸ In northeast Lower Iraq, there were thus still groups of land-
owners with Persian origins.
We must eventually discuss the relevance of the term dahāqīn two centuries
after the conquest, especially once the dahāqīn converted to Islam. Some of
those belonging to this group might have become henceforth part of the Muslim
regional elites, quoted in the sources under their Muslim names without any
clarification of their Sasanian background.
Muslim Landowners: Between Regional and Imperial Elites
By definition, the first Muslim landowners were originally part of the imperial
elite. They did not come from Mesopotamia, but settled there in the course of
the Islamic conquest and the founding of the amṣār. These incoming imperial
elites were the ancestors of the regionally born Muslim landowners who lived
during the 8th century, when the heirs of conqueror families can be counted
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, 258.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 293.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, II, 258; Al-Qāḍī 2006, 359.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 272–273; Abū Yūsuf, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 1, 69.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 293.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 1, 158.
80 Noëmie Lucas
among Muslim landowners in Lower Iraq. This was, for example, the case of the
family of Abū Bakra,⁵⁹ one of the founders of al-Baṣra, whose relatives were
known as important landowners.⁶⁰
The grandson of Abū Bakra, Bashīr b. ʿUbaydallāh b. Abī Bakra, was in-
volved in conflicts related to land during the 8th century.⁶¹ The family of Abū
Mūsā al-Ashʿarī,⁶² in particular his grandson Bilāl b. Abī Burda, was also part
of the group of landowners in the area.⁶³ The Banū l-Muhallab should addition-
ally be taken into account during this period, especially Yazīd b. al-Muhallab
and his close family.
By multiple means, Banū l-Muhallab and Yazīd became major landowners in
Lower Iraq, but their territorial establishment was not limited to it. They forged
ties in Khurāsān as well due to their government positions there.⁶⁴ These region-
al Muslim landowners, tied to Lower Iraq since the Islamic conquest, participat-
ed in the working of the larger Islamic Empire by holding offices that brought
them close to the imperial administration. The relation between government
function and landholding is obvious since parts of the estates of these families
were acquired by grants,⁶⁵ so that imperial elites and regional landholding were
intertwined. How regional landowners became eligible for government positions
is also consistent. Thus, it was through their regional power and networks that
they became imperial elites. This aspect of the explanation is strengthened by
evidence proving that estates of these families were not only the result of grants
but were also purchased.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, participation in government does not
alter the fact that these landowners were regional ones, with regional ties.
 Pellat, “Abū Bakra”, EI2, I, 14.
 In Morony 1984b, 213, M. Morony gives, using al-Balādhurī’s Futūḥ, evidence of their estates
in Lower Iraq.
 With Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, who dug a canal in a land grant of Bashīr and then tried to pres-
sure him into a document of title to this canal (al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 365); and also, under the
governorate of Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī, with Ḥimyarī b. Hilāl when Bashīr himself tried
to gain the possession of part of his land grants by digging a canal (al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 364).
 Lecker, “Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī”, EI3, http:// referenceworks.brillonline.com.ezproxy.univ-par-
is1.fr/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/al-ashari-abu-musa-COM_24243?s.num=1&s.q=Abū+Mū-
sā+al-Ashʿarī (accessed May 30, 2017).
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 353, 364.
 Crone, “Yazīd ibn al-Muhallab”, EI2, VII, 361.
 It is, for example, known that Yazīd b. al-Muhallab received as much of the swamps as he
wanted from Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (al-Balādhurī, Futūh, 369).
 Bilāl b. Abī Burda bought the land he then called Bilālān from ʿAbbād b. Ziyād (al-
Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 353).
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Some elites owned lands in Lower Iraq but were not specifically tied to the
region at first. In the case of al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf or Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī, for
example, the political careers of both indicate they have to be considered trans-
regional elites. Their families were not specially bonded to Lower Iraq.⁶⁷ Both be-
came landowners in the area during their respective governorates.⁶⁸ Khālid
b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī lost most of his estates to caliphal confiscation following
his dismissal,⁶⁹ implying his landholding was linked to his government posi-
tion.⁷⁰
The ʿAbbāsid takeover and the shift of the center of gravity from Syria to Iraq
impacted landowners and landholding in Lower Iraq. A study of Muslim land-
owners in the area during the first decades of the ʿAbbāsid rule indicates an in-
crease in those we can refer to as imperial landowners, in the sense that they
were less tied to Lower Iraq and lived in Baghdad.⁷¹ This type of landlord was
not entirely new, since the Umayyad family had owned large estates in Lower
Iraq before.
Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik was the landlord of important parts of al-baṭāʾiḥ.⁷²
The caliph Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik also acquired large estates through reclama-
tion and development,⁷³ though to a certain extent it remains unknown whether
those estates were part of the ṣawāfī, the private property of the caliph, or both
at the same time. The ʿAbbāsid takeover was followed by the rise of non-regional
landowners, mainly the ʿAbbāsid family. Al-Manṣūr possessed lands in Lower
 Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī was, according to the prosopographic work of Crone 1980, 102,
the grandson of a man who settled in Syria. His father is known to have participated to the battle
of Marj Rāhiṭ on the side of Ibn al-Zubayr. Khālid was governor of Mecca before his nomination
in Iraq. As for al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, he was born in al-Ṭāʾif in Arabia, where he spent his youth and
where he is known to have been a teacher, participated in some battles and served as governor
of Tabāla. He then moved to Syria, served in the shurṭa and began his rise in importance (Die-
trich, “al-Hadjdjādj ibn Yūsuf”, EI2, III, 41–45).
 Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī (see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, VII, 151–152; al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 290);
al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf (al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 289–90: in the course of the building of al-Wāsiṭ;
Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, 92–95: Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik seized land belonging to the
grandson of al-Ḥajjāj).
 See al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, VII, 152
 That Khālid owed his wealth to his governmental function is made quite clear in al-
Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ashrāf (IX, 31– 109).
 The question of absentee landlords is not broached here, but there is no doubt that in many
cases these imperial landlords were rarely personally present. Even regional landowners may
have lived in al-Baṣra or al-Kūfa and managed their estates in the countryside at a distance.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 294; Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 1, 169–70.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 293; Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, Kitāb al-Kharāj, 240; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh,VII, 142–
143.
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Iraq.⁷⁴ Al-Ṭabarī reported that the canal al-Khayzurāniyya was named after the
ʿAbbāsid caliph al-Mahdī’s wife al-Khayzurān, and that another’s name was de-
rived from her secretary ʿUmar b. Mihrān.⁷⁵ It seems accurate to say that these
were imperial, not regional, landowners.
Distinctions should be made when it comes to other members of the ʿAbbā-
sid family, some of whom built links with Lower Iraq and settled there. One of
the best examples is Sulaymān b. ʿAlī, who in all probability settled in al-
Baṣra when he was appointed governor of the area.⁷⁶ He acquired a large number
of estates through grants and irrigation projects and his son remained an impor-
tant landlord in the area after him; they can be considered regional landown-
ers.⁷⁷ As in the Marwānid period, proximity to the caliph’s family or government
was a way to gain property under the ʿAbbāsids; high officials were either grant-
ed numerous estates or purchased them. The case of Jibrīl Bukhtīshūʿ has been
mentioned before, as has the Barmakids’ case. As a matter of fact, these land-
owners—in comparison with the Marwānid period—were no longer regional
landowners but rather settled in Baghdad or in other cities where they owned
houses. They were typical trans-regional landowners.
It is important not to underestimate regional landowners. They did not dis-
appear. Non-Muslim landowners were obviously still important. Yet as far as
Muslim landowners are concerned, we can legitimately ask whether or not re-
gional landlords were as important after the takeover of the ʿAbbāsids.
The seizing of the Umayyad estates and the suppression of their supporters
may have changed the pattern of landholding. New grants were given to regional
elites⁷⁸ like Sulaymān b. ʿUbaydallāh b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Hārith b. Nawfal,⁷⁹ who
received land from Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ in al-Baṣra region.⁸⁰ Some elites who
had fallen into disfavor under the Umayyads managed to retrieve part of their
lands after the ʿAbbāsid takeover; the Muhallabī example is a striking one.⁸¹
In spite of some confiscation, a certain amount of Muslim landowners remained
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 362, 371–372.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, IX, 491; Verkinderen 2018, 519–520.
 He was first nominated in 133 H/751 CE (Ibn Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh, 412).
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 349, 369, 370–371. His son Muḥammad,who inherited his fortune when
he died in 173 H/789 CE, lost these estates when the caliph seized his fortune (al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh,
VIII, 237).
 Who may have been supporters of the ʿAbbāsid cause.
 Sulaymān was an akhbārī, as we may note from al-Ṭabarī, and potentially from al-Saffāḥ’s
reign. His grandfather ʿAbdallāh (d. 84 H/703 CE) is said to have been a notable man settled in
al-Baṣra. He was governor of the city in 64 H/684 CE.
 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, 92–95; Tillier 2009, 592–596.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 367.
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on their lands, as indicated by al-Balādhurī regarding the estates named al-Mas-
rukhānān. These belonged to the family of Abū Bakra.⁸² Some parts of them were
confiscated by al-Manṣūr, but the rest remained their property.⁸³
The regional landowner elite was then composed of non-Muslim (mainly Jewish
and East Syrian) as well as Muslim people. Two main differences existed be-
tween these two populations. The first group was of ancient settlement. After
the Islamic conquest, they continued to own land. The second group only settled
in Lower Iraq for about 50 to 60 years, and may be addressed in terms of gen-
erations since the first conquerors can be seen as imperial rather than regional
elites. It is different for their sons, even more so for their grandsons. Two gener-
ations after the conquest, Muslim inhabitants of Lower Iraq had become elite re-
gional landowners; they were born there and bonded to the area individually
and sometimes professionally.
The second difference between the two populations is in their relationship
with the Islamic Empire. The Muslim regional elites often played a role in the
working of the Empire and in that respect were regional as well as imperial
elites. There was apparently a link between governing and landholding, since
parts of the estates of these Muslim families were acquired by grants. To a certain
extent, the imperial role taken on by regional elites might also be applied to the
non-Muslim group, for example the ecclesiastical elites (particularly at the high-
est level of the Exilarch and catholicos).
These sample types of landowners in Lower Iraq are put forward to single
out relevant categories for the study of landholding, landowners and more gen-
erally for the history of Lower Iraq during the 8th century. These types should not
however be considered completely accurate without a study of the location of
specific estates. Grants were often located in the al-Baṣra area or in swamps.
The lands around al-Kūfa were mainly owned by Jews and those around Wāsiṭ
by East Syrians. This study of estate locations is difficult to carry out at scale
but it is certainly useful regionally. The interplay between the diverse groups
of landowners defined here aids in grasping the changes that occurred in the
course of the 8thcentury, and helps the work of localization. The different modal-
ities and interactions also help to explain the power ratios at stake at that time in
Lower Iraq.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 365.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 365.
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Interplays
By interactions, I do not only mean inter-group relationships; intra-group ones
must also be considered. Types are inaccurate when not associated with a
study of their interactions. As far as landowners are concerned, these examples
of interplay may be distinguished in three ways. The first is related to the acquis-
ition of estates, the second to the loss of properties. The last stems from conflicts
over land; these were sometimes linked to the purchase of estates. These three
aspects of interaction sometimes became entangled.
Acquiring an Estate
Most people involved in purchasing land during the 8th century were Muslim
landowners. Non-Muslim landowners already owned lands at the time of the
conquest and in the main their heirs inherited them. The inheritance of estates
may be part of the acquisition of lands, but only passively. Non-Muslim landown-
ers were not marginalized and certainly purchased lands on occasion, but the
fact remains that written sources contain more information about Muslim land-
owners. According to the available materials, one of the first ways to become a
landowner was related to land grants. This type of acquisition did not necessarily
entail an interaction between two persons or two groups, as in (for example)
land reclamation.
Land Grants
Land grants are one of the main interactions regarding land purchase, linking
imperial elites—primary the caliphs—to regional elites. Those receiving land dur-
ing the 8th century were mainly high officials (governors, quḍāt, shurṭa chiefs) or
relatives of the caliphs and mawālī. Al-Balādhurī can be singled out as one of the
main authors providing information regarding these grants.⁸⁴ Although the
source is rather recent, al-Balādhurī notably⁸⁵ used the works of al-Qaḥdhamī
as a source.⁸⁶ Al-Qaḥdhamī was a Baṣran akhbārī whose grandfather Qaḥdham
was a financial secretary and/or in charge of the tax office in Iraq under al-Ḥajjāj
 This information was found through al-Balādhurī’s Futūḥ al-Buldān.
 Al-Balādhurī used 35 pieces of information from this akhbārī in the section about al-Baṣra.
 See the article of al-Qāḍī 2010, 258–266.
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b. Yūsuf, Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī and Yūsuf b. ʿUmar al-Thaqafī.⁸⁷ He may
have transmitted information whose authority was based on some lost govern-
ment archive.
Literature about these land grants shows they are an interesting matter that
is worthy of discussion.⁸⁸ For my purposes, this is primarily in terms of the inter-
plays that land grants broached. Thanks to the qaṭāʾiʿ, grantees became land-
lords of their estates with full ownership.⁸⁹ Land grants could be associated
with land reclamation,⁹⁰ but such reclamation was also possible during the
8th century without a grant.
Land grants established an interaction between two groups: the granter and
the grantee/receiver. For Islamic landowners, land grants can be seen as the pri-
mary way to acquire land, via a method implying a relationship with the caliph.
Such relationships were inter-group as well as intra-group: caliphs granted land
to regional officials and local notables (regional elites), ⁹¹ especially during the
Marwānid period, but also gave estates to relatives and mawālī (imperial
elites).⁹² I must emphasize the continuation of grants under ʿAbbāsid rule to
members of the ʿAbbāsid family⁹³ and ʿAbbāsid followers,⁹⁴ especially important
figures of the central government; that may indicate a rise of intra-group grants
within imperial elites.
Buying Land
The purchase of lands was another way to become a landowner, one that plainly
implies an interaction between the buyer and the seller. This interaction adds the
seller to the group of those losing land, while for the buyer the purchase is a way
 al-Qāḍī 2010, 264–265.
 For example Morony 1984b; Kennedy 2004, 2014; Verkinderen 2018.
 It is debatable, but I argue that at that time the qaṭāʿī meant a grant of landownership. See
Abū Yūsuf (Kitāb al-kharāj, I, 73): اًدِحاَوَبَصَغِبِصاَغْلاَِةلِزْنَمِباَذَهَفَرَخآاَهَعَطْقأَواًضَْرأٍدِحاَوِدَيْنِمِيلاَولاَذََخأْنإ
َرَخآىَطَْعأَو .
 About land reclamation see Verkinderen 2018.
 For example, Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik granted ʿUmar b. Hubayra land seized from Yazīd b. al-
Muhallab (al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 367).
 Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik granted some of the land confiscated from Yazīd b. al-Muhallab to
his son (al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 369).
 This was for example the case of Sulaymān b. ʿAlī, who was granted the estate called ʿAb-
bāsān by Abū l-ʿAbbās (al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 369).
 Yaqṭīn ṣāḥib al-daʿwa—who was certainly Yaqṭīn b. Mūsā—received several ḍiyaʿas in al-
Sawād in the early period of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate (Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, Kitāb al-Kharāj, I, 17;
about Yaqṭīn, see also Elad 1992, 315–316).
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to join the group of those who own an estate. There is evidence of a real-estate
market in the sale of land between Muslim elites. Bilāl b. Abī Burda, for exam-
ple, is known to have had acquired the estate of ʿAbbād b. Ziyād in this way,⁹⁵
among other tracts of land.⁹⁶ According to Khālid b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Thaqafī,
Wakīʿ also reported that Yaḥyā b. Barmak bought land close to al-Baṣra from
Hārūn al-Rashīd.⁹⁷ In the Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ, Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī, a famous singer
close to Hārūn al-Rashīd, is recorded as wanting to buy the estate (ḍayʿa) next to
his, up for sale at 100,000 dirhams.⁹⁸
As far as these examples are concerned, the purchase created an intra-group
relationship within the Muslim group of landowners. In the case of Bilāl b. Abī
Burda and ʿAbbād b. Ziyād, the interaction was established within the regional
group of Muslim landowners. In that of Yaḥyā b. Khālid al-Barmakī and Hārūn
al-Rashīd, it happened within the imperial group. Despite this, there is nothing
to preclude the purchase of lands between non-Muslim and Muslim groups,
though there is no extant evidence of it over the course of the 8th century in
Lower Iraq. Legal sources composed at the end of the 8th century do indicate
some examples of selling of lands following the Islamic conquest, and provide
interesting information devoted to the question of kharāj lands and transactions
between ahl al-kitāb and Muslims.⁹⁹ The fact that the jurists found it important to
broach this theme shows that some Muslim elites must have bought land from
non-Muslim elites.
The market did not represent the principal interaction between groups of
landowners. Land purchase was not the main way of gaining an estate, especial-
ly from the end of the century when legal sources began to forbid (up to a point)
the purchase of kharāj lands. This ban may be understood as a way for the ʿAb-
bāsid rulers to keep control of the land market and avoid the reduction of taxes.
It may be possible to connect the normative decision formulated in these
sources with another way to acquire land.
 He was one of the four sons of Ziyād b. Abīhi.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 353: ʿAbbād b. Ziyād’s land is called qaṭīʿā, indicating he received it as
grant. It attests that the grantee was allowed to sell his grant.
 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, I, 143.
 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ, 214.
 For this matter see, in their respective English translations: Ibn Sallām from tradition 194 to
230 dealt with “The purchase of lands annexed by force…”; Yaḥyā b. Ādam collected 57 tradi-
tions (136– 193) about “The ban of the purchase of kharāj lands”.
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Taljiʾa and Ḥimāya: A Process of Purchasing Land?
Interactions between landowners regarding the purchase of land include what
have been called taljiʾa and ḥimāya. These concepts refer to habits and institu-
tions of protection more or less unknown by the fiqh, even though they seemed
important in Islamic society. The taljiʾa indicates an interaction concerning the
acquisition of land as well as its loss. It is particularly noteworthy since on
the one hand it connects groups with each other but not necessarily within
themselves, and on the other it contributes to the decrease in small landowners
in Lower Iraq—perhaps specifically to the decrease in non-Muslim landowners.
The taljiʾa referred to a process via which an independent landed proprietor
asked for protection (ḥimāya), or more precisely placed his land under the pro-
tection (aljaʾa) of a bigger landowner. This protector was then registered in the
fiscal dīwān, preserving the smaller landowner from extortion. The protégée,
who had secured himself and indemnified his estates, had to provide financial
compensation to the protector in addition to the usual taxes.¹⁰⁰ The definition
given by al-Khwārizmī in Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm does not say anything about this com-
pensation, though.¹⁰¹ In the chapter devoted to secretaryship (al-kitāba), in the
section on the technical terms used by the secretaries in the dīwān al-kharāj,
the taljiʾa is defined as “when a weak person hands over (yuljiʾa) his property
(ḍayʿa) to a strong one so that the latter may protect it. Plurals for the word
are malājiʾ and talājiʾ. The strong person usually protects the property which
its owner (ṣāḥib) has entrusted to him.”¹⁰² Even if financial compensation is
not mentioned, the fact that during the 10th century the taljiʾa was considered
one of the technical terms a secretary of the diwān al-kharāj needed to know
and understand suggests that it was a custom at that time.
The process of taljiʾa was not limited to Lower Iraq. Evidence of it can be
found in Fārs, Khūzistān¹⁰³ and even further—Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm may have been
dedicated to a Sāmānid wazīr of Nīshāpūr.¹⁰⁴ In Khūzistān, a landlord from al-
Ahwāz asked Abū Ayyūb, a secretary of al-Manṣūr,¹⁰⁵ to register the landlord’s
estate under his name in order to protect him from the ʿummāl in exchange
for 100,000 dirhams every year.¹⁰⁶ As far as the south of Iraq is concerned,
 Cahen, “Ḥimāya”, EI2, III, 406–407; Lokkegaard 1950, 67–68.
 Al-Khwārizmī, Mafātīḥ al-ʿulūm, 73.
 Translation of Bosworth 1969, 138.
 Fārs: al-Iṣṭakhrī, Kitāb Masālik al-mamālik, 158; Khūzistān: al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ,
118.
 Sabra, “al-Khwārizmī”, EI2, IV, 1100–1101.
 Sourdel 1960, 1, 78–87.
 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ, 118.
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one of the most striking examples of the taljiʾa is recorded in al-Balādhurī’s
Futūḥ al-buldān and concerns Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik.¹⁰⁷ At the beginning
of the 8th century, under the governorate of al-Ḥajjāj and the reign of al-Walīd,
Maslama is known to have invested 3,000,000 dirhams in the restoration of
an irrigation system and in return gained possession of certain lands.¹⁰⁸ Many
landowners are said to have voluntarily turned their lands over to him.¹⁰⁹
Some evidence can also be found in the first ʿAbbāsid decades, when according
to al-Tanūkhī a landowner offered al-Manṣūr 25 percent of the products of his
land in addition to the usual tax provided that the caliph registered the land
under his own name.¹¹⁰ In al-Jazīra, the author of the Chronicle of Zuqnīn ex-
plained that around 155– 163 H/772–779 CE, some landowners/farmers sought
protection from local chiefs.¹¹¹ These few examples are representative of the im-
plicit relationship in the taljiʾa: between the one seeking protection and the pro-
tector, or between the small landowner and the larger.
These examples also make it possible to understand two of the reasons ex-
plaining the cause of the process. The ḥimāya of Maslama needs to be contex-
tualized. Because of the upheaval of Ibn al-Ashʿath, damage was done to the
dikes that grew worse. It is possible to link this and the demand of al-Ḥajjāj
to al-Walīd.¹¹² In that case, the taljiʾa may be related to the caliphal refusal to
take over upkeep and the subsequent recourse to a private investor in the person
of Maslama. The small landowners seeking ḥimāya might have been in a difficult
economic situation (perhaps with uncultivable lands).
The other two examples, plus that of Khūzistān, are quite different. They
refer to the harsh tax-levy and its excesses, especially those of the tax collec-
tors.¹¹³ They are representative of the reasons behind the taljiʾa, at least at the
beginning of the ʿAbbāsid period. Epistles dedicated to al-Manṣūr and al-
Mahdī condemn this harsh tax-levy as well as the abuses of the tax collectors.
So much can be read in the Risālat al-ṣahāba composed by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
for al-Manṣūr,¹¹⁴ and in the Risāla addressed to al-Mahdī by ʿUbaydallāh b. al-
Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī, who was qāḍī of Baṣra between 156 H/773 CE and 166– 167
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 294; Qudāma b. Jaʿfar, Kitāb al-Kharāj, I, 169–70.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 294.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 294; in Arabic: هبزّزعتللةريثكاعايضاهيلاسانلاأجلاونيضرالاكلترمعو
 Al-Tanūkhī, Nishwār, VIII, 76.
 Chronicle of Denys of Tell Mahré, 138.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 294.
 Chronicle of Denys of Tell Mahré, 138, and al-Tanūkhī, Nishwār, VIII, 76.
 Ibn Muqaffaʿ, Risāla, 117.
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H/782–784 CE.¹¹⁵ The consequences of the ʿAbbāsid tax policy on landholding
patterns¹¹⁶ may explain why the process still went on in the 10th century and
thus be part of the explanation of the lessening of small landholding after all.
In terms of interplays, the taljiʾa created interesting relationships between
the groups of the typology. No indication is provided regarding those who turned
their estates over to Maslama. Knowing that it took place in Lower Iraq at the
beginning of the century, it can be assumed that the protégées were either
from groups of non-Muslim landowners or the dahāqīn (whether Muslim or
not). The hypothesis of the dahāqīn using this seems likely because of the diffi-
culties they faced at the time.¹¹⁷ In the Jazīran example, there is no doubt that the
landowners asking for protection were Christians.¹¹⁸ As far as the village chiefs
are concerned, we can also assume that they were a part of the Christian popu-
lation if we follow Chase F. Robinson’s discussion of the shahārija.¹¹⁹ It corre-
sponds to an intra-group relationship or an inter-group one. The al-Manṣūr
case is more complicated but as in Maslama’s example it was an inter-group
meeting between imperial and local elites.
Why can taljiʾa be added to the process of purchasing lands? Strictly speak-
ing, the protected individual should have remained the owner of his estates. This
was a subject of debate between academics who wrote about taljiʾa and
ḥimāya.¹²⁰ This agreement was unstated, and the name of the original owners
was removed from the tax register—meaning that it could become impossible
for them to establish actual ownership. According to Claude Cahen and
Ḥusām al-Sāmarrāie, what was at first joint property became, as time passed,
the property of the protector. The original landowner was reduced to a share-
 Tillier 2006, 147–148, 162.
 Ackerman-Lieberman 2015, online. The question of the consequences of the ʿAbbāsid tax
policy can also be related to the promotion of a new assessment system in al-Sawād, the muqā-
sama. On this question, see for example Campopiano 2011.
 See above regarding the dahāqīn and the refusal of al-Ḥajjāj to fix irrigation infrastructures.
 The Chronicle of Zuqnīn/Chronicle of Denis of Tell Mahré deals with the Christian popula-
tion.
 According to Robinson 2000, 90– 108, the name shahārija was given to some local notables
who were part, like the dahāqīn, of the nobility of al-Sawād during the Sasanian period. They
were however superior in rank to the dahāqīn.
 Claude Cahen and Fred Lokkegaard seem to disagree, since Lokkegaard wrote that “On en-
tering the taljiʾa the one who cedes his ḍayʿa loses his milk in it” (1950, 68) and Cahen thought
that the protégée remained the official owner of his land but lost real control of it over time
(Cahen, “Ḥimāya”, EI2, III, 406–407).
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cropper.¹²¹ This observation may be corroborated by the use of the term muzā-
riʿūn.¹²² For the protectors, the taljiʾa was a way to gradually purchase land.
The use of taljiʾa as a way to protect property may explain the decrease in
numbers of small landowners, especially among the non-Muslim groups, or
rather their drop in status to estate share-croppers rather than owners. It is
not a coincidence that fiqh literature about contracts, and especially all types
of sharecropping contracts, is fairly developed even when taljiʾa is still unknown
by the fiqh.¹²³ Since precise examples of taljiʿa are scarce, it was either not a very
extensive phenomenon, or practically speaking it referred to share-cropping or a
similar contract. The latter may also explain why the taljiʾa was an unstated
agreement since the rules governing share-cropping were strict in fiqh literature.
The links between taljiʾa and share-cropping need further study in order to better
understand the difference between ownership and possession of an estate. The
scope of the phenomenon needs to be properly reckoned since narratives give
little evidence of the taljiʾa as such.
The fact remains that the taljiʾa may be regarded as part of a process leading
to the loss of an estate.
The Loss of Estates
Losing an estate is the other side of the transaction, whether via selling or the
taljiʾa. Some loss of estates might also be related to inheritance. The heirs of a
landowner inherited his estates.Without heirs, notably without sons, various is-
sues emerged regardless of the concerned landowner group.¹²⁴ Questions of in-
heritance will not be tackled in the course of this paper; I will rather concentrate
on the seizure of estates, which reflects an important power dynamic of the time.
The confiscation of estates occurred frequently during the 8th century. It
could only happen as part of an unequal relationship. The power to seize land
was the exclusive preserve of the supreme authority, the caliph. Even leaving
out the massive confiscation of Umayyad landed estates carried out immediately
following the takeover of the ʿAbbāsids, land seizure remains significant. New
landlords were promoted whereas others lost their lands. Lands owned by Mas-
lama b. ʿAbd al-Malik,¹²⁵ for example, were confiscated by the ʿAbbāsids and
 al-Sāmarrāie 1972, 131; Cahen, “Ḥimayā”, EI2, III, 406–407.
 Cahen 1956, I, 273.
 See al-Ṭabarī, Kitāb Ikhtilāf al-fuqahāʾ, 141– 170.
 See above regarding Jewish and Christian landowners.
 And in the course of which some farmers asked for protection.
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granted to Dāʾūd b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās, a brother of Sulaymān
b. ʿAlī.¹²⁶ The seizing of Umayyad lands took place in a characteristic context.
What must be remembered is the ʿAbbāsid action of confiscation was not only
limited to the takeover period and to Lower Iraq. It may be regarded as an ʿAb-
bāsid policy, “a general process encompassing the entire caliphal domains.”¹²⁷
A pattern can be seen in the cases of confiscation described during the
Marwānid and the ʿAbbāsid periods. The seizing of land points out interplays be-
tween imperial elites and regional elites as well as within imperial groups. Both
instances take place within the Muslim group of landowners who work as high
officials for the Islamic Empire. There are multiple cases among them, including
the confiscation of the Muhallabid estates as a result of the upheaval of Yazīd
and his suppression¹²⁸ and the seizing of the possessions of Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh
al-Qasrī after his dismissal.¹²⁹ During the ʿAbbāsid 8th century, there is the con-
fiscation of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. ʿAlī l-ʿAbbāsī’s estates after his death
ended his governorate in al-Baṣra,¹³⁰ and the seizing of the Barmakids’ estates.¹³¹
In each case, seizure took on the guise of punishment and was added to a set of
other sentences.¹³² Seizure was the most relevant because it linked caliphal pol-
icies of centralization and land control. Seizing these estates meant properties
gained by the caliphal authority swung the balance of power in the state’s
favor. It may even be indicative of a formal state policy designed to monopolize
as much land as possible in the strategic region of Lower Iraq. Land remained an
essential basis of wealth.¹³³
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 294.
 Elad 2016, 103.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 369.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, VII, 152.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, VIII, 237.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, VIII, 296; al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ, 237–293.
 Yazīd was accused of rebelling against the caliphate. Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī was ac-
cused of embezzlement or at least of the fraudulent acquisition of his fortune. Muḥammad b.
Sulaymān b. ʿAlī did not comply with Hārūn al-Rashīd’s orders, especially regarding the ap-
pointment of judges (Tillier 2009, 109– 111). As for the Barmakids, the reasons behind their dis-
favor are not yet clear.
 In this respect, the article of Albrecht Noth, “Some Remarks on the Nationalization of Con-
quered Lands at the Time of the Umayyads” (1984, 227–228), is inspiring since he reaches a sim-
ilar conclusion from the study of ṣulḥan/ʿanwatan traditions in the Iraqi sawād. According to
him, these traditions date to the period between the end of the 7th and the beginning of the
8th centuries. Thus they may reflect a power struggle between the Umayyad government,
which tried to claim as much ʿanwatan land as possible, and the descendants of the conquerors,
who had become landowners and wanted to claim to as much ṣulḥan land as they could.
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Contentious Interplays
While land was a debated legal matter, as may be read in the various Kitāb al-
Kharāj, it was also at the heart of conflicts between landowners in Lower Iraq
during the 8th century. One may say that it even generated those conflicts, or
at least led to contentious relationships. In line with Georg Simmel’s theory
about conflicts, these troubled interplays should not only be seen as creators
of opposition between groups, but also perceived as an interaction forming links.
Lands could be passed down via inheritance and were an important source
of wealth. For that reason competition over who inherited land was fierce follow-
ing the death of the primary male householder. The Judgments of Henanishoʿ
contain many typical inheritance questions and their resolutions. In Ahōnā’s
case,¹³⁴ the question asked is whether or not his second wife in al-Kūfa was al-
lowed to inherit something when he already had a wife and children.¹³⁵ In other
words, the sons of Ahōnā spoke out against their father’s second wife. In this
case, in the end the whole inheritance reverted back to the legitimate widow
and the sons, but the second wife “received an estate” as a residence and source
of income for her lifetime.¹³⁶ This story is not an isolated case. Others like it can
be observed in the Judgments of Henanishoʿ and also in the Regulations of Timo-
thy I.¹³⁷ These troubled interactions happened among East Syrian landowners
but it is not hard to imagine that similar conflicts existed within the groups of
Jewish or Muslim landowners. The question is, to what extent were issues of
land inheritance the subjects of lawsuits or of legal resolution? The existence
of troubled interactions due to inheritance issues regarding lands is highlighted
in this work, and all the questions around it are still an ongoing subject for re-
search.
Other conflicts arose from individuals who opposed each other over owner-
ship of land or its fraudulent purchase. One example of a conflict over land in
Lower Iraq in the course of the 8th century is the case of Bashīr b. ʿUbaydallāh
b. Abī Bakra and Ḥimyarī b. Hilāl, which occurred under Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh
al-Qasrī’s governorate in Iraq. Ḥimyarī b. Hilāl blamed Bashīr for attempting
to gain possession of some of his estates¹³⁸ by digging the al-Murghāb
 Henanishoʿ, “Judgments”, in Sachau 1908, II, 26–28.
 Henanishoʿ, “Judgments”, in Sachau 1908,II, 2–28.
 Henanishoʿ, “Judgments”, in Sachau 1908, II, 26–28.
 See for example Henanishoʿ, “Judgments”, in Sachau 1908, II, 18–21 and 22–23; Timothy I,
“Regulations”, in Sachau 1908, II, 90–93.
 His estates actually belonged to his father and had been granted to him by Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-
Malik.
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canal.¹³⁹ This troubled relationship between two local landowners shows the
depth of competition for the ownership of land at that time. Bashīr, who is
known to have been an important landowner, sought to increase his estates.
This example also shows that the building of canals and dikes was not only
vital for agriculture but might also have been a way to gain possession of land.
Some conflicts are specifically linked to land grant issues. This is true of the
case under al-Mahdī’s reign between Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Nawfalī, whose
grandfather received a land grant from Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ, and the Banū
ʿAbd al-Malik, whose ancestors owned estates granted at the time of the Marwā-
nids until Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik seized them.¹⁴⁰ During al-Mahdī’s reign the
Banū ʿAbd al-Malik tried to reclaim the land their ancestors had lost. They resort-
ed to being helped by the qāḍī and trying to charge Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-
Nawfalī with acquiring their land by force (ghaṣabahum).¹⁴¹ Details of such trou-
bled interplays are not necessarily useful here, but the conflict is a good illustra-
tion of the complexity and consequences of confiscation and ownership. It also
points out issues that might have been raised after the ʿAbbāsid takeover and
their redistribution of the Umayyad estates.
The landowner point of view offers a relevant angle to grasp the diversity of
Lower Iraqi elites. This variety can be couched in terms of religion and also in
ties to the larger Islamic Empire. The distinction between regional and imperial
or trans-regional landowners is inspiring but needs to be further discussed. The
presentation of interactions between group types helps to understand the nature
of the relationships that existed between the different groups of landowners. At
the same time, it enables an understanding of the power ratio between various
Lower Iraqi landowners, and between them as a group and the caliphal state.
This attempt to describe Lower Iraqi landowners is not only useful in gaining
a better view of Lower Iraqi society during the 8th century. It also sheds a light on
the multiple processes that disrupted or changed the workings of this empire and
its society, such as the decreasing numbers of small landholders. The role of the
imperial state in all this has now been sketched, but still needs to be studied.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 364.
 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, 92–95; Tillier 2009, 592–596.
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The Rise and Fall of the Early ʿAbbāsid
Political and Military Elite
Abstract: This paper explores the composition and role of the military and polit-
ical elite of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate (750–809) whose support enabled the
caliphs to maintain sovereignty over their far-flung domains. It considers the im-
portance of different groups, including members of the ʿAbbāsid family, military
commanders from Khurāsān and members of powerful and wealthy families like
the Muhallabīs and the Shaybāni tribal chiefs. The paper concludes with a dis-
cussion of the reasons for the disappearance and effective extinction of this
elite in the years after the great civil war that followed Hārūn al-Rashīd’s
death in 809.
Keywords: Caliphs; armies; political power; Syria; Khurāsān
The governance of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate was a remarkable political and
organizational achievement. For half a century, between the establishment of
the dynasty in 132 H/750 CE and the death of Hārūn al-Rashīd in 193 H/809
CE, the area from Tunisia in the west to Sind and Central Asia in the east was
governed effectively and largely peacefully from Iraq. From 145 H/762 CE, the
city of Baghdad served as the administrative capital, though the distances
which separated it from the far-flung provinces were enormous: it is over
2,000 kilometres from Baghdad to Merv, the political centre of the great province
of Khurāsān, and 1,500 kilometres from the capital to the Holy City of Mecca.
The barīd postal system inherited from the Umayyads and Sasanians was
surprisingly effective at communicating urgent messages over these huge distan-
ces.¹ When the caliph al-Rashīd died in the year 809 at Ṭūs (near Mashhad in
north-east Iran) a messenger brought the news to Baghdad in twelve days, trav-
eling 1,900 kilometres at an average speed of 150 kilometres per day. Similar
I will not be dealing with the bureaucratic elite of the kuttāb or the religious elite of the fuqahāʾ
and qādīs that would require a whole other study. For the general history of early ʿAbbāsid ca-
liphate, Kennedy 2016; El-Hibri 2010, 269–304; Bennison 2009. For earlier studies of the ʿAb-
bāsid elite with full references to sources, Crone 1980, esp. 173–189, and Kennedy 1981/2016,
73–86.
 On the barīd and the distances covered, see Silverstein 2007, 191– 193.
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speeds are recorded for the reporting of other crucial events. Not until the inven-
tion of the electric telegraph in the late 19th century was such swiftness bettered.
Information was clearly very important.
Enforcement was much slower. Even without opposition or resistance, ar-
mies could travel no more than 20 kilometres a day, and usually managed
less. That left plenty of time for a provincial rebellion to gather support and mo-
mentum before the forces of central government arrived on the scene. Exercising
control and authority over such enormous distances was always going to be dif-
ficult, and demands for provincial autonomy were correspondingly hard to re-
sist.
Despite these formidable obstacles the ʿAbbāsids maintained their authority
and the cohesion of their caliphate for more than half a century. No later Islamic
dynasty established the same degree of authority over so wide and diverse an
area. The achievement was not the result of absolutist authority, but of the devel-
opment of a stable political and military elite, or rather a series of elites,which at
the same time represented the caliphal government in the provinces and the
provinces to the central government in Baghdad.
While this must have been true for all large pre-modern empires in the Mid-
dle East from the Achaemenids onwards, one factor that distinguishes the ʿAb-
bāsid example is the wealth of information that survives in the sources about
the government of the caliphate. In al-Ṭabarī’s great Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa-l-
mulūk (History of the Prophets and Kings),² there are enough details to build
up a detailed prosopography of the ruling elite, of their origins, connections, suc-
cesses and failures. This is supplemented by universal chronicles such as al-
Yaʿqūbī’s Taʾrīkh (History),³ and provincial accounts such as al-Kindī’s Kitāb
Wulāt Miṣr (Governors of Egypt)⁴ and al-Azdī’s Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil (History of
Mosul).⁵
Despite occasional contradictions, we can trace individual families through
several generations in the evidence and get a clear idea of their influence. There
is perhaps no other period in early Islamic history when so much attention was
paid to the appointment of provincial governors and officials far away from the
court and capital. It did not last. By the mid-9th century, the caliphate was domi-
nated by the Turkish and eastern Iranian military of Samarra. Hardly any infor-
mation survives regarding provincial appointments and we cannot reliably trace
the names of governors, even of really important cities such as Basra. The care





with which earlier annalists recorded this type of information clearly shows how
important these people and the offices they held were then considered to be.
The key to these patterns of provincial power was the office of wālī, which is
usually translated as governor. The richness of the sources means we can build
up a virtually complete fasti of the governors of all the major provinces of the
caliphate from the ʿAbbāsid revolution to the reign of al-Maʾmūn, though (as
is only to be expected) there are some confusions and ambiguities. The identities
of the men who held these posts are an invaluable measure of the political com-
plexities of the caliphate. The term ʿāmil was also employed to designate this
type of provincial official. The sources sometimes make a distinction between
the office of wālī, in charge of leading prayers and the people in war, and the
ʿāmil, in charge of taxation, but the terms were often used interchangeably
and the distinction between the two offices blurred.⁶
If the annals superficially make the caliph appear as a powerful absolute
ruler, further down the chain of power the governors display effective executive
power over military and civil affairs in the province. These areas are often simply
characterised as ḥarb and ṣalāt (war and prayer), but when sources like al-Kin-
dī’s history of Egypt allow us to peer below the surface, we find governors in a
more complicated situation.⁷ The governors of Egypt were the middle men be-
tween the caliph and his government in Baghdad, which was always seeking
to extract more tax revenue from this rich province, and the local Muslim elites,
who were determined to retain as much of the revenue as possible in the local
dīwān to pay their salaries and those of their followers. The governors’ position
was made more precarious in that they were usually outsiders with few Egyptian
connections; they had to cooperate with or at least not alienate the wujūh, the
local Arab Muslim elite. The wujūh were led by the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa, the chief of
police. Unlike the titular governor, the ṣāḥib al-shurṭa was always chosen from
a small circle of prominent local families and they often served for longer
than their ephemeral superiors. At one level this seems a weak system of govern-
ment, ultimately dependent on the consent of local notables. In reality the sys-
tem was very resilient: the local Egyptian Muslim elite,who never held office out-
side their province and seldom left it, were stakeholders in the ʿAbbāsid rule that
assured their high status. One of the main reasons for the collapse of the caliph-
ate in the 9th century was the breaking of bonds between Baghdad and local
elites by the influx of Turks and eastern Iranians to the top ranks of central gov-
ernment.
 For an overview of the role of provincial governors, see EI2, “Amīr” (A. A. Duri).
 Kennedy 1981, 26–38; Kennedy 1998, 62–85; Mikhail 2014, esp. 136– 159.
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The provincial elite was largely formed by the political genius of the second
ʿAbbāsid caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr (136– 158 H/754–775 CE). This cadre gov-
erned the vast ʿAbbāsid Empire; its broad-based nature was vital in keeping
the caliphate together politically and its disappearance after the great civil
war that followed the death of al-Rashīd in 193 H/809 CE was a major factor
in the caliphate’s breakup.
It is sometimes easy to forget how exceptional this pre-war period was and
how impressive was the political success that kept this multi-ethnic, multi-cul-
tural state together. In what follows, I will investigate some important constitu-
ents of the elite of this time to determine the sources of its power and the dynam-
ics of its political operation.
The ʿAbbāsid family formed an important element in this elite.⁸ The caliph’s
numerous uncles, the Banū ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās, and his cousins were
appointed to governorates in the western part of the caliphate, notably in Syria,
Egypt and the prosperous and peaceful province of southern Iraq (most impor-
tantly in the city of Basra). They did not, however, serve in the Iranian provinces;
al-Saffāḥ’s brief appointment of one of his uncles as governor of Fārs was abrupt-
ly terminated by Abū Muslim.⁹ Nor did they serve in the Caucasus or North Afri-
ca, areas likely to see serious military activity and where Khurāsānī soldiers were
stationed in large numbers. In some cases these ʿAbbāsids formed sub-dynasties
passing the title of governor from father to son, for example Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī (d. 152
H/769 CE) and his sons al-Faḍl (d. after 163 H/780 CE) and ʿAbd al-Malik (d. 196
H/811–12 CE) in Syria, and Sulaymān b. ʿAlī (d. 142 H/759–60 CE) and his son
Muḥammad (d. 173 H/789 CE) in Basra.
The granting of these prominent roles assured the loyalty of the wider ʿAb-
bāsid family to the ruling branch of the dynasty, discouraging internecine rebel-
lion or usurpation. Governors also provided a focus of dynastic loyalty for the
people of the provinces. This is especially clear in the case of Syria. Many ele-
ments in this large and potentially turbulent province found themselves exclud-
ed from positions in the army with the end of Umayyad rule, but the patronage of
Ṣāliḥ and his sons assured the continuing loyalty of at least some of them to the
ʿAbbāsids. This was made very clear during the short reign of al-Amīn, when
ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ was able to recruit large numbers of Syrians to support
the caliph against the eastern Iranian armies of his brother al-Maʾmūn.¹⁰
 This section expands on Kennedy 1981/2016, 73–95, where I first began to investigate the elite
of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1879– 1901, iii, 71–72.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1879– 1901, iii, 841–845.
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Members of the ʿAbbāsid family were also wealthy property owners; for ex-
ample, Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī, who took over most of the extensive property in northern
Syria developed by Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik and other Umayyad princes.
This meant that even when they held no formal government position, the ʿAbbā-
sids retained influence in their provinces. Although they visited the caliphal
court in Baghdad, it seems that they resided in their own districts most of the
time.
It is clear that al-Rashīd, or rather his Barmakid mentors, sought to under-
mine the power of these sub-dynasties. Upon Muḥammad b. Sulaymān’s death
in Basra, his house and vast fortune were confiscated by the caliph. Neither
his brother Jaʿfar or any children he may have had were allowed to inherit his
position in the city. Similarly, ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ spent the last six years of
Hārūn’s reign in prison because the caliph was apprehensive about the power
he wielded in Syria. Members of the family were still property owners in comfort-
able circumstances but their place in the political elite was greatly diminished.
After the death of ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ in 195 H/811 CE no ʿAbbāsid remained
who could rally the Syrians to the support of the caliph as he and his father had
been able to.
During the 3rd century H/9th century CE, the role of the ʿAbbāsid family was
greatly restricted. No members of the dynasty governed provinces or commanded
armies except for the caliph, those of his children designated as heirs, and occa-
sionally a brother—as in the case of al-Muwaffaq, brother of the caliph al-Muʿta-
mid (r. 256–279 H/870–892 CE) and leader of the campaign against the Zanj in
southern Iraq.With these changes, the ruling dynasty became disconnected from
the inhabitants of many of the provinces, for whom the ʿAbbāsid family became
an absent and increasingly irrelevant group.
Some other families who had been important in Umayyad times continued to
be powerful under the new regime, either because they opposed the later
Umayyads or because they offered support to the new dynasty allowing their pre-
vious allegiance to the old rulers to be conveniently overlooked. The most nota-
ble of these families were the Muhallabīs.¹¹ Originally from the Azd tribes of
ʿUmān, the Muhallabīs rose to prominence in Umayyad service and played a
major role in defeating the Khārijite rebellions that threatened the caliphate in
Fārs and other areas of Iran. Al-Muhallab and his son Yazīd had been major fig-
ures in Umayyad politics, but in the later decades of Umayyad rule they had
been marginalised. However, they still retained power and influence in the
 For the general history of the family, see EI2, “Muhallabids” (P. Crone), and Crone 1980,
133–35. For their role in the ʿAbbāsid elite, Kennedy 1981/2016, 82–3, 190–2.
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city of Basra, and on the approach of the ʿAbbāsid armies in 132 H/749 CE they
brought the city over to the cause of the new dynasty. Over the coming decades,
they were rewarded with important provincial governorates and military com-
mands, notably in Egypt and North Africa and eventually in Sind as well. In
North Africa they formed a minor dynasty referred to many centuries later by
the local historian Ibn ʿIdhārī (d. c. 712 H/1312 CE)¹² as the dawlat al-muhāliba.
If things had turned out differently, it might well have been the Muhallabīs
rather than the Aghlabids who were remembered as the first independent rulers
of Muslim Ifrīqiya (Tunisia). In the event, their rule was terminated by the caliph
al-Rashīd and their evanescent dawla disappeared. Nonetheless, the history of
the family shows clearly that the ʿAbbāsids had no qualms about making use
of the talents and influence of these important supporters of the previous dynas-
ty. The Muhallabīs brought with them influence in Basra itself and in the Basran
trading networks that led from North Africa through Egypt (where there were Mu-
hallabī governors) to Basra and the Gulf and finally to Sind (where there were
also Muhallabī governors). In return for governorships, the family brought the
caliph influence in areas where ʿAbbāsid armies seldom reached. It could be ar-
gued that the Muhallabīs mediated caliphal soft power in the southern fringes of
the empire and among the merchant and commercial classes.
The most important source of military power for the caliphs was the group
known collectively as the quwwād. The term qāʾid (pl. quwwād) is one of a num-
ber of Arabic words for leadership used throughout Arabic historiography. In the
early ʿAbbāsid period the term had an almost technical meaning, describing the
cadre of military officers who formed the backbone of the contemporary ʿAbbā-
sid army. By tracing the careers of members of some of these families, we can
establish a profile of the group and their trajectories. Among the well-known
families were those of Mālik b. al-Haytham al-Khuzāʿī, Musayyib b. Zuhayr
and al-Ḍabbī, ʿUthmān b. Nahīk al-ʿAkkī, ʿĪsā b. Māhān and others. Here I
have chosen to concentrate on two, the families of Khuzayma b. Khāzim al-
Tamīmī and Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb al-Ṭāʾī. I shall also discuss the family of Maʿn
b. Zāʾida al-Shaybānī, who though their origins were different had much in com-
mon with the other quwwād dynasties.
Almost all the quwwād came from Khurāsān. The first known members of
this elite joined the armies of the ʿAbbāsid revolution from 130 H/747 CE on-
wards. Many of them had served Abū Muslim, the leader of the revolution in
Khurāsān, but changed their allegiance to the caliph al-Manṣūr after Abū Mus-
lim’s execution. They all bore Arabic names and their nisbas show that they
 Ibn ʿIdhārī 1948.
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claimed to be descended from well-known Arab tribes. Whether this is actually
true or they were Iranian mawālī who wanted to claim Arab origin is impossible
to ascertain. They seem to have been Arabic speaking and the language of the
army was probably Arabic, though it is likely that the Arabic-Persian hybrid lan-
guage we now know as New Persian was developed in their ranks at this time.¹³
The non-Muslim populations of the Jazīra were certainly aware of their eastern
origins, and describe them as Persians.¹⁴
This elite had a number of distinctive features. Firstly it was geographically
mobile. Members typically served in different provinces of the caliphate, return-
ing to Baghdad between terms of office to be given new appointments. Alterna-
tively they might enjoy a period of office in the capital itself by serving as mem-
bers of the elite military units attached to the caliphal court, the shurṭa (police)
and the ḥaras (guard). When they were appointed to governorships or military
commands, this was symbolised by the handing over of a liwāʾ or banner of of-
fice. They were, in fact, an elite who owed their loyalty to Baghdad and the ca-
liphate rather than to the provinces they governed, a truly pan-imperial cadre.
The leading figures among the quwwād retained contacts in the Khurāsānī
places where their families originated. They may well have returned on visits
and almost all the major families produced at least one provincial governor.
At the same time they were also given properties called qaṭāʾiʿ (sing. qaṭīʿa) in
Baghdad.¹⁵ Typically these included dwelling houses, a market, a square
(raḥba) and sometimes a mosque. They settled their troops in these urban quar-
ters, where the men could benefit from the commercial opportunities afforded by
the expanding new capital. It is likely that the quwwād families recruited soldiers
from their native Khurāsān and from those of Khurāsānī descent who had settled
in Baghdad. They may well have been responsible directly for the payment of sal-
aries to their men, but we have no clear information regarding this.
The composition of the military following of the first family of quwwād stud-
ied here repays more detailed examination. The family of Khāzim b. Khuzayma
al-Tamīmī¹⁶ was closely connected with his town of origin: Marw al-Rūdh, a
small city on the Murghāb river whose site now lies on the border between Uz-
bekistan and Afghanistan.When he was sent to ʿUmān in 751/2 to fight the Khāri-
 Bulliet 2009, 140– 142, argues that New Persian emerged as a language used by cotton trad-
ers to do business. I would argue that it is at least as possible that it emerged among the
Khurāsānī military contingents led by the ʿAbbāsid period quwwād.
 The Chronicle of Michael the Syrian (1899– 1910) makes this very clear.
 For the distribution of properties in Baghdad, see al-Yaʿqūbī 1892, 140–55, now available in
an English translation, al-Yaʿqūbī 2018, I, 73–87.
 Crone 1980, 180–1; Kennedy 1981/2016, 81–2.
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jite rebels, his forces consisted of men from his ahl (family), his ʿashīra (tribe),
his mawālī (freedmen), the people of Marw al-Rūdh and some Tamīmīs who
joined him as he passed through Basra. All these men were in some way depend-
ent on or related to him. Four years later he was fighting Khārijite rebels again,
this time in the Jazīra with 8,000 men of Marw al-Rūdh. In 758–759 he was or-
dered back to Khurāsān to fight the governor, who had rebelled against the ca-
liph. On his approach the people of Marw al-Rūdh rose up against the rebels,
captured their leader and handed him over to Khāzim, showing that despite
some ten years absence in the west he still retained close links to his native
town. When he died, his power and position passed to his son Khuzayma,
who was able to raise 5,000 armed supporters in Baghdad on the night in 169
H/786 CE when the caliph al-Hādī died. The family owned a prestigious house
in a central part of Baghdad, strategically placed at the east end of the city’s
main bridge of boats. In 198 H/813 CE, though Khāzim himself was old and
blind, this house became a meeting place for supporters of al-Amīn who wished
to negotiate his peaceful surrender to Ṭāhir and the supporters of al-Maʾmūn.¹⁷
We are well informed about the family of Khāzim because of the high-profile
campaigns he fought in, but he was likely typical of the qāʾid cadre. He raised
the troops he commanded and he probably distributed their pay. He was in
fact not a mere employee of the caliph, but (along with the rest of his family)
a contractor who needed to be rewarded and respected for his services. Without
the loyalty of such figures, the caliph would have been unable to maintain con-
trol over his vast empire.
Another typical family of quwwād were the descendants of Qaḥṭaba b. Sha-
bīb al-Ṭāʾī,¹⁸ but the trajectory of this elite family is rather different from that of
Khāzim. Qaḥtaba came from the same Arab-Khurāsānī background as Khāzim.
He had been the leader of the army Abū Muslim sent to the west to install the
ʿAbbāsids as caliphs, and would certainly have enjoyed a leading position
under the new regime if he had not been killed crossing the Euphrates in the
final stages of the campaign. He left two adult sons, al-Ḥasan and Ḥumayd,
who both enjoyed long but very different careers in the ʿAbbāsid imperial
elite. Al-Ḥasan took over his father’s command and joined the siege of the last
Umayyad governor Yazīd b. Hubayra in the old Umayyad garrison city of
Wāsiṭ. Here he came in contact with the caliph’s brother Abū Jaʿfar, later caliph
himself under the title al-Manṣūr. Together they forced the surrender of this last
outpost of Umayyad resistance.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1879– 1901, III, 916.
 For this family, see Crone 1980, 188–189; Kennedy 1981/2016, 79–80.
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The bond the two men struck up was the foundation of al-Ḥasan’s subse-
quent career. He followed the future caliph when he became governor of the
Jazīra and provided him with crucial support in his final showdown with Abū
Muslim in 755. He spent most of the rest of his long career on the Byzantine fron-
tier and in Armenia. Here he worked closely with military leaders in the frontier
districts (the thughūr), leading expeditions deep in Byzantine territory and lead-
ing projects like the rebuilding of the frontier fortress of Malaṭya. Like all the
leading quwwād he was given property in Baghdad (including a street, a
rabaḍ and houses) on which to settle his Khurāsānī followers. He died in 181
H/797 CE at the age of 84, full of years and distinction.
By contrast, his brother Ḥumayd was in some ways the black sheep of the
family. He made a number of unwise career decisions that would normally
have resulted in disgrace, if not execution. The fact that he survived shows
how dependent successive caliphs were on the support and loyalty of these
Khurāsānī families.While al-Ḥasan attached himself to the future caliph al-Man-
ṣūr, his younger brother took the side of the caliph’s uncle ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī when
he challenged al-Manṣūr for the supreme title. However, ʿAbdallāh also sought
the support of the Syrian military elites who had supported the Umayyads.
Deep-seated tensions between them and Ḥumayd’s Khurāsānī followers meant
he deserted before the final battle that saw al-Manṣūr victorious.
Despite Ḥumayd’s support of al-Manṣūr’s rival, he was appointed governor
of Egypt just five years later in 142 H/759 CE. He subsequently jeopardised his
position yet again at the time of the great ʿAlīd rebellion led by Muḥammad
the Pure Soul in 145 H/762 CE, when he fled the battlefield and almost caused
a disastrous panic in the ʿAbbāsid army. Once more he was rehabilitated, serving
as governor of Armenia and finally in the most powerful position open to any of
the Khurāsānī military elite: as governor of Khurāsān from 151 H/768 CE until his
death in 159 H/776 CE. Like his brother, he had properties in Baghdad.
Both al-Ḥasan’s and Ḥumayd’s sons carried on the family tradition. The third
generation played an important role in supporting al-Amīn against his brother
al-Maʾmūn in the great ʿAbbāsid civil war after the death of al-Rashīd. Like
most of these families, the descendants of Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb lost everything dur-
ing the long conflict. Their properties in Baghdad were destroyed and their con-
nections with Khurāsān cut off. They were completely excluded from government
office during the caliphates of al-Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim.
Not all of the families who constituted the military elite were of Khurāsānī
origin and not all had supported the ʿAbbāsid revolution. The family of Maʿn
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b. Zāʾida in fact broke most of the rules that might lead to advancement.¹⁹ They
were the most prominent of the ashrāf (nobles) of the bedouin tribe of Shaybān,
which dominated most of the northern Iraqi steppes. They had a substantial fol-
lowing among their fellow tribesmen and could bring experienced and hardy
warriors to serve in the ʿAbbāsid armies—but they also had fierce and deter-
mined enemies within their own tribe. As tribal leaders, they were opposed by
Khārijite groups from Shaybān and by other tribes bitterly hostile to the ashrāf
who served both Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid caliphates.
Maʿn b. Zāʾida had been a leading supporter of the last Umayyad caliph Mar-
wān II; he went so far as to claim that it was he who killed Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb at
time of the crossing of the Euphrates. Those two facts would have made relations
with the new regime strained, to put it mildly. With his record, it would seem
most improbable that his family would enjoy elite status under the ʿAbbāsid ca-
liphs. Yet that proved the case. Maʿn went perfunctorily into hiding after the fall
of the Umayyads but he was clearly hovering, looking for an opportunity to in-
gratiate himself with al-Manṣūr. His chance came with the rebellion of the Rāw-
andiyya, a group of radical Shīʿites, in Baghdad. It caught the caliph off his
guard and Maʿn was present to save his life. After this al-Manṣūr recognised
that Maʿn, along with his Shaybānī tribesmen, was a valuable supporter. He
was sent on distant and unglamorous postings to places like Yaman and Sīstān,
and was killed in 152 H/772–773 CE in Bust (in the modern Helmand province of
southern Afghanistan) when a group of Khārijites dug through the flat roof of his
house and surprised him.
He seems to have left no sons. His position within the tribe and his feud with
the Khārijites was inherited by his nephew Yazīd b. Mazyad, whom Khārijites
pursued to Baghdad and attempted to murder on the city’s bridge of boats.
Yazīd b. Mazyad became a leading military commander in the reign of al-
Mahdī but found himself on the wrong side of a major political conflict when
the caliph was succeeded by his son Mūsā al-Hādī. Mūsā enjoyed strong support
among military leaders and Yazīd played an important part in this. He is said to
have been among those who urged the new caliph to remove his brother Hārūn
from the succession and to execute his mentor and leading supporter Yaḥyā the
Barmakid. In the event, the sudden death of Mūsā al-Hādī and Hārūn’s accession
meant that Yazīd, like other quwwād, was in deep disgrace and perhaps lucky to
escape with his life.
Apart from a short spell as governor of Armenia, Yazīd remained in the po-
litical wilderness for almost a decade until the caliph was once more in need of
 For this family, see Crone 1980, 169– 170.
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his military abilities and tribal following. The Jazīra was disturbed by a wide-
spread Khārijite rebellion led by the charismatic and romantic figure of al-
Walīd b. Ṭarīf al-Shārī, who was said to have been from the same Shaybānī
tribe as Yazīd. The forces sent by the Barmakid administration were unable to
deal with these fast-moving opponents until, despite the advice of Yaḥyā b. Khāl-
id, the caliph called on the services of Yazīd. He led his tribal following (ʿashīra)
against the enemy, defeated the rebels and killed their leader al-Walīd, whose
grief-stricken sister composed one of the greatest laments in classical Arabic lit-
erature on his death. Yazīd was now firmly back in favour with the caliph. His
career prospered and he served Hārūn in Khurāsān, on the Byzantine frontier
and in Armenia, where he died in 185 H/801 CE.
His son Asad inherited his tribal following and it would seem his prestige.
During the great civil war, he was a vigorous supporter of al-Amīn and was
known as fāris al-ʿarab, the ‘knight of the Arabs’. Like his father and uncle,
he was looked up to as an exemplar of the ancient bedouin virtues of courage
and generosity. Unfortunately, the defeat of al-Amīn meant that Asad lost
power and influence. He had no place in the new ʿAbbāsid caliphate as it was
reconstructed by al-Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim; Arab tribal followings were not al-
lowed to participate in the new military organization of the time, dominated as it
was by eastern Iranians and Turks. However, unlike many of the other quwwād
families under discussion here, the Shaybānī ashrāf reinvented themselves, sur-
vived and prospered.
In 171 H/787 CE Hārūn had appointed Yazīd b. Mazyad as governor of Azer-
bayjan, a province requiring a firm military hand to keep the locals peaceful
whilst defending them from the Khazars to the north.²⁰ When he died in the pro-
vincial capital of Bardhaʿa, his son Asad was appointed to succeed him. It seems
as if the family connection with the province continued. In 245 H/859–860 CE
the caliph al-Mutawakkil appointed Yazīd’s grandson Muḥammad b. Khālid as
governor of Bāb al-Abwāb (Derbent) and its surrounding districts. “He rebuilt
the city of Ganja and was granted it and the estates (ḍiyāʿ) in the area as heredi-
tary possessions (irthan)”.
With the assassination of al-Mutawakkil in the next year, caliphal control
over the Caucasus effectively collapsed and left the family in control. In the
years to come the descendants of Maʿn b. Zāʾida changed their collective identity
and with it their familial claim to leadership. Instead of being ashrāf of Shaybān,
they took the ancient Iranian title of Shirvān Shāh and claimed descent from the
 For the complicated events taking place in Azerbayjan in the 3rd century H/9th century CE, see
Madelung 1975, 243–249.
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semi-mythical Sāsānian hero Bahram Gur.²¹ Beginning with Manuchehr, who
succeeded in 418 H/1028 CE, the members of the family bore Persian rather
than Arab names. The dynasty survived in the eastern Caucasus in one form
or another until the mid–13th century, coincidentally disappearing at almost
the same time as the ʿAbbāsids finally lost Baghdad.
The Shaybānī elite survived when other families of quwwād lost their status
and identity for a number of reasons. The most important was their enjoyment of
tribal support that was not necessarily dependent on salaries from the dīwān in
Baghdad or revenues from Khurāsān. Though the tribe was clearly divided be-
tween supporters of the ashrāf and supporters of the Khārijites, there were tribes-
men who had followed their leaders and settled in Azerbayjan where the family
established their power base in later generations, having an almost hereditary
position in the eastern Caucasus before the death of Hārūn and the great civil
war. Although they fought on the losing side that time, they had a power base
beyond the reach of al-Maʾmūn and his victorious general Ṭāhir. They did not
even suffer from the loss of their property in Baghdad after the civil war, because
seemingly they never had any. As we have seen, the family survived, but only by
adapting themselves to new circumstances in new areas and adopting an entire-
ly new political personality: as Iranian shahs, not Arab ashrāf.
The last family I want to consider in detail is that of al-Ashʿath b. Qays al-
Kindī. Their history illustrates another pattern of continuity and survival
among the elite of the Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid caliphates. Descended
from the kings of the great south Arabian tribe of Kinda, the family of al-Ashʿath
came from the highest echelons of the pre-Islamic Arab nobility. Al-Ashʿath him-
self had pledged allegiance to the Prophet but joined the ridda (apostasy) after
his death. Despite this, because of their status as tribal leaders the family still
remained influential among the Kindīs who settled in Iraq during the Umayyad
period. Al-Ashʿath’s grandson, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, led the last great, unsuccessful
rebellion of the ashrāf of the Iraqi tribes against the Umayyads in 82 H/701 CE.
Under the early ʿAbbāsids, the Kindī leaders enjoyed a modest revival of their
power, with several of their members appointed as governors of Kufa.
Unlike the Shaybānīs, who could clearly mobilise a nomad force from their
tribesmen, the influence of the Kindīs seems to have been urban and based in
the city of Kufa. Though they never reached the top ranks of the ʿAbbāsid
elite, they were important in securing the loyalty of the people of Kufa to the ʿAb-
bāsid cause, especially when faced with the ʿAlīd rebellion of Muḥammad the
Pure Soul in Medina in 145 H/762 CE. The fact that the city, so turbulent in
 See Vacca 2017, 144– 145.
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Umayyad times, was peaceful throughout the first ʿAbbāsid half-century must
have been in part due to their influence.
This was the family that produced the famous intellectual Yaʿqūb b. al-Sibāh
al-Kindī, known as the ‘philosopher of the Arabs’. Like many of the leading fig-
ures in Kufa, he had moved to Baghdad as the city lost economic and political
status in favour of the capital. Yaʿqūb seems to have built up his famous library
from the wealth he inherited from his illustrious family, but appears to have had
no personal military or political ambitions himself.With his death, we lose touch
with the family, but their story is an interesting one of elite survival and progres-
sive adaptation to the Rāshidūn, to the Umayyads and to the ʿAbbāsids. They
moved from tribal leaders, to defeated rebels, to functionaries of the ʿAbbāsid
state, and finally to the intellectual eminence that ensured the Kindī name
was the only one of the early ʿAbbāsid elite families to remain well-known in
later centuries, as its reputation spread to the cathedral schools and universities
of western Europe.
The dominance of this early ʿAbbāsid elite was ended by the great civil war
that followed the death of the caliph al-Rashīd in 193 H/809 CE. His son al-Amīn
enjoyed the support of most of the early ʿAbbāsid elite. Led by ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b.
Māhān, the quwwād of the Khurāsāniyya were defeated near Rayy in northern
Iran by the much smaller army of the supporters of al-Maʾmūn. Although
some figures of the elite remained at al-Maʾmūn’s court, the army commanders
(notably Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn) came from eastern Iranian families with no previous
connection with the ʿAbbāsid court. They had been thoroughly alienated from it
by the harsh taxation policies of ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā.
This defeat, and the subsequent siege and ruin of Baghdad, destroyed the
power base of much of the elite. The quwwād no longer enjoyed the financial
support of the government to recruit and pay their followers, and they were
cut off and excluded from their ancestral homes in Khurāsān. None of the
quwwād families who had dominated the military structures of the early ʿAbbā-
sid caliphate played any important role in the caliphate re-established by al-
Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim. The only member of the group known to us is Naṣr
al-Khuzāʿī—and not as a supporter of the caliphate, but as the man who led
the rebellion in Baghdad protesting the enforcement of the doctrine of the creat-
edness of the Qurʾān.
It was not only the quwwād whose power was destroyed by the coming of the
new order. The members of the ʿAbbāsid family who had played such important
roles in the early ʿAbbāsid elite, representing the family (so to speak) in the great
cities of Basra and Kufa, in the sawād of Iraq, Syria and sometimes Egypt, dis-
appear at this time from the political stage. It is a sign of the changes in the early
3rd century hijrī that the sources no longer tell us the names of the governors of
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these great cities and provinces, except when they are involved in some disturb-
ance or battle like the defence of Basra against the Qarāmiṭa. When we are told
their names, they are always members of the Turkish and eastern Iranian milita-
ry, not members of the ruling family. We are informed incidentally that the de-
scendants of the great ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ, effective ruler of much of northern
Syria, still lived in the neighbourhood of Manbij where he had constructed a
celebrated palace, but there is no indication they played any part in the political
life of the province. The provincial elites could no longer look to the patronage
and protection of ‘their’ members of the ruling family, and this connection with
the dynasty was lost.
The elite of the early ʿAbbāsid caliphate is remarkable in Islamic history be-
cause of its variety, its broad base and its many contacts.We cannot understand
the history of this great dynasty unless we look beyond the narrative of the ac-
tions of the caliphs to those who supported and influenced them.
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Who Were the Mulūk Fārs?
Abstract: Taking a passage in al-Iṣṭakhrī as its starting point, this paper presents
the Fārs rural elites called mulūk and ahl al-buyūtāt. It argues that these families
were the dominant influence in the province, controlling many sources of reve-
nue (including overseas trade routes and agricultural taxes). The main body of
the paper is a study of one representative of such a family, Muḥammad b.
Wāṣil al-Ḥanẓalī al-Tamīmī. His pedigree can be traced for more than four cen-
turies, from early Islamic times to the 11th century. Finally, the paper discusses
earlier scholarship on this figure, showing serious misrepresentations.
Keywords: Fārs; malik; raʾīs; ahl al-buyūtāt; local lordship; aristocracy; castle;
taxation
Introduction
Talking about elites in pre-Mongol Iran or in other parts of the Muslim world gen-
erally means talking about military commanders, emirs, or governors, or, on the
civilian side of state administration, viziers and clerks. Of these, Muslim scholars
are best documented, to the point of producing the famous quote “ulemology is
a noble science—at least we have to think so, because it is almost all the Islamic
social history we will ever have for this period.”¹ A prominent example of this
state of affairs is the recent study on Baghdadi elites in the Seljuq period.² In
the context of pre-Mongol Iran, but also Iraq and Syria, the urban notables
tend to be ʿulamāʾ.³
Thanks are due to Peter Verkinderen and Hannah Hagemann, who read an earlier version of this
article and gave valuable comments. Their support is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining
shortcomings and errors are mine.
 Mottahedeh 1975, 495; famously also quoted in Humphreys 1991, 187. It is worth noting the
reservations about the period—Mottahedeh has in mind the 11th and 12th centuries, a little
later than the focus of the present contribution.
 van Renterghem 2015, I, 57. The author distinguishes three major fields of elite activities: re-
ligious and legal encadrement, government service, and economic activities (which at the end
are restricted to long-distance trade). Rural elites are not covered in this work.
 The word “notables” to indicate a group of urban elite persons was first used by Albert Hour-
ani in his “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables”, reprinted in Hourani 1981 (first pub-
lished 1968). See also Gelvin 2006.
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This situation is of course due to the available source material. Whereas
chronicles and other narrative histories yield information about emirs and viziers
(the latter group are also the subject of source monographs), Muslim scholars
profit from their own literary genre, the biographical dictionary. This has two
forms, general and regional, and scholars appear in both.⁴ In certain cases,
this abundant material allows complex prosopographic studies; one of the ear-
liest was Bulliet’s book on the notables—he calls them patricians—of Nīshāpūr.⁵
There have been more studies of this kind, Mottahedeh on Qazwīn for example.
The vast material available for Baghdad made van Renterghem’s work possible.⁶
For other well-documented cities, a mix of sources has also allowed detailed
studies for longer periods; the best example is Durand-Guédy’s monograph on
Iṣfahān.⁷
This focus means that another social group has remained largely unstudied
until the present day. These are the rural aristocrats: large landowners, castel-
lans, and so forth.⁸ They must have been there, and must have played very im-
portant roles in their provinces and sometimes on a geographically broader
level, but we rarely get more than a glimpse of who they were, what they did,
where they came from, how they saw their position in society, and so forth. Most-
ly, they are not mentioned by name—and thus prosopographic studies are out of
the question—but they appear under generic identifications like ruʾasāʾ, ahl al-
buyūtāt, and so on, or are described with older Iranian terms such as dihqān.⁹
This plurality of terms confirms the situation sketched in the introduction to
this volume: many somewhat fuzzy terms are in use for persons and groups of
elite status.
There is no type of source that explicitly deals with rural aristocrats, though
there is some overlap with the biographical dictionaries where rural lords appear
if they were also Muslim scholars. We may conversely surmise that many schol-
ars were landlords, but the sources do not often talk about such profane things
as a man’s position in society when they can instead give long lists of whose
ḥadīth he heard and to whom he transmitted.¹⁰
 For a recent review of the state of the art, al-Qāḍī 2009.
 Bulliet 1972. See also Mottahedeh 1975.
 Mottahedeh 1973.
 Durand-Guédy 2010.
 Paul 2016, and for the raʾīs as a type of rural notable, Paul 2015.
 For this stratum of the elites, see Tafażżoli and Paul 2013. Articles from the Encyclopedia Ira-
nica are quoted exclusively with reference to the online edition.
 Cohen 1970.
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Despite this, since we know that the rural lords must have been a decisive
part of the upper class we should endeavor to find out more about them.
There are two ways to do so. First, the extant corpus of narrative and non-narra-
tive sources must be scrutinized and the tiny bits of information available there
put together. Second, the exceptional passages where rural lords are focused
upon must be identified. One of these exceptional passages can be found in
al-Iṣṭakhrī’s geography, and it concerns the mulūk (“kings”) of his home prov-
ince, Fārs.¹¹ He also writes here of the ahl al-buyūtāt (“noble houses”), another
type of rural lord whose position probably was one step below mulūk status;
mulūk commanded greater wealth and were eligible for high offices to which
ahl al-buyūtāt apparently had no access. It is interesting to note that the
mulūk families were all of Arab stock whereas the ahl al-buyūtāt descended
from Iranian nobles.
Al-Iṣṭakhrī knew this province very well. The people he was writing about
were active within living memory, and some of their families still held very
much the same positions their ancestors had. I suspect that he included this pas-
sage in order to show that important people and families came from Fārs—the
enumeration of the provincial mulūk is part of the province’s faḍāʾil, part of
his praise of it. He may be exaggerating, but only a little; at least some of the
events, persons, and families he speaks of can be identified in other sources.
The passage in question does not resurface in Ibn Ḥawqal, who otherwise fol-
lows al-Iṣṭakhrī closely, but nevertheless some information on these elites can
also be gained from his work.¹²
In this article, I shall first give examples of the use of the term mulūk in sour-
ces dealing with pre-Mongol Iran, before presenting the passage in al-Iṣṭakhrī in
some detail, and finally turning to a case study of one of the representatives of
the mulūk Fārs: a man called Muḥammad b.Wāṣil b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥanẓalī al-Tamī-
mī, whose career in Fārsī politics can be followed between ca. 255 H/869 CE and
ca. 262 H/876 CE. This case study includes dealing with the image of Muḥammad
b. Wāṣil found in earlier scholarship. He would not necessarily warrant the de-
tailed examination presented here, except that he is one of the rare individuals
regarding whom such a study is possible. More such individuals could be iden-
tified. Here, I regard Muḥammad b.Wāṣil as a specimen of his social group—how
typical a specimen must be left to future research.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 140–144.
 Ibn Ḥawqal 1939 and 1964.
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Mulūk as a Term
Today, malik means “king” in Arabic. In earlier sources, the meaning is broader
and the term applied to different kinds of elite persons and families. The term is
used for rural secular notables (as opposed to Muslim scholars), who are large
landholders, nobles, aristocrats, and/or local lords. They are more important,
wealthier, and have better connections at court than the rural gentry of Iranian
extraction, whom the sources more frequently call dahāqīn. In some ways, these
noble families, the mulūk and the dahāqīn, run the province together. They are
central to its administration and to a large degree manage taxation (often as
tax farmers). Later, some of these families become known as the province’s
ruʾasāʾ.
Apart from the passage in al-Iṣṭakhrī that serves as the starting point for this
contribution, a survey yields more occurrences of the term in pre-Mongol sour-
ces. A detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper; what follows is a cur-
sory summary.¹³
For pre-Islamic times, the term is used for the Persian kings (regional as well
as Great Kings), but also the rulers of Rūm, India, and China. For the Arab world,
it is interesting to see which groups have mulūk; most prominently, Kinda, but
also Ḥimyar and less frequently other groups. There is also mention of mulūk
al-Yaman, “kings of Yemen.”¹⁴ In the following passage, I will concentrate on
mulūk from the Islamic period.
Sources from the early Islamic period have an “extensive discussion of the
terms used to designate holders of authority.”¹⁵ Malik is only one of those
terms, but one that is sometimes privileged.
Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī includes the biography of a singer of the Umayyad pe-
riod, Ibrāhīm b. Māhān. Describing his career, al-Khaṭīb notes that Ibrāhīm met
caliphs and mulūk.¹⁶ Since there were no independent regional “kings” in early
Umayyad times,what is probably meant are extremely wealthy and well-connect-
ed landowners, and in this case not necessarily rural ones. In his version of the
 I profited from Peter Verkinderen’s expertise who ran a search on my behalf in the ‘Jedli’
toolbox: https://www.islamic-empire.uni-hamburg.de/en/publications-tools/digital-tools/down
loads/jedli-toolbox.html. The search was for mulūk, mulūk al-ṭawāʾif, and mulūk al-aṭrāf. Peter
Verkinderen’s generous help is gratefully acknowledged here.
 In the Islamic period, some Arab groups had mulūk. Some of the Arab dynasties of the 10th
and 11th centuries are called by this term, e.g. the Mazyadids at Ḥilla are presented as mulūk al-
asadiyya. Al-Ḥillī 1984.
 Marlow 2016, 113–26.
 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1931, 6:175.
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biography of Yaʿqūb b. Layth al-Ṣaffār (r. 861–879) which also includes ʿAmr b.
al-Layth, Yaʿqūb’s brother and successor (r. 879–900), Ibn Khallikān gives some
details about the ‘revolt’ of Rāfiʿ b. Harthama in Khurāsān. In May 896 CE (Rabīʿ
II, 283 H) Rāfiʿ sent to the neighbouring mulūk, asking them to help him against
ʿAmr b. al-Layth.¹⁷ In this case, apart from landed properties we can suppose
that these families also maintained military resources such as castles, retainers
and so forth. Al-Muqaddasī has a report about the emergence of Darī (Persian) as
the court language in which the main character is one of the local rulers (mulūk
Khurāsān).¹⁸ In al-ʿUtbī’s history of Maḥmūd the Ghaznavid, we also meet mulūk
Khurāsān, and he speaks of the mulūk Khurāsān wa-aṣḥāb al-juyūsh bihā.¹⁹ How-
ever, Ibn Funduq Bayhaqī informs us that the province has not produced any
mulūk, only military commanders. The author regrets that he cannot include a
chapter on the province’s mulūk; such a chapter, in his words, is a standard fea-
ture in regional historiography.²⁰ He calls dynasties such as the Ṭāhirids and the
Ṣaffārids mulūk. Ibn Khurdādhbih, on the other hand, has a list of mulūk
Khurāsān together with their titles; probably pre-Islamic figures are meant and
some may have survived into the early Islamic period.²¹ This also is the way
the anonymous Persian Ḥudūd al-ʿālam uses the term.²² In the eastern provinces
in particular, the regional or vassal kings can appear as mulūk al-aṭrāf; some of
these kings are also included in Ibn Khurdādhbih’s list. Such regional dynasties
are typical of these mountainous regions (now part of Afghanistan).²³
Ibn Ḥawqal offers a list of local and regional rulers in Azerbaijan and the
Caucasus whom he calls collectively mulūk al-aṭrāf. It is interesting to note
that the master of the province, Ibn Abī l-Sāj, is also called malik. This yields
a hierarchy of local and provincial mulūk.²⁴ In this region, the mountainous
northwest of Iran, local rulers are often called mulūk. This also applies also to
the rulers of Daylam.²⁵
The term mulūk al-aṭrāf could be used for people whose rank in pre-Islamic
Iran was that of marzbān; this is the definition found in al-Khwārazmī’s treatise
 Ibn Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:468.
 Al-Muqaddasī 1906, 334–5; see Marlow 2016, 68.
 Al-ʿUtbī 1424/2004, 434. In another instance, he calls the Sāmānids the mulūk al-sharq,
“kings of the east”, 184. For the use of the title malik by Sāmānid rulers, see Treadwell 2003.
 Ibn Funduq Bayhaqī 1317/1938, 65.
 Ibn Khurdādhbih 1889, 39.
 Ḥudūd al-ʿālam 1962, and Paul 1994.
 I have discussed terms for rural notables and local ruling houses in Paul 1994, 182– 183; see
also Paul 2016, 113– 116.
 Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 347–348 and 354; Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 341–2 and 347.
 One example only: al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 112.
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on administrative terminology. It is also employed for the regional kings who
ruled Iran whenever there was no empire.²⁶ One of the most salient later narra-
tive patterns is that of the central government sending out messengers to the
mulūk al-aṭrāf.²⁷
Closest to al-Iṣṭakhrī in time and space is the hagiographic account of the
life of Ibn Khafīf Shīrāzī. It includes a report of a man of high descent who start-
ed out on the mystic’s path, after which upper-class families—mulūk wa- ruʾasāʾ
—of Shīrāz began offering him their daughters in marriage. The marriages took
place, hundreds of them, but the man divorced the brides before consummation.
Some of the girls were allowed to stay; one (a vizier’s daughter) for over forty
years.²⁸ In another context, this same source uses mulūk together with salāṭīn,
saying that such people are in the habit of having soldiers run before them to
drive the people out of the way as they ride through towns. The rider in question
was ʿAmr b. al-Layth the Ṣaffārid, and the setting Nīshāpūr.²⁹
This term is thus not always correctly translated as “king” and not even as
“ruler.”³⁰ Its meaning is broader since it includes figures and families who did
not rule as royalty but were aristocrats, landholders, and very wealthy and influ-
ential persons, the top families of the upper class. Later, particularly in Seljuqid
contexts, the term is mostly used for subordinate rulers who are members of the
dynasty; as is well known, the term al-sulṭān al-aʿẓam was reserved for the im-
perial overlord, al-sulṭān al-muʿaẓẓam for whoever ruled over a significant part
of the imperial territory, and malik for a ruler on the provincial level.
In the earlier periods, however, the term sometimes is paired with tunnāʾ,
“landowners.” Tunnāʾ in turn comes alongside dahāqīn or in other cases tujjār
(“merchants”, and particularly those in long-distance trade). Al-Iṣṭakhrī himself
brings together mulūk and tunnāʾ when he describes their apparel and other fea-
tures.³¹ Al-Muqaddasī combines tunnāʾ and tujjār in his description and praise of
Samarqand.³² For Fārs, he mentions tunnāʾ among the notables otherwise enum-
erated as mashāyikh and wujūh.³³ Ibn Ḥawqal has a very interesting passage
 Al-Khwārazmī 1895, 114.
 Al-Samʿānī 1963, s.v. Bishkānī, 2:249, repeated in Yāqūt 1955, same lemma, 1:428.
 Al-Daylamī 1955, 224.
 Al-Daylamī 1955, 10.
 Karev 2015, 300. Karev notes that the great landholder ʿUjayf b. ʿAnbasa, a representative of
the new supra-regional elite forming in Transoxiana after the conquest, is introduced as malik in
a list of “kings” who came to submit to the caliph al-Muʿtaṣim.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 138.
 Al-Muqaddasī 1906, 278.
 Al-Muqaddasī 1906, 430.
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about fashion styles of various upper-class groups in Fārs; the tunnāʾ, he says,
hold a middle course between the secretaries and the merchants tujjār.³⁴ This
is also their place in Māfarrūkhī’s ranking of social strata.³⁵
Morony describes a hierarchy within the upper class in the conquest period
in Iraq. Beneath the royal family, he places the ahl al-buyūtāt, people descended
from the noble houses of the Parthian period.³⁶ This was presumably the group
best matching the mulūk of later centuries. Morony continues: “At the bottom of
this aristocratic hierarchy were the small landed proprietors (ar. tunnāʾ, syr. mare
qorye).”³⁷ Whereas Morony’s study is based on western—Iraqi—material, de la
Vaissière has studied the eastern centers of the emerging Muslim world. He de-
scribes the transition from Sogdian nobles to “the sons of Sogdian mulūk” and he
insists on a ranking of nobility there.³⁸ David Durand-Guédy gives some details
about old Iṣfahānī families in his monograph on Iṣfahān in the Seljuq period.
Quoting Ibn Ḥawqal, he observes that the dahāqīn of pre-Islamic times were
now the great tunnāʾ. Several families, he continues, were “directly connected
to the Sasanian elite.”³⁹
Returning to Fārs, al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal stress the continuity between
pre-Islamic and Islamic times. They list a number of noble families (ahl al-
buyūtāt, buyūt) who have held hereditary leading positions in the provincial ad-
ministration for many generations; there is no doubt that these families were
also large landholders.⁴⁰ Some had such positions still in the mid-10th century,
and had therefore transmitted their rank for no less than four centuries. But
they are still considered separately from the mulūk: they occupy an elevated
rank, but it is one level below the mulūk.
It would be interesting to follow the idea of precise social ranking within the
upper class through the early Islamic centuries, but this is beyond the scope of
this contribution.⁴¹ It is however clear that the term mulūk is one of several used
in marking social rank, and that invariably the mulūk occupy a place beneath the
actual ruler, but above the rural gentry mostly known as the dahāqīn.
 Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 289; Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 283.
 Māfarrūkhī 1933, 87–8; English translation Durand-Guédy 2010, 28–9.
 Pourshariati 2011, 58–9.
 Morony 1984, 186–7.
 de la Vaissière 2007, 33–6.
 Durand-Guédy 2010, 29; Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 367.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 147–148; Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 292; Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 286.
 See Marlow 2016, 113–126 as a starting point, and also Hayes 2015.
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Mulūk in al-Iṣṭakhrī: Leading Families of Fārs
In al-Iṣṭakhrī’s text,⁴² various kinds of mulūk appear. He opens the passage stat-
ing that the province has produced many mulūk and first mentions (but does not
enumerate) the Persian kings of pre-Islamic times. Second comes the Sasanian
general Hurmuzān; he is probably included because of his major role in the
early Islamic community and because he was married to a woman from the fam-
ily of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.⁴³ Then al-Iṣṭakhrī names Salmān al-Fārisī,⁴⁴ to whom leg-
end also ascribes noble birth (although not quite of the rank of a malik). All this
history appears merely as an introduction, however. The main part of the pas-
sage is devoted to very real and very contemporary people. These families are
of Arabic stock but have been living in Fārs since the early Islamic period;
some of them could even have arrived on the northern shores of the sea in
pre-Islamic times. It is beyond the scope of this contribution to go into details
regarding all those families. After a brief introduction of the various mulūk fam-
ilies of Fārs, therefore, only one of them will be discussed at length.
The first family al-Iṣṭakhrī presents are the Āl ʿUmāra, whom he says are
identical with or part of the Āl al-Julandā. The family was well connected on
both sides of the sea, with its Fārsī center on the coast. The Fārs branch derived
its wealth and influence mainly from control of the sea passages of the Persian
littoral. Their main base was the fortress of Dikdān.⁴⁵ This fortification, also
known as Dākbāyāh,⁴⁶ was renowned as one of the most impregnable in the
world;⁴⁷ it allowed its masters to take in the ʿushr of all the ships that passed
by. Other branches of the Āl al-Julandā were prominent on the Arab side in
ʿUmān, where they were for a while a ruling dynasty.⁴⁸ Al-Iṣṭakhrī links the
Fārs branch to the story of Mūsā the Prophet on his quest for the Water of
Life, and he tells us that the Qurʾānic verse “beyond them was a king who seized
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 140ff. The passage has been noted by previous authors, including Spuler
1952, 434. Spuler’s focus is on the preservation of the Iranian pre-Islamic culture rather than
the significance of these families in the political sphere.
 See Shahbazi. He was indeed born into a family who had the rank which Morony describes
for the early mulūk (Morony 1984). His province was Khūzistān (with al-Ahwāz as a center), so he
is not immediately from the Fārs area, but some of his fights against the Arab invaders took
place next to Iṣṭakhr. See also Pourshariati 2011, 336–338.
 On him, see Levi della Vida 2004; Levi della Vida notes that some versions see Salmān as
coming from a dihqān background.
 Pellat 2004.
 Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 268; Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 272, also has qalʿa Ibn ʿUmāra.
 Al-Masʿūdī 1962, I, 181 (§ 501).
 Wilkinson 1975.
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every ship, unlawfully” refers to them.⁴⁹ This detail implies they held the posi-
tion in question since pre-Islamic times.
We thus see a family—or rather a cluster of families or clans—of Arab de-
scent, long resident on the Fārs coast, deriving enormous incomes from ‘taxing’
the sea trade but still able to mobilize support from inland groups as well.We are
not informed of what their landholdings consisted of, but it must be supposed
they were large.
Another family, the Āl Abī Zuhayr al-Madīnī, is most interesting because one
of their number, Abū Sāra, ‘rebelled’ in the times of the caliph al-Maʾmūn (r.
813–833). His revolt is not dated more precisely, but it may well have been linked
to the uprisings during al-Maʾmūn’s prolonged stay in the East. Abū Sāra claim-
ed authority for himself in Fārs.⁵⁰ His rebellion had to be quelled by an army sent
from Khurāsān and led by the Khurāsānī general Muḥammad b. Ashʿath.⁵¹ An
earlier representative of the family, Jaʿfar b. Abī Zuhayr, led a delegation of
Fārsī rural lords—the mulūk Fārs—to Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–809), who was ex-
tremely pleased and is quoted as having seen him as a potential vizier (unfortu-
nately, he was prohibitively deaf). The Āl Abī Zuhayr controlled a strip of the
coast like the Āl al-Julandā and were also landholders; one of their members
owned an entire district. This particular family apparently controlled a fuller
set of resources than the Āl al-Julandā, and they were well connected to the cen-
tral government.⁵²
The mulūk Fārs were thus a group of enormously wealthy families of Arab
descent with two main sources of revenue: control of long-distance overseas
trade and agriculture. Regarding the latter, we can assume these families actively
owned vast stretches of land. They also farmed the taxes of many districts. In
some cases, their economic importance translated into political influence; they
were seen as representatives of their class at the caliphal court, and even some-
 18 (al-Kahf): 79, tr. Khalidi. Wa-kāna warāʾahum malikun yaʾkhudhu kulla safīnatin ghaṣban.
“Ghaṣban” could also be translated by “violently”.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 141, yadʿū ilā nafsihi.
 I have been unable to identify this person. He cannot be the Abū l-Sarāyā who revolted in
southern Iraq (around Kūfa) in the beginning of al-Maʾmūn’s caliphate (in 199 H/814–5 CE) be-
cause as far as I can see this revolt never spread to Fārs (al-Ṭabarī 1994, 8:528–535). This revolt
was ended by Harthama b. Aʿyan. On the other hand, the Muḥammad b. Ashʿath who is said to
have quelled the revolt in Fārs cannot be the Muḥammad b. Ashʿath al-Khuzāʿī who died during
a summer raid into Anatolia in 149 H/766 CE (al-Ṭabarī 1994, 8:28). Did al-Iṣṭakhrī follow oral
traditions here and mix up the names of both rebel and general? Other sources date Abū
Sāra to the reign of al-Manṣūr (al-Balādhurī 2000, 11:31), and this would fit the context better.
 The information that ʿUmāra and Zuhayr came to Fārs in the ʿAbbāsid period therefore may
well be mistaken, see Oberling/Hourcade.
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times rebelled against the central authorities. This seems to show that they also
had some military power.
None of the local persons al-Iṣṭakhrī enumerates in this passage can be
found in the indexes of al-Ṭabarī and Ibn al-Athīr. The families likewise do not
appear in the general historiography with its focus on the imperial center and
its Arabocentric worldview. The man to whom the case study is devoted is an ex-
ception. In his case, the narrative in al-Iṣṭakhrī can be confirmed in the universal
chronicles; there is also some extra information in Ibn Ḥawqal, Ibn al-Balkhī,
and Ibn Khallikān.
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil and the Descendants of ʿUrwa b. Udayya
in Fārs
My case study concerns Muḥammad b.Wāṣil b. Ibrāhīm. He came from a prom-
inent family of Arab stock who moved to Fārs in the late 7th century and settled
around the provincial center of Iṣṭakhr. The family grew very wealthy over time
(it is unclear how) and it may be supposed many members of it held leading po-
sitions in the province. It is not possible to establish a genealogical tree. Only a
few members emerge from the sources, and only a couple of episodes are told in
sufficient detail to gain an idea of the family’s social profile. It is clear, however,
that they did not reside on the coast and were not as important in the overseas
trade as other families; they were primarily landowners and tax farmers.
The family belonged to the Ḥanẓala branch of the Banū Tamīm and Ibn
Wāṣil therefore is introduced as al-Ḥanẓalī al-Tamīmī. The Banū Ḥanẓala were
still present in the region in later days, but further west: Ibn al-Balkhī reports
them living between Ahwāz and Baṣra and from there down to the coast. In
the time under discussion here, Muḥammad b. Wāṣil’s power and landholdings
were centered in the region of Iṣṭakhr.⁵³
The first members of the family whomwe can trace in the sources were Khār-
ijīs, opponents of both ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib (r. 656–661) and the Umayyad caliph
Muʿāwiya (r. 661–680) whose governor in southern Iraq, Ziyād b. Abīhi, killed
many out of their numbers. These included the ancestors of Muḥammad b.
Wāṣil, ʿUrwa b. Udayya and his brother Abū Bilāl Mirdās b. Udayya; Abū Bilāl
Mirdās, a prominent man among the Khārijīs, was killed in 61 H/680–681
 Ibn al-Balkhī 1921, 69.
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CE.⁵⁴ In the sources, Abū Bilāl is shown as a model of ascetic piety, a quietist for
most of his life until his final ‘rebellion’ (khurūj). This khurūj (literally “leaving”
or “going out”) drove him from Baṣra. He went to Ahwāz with a small group of
followers, won an unexpected victory over an Umayyad detachment, and finally
was defeated and killed next to Dārābjird, in Fārs.⁵⁵ His brother ʿUrwa does not
seem to have participated in Abū Bilāl’s khurūj, but he was still executed in
Baṣra later.
Al-Maʾmūn appointed ʿUmar b. Ibrāhīm, one of this family, as leader of the
maritime ghazw in the Persian Gulf. The target of this expedition was a group
called the Qaṭarīya—the real or presumed successors of a central figure in
early extreme Khārijism called Qaṭarī b. al-Fujāʾa, active in the last decades of
the 7th century.⁵⁶ Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī details the battles against Qaṭarī, who whilst
fleeing the caliphal troops followed the same route as Abū Bilāl Mirdās via
Ahwāz to Dārābjird.⁵⁷ Ibn Ḥawqal links the Qaṭarīya to the Ṣufrīya, another ex-
tremist group of Khārijites, saying that ʿAbādān (next to the mouth of the Tigris
on the Persian Gulf coast) “is a stronghold where warriors live who fight the
Ṣufrīya and the Qaṭarīya and other pirates.”⁵⁸
The family thus either dropped their Khārijī sympathies in the early 9th cen-
tury or followed a quietist form of Khārijism as their ancestors had done. The
campaign is presented very much as a family enterprise: it was equipped (and
apparently at least partly paid for) by another family member, Abū Bilāl Mirdās
b. ʿUmar, son of that ʿUmar b. Ibrāhīmwho led the enterprise. As this Mirdās was
called by his kunya Abū Bilāl, the name Abū Bilāl Mirdās resurfaced; a reminder
that in such genealogically conscious families, names were passed on.
The family was extremely wealthy, evident in the fact that it could muster
the funds for such a campaign. Abū Bilāl Mirdās b. ʿUmar was charged a
kharāj or annual land tax of roughly three million dirham. His relative Muḥam-
 He even has an entry in the EI2: Levi della Vida 1993. Levi della Vida completes the geneal-
ogy in pre-Islamic times: the Arab tribal group was Rabīʿa b. Ḥanẓala b. Mālik b. Zayd Manāt,
also called Rabīʿa al-wusṭā. Mirdās was descended from Ḥudayr b. ʿAmr b. ʿAbd b. Kaʿb; Udayya
was the name of his mother or grandmother. He was mostly known by his kunya Abū Bilāl.
 Hagemann 2016, 41–42. The narrative of this khurūj also appears in Levi della Vida 1993. For
the figure of Abū Bilāl, see also Gaiser 2014. Both Hagemann and Gaiser do not aim at recon-
structing the events, but concentrate on the narrative itself.
 Van Ess 1992, 573, 613.
 Al-Kūfī 1392/1972, 1–41. No Ḥanẓala appear in this narrative.
 Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 48: kāna fīhi al-muḥāribūn li-l-Ṣufrīya wa-l-Qaṭarīya wa-ghayrihim min mu-
talaṣṣiṣa al-baḥr. Van Ess 1992 does not list a group called the Qaṭarīya but has much informa-
tion on the Ṣufrīya.
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mad b. Wāṣil had to pay about the same sum.⁵⁹ In total the family’s members
owed a sum of 10 million dirham to the state. (To put this in perspective, the en-
tire province was good for about 30 million dirham.⁶⁰) The sum probably means
that the family was engaged in tax farming, so that the amount stated was not
due merely from their own landholdings but was the sum total they had to de-
liver to the caliphal administration. On the other hand, al-Iṣṭakhrī explicitly says
they owned many villages. For their administration, they may have employed
Iranian experts, at least in earlier periods; we hear of a man of dihqān extraction
who managed Ḥanẓalī holdings in Fārs and was himself a client of the
Ḥanẓala.⁶¹
Another asset which made the Ḥanẓalī family influential was their control of
castles. Castles were a necessary feature of local lordship. As mentioned above,
the Āl al-Julandā held the castle of Dikdān on the coast. Muḥammad b.Wāṣil ac-
quired at least one castle in the region of Iṣṭakhr, next to Rāmjird, called Saʿīdā-
bād. This was an old fortress, as Ibn Ḥawqal tells us. It had been in use in Sa-
sanian times and in the early Islamic period it had served as a stronghold for
the governor Ziyād b. Abīhi (who killed so many Khārijites, among them the
two ancestors of Muḥammad b.Wāṣil). Muḥammad b.Wāṣil ordered it demolish-
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 142.
 Ibn Khurdādhbih 1889, 48, who adds that in pre-Islamic times the state took 40 million from
the province. For the year 350 H/961 CE, Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 299 and Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 304 gives
1.5 million dinar (the exchange rate between silver dirham and gold dinar is a matter of dispute;
the figures presented here would make a rate of 20 dirham to the dinar probable). Ibn Ḥawqal’s
figures may point to an organized financial bureaucracy; these were the times of ʿAḍud al-Dawla
the Būyid (338–372 H/949–983 CE). Compare this to the 15 million dirham which Yaʿqūb b. al-
Layth (in 255 H/869 CE) reportedly offered to get the caliphal administration from the taxes of
Fārs if he were appointed over the province; Ibn Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:447. When Yaʿqūb
came to Fārs again in or around 260 H/873–4 CE and was able to administer the taxes in a reg-
ular way, he got the 30 million that seem to have been the norm in this period. He had his rep-
resentative in Fārs, Muḥammad b.Wāṣil, send only five million on to the caliphal administration
(Ibn Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:453). The same source mentions that the Ṣaffār had an appointment
for a number of provinces (including Khurāsān, but also Fārs) on condition that he deliver two-
thirds of the taxes he collected. In that case, the caliphal court would have expected around 20
million dirham from Fārs. Ibn Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:462. For more figures relating to the taxes
due from Fārs, see Spuler 1952, 468–469.
 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1931, 6:175, no. 3231. One member of the family of the singer Ibrāhīm
b. Māhān is quoted as saying kānat fī aydīnā ḍiyāʿ li-baʿḍ al-Ḥanẓaliyīn. There is a problem here,
however. Ibn al-Nadīm puts it differently. He has the family come from Arrajān (in western Fārs,
where Muḥammad b. Wāṣil’s family is not attested), and says they fled from there in the
Umayyad period because of unjust tax collectors. Ibn al-Nadīm also has them as clients of
the Ḥanẓala, mawāliyunā [min] al-Ḥanẓaliyīn, wa-kānat lahum ḍiyāʿᶜindanā, which does not nec-
essarily mean that the Iranian family managed these estates. Ibn al-Nadīm n.d., 157.
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ed, only to later have it rebuilt.⁶² He then kept his treasure there—we learn that
because it was carried off when Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth the Ṣaffār conquered the cas-
tle. The place was later used as prison.
It is not stated which castle or castles the family had before Muḥammad b.
Wāṣil took over Saʿīdābād, but we can suppose that all branches of the Ḥanẓala
in Fārs had such strongholds. Al-Iṣṭakhrī speaks of 5,000 castles in Fārs, a figure
Ibn Ḥawqal repeats; this figure refers to the fortresses in the mountains and sim-
ilar places that were close to settlements but not an integral part of them. Cita-
dels and urban fortifications come on top of that.⁶³ It is interesting to note that
Ibn Ḥawqal quotes a man of the tunnāʾ group as his source: evidently that is who
was knowledgeable in such matters—probably because they owned such places
themselves.
There can be no doubt that the Ḥanẓalī family was one of the pillars of ʿAb-
bāsid power in Fārs, together with the other noble houses of the mulūk and the
ahl al-buyūtāt.
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil’s ‘Rebellion’
In the mid-9th century, the caliphal administration weakened and troops of mili-
tary slaves dominated the new capital of Sāmarrāʾ. The most striking single
event, remembered because it ushered in a long period of ‘anarchy’ in Sāmarrāʾ,
was the assassination of al-Mutawakkil in 247 H/861 CE.⁶⁴
For some time, the caliphs had been ruling large parts of Iran including Fārs
through a hereditary line of super-governors, the Ṭāhirids. From the perspective
of Fārs, the Ṭāhirids were overlords, but also always—at least formally—agents of
the caliphal central administration. In this time of instability in Fārs, the main
actors were representatives of the Ṭāhirids and Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth the Ṣaffār
as external powers on the one hand, and regional figures on the other.
What was at stake was evidently the tax revenue from Fārs, money of in-
creasing importance for Sāmarrāʾ: Iraq had become problematic to tax, and
not much could be expected from Khurāsān any longer. To give an example:
in Muḥarram 256 H/early December 9, 869 CE, ten million dirham and a half
 Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 268, Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 272–273.
 Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 268, Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 272. Ibn al-Balkhī mentions more than 70 castles
conquered and then destroyed by the Seljuqid governor Chawlī, and he specifically enumerates
only those which were not in this number. Therefore, it is not completely surprising that
Saʿīdābād is not mentioned. Ibn al-Balkhī 1921, 158.
 Kennedy 2016, 147.
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in tax payments arrived in Sāmarrāʾ from Fārs.⁶⁵ This money allowed a clique of
military slaves to pursue an action against al-Muhtadī (r. 869–70) that they had
been forced to postpone for lack of funds. Some kind of tax administration was
still at work in the province.
Until 255 H/869 CE, a man called ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Quraysh intermittently
controlled Fārs.⁶⁶ At some times he had a caliphal appointment and at others he
rebelled against the official representative of Ṭāhirid and caliphal power. The
exact details of the struggle in the 250s H/860s CE between the Ṭāhirids, the
Ṣaffār (the rising power in the east), and local actors like ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn
need not detain us here. According to al-Ṭabarī (at the beginning of the story
of Muḥammad b. Wāṣil), the Ṭāhirid representative in Fārs was Ḥārith b. Sīmā.
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil and a Kurdish emir called Aḥmad b. al-Layth rose against
Ḥārith b. Sīmā and killed him in 256 H/870 CE.⁶⁷
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil in Power
Muḥammad b.Wāṣil controlled Fārs from 256–261 H/870–875 CE. But he always
accepted an overlord’s authority, either that of the caliph or Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth or
both. Ibn Khallikān calls him the governor of Fārs, in charge of finances and war
at the same time; this may go back to an agreement between the caliph and
Yaʿqūb. Al-Ṭabarī also says Ibn Wāṣil submitted to the Ṣaffār; when Yaʿqūb in-
sisted that he hand over the province to a representative of the caliph, this
was done in 258 H/872 CE.⁶⁸
The Tārīkh-i Sīstān has Yaʿqūb come to Kirmān at the beginning of al-Muʿta-
mid’s caliphate (r. 256–279 H/870–892 CE). Muḥammad b. Wāṣil met him with
his army and offered submission and obedience together with presents and
much wealth.⁶⁹ This presupposes that Ibn Wāṣil had been in control of Fārs
for some time, so the event should probably be dated to 257 H/870–871 CE. In
return, the source continues, Yaʿqūb gave him Fārs. Ibn Wāṣil also sent some
 Ibn al-Athīr 1965, 7:221.
 Ibn Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:447–450.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:474 (III:1839 in de Goeje’s edition); Ibn al-Athīr 1965, 7:240.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:490 (III: 1859); Ibn al-Athīr 1965, 7:257.
 Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1314/1935 216; Istoriia Sistana 1974, 216, with note 638 which repeats Smirno-
va’s note 543.
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tax monies to the caliphal court at that time.⁷⁰ He had his own tax agents (bun-
dār): these men were later remembered as having worked for him.⁷¹
In 258 H/871–872 CE, Ibn Wāṣil returned to the caliphal ṭāʿa (obedience);
that is, he formally submitted to the caliph—he had been obedient before, but
then rebelled. At the same time, he accepted a new caliphal agent, Muḥammad
b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-Fayyāḍ, as responsible for the finances (al-kharāj wa-l-ḍiyāʿ) of
Fārs.⁷² This agent is not mentioned again. There is no information regarding
what his appointment meant for the holder of the corresponding military posi-
tion (al-ḥarb): in some cases, one man held both positions, but they also some-
times devolved onto two appointees.
Some years later, in 261 H/874–875 CE, Ibn Wāṣil defeated a caliphal force
sent against him. The commander of this caliphal force was ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b.
Mufliḥ and his second-in-command was Ṭāshtimur. In the battle, Ṭāshtimur was
killed and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān taken prisoner. Ibn Wāṣil refused to negotiate his lib-
eration, and Ibn Mufliḥ died in captivity.⁷³ Muḥammad b.Wāṣil now was master
of the province again, and he expanded into neighboring provinces such as Khū-
zistān. It was from there that he hastened east to meet Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth, only to
be defeated at al-Bayḍāʾ (see below).
At some point, Ibn Wāṣil had the ruined fortress of Saʿīdābād (Rāmjird, dis-
trict Iṣṭakhr) repaired, and tried to put down local resistance by conquering other
fortresses held by recalcitrant local lords. But he had trouble taking some of
them: Al-Iṣṭakhri (and Ibn Ḥawqal following him) specifically name the fortress
of Kāriyān in the Tīn mountains—he could not break the resistance of the castel-
lan there, Aḥmad b. al-Ḥasan al-Azdī.⁷⁴
In general, however, Muḥammad b.Wāṣil seemed well established. His rela-
tionship with the caliph was troubled, but he must have been followed by a ma-
jority of the local lords and castellans. He had his own agents, including taxation
specialists, working for him. He delivered some of the taxes produced to the ca-
liphal court, if irregularly. The caliph could not remove him—an attempt to do so
 Ibn Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:453. The sum quoted is five million dirham; Yaʿqūb had taken the
(usual) thirty million at the same time. See above, note 60.
 In their list of old families who produced able administrators, al-Iṣṭakhrī and Ibn Ḥawqal
quote the Marzbān b. Zādbih family (judging by the name, of dihqān stock). Al-Ḥasan b.
Marzbān worked as bundār for Muḥammad b. Wāṣil and later for Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth; Ibn
Ḥawqal 1964, 286; Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 292; al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 147.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:490 (III:1859); Ibn al-Athīr 1965, 7:257.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:513; Ibn al-Athīr 1965, 7:275. Both commanders participated in earlier cam-
paigns against the Zanj.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 116; Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 269/Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 272. It is not stated whether old
grudges between Azd and Tamīm played a role here.
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had failed, and most of the caliphal military and financial resources were now
directed against the Zanj who were clearly the more dangerous threat.⁷⁵ The ge-
ographer al-Iṣṭakhrī, a regional source, calls Ibn Wāṣil “governor” of Fārs (wālī),
and probably he reflects local feelings.⁷⁶ And as we have seen, all the other sour-
ces see Ibn Wāṣil as the legitimate governor of Fārs as well, at least up to a point.
Reasons for ‘Rebellion’
In order to understand the reasons for this movement, we turn to a story told
only in al-Iṣṭakhrī. A group of Turkish military slaves, reportedly forty officers,
were given land grants (iqṭāʿ) in Fārs, or at any rate they went there and claimed
they had. Their commander-in-chief, whom al-Iṣṭakhrī calls al-Muwallad and
who therefore was probably the noted slave general Muḥammad b. al-Muwal-
lad,⁷⁷ tried to prevent abuse, and therefore his subordinates rebelled against
him. He sought refuge with Mirdās b. ʿUmar, Muḥammad b. Wāṣil’s paternal
cousin. Abū Bilāl Mirdās gave shelter and asylum to al-Muwallad and saw to
it that he made his way back to Baghdad. With al-Muwallad gone, the Turkish
officers elected another leader—Ibrāhīm b. Sīmā, apparently the brother of
that Ḥārith b. Sīmā whom Ibn Wāṣil is reported to have killed.⁷⁸
The caliphal administration now asked Mirdās to pursue and to punish the
Turks, whom they wanted killed; however, Mirdās excused himself. The caliph
then addressed the same request to Muḥammad b.Wāṣil, and Ibn Wāṣil indeed
took action by executing almost all forty Turkish officers. Only Ibrāhīm b. Sīmā
 Their revolt lasted from 255–270 H/869–883 CE. Popovic 2002.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 116; Ibn Ḥawqal 1964, 269; Ibn Ḥawqal 1939, 273: kāna Muḥammad b. Wāṣil
al-Ḥanẓalī wālī Fārs yalīhā ḥarban wa-kharājan; note the explicit mention of both financial and
military matters.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 142. This man led military action against the Zanj in Baṣra in late 257 H/871
CE. In Rabīʿ I, 259 H/January 873 CE, he was appointed to lead the war against the Zanj in the
region of Wāsiṭ. In 261 H/874–875 CE, when Yaʿqūb defeated Muḥammad b.Wāṣil, he was not in
the Fārs region either. In later years, e.g. in 264 H/877–878 CE, he was still busy fighting the
Zanj as military commander of Wāsiṭ. Thus his presence in Fārs is not documented for the rel-
evant years in al-Ṭabarī. Later, he defected to the Ṣaffārid army.
 Ibrāhīm b. Sīmā is also a known commander. In 257 H/871 CE, he fought the Zanj west of
Ahwāz, and al-Ṭabarī explains that he “retreated from Fārs where he had been together with
al-Ḥārith b. Sīmā in the field/steppe known as the Arbuk steppe, this is between al-Ahwāz
and the bridge” (al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:479). In the following years, Ibrāhīm was also involved in
the wars against the Zanj. He was killed in the battle of Dayr ʿĀqūl (otherwise a victory for
the caliphal troops) in Rajab 262 H/April 876 CE.
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and a handful more escaped. Subsequently Muḥammad b. Wāṣil took over in
Fārs.
If we consider that the report of the killing of Ḥārith b. Sīmā is not in al-
Iṣṭakhrī and the story of the killing of the Turkish officers is not in al-Ṭabarī,
we may ask whether both stories could refer to the same chain of events. Al-
Ṭabarī shows Ibrāhīm b. Sīma, who escaped the massacre, as coming to
Ahwāz “retreating from Fārs where he had been with al-Ḥārith b. Sīmā” in 257
H/871 CE.⁷⁹ If the killing had taken place just a bit earlier, it can be dated to
256 H/870 CE, the year al-Ṭabarī reports the killing of al-Ḥārith and Ibn Wāṣil’s
usurpation of Fārs. This date also works well with reports in other sources. Al-
Iṣṭakhrī’s report is biased: the killing took place on caliphal orders, so it cannot
be laid at Ibn Wāṣil’s door.
The sources do not give any reason for Ibn Wāṣil’s action; they put it into the
general basket of insubordination and rebellion. Clues can be obtained (with
caution) from the timing of the uprising. Al-Iṣṭakhrī explicitly links the killing
of the military slaves in Fārs to two factors: firstly, the breakdown of central au-
thority, and secondly, the greed (“injustice”) of the Turks who held iqṭāʿāt.When
they came to Fārs they apparently tried to seize both money and goods. This en-
croached on the traditional rights of the established upper rung of the landed
elites in several ways. They were no longer the direct partner of the central ad-
ministration. They could no longer make a profit themselves out of tax farming.
They probably had to disburse taxes and tax arrears in unprecedented amounts.
And they had to confront a group of people who were quite prepared to use vio-
lence to get what they wanted. Taken together, these reasons were enough to
make the provincial nobility think of rebellion and therefore it is unlikely that
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil acted only for his own sake.
The End
The end came quickly. Again according to al-Iṣṭakhrī,⁸⁰ Yaʿqūb the Ṣaffār was
called in—not by the caliph, but by Mirdās, Ibn Wāṣil’s cousin, who feared for
his life if Ibn Wāṣil were to continue. Yaʿqūb invaded Fārs in Shawwāl 261 H/
July 875 CE, and in the ensuing battle near Bayḍāʾ in the region of Iṣṭakhr Ibn
 Al- Ṭabarī 1994, 9:479–480. There is no explanation of why and fearing whom Ibrāhīm
should have “retreated” from Fārs.
 According to the Tārīkh-i Sīstān, an erstwhile Ṣaffārid commander, Muḥammad b. Zayda-
wayh, enticed Muḥammad b.Wāṣil to rise against Yaʿqūb. Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1314/1935, 226; Istoriia
Sistana 224.
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Wāṣil was defeated. Yaʿqūb also took his fortress or fortresses. The booty was
enormous—40 million dirham⁸¹—and according to al-Ṭabarī Yaʿqūb took Ibn Wā-
ṣil’s maternal uncle Mirdās prisoner.⁸² There is a difficulty here: al-Iṣṭakhrī sees
Mirdās as Ibn Wāṣil’s paternal cousin, and in an entirely different role. Ibn al-
Athīr adds to the confusion over this man, whom he sees as conducting negotia-
tions between Yaʿqūb and Ibn Wāṣil.⁸³ In his version, when Yaʿqūb entered Fārs,
Ibn Wāṣil was in the region of Ahwāz west of his home country. He sent his ma-
ternal uncle (khāl) Abū Bilāl Mirdās to negotiate with Yaʿqūb, and as a result Abū
Bilāl tendered Ibn Wāṣil’s submission. This was not what Ibn Wāṣil had intend-
ed, and when Abū Bilāl came back he had him imprisoned together with Yaʿ-
qūb’s emissaries. Battle thus became inevitable. Ibn Wāṣil had lost many men,
foot soldiers as well as cavalry, from hunger and thirst. Just as the fighting start-
ed, Yaʿqūb said to Abū Bilāl (whom the account does not previously mention as
freed): “Ibn Wāṣil has betrayed us.” Ibn Wāṣil’s men then fled without doing bat-
tle.⁸⁴
Besides these accounts of the war and battle between Yaʿqūb and Ibn Wāṣil,
there is the material found in the Tārīkh-i Sīstān. The Tārīkh-i Sīstān underlines
Yaʿqūb’s resourcefulness; Yaʿqūb wins because he outwits Ibn Wāṣil.⁸⁵ Its end
sees Muḥammad b. Wāṣil locked up in a fortress and Yaʿqūb proceeding to
Ahwāz accompanied by Abū Muʿādh Bilāl b. al-Azhar.⁸⁶ One would like to
know whether there is any link between this Bilāl and Abū Bilāl Mirdās, but
that cannot be established and would seem unlikely at first glance because of
the nasab of Abū Muʿādh.⁸⁷
 In comparison,Yaʿqūb is said to have left at his death the fantastic sum of four million dinar
(in gold, ʿayn) and fifty million dirham (silver, waraq), not counting equipment and so forth. Ibn
Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:462. The rendition of the fortress is also related in the Tārīkh-i Sīstān, and
there is a much embellished story regarding how Muḥammad b.Wāṣil finally unveiled the secret
of how to get into it. Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1314/1935, 229–230; Istoriia Sistana 1974, 226–227.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:514 (III:1888).
 This dilemma has been noted by Bosworth already, and I am unable to offer a solution. Bos-
worth 1994, 151.
 Ibn al-Athīr 1965, 7:276–277.
 The prototypical ʿayyār, Yaʿqūb is often shown outwitting his enemies; see Tor 2007. It is
therefore no wonder that later authors relate further stories about Yaʿqūb duping Muḥammad
b. Wāṣil. One of those is in al-ʿAwfī 1393/2015, 195–196. In the subsequent anecdote (196–
198), the lord of Dīnawar in his turn bests Muḥammad b.Wāṣil. In the India of the 13th century,
Muḥammad b.Wāṣil was still remembered as a bit dumb and no match for the Ṣaffār (or even for
ordinary local lords). My thanks to Peter Verkinderen for the reference to al-ʿAwfī.
 Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1314/1935, 226–230, Istoriia Sistana 1974, 223–227.
 This man’s career can be followed to some extent in the Tārīkh-i Sīstān. (He is, however, un-
known to the central chronicles.) He ruled Fārs on behalf of ʿAmr b. al-Layth in 274 H/887 CE
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After the battle at Bayḍāʾ, Ibn Wāṣil’s troops dispersed. According to al-
Ṭabarī, Ibn Wāṣil escaped into the mountains. After a short while, the political
wind changed again. In the question which continued to occupy policy makers
at the caliphal court, namely whom to appoint over the eastern provinces, the
Ṣaffār or one of the Ṭāhirids, the pendulum swung again—this time in favour
of the Ṭāhirids. Yaʿqūb had been beaten at Dayr ʿĀqūl on Rajab 9, 262 H (April
8, 876 CE),⁸⁸ and though the defeat was not a catastrophic one it did much to
harm Yaʿqūb’s reputation as a military leader. Yaʿqūb was once more publicly
cursed, and the caliph appointed Ibn Wāṣil to rule Fārs.⁸⁹ But according to
the same source, in that year Yaʿqūb regained control of Fārs and Ibn Wāṣil
fled. The following year, in 263 H/876–877 CE, one of Yaʿqūb’s commanders suc-
ceeded in taking him prisoner.⁹⁰ Perhaps al-Iṣṭakhrī’s report about Ibn Wāṣil’s
imprisonment should be related to this second occasion: Ibn Wāṣil was taken
prisoner either immediately after the battle at Bayḍāʾ or shortly after. He was
brought to Sīrāf and later handed over to Yaʿqūb who transferred him to
Thamm, another fortress. Ibn Wāṣil spent two years in this fortress. For a
short while, when Yaʿqūb was in Jundayshāpūr, Ibn Wāṣil was able to get free
and take over the fortification; but Yaʿqūb soon sent orders to kill him.⁹¹ No
source gives a death date for Ibn Wāṣil.
Later History
The end of Muḥammad b. Wāṣil did not mean that his family had lost all influ-
ence.When the Būyid ʿAlī b. Būya (ʿImād al-Dawla) conquered Shīrāz in 322 H/
934 CE, the resulting taxes (or tax arrears) were farmed out. Three local land-
(Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1314/1935, 247, Istoriia Sistana 1974, 239); he is said to have accomplished his task
there well. He continued in Fārs but was employed also on campaigns elsewhere. At the end,
perhaps in 291 H/904 CE, he was ordered to go into exile in Sīstān; he gathered “his belongings,
his people, and set in march his slaves and his warriors and everyone who was beholden to him
and had them depart for Sīstān” (māl wa-ahl-i khwīsh bar girift wa-ghulāmān wa-sipāh-i khwīsh
harchi khāṣṣ-i ū būd wa-rāh-i Sīstān bar girift), Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1314/1935, 275, Istoriia Sistana 1974,
263. But he was intercepted by Ṣaffārid forces and imprisoned in Muḥammad b.Wāṣil’s fortress.
If by any chance he was a member of the Ḥanẓalī clan, this would be ironic indeed. It seems
clear that he was a Fārsī nobleman, and even if he was not Abū Bilāl Mirdās’ son, he might
still belong to the larger family.
 Bosworth, “Dayral-ᶜĀqūl.”
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:519.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:530.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 143– 144.
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holders are named explicitly among those who took the contracts, among them
an Ibn Mirdās. There can be no doubt that this is a member of the Ḥanẓalī fam-
ily.⁹²
Ibn al-Balkhī speaks of a family of qāḍīs in Fārs who were admired for both
their knowledge in legal affairs and for their long-lasting influence. The first man
whom he mentions is Abū Muḥammad ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad b. Sulaymān b. Abī
Burda al-Fazārī, dated to the times of the caliph al-Rāḍī (r. 322–329 H/934–940
CE).⁹³ Abū Muḥammad’s descendants spread into Kirmān and Fārs, acquiring
positions and landed property as far afield as Ghazna. At some point, his son
Abū Naṣr (who apparently stayed in Fārs) got married to a girl from the Mirdā-
siyān raʾīs (this word probably meaning wealthy landowners, well connected,
with a potential for high positions in the provincial administration; as men-
tioned above, raʾīs is a term which continues an association with malik in
some contexts).⁹⁴
As a consequence, their son ʿAbdallāh held both positions: he was qāḍī as a
legacy from his father and he inherited the riyāsa from his mother’s family.⁹⁵ It
cannot be shown definitely that the Mirdāsiyān in Ibn al-Balkhī are the descend-
ants of Abū Bilāl Mirdās—whether the early Khārijite or the later malik—but it is
highly probable. Mirdās is not a frequent name and there is no other candidate
for an eponym of any Mirdāsiyān as a raʾīs family in Fārs. The descendants of
this ʿAbdallāh were in turn highly respected in their offices, both the qaḍāʾ
and the riyāsa, and Ibn al-Balkhī proudly informs his readers that his grandfa-
ther had the privilege of working with one of them in the beginning of the
Jalālī era (the reign of the Seljuqid sultan Malikshāh, 1072– 1092).⁹⁶ This
would give the Fazārī/Mirdāsī family of qāḍīs and ruʾasāʾ an active timespan
of over a century. If we include this period, the Ḥanẓalī mulūk of Fārs have a his-
torical record of four centuries and a half, ranging from ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib in the
mid-7th century to the reign of Malikshāh in the late 11th.
 Ibn Miskawayh 1916, 300. The other two were al-Nawbandajānī and a member of the Fasān-
jus clan.
 I have been unable to identify this person.
 This kunya is the only part of the name Ibn al-Balkhī quotes, and therefore it is impossible to
find out more about him.
 Ibn al-Balkhī 1921, 117–118. Pas qaḍāʾ-i Fārs ba-mīrāth-i pidar wa riyāsat-i ān wilāyat ba-mīr-
āth-i khānadān-i mādar badū rasīd.
 Ibn al-Balkhī 1921, 118. It is known that Ibn al-Balkhī’s grandfather was a mustawfī under
various rulers in the late 11th century; see Bosworth, “Ebn al-Balkī.”
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Muḥammad b. Wāṣil as One of the Mulūk Fārs
We have seen that al-Iṣṭakhrī’s mulūk Fārs were the top level of the provincial
landholding elite, enormously wealthy, politically influential, and eligible for
high offices. The Ḥanẓalī family to whom Muḥammad b. Wāṣil belonged was
one of several, but it seems that Ibn Wāṣil himself was an exceptional figure.
Even if the narratives in the various sources seem to defy attempts at recon-
structing the chain of events, some points are clear on the level of social history.
First, it is clear where Muḥammad b.Wāṣil got his financial resources. His entire
family had huge landholdings and they were possibly also involved in tax farm-
ing, although there is no clear indication of the latter in the sources. His military
resources included control over at least one castle (which he had repaired while
he was in power), and probably other places too.
But military resources also mean military manpower. Here the sources are
less forthcoming. In his action against the Turks from Sāmarrāʾ whom he had
killed on caliphal orders (as al-Iṣṭakhrī claims), he relied on his personal retain-
ers, a group of people whom al-Iṣṭakhrī introduces as ḥāshiyatuhu wa-ahl
ṭāʿatihi.⁹⁷ It is interesting to see that a figure like Muḥammad b. Wāṣil had
men in his ṭāʿa, his obedience, a term normally used to indicate those serving
and obeying rulers. The ḥāshiya may have been something like household
troops, people personally dependent on Muḥammad b. Wāṣil as their lord,
whereas the ahl ṭāʿatihi could correspond to a larger group of supporters and
people who followed him for the time being. In the Tārīkh-i Sīstān, it is taken
for granted that Ibn Wāṣil had his own troops, though we do not learn who
they were. In Ibn al-Athīr’s report on the events leading to the battle at al-
Bayḍāʾ between Ibn Wāṣil and Yaʿqūb the Ṣaffār, infantry and cavalry troops
are mentioned in Ibn Wāṣil’s army; this might point to an ancient type of mobi-
lization with a comparatively high proportion of drafted followers of local lords
fighting on foot.
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil is also reported to have mustered Bedouin troops in
Fārs, from Tamīm (the source mentions they were from his tribal group), and
from ʿAbd Qays in Baḥrayn. Both groups had sent ill-equipped and ragged
men.⁹⁸ Since this information comes from a contemporary source, two points
are interesting: first, it is taken for granted that Muḥammad b.Wāṣil has a mili-
tary following, and second, his rule extends as far as Baḥrayn.
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 142. See also the description of Bilāl b. al-Azhar’s following when he left
Fārs for Sīstān, above, note 88.
 Ibn al-Muʿtazz 1939, 407. I owe this reference to Peter Verkinderen.
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Another important asset were allies, political resources that could be turned
into military ones in case of need. Groups the sources identify as Kurds appear as
allies of Muḥammad b. Wāṣil (and of other local lords as well). One of the rele-
vant Kurdish lords was Aḥmad b. al-Layth (no relation of the Ṣaffārids, of
course). Whereas Ibn Khallikān shows this man as Yaʿqūb’s most important
enemy and as an ally of ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Quraysh in the conquest of
Fārs,⁹⁹ he appears as Muḥammad b. Wāṣil’s accomplice in the uprising against
Ḥārith b. Sīmā in al-Ṭabarī.¹⁰⁰ Apparently in both cases Kurdish fighters were
seen as a necessary but problematic factor in military action in Fārs; they
were always pillaging and raping, and their loyalties were shaky. Still, Muḥam-
mad b.Wāṣil must have made use of Kurdish forces repeatedly since after his de-
feat Yaʿqūb cracked down on a Kurdish group, the men of Mūsā b. Mihrān, for
sympathizing with Ibn Wāṣil. Probably some out of their numbers had partici-
pated in Ibn Wāṣil’s campaigns.¹⁰¹
Apart from the Kurdish lords, what about the Iranian or Arab local lords, in-
cluding the families of the mulūk Fārs? Here, we have no information besides the
anecdote that one of them refused to join Muḥammad b.Wāṣil who therefore laid
siege to his castle—without, however, managing to take it. It is tempting to con-
jecture that many others did in fact join Ibn Wāṣil, but this is clearly stated no-
where.
After his initial successes, Ibn Wāṣil may have pursued the goal he achieved
at the end: to be appointed as governor of Fārs. It seems that he also was Yaʿ-
qūb’s man in that province; at any rate, he was prepared to serve the Ṣaffār
as well as the caliph. The Ṭāhirids were no longer part of the game in any prac-
tical way as far as Fārs was concerned. Ibn Wāṣil was one of those who aspired
to positions of leadership in their own province. The sources are silent about
who he may have had in mind as a role model (if anyone), but perhaps it is
no coincidence that al-Iṣṭakhrī makes some comments about the Sāmānids im-
mediately after his passage on Ibn Wāṣil, and that the Sāmānids appear as
mulūk al-Furs.¹⁰²
 Ibn Khallikān 1367/1948, 5:448–450. Aḥmad’s Kurds were made responsible for a number of
outrageous deeds, among them the raping of hundreds of noble girls. See also Tor 2007, 129.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:474, year 256 (III:1839); Ibn al-Athīr 1965, 7:240.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1994, 9:514, year 261. Al-Iṣṭakhrī presents Mūsā b. Mihrāb (not Mihrān) as leader
of the Bādhinjān ramm of Kurds in Fārs, the most warlike group because of the horses they
raised. The group lived closer to Iṣfahān than to Fārs, but their leaders owned many estates
and villages in Fārs (al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 145).
 Al-Iṣṭakhrī 1870, 144.
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It is possibly in this context that his conflict with prominent family mem-
bers, in particular with Abū Bilāl Mirdās, can be explained. Abū Bilāl is present-
ed as a ‘traditional’ local lord: he was prepared to act on behalf of the caliphal
authorities, but not to confront the military powers, sticking to paradigms of ne-
gotiation and mediation instead. When Ibn Wāṣil started to assert himself as
head of the province, he must have felt threatened, as indeed he was. If he
was a senior member of the senior branch of the family, he clearly stood in
Ibn Wāṣil’s way.
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil in Earlier Scholarship
Ibn Wāṣil is by no means an unknown figure. Since sources on his career have
been readily available for a long time, it is no surprise that many earlier scholars
have devoted lines or pages to him. In general, he appears as a lesser figure in
the story of Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth and therefore has not been the subject of a de-
tailed study until now.
Nöldeke gives a brief rendering of the main source narrative in his study of
the Ṣaffārids. He (wrongly) claims that Muḥammad b. Wāṣil was already recog-
nized as governor over Fārs by the caliphal administration in 256 H/861 CE dur-
ing Yaʿqūb’s advance, and again Ibn Wāṣil appears as caliphal representative
fighting Yaʿqūb after the Ṣaffār had been defeated. In all, Ibn Wāṣil is not a
prominent figure and not described as a rebel.¹⁰³
Vasmer’s study on the coinage of the Ṣaffārids and their enemies in Fārs and
Khurāsān not only has basic numismatic information, but also a summary of the
narrative in the main chronicles, much fuller than the one found in Nöldeke.
Vasmer presents Ibn Wāṣil as a powerful provincial figure, allied at some
times to the caliphal side and at others to Yaʿqūb.¹⁰⁴
Bosworth strikes another note in his study on the armies of the Ṣaffārids. He
touches briefly on the conquest of Saʿīdābād, Ibn Wāṣil’s castle, by Yaʿqūb’s
troops in 263 H/876 CE, and comments that it “belonged to the adventurer Mu-
ḥammad b. Wāṣil al-Ḥanẓalī.” In a footnote, he asks whether this man was
“the Muḥammad b.Wāṣil who had rebelled in Bust against the Ṭāhirid governor
 Nöldeke 1892, 185–217 (193, 200, 203). Nöldeke does not quote his sources, but it is evident
that his study is based on al-Ṭabarī, Ibn al-Athīr, and Ibn Khallikān. There is no trace of his hav-
ing used al-Iṣṭakhrī (who is not a central source for the history of the Ṣaffārids).
 Vasmer 1930.
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there.”¹⁰⁵ This is the first time that Ibn Wāṣil is categorized: he is an adventurer,
and it is possible that he is a Khārijite on top of that. One has to ask whether
either of these identifications is plausible. In my view, the answer has to be neg-
ative.
Muḥammad b. Wāṣil of Bust is mentioned in the Tārīkh-i Sīstān (and appa-
rently in no other source). His rebellion is dated to approximately 222 H/837 CE,
or 33 lunar years before his Fārsī namesake makes his first appearance. In Bust,
in the years preceding 222 H there had been several movements the Tārīkh-i
Sīstān classifies as uprisings, all with a more or less clear Khārijite background.
In 220 H/835 CE, famine broke out due to the drying up of the Helmand river and
an uprising took place. Its leader was one ʿAbdallāh al-Jabalī, and many Khāri-
jites gathered around him. After some fighting the revolt was ended, not by a
massacre but by some kind of agreement: ʿAbdallāh was even given a robe of
honor. Another uprising took place under Muḥammad b. Yazīd; the source
says that many of those who had dispersed (probably out of the Khārijites) gath-
ered again. This revolt was quelled by the military and many people were killed.
After further actions, the Khārijites (or at least a substantial number of them) left
for Kirmān. Again, the governor did not succeed in establishing his rule at Bust
on behalf of the Ṭāhirids; again, there was an uprising, this time under Muḥam-
mad b. Wāṣil, and again, those who had previously dispersed gathered around
him. (This reference to people who had earlier dispersed prompts thoughts of
a Khārijite background.) Muḥammad b. Wāṣil succeeded in taking the new gov-
ernor prisoner for a while, but the movement was quickly subdued.¹⁰⁶ We do not
hear anything more of this Muḥammad b. Wāṣil in the context of Bust or of
Sīstān in general. Should the two men be identified, as Bosworth suggests?
Bust is situated in present-day Afghanistan¹⁰⁷ in the Helmand valley, and is
roughly 1,500 km (by modern road) away from Iṣṭakhr in Fārs. It belonged to Sī-
stān, where Khārijī movements were frequent and occurred even when Khārijism
was largely extinct elsewhere. And there is not the slightest hint that Muḥammad
b. Wāṣil al-Ḥanẓalī of Fārs ever travelled to Sīstān, let alone led an uprising
there. The time difference of 33 lunar years also speaks against this identifica-
tion, if it does not preclude it.
 Bosworth 1968, 534–554 (551), with note 75. This note has elicited a comment by L. P. Smir-
nova in Istoriia Sistana 1974, p. 432, note 543. Smirnova claims that al-Ṭabarī has Muḥammad b.
Wāṣil as a Kurdish leader from Fārs (al-Ṭabarī has nothing of the sort). She then quotes Bos-
worth’s attempt to identify this person with Muḥammad b. Wāṣil of Bust without taking a
clear position.
 Tārīkh-i Sīstān 1314/1935, 185– 188, Istoriia Sistana 1974, 192– 193.
 Present-day Lashkargāh-i Bāzār, see Fischer / de Planhol.
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Regarding the argument of Khārijism, as I have shown above the Ḥanẓalī
family of Fārs had a prominent record of Khārijism but their ancestors were qui-
etists. Moreover, the family may have opted out before the early 9th century. A
Khārijite past is no argument for a Khārijite present in the times of Muḥammad
b. Wāṣil. The Khārijite argument regarding Muḥammad b. Wāṣil of Fārs was not
prominent before Shaban’s Islamic History of 1976. In an altogether inadequate
summary of events in Fārs, he states: “It is a remarkable fact that Muḥammad
b.Wāṣil was of a genuine lineage of Umayyad Khārijites who had long since set-
tled in Iṣṭakhr in the heart of Fārs.”¹⁰⁸ This is correct, as we have seen, but it does
not mean what Shaban apparently wants us to believe, namely that Muḥammad
b. Wāṣil was a Khārijite or a crypto-Khārijite or something of the sort, and that
Khārijism was a synonym for revolt and rebellion.
Shaban’s statement was taken up by Bosworth in his monograph on the His-
tory of the Ṣaffārids and the Maliks of Nimruz. In this work, Bosworth quotes the
early Khārijite connections of the family but does not claim that Muḥammad b.
Wāṣil himself had Khārijite leanings, and he does not come back to the question
of whether the man in Sīstān should be identified with the man in Fārs. This
book’s passage on Fārs during the three-cornered struggle between the caliphal
forces, the Ṣaffār, and Muḥammad b.Wāṣil is otherwise an excellent summary of
what the sources tell us.¹⁰⁹
In Kennedy’s textbook on the history of the caliphate, Ibn Wāṣil is briefly
mentioned. Kennedy follows Bosworth: Ibn Wāṣil is “a local adventurer”. He es-
tablishes a context for Ibn Wāṣil’s movement and the caliphal policies in the
context of the revolt of the Zanj in southern Iraq, and indeed we have seen
that all the military commanders who came to Fārs to fight Ibn Wāṣil were oth-
erwise engaged in this struggle.¹¹⁰
Gordon follows the general trend in his work on the military slaves (where,
of course, the focus is not on Fārs). Tracing the career of the slave general Mūsā
b. Bughā, he notes that Mūsā’s forces (under the command of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b.
Mufliḥ) were defeated by “local rebel” Ibn Wāṣil.¹¹¹
Deborah Tor has most to say on the subject: she sees the Muḥammad b.
Wāṣil in Bust as the same person as the Muḥammad b.Wāṣil in Fārs, and there-
fore she can state that when Ibn Wāṣil usurped the province (Fārs) in 256 H/870
CE, he “had a long history of disruptive behavior.” She also calls him an “erst-
 Shaban 1976, 98–99.
 Bosworth 1994, 147–152.
 Kennedy 2016, 153.
 Gordon 2001, 145.
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while Khārijite” or an “at least erstwhile Khārijite” as indeed he was if he was the
rebel of Bust. She does not note his background as one of the mulūk Fārs, nor
mention the family’s Khārijite antecedents.¹¹² When she describes Yaʿqūb’s
later campaign against Ibn Wāṣil that ended with the former’s victory, she
tells us that “at this juncture one of the leading magnates of Fārs appealed to
Yaʿqūb to save Fārs from the arbitrary rule of Muḥammad b. Wāṣil.” She omits
that this magnate, Abū Bilāl Mirdās, was a relative of Muḥammad’s, and she
does not give details as to how Ibn Wāṣil’s rule was arbitrary.¹¹³ Her picture of
Ibn Wāṣil as a Khārijite with a long record of disruptive behavior is therefore
based on an identification I think is spurious, and in order to make this dubious
identification work she has to disregard all other information about Ibn Wāṣil’s
background. Moreover, the identification of Khārijism with “disruptive behavior”
does not do justice to the quietist (and later Ibāḍī) movement current in Khārij-
ism.
I hope this essay has shown that Muḥammad b.Wāṣil was neither a Khārijite
(if that means an irredeemable rebel) nor an adventurer. He may have been a
rebel in that he ‘usurped’ power in Fārs, but at times he also was the appointed
governor there on behalf of Yaʿqūb or the caliph. He was a representative of the
mulūk Fārs, interested in safeguarding his influence, wealth, and power. Earlier
research has more or less completely disregarded his family history (with only an
occasional hint at its early Khārijite stages) as well as his social standing. This is
a consequence of the central perspective taken by most researchers, to whom lo-
cally powerful people appear as rebels as soon as they come into conflict with
the imperial center, and outright rebellion starts as soon as these local power-
holders take action in defense of their own interests against the central powers.
Let it be noted, however, that Bosworth came back to this question in one of his
latest publications, and that in his entry “Ṣaffārids” in the Encyclopedia Iranica
Online he calls Muḥammad b.Wāṣil a “local magnate”.¹¹⁴ This coincides with the
results of the present analysis.
 Tor 2007, 130– 131.
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An Empire of Elites: Mobility in the Early
Islamic Empire
Abstract: This study uses prosopographies pertaining to political elites from
Khurāsān in order to examine patterns of social mobility, professional circula-
tion, and structures of imperial rule in the ʿAbbāsid Empire during the 8th–9th
centuries. It suggests that the early ʿAbbāsid Empire was dominated by informal
patterns of rule that depended disproportionately on personal retainers and elite
gubernatorial and military families to maintain structures of an otherwise bu-
reaucratic centralized empire.
Keywords: Early Islamic Empire; elites; Khurāsān; ʿAbbāsids; governors; mobili-
ty
Introduction
The early Islamic Empire exhibits one of the most ambitious attempts in late an-
tique and medieval history to maintain structures of economic, political, and ad-
ministrative control over territories ranging from North Africa to the Hindu Kush.
The truly labyrinthine scale of this empire and its diverse communities raises the
question of how to write the history of the early Islamic Empire and its provinces.
One 10th-century observer of medieval Islamic politics and society has suggested
one approach to this historiographical conundrum:¹
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low has published some of her findings elsewhere in publications going back some ten years:
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In the maintenance of the empire and its great provinces, it is impossible to dispense with
viziers, deputies, secretaries, commanders of armies, overseers of military affairs, directors
of police, overseers or leaders, officers of the guard, gatherers of information, financial
agents, governors, and judges (lā budda fī iqāmat al-mamlaka wa-l-wilāyāt al-ʿaẓīma min
wuzarāʾ wa-khulafāʾ wa-kuttāb wa-aṣḥāb juyūsh wa-ʿāriḍīn wa-aṣḥāb shuraṭ wa-nuqabāʾ
wa-aṣḥāb ḥaras wa-aṣḥāb akhbār wa-wulāt wa-quḍāt).
The unknown author of Counsel for Kings was convinced of the indispensable
contribution elite officials made to the maintenance of the empire and its impe-
rial provinces. The study of these elite officials is as good a place as any to begin
an inquiry into elites in early Islamic societies and what impact they had on the
organisation, administration, and management of the early Islamic Empire.² This
article uses a prosopographical approach to document and study social trends
relating to the functions of elite officials in the 8th and 9th centuries. First, I docu-
ment the mobility of elites across the various regions of the early Islamic Empire.
Second, I highlight the circulation of elites within different offices and positions
of authority, providing instances of social climbing among elite officials; that is
to say, examples of elite officials who acquired higher offices. These social pat-
terns are discernible based on a prosopographical analysis of the careers of
state officials, and they bring into clearer focus the extent to which transregional
mobility was a fundamental dimension of the early Islamic Empire’s bureaucrat-
ic, military, and gubernatorial elite.
Prosopography of elites has long been recognised as a sine qua non of social
histories of ancient and medieval empires.³ Since the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury, historians of ancient Rome have worked towards a prosopography of the
empire.⁴ Theodor Mommsen began work on a prosopography of officials assum-
ing secular and ecclesiastic offices as early as 1874.⁵ H. I. Marrou and A. H. M.
Jones made great strides in advancing Mommsen’s endeavour and by 1972 pub-
 In a separate publication, I have studied the organisation of empire in one region of Khurāsān
based on a prosopographical analysis of officials who appear in 8th-century documentary sour-
ces. See Khan (forthcoming), “The idea and practice of empire: the view from the documentary
sources.”
 Olszaniec 2013; Tackett 2014; Preiser-Kapeller 2010. I would like to thank Johannes Preiser-Ka-
peller for discussing with me his combination of prosopographical methods and network anal-
ysis.
 For a broad overview of prosopographical studies of the Roman Empire, see Cameron 2003;
Barnes 2007, 83–94, 231–40.
 In 1874, Mommsen submitted a hand-written proposal for a prosopography of the imperial pe-
riod. This has been published by Eck 2003, 11–23.
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lished their landmark Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire.⁶ A decade later,
Patricia Crone made an important case for early Islamic prosopographical stud-
ies in Slaves on Horses, her iconic study of medieval Islamic society,⁷ which pur-
ports to offer nothing less than an explanation for the form and structure of the
medieval Islamic polity. The book continues to be remembered and debated be-
cause of its erudite (though controversial) historical assertions, delightful locu-
tions, and analogical and comparative historical writing (a form in many ways
unique to Crone’s oeuvre).⁸ Still, the written prose sections of Slaves on Horses
extend to only ninety pages. The remaining two hundred pages of the book con-
stitute a vital prosopography of the early Islamic Empire and its imperial and
provincial elites.
Slaves on Horses noticeably fails to integrate this valuable prosopographical
data into the text,⁹ and there seems to be no attempt to interpret these details
 Jones and Marrou 1951, 146–7; Marrou 1951a, 26–27; Marrou 1951b, 28–32; Jones and Martin-
dale 1971–2.
 Crone 1980, 16– 17.
 On this point, see Hillenbrand 1982, 116–9: “The style of the book is difficult and convoluted.
Valuable and penetrating insights are often hidden behind a dense hedge of verbal pyrotech-
nics…In general, there is no steady exposition of a hypothesis, and only a minimum of back-
ground information. Instead, much of the book consists of staccato generalisations, couched
in terms that brook no contradiction…Her weakness for the telling image permits such state-
ments as the following: ‘Nothing less than a restoration of Adam’s faith in a post-physical
world could now save the marriage between religion and power to which the Islamic polity
owed its existence. And whether this polity could survive the divorce proceedings was still an
open question’ (p. 85). Dr Crone’s style, moreover, makes a fetish of antithesis; this feature
even pervades the footnotes. Note 649 is a typical example: “Merovingian fainéance meant Car-
olingian consolidation, just as ʿAbbāsid fainéance was in due course to mean Seljuq unifica-
tion.” On the book’s comparative historical method, “Another stylistic weakness of the book
—indeed, one which becomes a weakness of method—is its frequent use of analogies from a
wider sweep of history than any single scholar can be expected to control…Whilst it is no
doubt worthwhile to avoid interpreting early Islamic history, or indeed any other kind of history,
in a hermetically sealed way, analogies such as these—and many others too numerous to cite—
which appear both in the text and the footnotes, and which cover such a wide geographical area
and chronological time-scale, are at once facile and contrived. This is comparative historical
analysis at its most superficial, and it distracts the reader from the main subject of the
book.” Similar objections to this method and style can be found in Donner 1982, 367–71.Wick-
ham describes Crone’s method as “analogical” in Wickham 1982, 106.
 Consider the following observations: Wickham 1982, 105–7, 107: “Although Slaves on Horses
seems long enough, at 300 pages, it is in reality rather short, and this in itself explains the dense
and abbreviated nature of the writing: the main text is less than 90 pages, the remainder divided
between appendices and notes…the appendices, all prosopographical…are useful, certainly,
though surprisingly little-integrated into the text; yet it does not seem to me that they stand
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and records.¹⁰ This is all the more surprising in light of the emphatic case Crone
makes for the value of prosopography to the study of early Islamic history. “Early
Islamic history has to be almost exclusively prosopographical,” she states in the
introduction of Slaves on Horses.¹¹ Nevertheless, the prosopographical data
Crone furnishes represents a remarkable achievement, not least because of the
painstaking and penetrating reading it demanded in an age when digital and
searchable Arabic texts were not available to scholars. It is unfortunate that
her superb prosopographical appendices have received little scholarly atten-
tion.¹² In what follows, I build on the prosopographical research of scholars
such as Crone, Amikam Elad, and Hugh Kennedy, and pursue a line of inquiry
proposed by the author of Counsel for Kings to show how the early Islamic Em-
pire was constituted of mobile and transregional elites.
Mobility
In governing such a vast landscape of imperial provinces one of the immediate
problems that presented itself to the early Islamic Empire was connecting dispa-
rate and demographically diverse communities. The provinces of Iraq, Egypt,
Fārs, Khurāsān, Shām, Ifrīqiya, and the Jazīra were shaped by very different so-
cial and political realities. Their communities belonged to different though not
incongruent confessions, each with its own ecclesiastical organisations and in-
on their own, either, for they are confessedly incomplete, and an incomplete prosopography has
much the same drawbacks as an incomplete dictionary. I leave it to Arabists, though, to deter-
mine whether these lists will be as useful as the book as a whole.” In a similar vein, Hillenbrand
1982, 116–9 writes: “Perhaps the most impressive section of the book is the corpus of prosopo-
graphical information contained in the appendices (93–200)…Generally, however, the mass of
information in the appendices is not integrated into the main sweep of the book’s argument…
in general her superbly documented appendices remain largely unexplained…instead of mar-
shalling the majority of such evidence in the text itself and integrating it into the argument,
Dr Crone has chosen to hide it away in the book’s 711 footnotes or to assume that such facts
are simply too well-known to require any explanation.” See also Robinson 2015, 597–620,
606, fn. 44.
 Crone 1980, 3, where Crone herself describes the work as “simply an overextended footnote.”
 Crone 1980, 17.
 A critical work in the field of prosopographical studies in early Islamic history is Ahmed
2011. The title, perhaps too modestly, describes the work as a study of the religious elite. In
fact, the book is an exceptionally detailed and lucid account of religious and political elites
in early Islamic society.
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stitutions.¹³ Another layer of complexity was added by a dizzying variety of eth-
nicities and tribal identities in these provinces.
The 7th century represented an experimental phase in the early Islamic Em-
pire’s attempts to establish some semblance of provincial authority.¹⁴ The case of
Khurāsān points to the important role played by large-scale migration in the pro-
jection and practical implementation of imperial power.When the first Arab gov-
ernors were appointed over the province of Khurāsān, they arrived in the prov-
ince along with a substantial proportion of their tribal group.¹⁵ The logic
guiding this kind of mass migration was simple and pragmatic. Governors
from outside the province of Khurāsān belonged to a new cadre of transregional
elites. They realised that establishing their authority in any one of the imperial
provinces was no straightforward task. They depended therefore on the secure
power base provided by members of their own tribe. As the Counsel for Kings re-
minds us, however, the makeup of the imperial elite was not limited to gover-
nors. Commanders of armies and overseers of military affairs (aṣḥāb juyūsh
wa-ʿāriḍīn) were perhaps the most mobile and transregional elite group.
Elite Families: the Abū Ghānims¹⁶
The imperial elite consisted of both a military and civilian elite. Both groups
were integral insofar as they were willing to be deployed anywhere in govern-
ment service. Flexibility was paramount.
The career of Abū Ghānim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Ribʿī and that of his family ex-
emplifies the transregional mobility demanded of military elites.¹⁷ Abū Ghānim
first appears in the literary record as a propagandist of the ʿAbbāsid revolution in
 See Robinson 2000, 9– 108; Payne 2015; Mikhail 2014; Tannous 2010, 379–569.
 Hoyland 2015.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīkh (1879–1901), ii: 1291 = XXIV, 14; ii: 49–2 = XX: 72–74.
 A genealogical table of this family is appended to this article.
 My examination analyses the transregional mobility of this family in the provinces and re-
gions of the early Islamic Empire. Modern prosopographical summaries or mentions of Abū
Ghānim and some of his descendants can be found in: Crone 1980, 174–5; Elad 2013,
245–84, 270–5; Kennedy 2001, 81 (Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd), 104 (Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd
al-Ṭūsī), 120 (Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd), 123 (Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd), 124 (Ḥumayd b.
ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd); Kennedy 1981, 165 (Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd); Al-Janābī 1980, 221–45;
Amabe 1995, 132–333; Agha 2003, 339. For Abū Ghānim in the medieval sources from the Dam-
ascene perspective, see Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh madīnat Dimashq (1996), 34: 66–67, who also quotes
from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Rāzī’s (d. 347 H/958 CE) lost history of Damascus.With respect to this lost
work, see Conrad 1991.
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Marv.¹⁸ He served as a general and chief of police (ṣāḥib al-shurṭa) under his
cousin Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb al-Ṭāʾī, one of the leading army commanders of the
ʿAbbāsid revolution in Khurāsān.¹⁹ Abū Ghānim’s role in Khurāsān seems to
have come to an end with the death of Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb in 132 H/749 CE,²⁰
but he was sufficiently prominent enough to find himself in the assembly of
al-Saffāḥ (r. 132-749 H/136-754 CE) during his initial coronation as caliph.²¹ A
year later, he participated in the battle of the Zāb in Iraq.²² In the same year,
he emerged in the province of Shām as one of the leading military commanders
(quwwād) under ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās.²³ When ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī departed to attend to a rebellion in Qinnasrīn, he appointed Abū Ghānim as
his deputy in Damascus. Abū Ghānim governed the city with four thousand
troops, the majority of whom were Khurāsānī.²⁴
Abū Ghānim’s significance as a military leader can be gleaned from the fact
that his involvement in the political life of two different provinces occurred dur-
ing pivotal episodes in the history of these provinces: his service in Marv was on
the eve of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, whilst his role as ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī’s deputy in
Damascus came in the context of the latter’s claim to be al-Saffāḥ’s successor in
opposition to al-Manṣūr.²⁵ Clearly, men of Abū Ghānim’s military pedigree were
in demand in more than one province, and they were called upon in the most
precarious political situations.
Despite Abū Ghānim’s residence in more than one of the empire’s imperial
provinces, he seems to have made Khurāsān his home before ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī’s defeat forced him to flee to al-Ruhāʾ, where he was discovered and dis-
patched to al-Manṣūr.²⁶ Once again, his reputation came to his rescue. Firstly,
a close companion of Abū Ghānim was dispatched to al-Ruḥāʾ to restore
 Anonymous, Akhbār al-dawla al-ʿabbāsiyya (1971), 1: 217, 220.
 On their kinship, see: Ibn al-Kalbī, Ǧamharat an-nasab (1966), 257; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamharat
ansāb al-ʿarab (1962), 404. On Abū Ghānim’s military service under Qaḥṭaba, see: al-Ṭabarī,
Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), ii: 2001 = XXVII: 107–8 (as a military officer in Ṭūs); iii: 15 = XXVII: 137
(as Qaḥṭaba’s ṣāḥib al-shurṭa).
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 11–19 = XXVII: 134–40 (Qaḥṭaba’s death); al-Ṣafadī,
Umarāʾ (1983), 50, 72.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 28 = XXVII: 151–2 and 36 = XXVII: 160.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 38 = XXVII: 107–8.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 53–54 = XXVII: 177–8.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 53–54 = XXVII: 177–8; Ibn ʿAsākir, Ta’rīkh madīnat Di-
mashq (1996), 38: 428; al-Ṣafadī, Umarāʾ (1983), 72.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 93 = XXVIII: 9; al-Ṣafadī, Umarāʾ (1983), 72; Ibn Kathīr, al-
Bidāya (2010), 10: 277.
 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb (1978), 3: 109.
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order, a man who could be depended on to treat him respectfully despite the cir-
cumstances. Secondly, al-Manṣūr overlooked his advocacy for the rival claimant
to the caliphate. The caliph claimed that he could not bring himself to kill a
member of the Qaḥṭaba family and instead pardoned him.²⁷ Some reports even
suggest that he spent the rest of his life in exile on one of al-Manṣūr’s ancestral
estates.²⁸
Abū Ghānim’s two sons, Aṣram b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd and Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-
Ḥamīd, were from Khurāsān.²⁹ It is likely that Aṣram was the eldest. Like their
father, they pursued military careers all over the empire. The Tārīkh-i Sīstān in-
forms us of Aṣram’s appointment as governor of Sīstān in the year 170 H/786
CE, after Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170–193 H/786–809 CE) appointed al-Faḍl b. Su-
laymān as the super-governor of Khurāsān and Fārs.³⁰ Al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān in
turn installed Aṣram in Sīstān,³¹ where his gubernatorial reign was initially
brief. It seems that he was appointed governor in 170 H/786 CE, removed, and
then reappointed as governor a decade later.³² In this second period, he appoint-
ed his younger brother Ḥumayd as one of his two deputy governors.³³ When
Aṣram died in Sīstān,³⁴ Hārūn al-Rashīd promoted Ḥumayd to governor in his
brother’s place.³⁵
Ḥumayd resided in Khurāsān, where he cultivated a career as a military
commander, but must have spent some considerable time in Sīstān deputising
for and then replacing his older brother.³⁶ When his term in Sīstān came to an
end, he seems to have returned to Khurāsān, where he came to al-Maʾmūn’s at-
tention when al-Maʾmūn arrived in the province in 199–200 H/815–6 CE. In 201
 Al-Balādhurī, Ansāb (1978), 3: 109–110.
 Al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ (1878), 180.
 Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Ta’rīkh (1985), 463.
 Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 168 (caliph al-Hādī’s appointment of al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān
as governor of Khurāsān), 169 (caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd’s appointment of al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān as
governor of Sīstān and Khurāsān (Hārūn al-Rashīd ʿahd-i Sīstān va Khurāsān suwī Faḍl b. Sulay-
mān farastād)). On al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān, see below (‘II Circulation’).
 Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 168 (va Faḍl b. Sulaymān Aṣram b. ʿAbd al-Ḥumayd [rā]
Sīstān dād).
 Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 168–9 (first appointment as governor), 172 (second ap-
pointment as governor).
 Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 168 (va Aṣram Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥumayd rā barādar-i
khwīsh rā bih khilāfat-i khwīsh bih Sīstān farastād). Aṣram’s other deputy governor was
Hamam b. Salama: Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 172.
 Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh (1985), 463; Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 168 (a grave illness
befell Aṣram b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd (chūn Aṣram bih Sīstān āmad ʿillatī-i ṣaʿb ū rā pīsh āmad).
 Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 169, 172.
 Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Sīstān (1935), 168.
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H/817 CE, al-Maʾmūn decided to send Ḥumayd to Iraq to take charge of its
kharāj,³⁷ and the rest of his career was in Baghdad.
Things began well. He received instructions directly from al-Maʾmūn during
the latter’s epochal journey from Khurāsān to Baghdād,³⁸ and he was one of al-
Ḥasan b. Sahl’s (d. 203 H/819 CE) leading commanders.³⁹ One can infer from the
sources that he was a very effective one,⁴⁰ and also a man not reluctant to ex-
press his dismay at the decisions of those he served.⁴¹ In the distressing circum-
stances of the fourth civil war, Ḥumayd corresponded with ʿĪsā b. Muḥammad
Abī Khālid to secure the latter’s surrender.⁴² Above all, he led the military efforts
to diminish the authority of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī.⁴³ For these reasons, it is clear
that he was integral to al-Maʾmūn’s success in seeing off Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī’s
caliphal challenge.⁴⁴
Ḥumayd retained his position as chief commander when al-Maʾmūn arrived
in Baghdad in 204 H/819 CE; he oversaw the army and the payment of salaries⁴⁵
and was tasked with reorganising the military.⁴⁶ He owned an estate (qaṣr) on
the Tigris river.⁴⁷ One 9th-century source describes him in 204 H/819 CE as seated
next to al-Maʾmūn during an intimate private banquet and as participating in the
caliph’s assembly (majlis).⁴⁸ Al-Maʾmūn singled him out for praise on account of
his practice of invocation (tasbīḥ),⁴⁹ and the caliph was even aware of panegyrics
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān (1860– 1861), 306.
 Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād (1949), 9.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 1005 = XXXII: 51; Elad 2013, 245–84, 271.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1005–7 = XXXII: 51–54; 1018 = XXXII: 69; 1029 = XXXII:
82; 1034 = XXXII: 90; 1034 = XXXII: 90–91; 1036 = XXXII: 92.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 1019 = XXXII: 71.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1030–4 = XXXII: 86–89; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh (1883), 2: 548.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 1034–6 = XXXII: 89–92.
 See also al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1019 = XXXII: 71.
 Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād (1949), 10.
 Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād (1949), 4; al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasāʾil (1964), ii: 206–8.
 The purchase and fortification of an estate in the town of Qaṣr Ibn Hubayra by al-Ṭabarī,
Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1012 = XXXII: 60; al-Iṣfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī (1867), 28: 106; and for
other estates, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1018 = XXXII: 70. For a description of one
of his fortresses, see al-Iṣfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī (1867), 106. For more information concerning
his wealth, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1019 = XXXII: 71.
 Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād (1949), 13, 16.
 Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād (1949), 58–59: Ḥumayd was praised for the quality of
his sacred incantations, Qaḥṭaba for his prayers, Nūshjānī for his fasting, al-Marīsī for his ritual
purification, Mālik b. Shāhī for building mosques, Ibrāhīm b. Barīha for his weeping at the pul-
pit, al-Ḥasan b. Quraysh for attending to orphans, Manjā for his story-telling, ʿAlī b. Junayd for
spending his wealth in the way of charity, Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm for hosting travelers, and so on.
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composed in Ḥumayd’s praise. Ḥumayd is said to have been embarrassed by this
fact and insisted on the pre-eminence of panegyrics composed in praise of the
caliph.⁵⁰
It appears, however, that something went terribly wrong. We only know of
Ḥumayd’s rapid downfall because al-Jāḥiẓ, always a contrarian, responded to
a book praising officials with one condemning them.⁵¹ Al-Jāḥiẓ speaks of Ḥu-
mayd’s suggestion to al-Maʾmūn that the army be reorganised to eliminate
non-Khurāsānī elements and undeserving soldiers’ salaries.⁵² Ḥumayd shared
the task with his secretary Maḥmūd b. ʿAbd al-Karīm. Together, they made a
complete and unmitigated mess of it, and in the process Ḥumayd’s reputation
was severely damaged.⁵³ Al-Maʾmūn eventually intervened and took matters
into his own hand.⁵⁴ Ḥumayd’s influence subsequently waned,⁵⁵ and in 210 H/
825–6 CE he was poisoned.⁵⁶
Ḥumayd’s career was spent in the highest echelons of military and govern-
ment service in the early Islamic Empire, from Khurāsān to Sīstān and from the
empire’s eastern provinces to its centre. He assumed a pivotal trust by supervis-
ing the collection of the kharāj. Ḥumayd’s loyalty to al-Maʾmūn and the stability
of the empire’s authority was also on display when he spearheaded the military
and diplomatic efforts to quash Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī’s precarious counter-caliph-
ate. Ḥumayd’s trajectory is defined by the transregional mobility characteristic of
his elite family and many others: a career that began and thrived in the empire’s
eastern provinces, only to end in ignominy in the empire’s dynastic capital whilst
dining with the caliph.
The career of Ḥumayd’s son Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd was scattered across the
empire’s regions and provinces. Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr speaks of Muḥammad b.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1153–4 = XXXII: 246–7. This was known to al-Iṣfahānī,
Kitāb al-Aghānī (1867), 18: 100–8. Panegyrics extolling Ḥumayd were not an isolated occurrence.
See al-Iṣfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī (1867), 3: 167 (describing the majesty of Ḥumayd’s military ret-
inue and his stature); 14: 36–37 (Ḥumayd’s confrontation with Ṭāhir prior to the latter’s omission
of the conventional invocation for the caliph al-Maʾmūn in the Friday sermon); 16: 163 (recited
whilst passing by Ḥumayd’s grave and reflecting on the irony presented by Ḥumayd’s impressive
resting place and his wrecked body); 18: 100– 113 (panegyrics and Ḥumayd’s generous payment
on hearing of them).
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasāʾil (1964), 187.
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasāʾil (1964), 206–7.
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasāʾil (1964), 207–8 (al-Jāḥiẓ is explicit about Ḥumayd’s mismanagement).
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasāʾil (1964), 208.
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Rasāʾil (1964), 207–8.
 Ibn Ḥabīb, Asmāʾ al-mughtalīn (1975), ii: 105–278, 199–200, where Ibn Ḥabīb sets the scene
for Ḥumayd’s poisoning.
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Ḥumayd’s appointment in Mecca in 210 H/826 CE to supervise its imām and the
rites of pilgrimage.⁵⁷ However, Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd was most active in Mosul,
where the local historian al-Azdī describes his critical role in restoring order in
212 H/827–8 CE. Al-Maʾmūn was furious when he learned that the local governor
of the Jazīra, al-Sayyid b. Anas al-Talīdī, had been killed whilst trying to sup-
press the rebellion of Zurayq b. ʿAlī b. Ṣadaqa b. Dīnār al-Azdī.⁵⁸ The caliph ap-
pointed Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd to lead the charge against Zurayq.⁵⁹ His cam-
paign was a success, and he delivered Zurayq to the caliph.⁶⁰ The caliph in
turn dispatched a victory letter to Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd in which he extolled
him (and his father) and praised their loyalty and service.⁶¹ Al-Maʾmūn turned
to Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd again in order to quell Bābak’s rebellion in Azerbai-
jan.⁶² This time, Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd was unsuccessful, and he was killed by
Bābak’s soldiers.⁶³
The story of Abū Ghānim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Ribʿī’s important and well-trav-
elled family did not end there. Abū Ghānim’s grandson Mahdī b. Aṣram followed
his grandfather and father into a military career, suppressing revolts against the
early Islamic Empire. 10th-century cultural critics such as Abū Tammām (d.
335–6 H/946–7 CE) were well acquainted with the significance and memory
of Abū Ghānim’s family. Abū Tammām dedicated encomiums to Muḥammad
b. Ḥumayd and another grandson of Abū Ghānim, Mahdī b. Aṣram; both were
 Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād (1949), 116 (wajjaha Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd al-Ṭūsī ilā
Makka li-yaqifa maʿ al-imām fī l-mawqif karāhat al-taḥallul fīhi, fa-tawajjaha ilā Makka wa-na-
fadha limā amara bihi wa-lam yakun shayʾ karihahu wa-rajaʿa bi-l-salāma). There are at least
two possible philological interpretations for al-Maʾmūn’s pretext for sending Muḥammad to
Mecca: that Muḥammad was dispatched to supervise the imām of Mecca at the physical location
where the restrictions of the state of iḥrām end; or alternatively that concerns had been raised
concerning the imām’s handling of pilgrimage rites, Muḥammad was sent to investigate, and he
returned to Baghdad because he observed no such irregularities. Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb
Baghdād (1949), 117, informs us that Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd wrote to the governor of Mecca,
Ṣāliḥ b. al-ʿAbbās b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās, to give him the all clear to
lead the official ḥajj procession in 210 H/826 CE.
 Al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil (1967), 372–81; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil (1987), 5: 484.
 Al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil (1967), 374, 378; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil (1987), 5: 484.
 Al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil (1967), 378–81; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh (1889), 2: 564–5.
 For the letter, its contents, and Muḥammad’s response to it, see al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil
(1967), 381–2.
 Al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil (1967), 378, 382–4; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1099–4 =
XXXII: 176–7. See Crone 2012, 46–76, esp. 58–59 concerning the uprisings of Bābak and Zurayq.
 While Ḥumayd was the subject of poetical encomiums, Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd was rebuked
severely by poets.We are told that (unlike his father) he was a miser and fled from battle. For a
particularly scathing example, see al-Iṣfahānī, Kitāb al-Aghānī (1867), 12: 104–5.
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killed whilst trying to put down Bābak’s rebellion.⁶⁴ There is an astonishingly
singular thread running through these four generations of the Ghānim family: se-
nior military commanders and governors from Khurāsān, operating in multiple
regions of the empire, quelling revolts and uprisings against the caliph, and de-
fending caliphal authority.
Ghānim b. Abī Muslim b. Ḥumayd al-Ṭūsī, the great-grandson of Abū
Ghānim and the grandson of Ḥumayd, appears in the historical record outside
the province of Khurāsān and in Mosul defending the territorial and political in-
tegrity of the early Islamic Empire and the caliph. In the year 231 H/846 CE, the
persistent rebel Muḥammad b. ʿAmr al-Shaybānī initiated a small revolt in Diyār
Rabīʿa.⁶⁵ Ghānim b. Abī Muslim was one of Mosul’s most senior political figures,
in charge of military affairs (wa-kāna ʿalā ḥarb al-Mawṣil).⁶⁶ Upon learning of
Muḥammad’s uprising, Ghānim b. Abī Muslim and a small military entourage
made their way to Diyār Rabīʿa. They made very quick work of Muḥammad b.
ʿAmr al-Shaybānī and his rebellion.While Muḥammad b. ʿAmr was taken captive
and sent to Sāmarrāʾ before being transferred to Maṭbaq prison in Baghdad,⁶⁷ no
such charity was shown to his fellow rebels. Their heads and banners were pub-
lically displayed at Khashabat Bābak: a truly macabre ʿAbbāsid lieu de mémoire
signifying the fate of those who rose against the empire.
Ghānim b. Abī Muslim’s brother ʿAbdallāh [b. Abī Muslim] b. Ḥumayd al-
Ṭūsī was not so fortunate. In 256 H/870 CE, the caliph al-Muwaffaq (r. 256–
279 H/870–892 CE) was faced with the substantial uprising of the Zanj. Follow-
ing the precedent of his ancestors, ʿAbdallāh b. Abī Muslim b. Ḥumayd was in-
volved in attempts to subdue the rebels, and he and his son were both killed dur-
ing a skirmish with the Zanj.⁶⁸
The Ghānim family represents a broader pattern of (military) elite mobility in
the early Islamic Empire. Khurāsān was the ancestral home of the Ghānims, but
more importantly, in the late 8th and 9th centuries Khurāsān was at the very cen-
tre of the empire’s production and training of military commanders and elites.⁶⁹
It was from Khurāsān that the Ghānims established their presence in the em-
pire’s nearby and remote provinces and regions, making a name for themselves
in Khurāsān; participating in battles in Iraq; quelling rebellions in Shām; assum-
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh (1883), 2: 565; Sezgin 1975, II: 583 and the sources cited therein.
 For this episode, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1351 = XXXIV: 367; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh
(1889), 2: 589; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil (1987), VI: 88.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 1351 = XXXIV: 367.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 1351 = XXXIV: 367; Le Strange 1900, 27; Lassner 1970, 243.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 1837 = XXXVI: 110– 1.
 De La Vaissière 2007.
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ing governorships in Sīstān; serving as Chief Commanders in the dynastic centre
of the empire; and putting down major revolts in north-western Iran. The case of
the Ghānims serves to show how mobility was essential not only to the interests
of Khurāsānī elites, but also to the preservation of the early Islamic Empire’s au-
thority in all of its major provinces. The history, people, and elites of Khurāsān
were implicated in the lives and fate of the entire empire.
Circulation
The study of the prosopography of elite officials reveals yet more important his-
torical patterns concerning the contributions they made to the work of empire.
The phenomenon of social climbing and the prospect of professional circulation
within the vast imperial bureaucracy of the early Islamic Empire was reflected in
the careers of a number of officials.
Such prospects were certainly brighter when one happened to be a scion of
an illustrious family from Khurāsān and Transoxiana. In the case of al-Faḍl b.
Sulaymān al-Ṭāʾī al-Ṭūsī, his paternal uncle was Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī, known
for his active participation in a number of military skirmishes in Transoxiana
during the caliphal reigns of Yazīd II and Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik.⁷⁰ On the
eve of the ʿAbbāsid revolution, al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān was busy instigating the ʿAb-
bāsid revolution in Khurāsān and Transoxiana, and he was described as an ʿAb-
bāsid propagandist operating out of Abīward.⁷¹ He appears to have been a close
confidante of Abū Muslim, who instructed him to move between the cities and
villages of Khurāsān and Transoxiana in order to communicate messages on
Abū Muslim’s behalf.⁷²
In 130 H/747–8 CE, al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān was in Ṭūs under the command of
Qaḥṭaba, where the former served alongside Abū Ghānim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b.
Ribʿī.⁷³ A few years later, al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān was in Wāsiṭ with al-Ḥasan b.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), ii: 1422 = XXIV: 152–3 (battle at the fortress of al-Bāhilī at Sa-
marqand in the year 102 H/701–2 CE); ii: 1521–2 = XXV: 59 (siege of Kamarja in the year 110 H/
728–9 CE).
 Anonymous, Akhbār al-dawla (1971), 218, 221. His name appears alongside Abū Ghānim
(again at 218) and ʿĪsā b. Nahīk (at 218 with ʿUthmān b. Nahīk).
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), ii: 1950 = XXVII: 61–2, ii: 1963 = XXVII: 73, where the same
story is repeated; Anonymous, Akhbār al-dawla (1971), 218–9.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), ii: 2001 = XXVII: 107–8.
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Qaḥṭaba,⁷⁴ and it seems he found himself employed in Wāsiṭ again in the service
of al-Manṣūr during al-Saffāḥ’s reign.⁷⁵
Upon the death of al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s long-time compatriot ʿUthmān b.
Nahīk, the position of caliph’s guard passed on to the latter’s son ʿĪsā b.
Nahīk⁷⁶ and then to al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān (fa-jaʿala ʿalā l-ḥaras Abā l-ʿAbbās al-
Ṭūsī).⁷⁷ The precise year of al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s appointment is unclear. First,
the year of ʿUthmān b. Nahīk’s death depends on the dating of the incident
with the Rāwandiyya.⁷⁸ Al-Ṭabarī believed this occurred in 141 H/758–9 CE,
though he is aware of reports that dated the event to 136–7 H/754–5 CE.⁷⁹ Kha-
līfa b. Khayyāṭ understood the employment history for the office of the caliph’s
guard and seal (ʿalā l-ḥaras wa-l-khātam) to have progressed in this way from
ʿUthmān b. Nahīk, to his son, and then to al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān. Khalīfa b.
Khayyāṭ, however, provides no date for al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s appointment,
and it is worth noting that he describes the two offices as having been passed
on to al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān, whereas al-Ṭabarī speaks only of the position of
the caliph’s guard.⁸⁰ To further complicate al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s employment
history we might add that al-Jahshiyārī (d. 331 H/942 CE) was of the view that
al-Manṣūr appointed al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān over the caliph’s seal in 153 H/770
CE.⁸¹ Al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān replaced Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm as commander of
al-Mahdī’s ḥaras.⁸² He is described as being in charge of the private guard (al-
ḥaras) in the reign of al-Mahdī, which then passed on to his son, ʿAbdallāh b.
Abī l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī.⁸³
In 146 H/763–4 CE al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān was ordered by the caliph al-Manṣūr
to track down Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yaḥyā b. ʿAbdallāh. The latter was in charge of the
accounts of Baghdad and its markets. It was discovered that he had a connection
to the ʿAlid rebels Muḥammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya and Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh. Al-
Faḍl b. Sulaymān captured Abū Zakariyyāʾ and al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s chamber-
lain, Mūsā, killed him (fa-qatalahu bi-yadihi ḥājib kāna li-Abī l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī).⁸⁴
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 20–21 = XXVII: 142–3 (in the year 132 H/749–50 CE).
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 68 = XXVII: 191.
 On ʿĪsā, see Anonymous, Akhbār al-dawla (1971), 218; Omar 1969, 73; Crone 1982, 189.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 131 = XXVIII: 64–66.
 ʿUthmān b. Nahīk and al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān served together in Ṭūs and Wāsiṭ. See al-Ṭabarī,
Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), ii: 2001 = XXVII: 108 and iii: 68 = XXVII: 191.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 129 = XXVIII: 62.
 Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh (1985), 436.
 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ (1980), 124 (qallada al-khātam al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān al-Ṭūsī).
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh (1883), ii: 483.
 Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Ta’rīkh (1985), 443.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 324 = XXIX: 9.
An Empire of Elites: Mobility in the Early Islamic Empire 159
Al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s chamberlain must have acquired quite a reputation for
himself by this act, for he was thereafter tasked by al-Manṣūr himself to execute
certain individuals.⁸⁵
There was no doubt that al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān was critical to the imperial
household. In one source, he appears as al-Manṣūr’s close confidante, exhibiting
no reluctance whatsoever to express himself to the caliph, even in cases where
his was a voice of dissent concerning significant decisions involving the caliph’s
son and heir-apparent.⁸⁶
Al-Manṣūr had gathered al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān, along with ʿĪsā b. ʿAlī, al-ʿAbbās b. Muḥam-
mad, and others from among his select advisers (khawāṣṣihi) and told them: I have decided
to assign the lands of the Sawād and Kuwar Dijla to al-Mahdī. All of the advisers present
agreed with the caliph’s judgment except al-Ṭūsī (fa-istaṣwaba jamīʿuhum raʾyahu khalā l-
Ṭūsī). Al-Ṭūsī then requested the caliph whether he could speak with him privately (fa-in-
nahu astakhlāhu). When they were alone, he said to the caliph: “Would it please you to
know that al-Mahdī might pursue a policy different to yours and begin to run things care-
lessly?” “By God, no it would not please me,” the caliph responded. “But, you would like to
endear him to your subjects. The problem is that appointing him over these lands will make
him loathed by your subjects, especially those among them who are loyal to you. Instead,
you should appoint ʿĪsā b. Mūsā as governor of this province and appoint al-Mahdī to over-
see peoples’ complaints. And you should command him to dispense justice to them in a fair
manner.” Al-Manṣūr began to laugh, and he stamped his feet on the ground [acknowledg-
ing al-Ṭūsī’s sagacious counsel].
Having served the caliph for many years in various provinces and in different im-
perial offices, al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān believed his relationship with al-Manṣūr per-
mitted such frank exchanges of policy. Delicate matters pertaining to the caliph’s
son and heir-apparent could be discussed between the two men. Based on this
report, it might even be argued that al-Mahdī’s interest in establishing courts of
complaints (maẓālim) originated with the idea al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān planted in al-
Manṣūr’s mind.⁸⁷
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 373 = XXIX: 68. From this source we learn that the name
of al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s chamberlain was Mūsā b. Dīnār. Kennedy in his translation cited above
(XXIX: 68, fn. 181) remarks that Mūsā is “unknown elsewhere.” This is not correct.
 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ (1980), 37–38.
 This report places the origins of themaẓālim courts in a new light. To my knowledge, modern
scholarship on the maẓālim courts has overlooked this reference: Tyan 1938, 474; Tillier 2009,
42–6; Tillier 2006; Hallaq 2005, 99– 101, and others place the origins of the maẓālim courts
with al-Mahdī, because of a dialogue preserved by Wakīʿ in which the qāḍī ʿUbaydallāh speaks
of being instructed by the caliph al-Mahdī to hear and investigate complaints: Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-
quḍāt (1947–50), 2: 92.
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Circumstances continued to improve for al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān. Al-Manṣūr’s
granting of properties to his senior commanders enabled al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān
to amass a significant amount of property on the west side of Baghdad.⁸⁸ Al-
Faḍl b. Sulaymān in turn remained a loyal and dutiful officer. Upon al-Manṣūr’s
death in 158 H/774–5 CE, in his capacity as keeper of the caliphal seal he had
that seal sent to al-Mahdī (baʿatha Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī bi-khātam al-khilāfa).⁸⁹
Even when all the imperial offices were placed under the ministerial control of
Yaḥyā b. Khālid during the caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd, the office of the caliph-
al seal maintained its independence under the authority of al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān
(wa-kānat al-dawāwīn kulluhā ilā Yaḥyā b. Khālid maʿ al-wizāra siwā dīwān al-
khātam fa-innahu kāna ilā Abī l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī).⁹⁰ This was something that per-
turbed Yaḥyā b. Khālid, who was concerned over the delay in obtaining the ca-
liphal seal from al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān for official letters.⁹¹
Provincial troubles in Khurāsān, however, signalled al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān’s
return to his home province of Khurāsān. Al-Mahdī had appointed Musayyab
b. Zuhayr as governor of Khurāsān in 166 H/782–3 CE. Troubles for him began
immediately on account of his decision to raise the land-tax above the amount
at which it had been fixed.⁹² Within eight months, Musayyab b. Zuhayr’s guber-
natorial reign was over and al-Mahdī replaced him with al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān.
Gardīzī provides us with the precise details of the smooth transition of power:⁹³
Abū l-ʿAbbās sent out Saʿīd b. Bashīr as commander of the advance guard, and Saʿīd came
to Marv in Muḥarram of the year 167 H/783 CE. He went into Musayyab’s presence, greeted
him, and gave him a letter instructing him to hand over his charge to Saʿīd. Musayyab had
had no prior knowledge of this change of appointment. When Musayyab had read it, he
rose from his place and said, “The seat of authority is now yours” (va Saʿid bi Marv
āmad…va bi nazdīk-i Musayyab shud va Musayyab hīch khabar nadāsht, va bar vay salām
kard va nāmi-yi taslīm-i ʿamal badū dād. Va chūn bi khwānd az jay-i khwīsh bar khāst va
guft, “majlis turā ast”).
The man whose career began as an agent and messenger of Abū Muslim, scurry-
ing between the cities and villages of Khurāsān and Transoxiana to convey mes-
sages on his behalf, returned to the province as its governor, an office that in-
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 367 = XXIX: 59.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 455 = XXIX: 165.
 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ (1980), 177.
 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ (1980), 178.
 Gardīzī, Zayn al-akhbār (1968), 282–3.
 Gardīzī, Zayn al-akhbār (1968), 283. For this article, I have used ʿAbd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī’s edi-
tion and not Raḥīm Riḍā-zāda Malik’s more recent edition (Tehran: Anjuman-i Āthār va Mafā-
khir-i Farhangī, 2005).
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cluded the regions of Sīstān and Ṭabaristān.⁹⁴ His impact was felt across the em-
pire’s provinces and at the imperial centre, where there was even a quarter be-
longing to al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān.⁹⁵
It is notoriously difficult to pursue the career of provincial governors beyond
their gubernatorial reign. Upon being dismissed from their position, provincial
governors often disappear into oblivion. In this respect, al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān is
an important exception. His dismissal as governor of Khurāsān and Sīstān in
171 H/787–9 CE by the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd was apparently not prompted
by improper conduct or any incompetence in his handling of provincial affairs.
That he was still trusted and honoured was shown on his arrival in Baghdad in
171 H/787–8 CE, when he was given charge of the caliphal seal.⁹⁶
Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to deploy prosopography in order to document
historical patterns and trends concerning the activities of elites in the early Is-
lamic Empire. I have used this methodology to document the lives of elites
who occupied leading positions in 8th and 9th-century government in order to
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 517–8, 521 = XXIX: 234–5, 239; iii: 740 = XXX: 305; Ibn
Isfandiyār, Tārīkh-i Ṭabaristān (1941), 1: 189. Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī is described as one of the gov-
ernors of Ṭabaristān sent from Baghdad (dār al-khilāfa). It is unclear to me whether this appoint-
ment occurred earlier or whether Ṭabaristān was included under his autonomy along with
Khurāsān and Sīstān. When al-Dīnawarī states that al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān remained governor
for two years (“wa-ʿaqada li-Abī l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī ʿalā Khurāsān fa-labitha ʿalayhā ʿāmmayn thum-
ma ʿazalahu”), he must intend by this two years into Hārūn al-Rashīd’s caliphal reign. I am read-
ing ʿaqada instead of the passive, ʿuqida, on account of the entire sentence’s syntax: al-Dīna-
warī, Akhbār al-ṭiwāl (1888), 383. For his and, subsequently, his son’s governorship, see
Ḥamza Iṣfahānī, Taʾrīkh sinī mulūk (1844– 1888), 222–3; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879–1901), iii: 521
= XXIX: 239; Khalīfa states that Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī’s gubernatorial reign continued under
the caliph al-Hādī: Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh (1985), 446; al-Fasawī states that he was governor
of Khurāsān from 166–170 H/783–4–787–8 CE: al-Fasawī, Kitāb al-Maʿrifa (1989), i: 154, 162
(where the end of his gubernatorial reign is noted). For a full historical reconstruction and com-
prehensive discussion of his governorship, see Khan (forthcoming monograph), ch. 3 (‘Govern-
ing the Empire’).
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh (1879– 1901), iii: 274–5 = XXVIII: 242 (al-murabbaʿa al-maʿrūfa bi-Abī l-
ʿAbbās al-Faḍl b. Sulaymān al-Ṭūsī). See Lassner 1970, 67.
 See Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh (1985), 465: Abū l-ʿAbbās was in charge of the seal after Jaʿfar
b. Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath. When the latter replaced Abū l-ʿAbbās as governor of Khurāsān,
Abū l-ʿAbbās commanded the seal (al-khātam). He kept this office until he died and was re-
placed by Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak.
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point out larger themes and developments they represent. Prosopography prom-
ises to illuminate the study of early and medieval Islamic history when it ad-
dresses larger conceptual and thematic questions.
This study has been devoted to two neglected areas in the study of the early
Islamic Empire and the role of elites towards the empire’s stability. It has argued
that transregional mobility, especially among military commanders, was founda-
tional to the empire’s maintenance. The elites studied in this chapter were active
all over the empire’s regions: from Mosul to Baghdad, from Khurāsān to Sīstān,
from Ṭabaristān to Ṭūs, from Azerbaijan to Baghdad. The circulation of elites re-
flects the extent to which the fate of the empire was tied to elite activity. Offices
and appointments circulated among family members, going from brother to
brother, father to son; and officials were ambitious and enterprising, not always
content with the offices and level of employment they or their ancestors had se-
cured. Many of them were social climbers, who began their careers as soldiers,
progressed to the caliph’s special military entourage, and rose to prominence
as governors of provinces. There were great opportunities to rise in the imperial
bureaucracy but even the highest offices were not without their risks.When loy-
alty was rewarded, it was rewarded generously. But when it was breached, the
consequences were grave and delivered swiftly. Heads could rise one day and
fall quite literally the next, only to be raised and displayed with the hallmark,
macabre display of imperial triumph in the empire’s capital.
This mobility and circulation points to two further dimensions of the early
Islamic Empire. The first was the cultural commensurability of the imperial
provinces. Subjects and administrators floated across different regions of the em-
pire. Cultures and customs differed, but the vast territorial diversity of the em-
pire’s landscape did not prevent a high degree of inter-cultural traffic. The sec-
ond and perhaps more important dimension was the early Islamic Empire’s
creation of a commensurate system. A trans-empire identity made it possible
for elites to move easily from province to province and swiftly embed themselves
in a bureaucratic system where there were similar expectations; social roles were
understood; positions of power were known; privilege and education were ex-
pected and recognised; and achievements in different provinces were accorded
respect.⁹⁷ This cultivation of a commensurable social world that enabled elite of-
 On this point, see Ando (2000), 410, who states about the early Roman Empire: “It does not
matter that most provincials probably never left the province in which they were born. Rather,
their appreciation of the empire grew from the belief they shared with Orosius, that they could
travel the length of the empire and still know precisely what benefits accrued from their mem-
bership in the Roman community.”
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ficials to thrive whilst serving the interests of the early Islamic Empire was a sig-
nificant achievement.⁹⁸
Beyond these two hypotheses concerning the nature of the early Islamic Em-
pire as an empire of mobile elites, this study has also advanced a less explicit,
though obvious, argument about the history of Khurāsān and its relationship to
the early Islamic Empire at large in the 8th and 9th centuries. Khurāsān was a
major province of the empire. In a forthcoming monograph, I study the ways
in which officials from Khurāsān were instrumental in supervising the affairs
of small villages and towns within the province,⁹⁹ as well as managing and di-
recting the affairs of other provinces such as Egypt and Iraq.¹⁰⁰ The present
study has highlighted the kinds of interventions and contributions that Khurā-
sān’s people and resources made in the lives of other regions of the empire.
The impact its residents had outside Khurāsān was both spectacular and highly
consequential. The sources do not detail the motivations or rewards for imperial
service.What they do allow us to deduce is how fundamental elite activity of this
kind was for the stability and maintenance of the early Islamic Empire. It could
not have survived for as long as it did without reproducing generations of elites,
from Khurāsān in particular, to do the work of empire in the province of Khur-
āsān, in the empire’s other key provinces, and in the imperial centre.
Elites from Khurāsān can be found all over the early Islamic empire. This
study has identified precisely where some of them were and what they were
doing. It has presented a picture of the early ʿAbbāsid Empire as one dominated
by informal patterns of rule that depended disproportionately on personal re-
tainers and elite gubernatorial and military families to maintain structures of
an otherwise bureaucratic centralised empire. Only on the basis of a larger
pool of prosopographies can we determine whether this pattern of rule charac-
terises the nature of the early Islamic Empire more broadly.
 Haldon 2016, 159–92. Charles Tilly’s landmark study of mobility in early modern Europe has
generated new typologies of mobility in medieval societies. Unfortunately, historians of early Is-
lamic history have a long way to go before we can propose stable typologies of this kind. For
some sense of what has been achieved by historians of the early Roman Empire, see the edited
volume Migration and Mobility in the Early Roman Empire (2016).
 See Khan (forthcoming journal article), “The Idea and Practice of Empire: the View from the
Documentary Sources.”
 Khan (forthcoming monograph), The Idea and Practice of Empire in Early Islamic Society.
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Appendix
Abū Ghānim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Ribʿī
Aṣram b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd
Mahdī b. Aṣram Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd
Ghānim b. AbīMuslim ʿAbdallāh b. AbīMuslim
Genealogical table of Abū Ghānim and his descendants
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Preliminary Notes on the Term and
Institution of al-Shākiriyya in Early Islam
(ca. 14–218 H/635–36–833 CE) Mainly
According to the Arabic Sources
Abstract The aim of this paper is to study the nature of the term and institution
of al-Shākiriyya by re-examining the Arabic sources pertaining to the Umawī and
early ʿAbbāsī caliphate. It is difficult to discern the character of the Shākiriyya in
the service of the Arab commanders in Central Asia from the Arabic sources.
They provide no information on ethnic composition, mobilization, military train-
ing or potential ties between a commander/master and his Shākir. This applies
mainly to the Umawī period, but also to the first ʿAbbāsī period up to al-Maʾ-
mūn’s rule (813–833). It is also impossible to determine from them the possible
connections between the ancient Central Asian military institutions and military
institutions in the Islamic world. From evidence about the Shākiriyya in the Ara-
bic sources we can usually discern a distinct military character, though it is note-
worthy that in some cases the term Shākirī can be translated as meaning a loyal
adherent, or even a servant.While relatively extensive, the evidence at hand from
the Umawī and the early ʿAbbāsī periods is too limited to fully demonstrate that
a) the Shākiriyya units denote Turks and b) that these allegedly Turkish units per-
formed their service for the ʿAbbāsī caliphs according to concepts and practices
derived from the Central Asian steppe.
Keywords: Shākiriyya; Umayyads; early ʿAbbāsids; early Islamic army; early Is-
lamic history and historiography
Introduction
During my current study of al-Maʾmūn’s army in Khurāsān, I came upon several
pieces of evidence relating to a corps of Shākiriyya at al-Maʾmūn’s court in Marw.
In checking the nature of the term and institution in the Arabic sources, I natu-
rally went back in history to the Umawī period and even earlier, to the period of
A shorter preliminary version of this paper was read at the workshop on The Origin and Early
Nature of Military Slavery in the Islamic World held at the Hebrew University in memory of
the late Prof. David Ayalon (17–22 December 2008).
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the Arab conquest. I am now in the preliminary stage of processing the material
so gathered. However, the Arab sources I examined are for the most part not de-
cisive. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the characteristics of the con-
temporary Shākiriyya from them.
A Brief Summary of Scholarly Views Regarding al-Shākiriyya
Barthold commented that the Shākiriyya is sometimes mentioned in Arabic sour-
ces as a ruler’s personal guard. He presents several examples related to Transox-
ania, according to which non-Arab rulers and also some tribal leaders and senior
Arab commanders possessed a guard of this type.¹ Barthold argued that the ori-
gin of the word is the Persian chākar (literally, servant).² This seems to be the
accepted opinion among some scholars.³ From Narashakhī’s description of the
queen of Bukhārā’s court, it seemed to Barthold that the Shākiriyya was a
kind of honour guard. It included young noblemen sent in mutual exchange
from the courts of other rulers, like the sons of European knights who served
at the courts of their kings and dukes.⁴
Shaban described this institution as an Iranian one in its origin, agreeing
that the root of the word is Persian and its meaning is servants.⁵ He argued in
a similar vein to Barthold (but without citing him) that the Shākiriyya performed
the same military service for their leaders that European knights in the Middle
Ages did for their kings. In the ʿAbbāsī period, primarily in that of al-Muʿtaṣim,
this institution was transferred from the east to the heart of the caliphate. Many
leaders and local princes from the east joined al-Muʿtaṣim. Following ancient
customs prevalent in the east, their loyal followers accompanied them and cre-
ated the Shākiriyya regiments, as a way to continue to serve their leaders in the
heart of the empire when those leaders became mawālī of the ruler. Others came
individually and joined the Shākiriyya of the ruler himself. Shaban brings a
string of references to prove his claims. However, though these references men-
tion the Shākiriyya, most of them are from the period of al-Muʿtaṣim and onward.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1159 [= Barthold 1928, 180]: the year 85 H/704–705 CE, the Shākiriyya of
Ṭarkhūn, the king of Samarqand, ruler of Sordia, see no. B/4, below; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1155:
an Arab tribal leader of Khuzāʿa, see no. B/3, below.
 Barthold 1928, 180.
 E.g., Beckwith 1984, 38, note 43: “the word is merely the Arabicized form of Persian chākar;”
Yonggyu 2004, 40.
 Barthold 1928, 180 (quoting Narshakhī, Taʾrīkh Bukhārā, pp. 7–8 [= Frye 1954, 9]).
 Shaban 1976, 2: 64–65, quoting the translation of al-Marwazī in Minorsky 1942, 18.
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They do not provide enough information to justify Shaban’s broad and detailed
explanation.⁶
Forand argued that the Shākiriyya of the Iranian/Soghdian princes and rul-
ers in Central Asia mentioned by the Arabic sources denotes “corps of slaves”
and that it is “impossible to establish beyond a doubt that individuals constitut-
ing a shākiriyya among the Umayyads [governors and senior commanders] were
of servile status.”⁷
Beckwith argues for a Central Asian (Soghdian) origin of the institution of al-
Shākiriyya, and this has been accepted by some scholars.⁸ He quotes Chinese
sources of the period describing the chākars’ Turkish and Soghdian guard
corps as courageous and fierce warriors.⁹ More comprehensive studies in this
vein have been carried out by Yonggyu and (recently) De La Vaissière (see
below).
From a single Arabic passage where a Turkish general says: “I am the slave
(ʿabd) of the Khāqān from his Shākiriyya,”¹⁰ Beckwith concludes that:
…the relationship between lord and chākar was extremely close indeed; al-Iskand’s ally
Ghūrak, the king of Samarkand, speaks of his feudal relationship to his Western-Turkic
liege-lord…It appears, therefore that the members of the central Asian guard corps spoke
of themselves as the slaves of their lord [my emphasis].
We need more than one (equivocal) piece of evidence to corroborate such a so-
cial-cultural and ethnic institution, despite Beckwith’s lively depiction.
Yonggyu is more cautious in his definitions. Regarding the above evidence,
he believes that the word “slave” (ʿabd) is used here metaphorically and does
not denote “simple slaves.”¹¹ Chākars “often labelled themselves as their
lords’ slaves, even if mostly metaphorically and nominally.”¹² Yonggyu brings
 Shaban 1976, 2: 64–65, quoting al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 8, 928, 1373, 1427, 1605; Ibn al-Athīr, al-
Kāmil (ed. Tornberg), 7, 32; Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ, 2, fol. 271a [= ed. Hyderabad, 8,
331].
 Forand 1962, 10–11.
 Beckwith 1984, esp. 39–40; Yonggyu 2004, chapter one, esp. 39–75; De La Vaissière 2007, esp.
59–158.
 Beckwith 1984, 37: Chinese sources describing the chākars in Bukhārā and Samarqand; the
word chākar in the Chinese sources is che-chieh (Beckwith 1984, 37, nn. 41 and 42); I cannot
judge these pieces of evidence.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1542: هتيركاشنمناقاخلادبعانأ ; see the discussion of Yonggyu below.
 Yonggyu 2004, 63: “Indeed they are not simple slaves, because they are also of the highest
echelons of society.”
 Yonggyu 2004, 63.
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several pieces of evidence from Chinese sources (some from the 7th century),
where the chākars of the Turkish qaghan are called “slaves of the qaghan,” de-
noting in his view subordinates.¹³ Regarding Forand’s assertion that “the Shākir-
iyyah of the Iranian rulers must have been slaves,”¹⁴ Yonggyu argues that this
conclusion “is somewhat extreme…it is probable that the chākars in Iran and
Central Asia were fully subordinate to their rulers and that they were servile el-
ements in the service of the rulers.”¹⁵ It is noteworthy that Beckwith speaks only
of Central Asia while Yonggyu distinguishes between Iran and Central Asia.
Yonggyu adds (following Forand’s examples) that al-Ṭabarī provides many ex-
amples showing that the Iranian ruler had the “right of life and death over
the members of shākiriyya.” But this assertion cannot be proved from the texts
he adduces.¹⁶
Some Major Characteristics of al-Shākiriyya in Central Asia.
Yonggyu asserts that Chinese sources from the 7th century attest to special mili-
tary forces called chākars.
…inner Asian historians and Sinologists have in general regarded the term as referring to
the elite armed forces constituted by Central Asian Turko-Persian ethnic groups.¹⁷…Other
currently available sources in Chinese also indicate that chākars are peoples associated
to Iranian groups.¹⁸
The military skills, courage and extreme loyalty of the chākars are well attested
to and demonstrated in the Chinese sources.¹⁹ Unfortunately, Yonggyu adds,
“The Chinese sources are not forthcoming when it comes to the question of by
what mechanism such a special bond between the inner Asian ruler and his re-
tainers was created.”²⁰ The same can be said about the Arabic sources pertaining
to the Umawī and the early ʿAbbāsī caliphate.
 Yonggyu 2004, 63.
 Forand 1962, 11.
 Yonggyu 2004, 68.
 Yonggyu 2004, 68, quoting Forand 1962, 11, citing al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 965, 1155, 1609, 1927
(nos. B/1, B/3, B/11 and B/15 in this paper).
 Yonggyu 2004, 44–45.
 Yonggyu 2004, 46.
 Yonggyu 2004, 68–69.
 Yonggyu 2004, 70.
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De La Vaissière’s Conclusions
De La Vaissière devotes large parts of a recent book to a broad in-depth discus-
sion of the Shākiriyya. He expands some of the conclusions of Beckwith and
more especially of Yonggyu, arguing that the Shākiriyya was strictly a special in-
stitution within the Soghdian armies in Transoxania.²¹ In his view the professio-
nal soldiers called chākar constituted “the most specific element of the military
Soghdian life.”²²
De La Vaissière relies mainly on two groups of Chinese and Arabic sources.
The Chinese sources enable him to establish unequivocally that the chākars were
“an elite guard restricted to a few selected companions.”²³
Les chākar étaient les soldats d’élites des nobles et des rois, distingués par leur bravoure,
entretenus, éduqués et adoptés fictivement par eux afin de s’assurer de leur fidélité. Ils les
suivaient à la guerre comme dans le service quotidien. La plupart d’entre eux devaient être
des gens du commun, mais des rois pouvaient avoir des chākar nobles.²⁴
Persian or Soghdian Origin?
Unlike some of the scholars that preceded him, De La Vaissière argues against
the Persian-Sasanian origin of this institution via the word itself. The etymology
of the word is from the Soghdian and not the Persian language; although it does
not appear in known Soghdian sources (mostly religious texts), it is found in the
Arabic and the Chinese sources.²⁵ All the Arabic (almost exclusively from al-Ṭab-
arī) and the Chinese sources that mention the Shākiriyya pertain to Central Asia
(Transoxania). Al-Ṭabarī never mentions these units in his descriptions of the
Arab conquests of the Sasanian territories.²⁶
De La Vaissière admits that the word chākar does appear in 10th century Per-
sian texts (for example, Narshakhī), but unlike Barthold²⁷ he argues that the
meaning of the word is servant or apprentice and that it refers to an institution
 De La Vaissière 2007, 59.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 68: “Les soldats professionnels nommés chākar forment l’élément le
plus spécifique de la vie militaire sogdienne.”
 De La Vaissière 2007, 69–70: “d’une garde d’élite restreinte à quelques compagnons choi-
sis.”
 De La Vaissière 2007, 86.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 68.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 72–73.
 See above.
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basically different from that of the chākars of Central Asia.²⁸ The main difference
between the chākars of Transoxania and Narshakhī’s chākars is the inferior so-
cial status of the latter. According to the Zoroastrian point of view, they are non-
noble servants performing base work. The descriptions of the court of the Queen
of Bukhārā by Narshakhī are completely different from the military institution of
the chākars depicted in the Chinese sources.²⁹
The difference between the meaning of the term chākar in the Persian versus
the Arabic and Chinese texts explains (in De La Vaissière’s opinion) the appa-
rently single text of al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī (Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh)
in which he describes the Shākiriyya units in the army of the Sasanian general
Rustam during the battle of al-Qādisiyya in the year 15 H/636 CE.³⁰ This conclu-
sion poses some difficulties.
A) There is a similar text recorded by al-Ṭabarī (no. 1): “The army of Rustam
consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand men. Sixty thousand were ac-
companied by Shākirī men; and from among these sixty thousand fifteen thou-
sand noblemen (also) were accompanied.”³¹
B) The term al-Shākiriyya in different forms (e.g., wa-Shākiriyyatuhu) appears
at least two more times in Ibn Ṭāhir’s book in connection with two different pe-
riods of the ʿAbbāsī caliphate 1) In the year 136 H/754 CE, the Shākiriyya of caliph
Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ (r. 132 H/749 CE–134 H/756 CE) is mentioned in al-Kūfa/al-
Hāshimiyya.³² (No. C/3 [20]) 2) The mawālī and the Shākiriyya in Sāmarrāʾ rebel-
led during the short reign of caliph al-Mustaʿīn (Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. al-Muʿ-
taṣim; r. 248 H/862 CE–252 H/866 CE) due to the latter’s political deeds, among
them the imprisonment of al-Mutawakkil’s two sons al-Muʿtazz and al-Muʾayyad
and the release of al-Ḥasan b. al-Afshīn from prison.³³
 De La Vaissière 2007, 88.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 74–75.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 73, and note 194, quoting Zakeri 1995, 184; “on peut assurer que lorsque
Maqdisī decrit des chākar parmi les suivants de Rostam et de Yazdergerd III durant la bataille de
Qadissiyya, dans son Livre de la création et de l’histoire, il se sert simplement d’un mot commun
à Balkh au Xe siècle pour décrire des serviteurs de souverains sassanides très différents des
chākar centre-assiatiques et qui, dans l’Iran sassanide portaient certainement un autre nom.”
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 1, 2258 : ةسمخافلأنيتسلانمو,يركاشلالجرلاعمعوبتمفلأنيتس:افلأنيرشعوةئامهدنجناكو
عوبتمفيرشفلأرشع .
 Al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir, al-Badʾ, 6, 76, records a tradition relating the plot by the caliph and
his brother al-Manṣūr to assassinate Abū Muslim; the caliph backs down from his decision, or-
dering one of his Shākiriyya ( هتيركاشضعبللاقف ) to tell his brother not to kill Abū Muslim.
 Al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir, al-Badʾ, 6, 123: ةيركاشلاويلاوملابغشو …; according to al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3,
1533, al-Ḥasan was released from prison in 250 H/864 CE. The insurrection against al-Mustaʿīn
and the release of al-Muʿtazz from prison occurred in 251 H/865 CE (al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1545;
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C) It is difficult to accept the historiographical method applied by De La
Vaissière to al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir’s work in general and to this specific text in
particular. Al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir was a native of Jerusalem, a contemporary of
the famous geographer Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr (known as al-Muqaddasī/al-
Maqdisī, d. ca. 1000). Al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir emigrated from Jerusalem to Bust
in Sijistān, where he wrote his book around 355 H/966 CE (not in Balkh as De
La Vaissière believes). Very little information survives regarding him; it is not
known exactly when he left Jerusalem and when he settled in Bust.³⁴ His work
was written in Arabic, not in Persian.
the rebels referred to are Turks). I did not find the expression al-mawālī wa-l-Shākiriyya in al-
Ṭabarī’s work, but this phrase does appear even earlier in other sources, e.g. during al-Mutawak-
kil’s reign (r. 232 H/847CE–247 H/861 CE), when the latter ordered the preparation of an extraor-
dinary celebration in honour of his young son, al-Muʿtazz, who had finished learning and recit-
ing the Qurʾān. This unprecedented celebration was held in Barkuwārā, one of al-Mutawakkil’s
palaces. See al-Muʿāfā b. Zakariyyāʾ, al-Jalīs al-Ṣāliḥ, 3, 103–105; 105: “he [the caliph) ordered the
most prominent dignitaries, the most distinguished mawālī and al-Shākiriyya to be present in
Barkuwārā…”: اراوكربروضحبةيركاشلاويلاوملاهوجوورباكألانمسانلاىلإزعوأو ; the isnād: نبنسحلاانثدح
انثدحلاقتارفلانبىسومنبدمحمنبدمحأسابعلاوبأانثدحلاقبتاكلانانبنببوقعيفسويوبأينثدحلاقيبكوكلامساقلا
انخويشنمةعامجويبأ ; Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Mūsā (236 H/850–851 CE–291 H/904 CE) belonged
to the famous Banū l-Furāt family, several of whose members held the offices of secretaries and
viziers under the ʿAbbāsīs (mainly from the end of the 3rd/9th century) and the Ikhshīdīs (in the 4
th/10th century). They were pro-Shīʿa. On Banū l-Furāt, see D. Sourdel, “Ibn al-Furāt”, The Ency-
clopedia of Islam, new edition, 3, s.v. (on Aḥmad and his father, see p. 767b.), but esp. Sourdel
1959–60 (index); for parallel sources for the tradition, see for example Ibn al-ʿImrānī, al-Inbāʾ, 1,
118–119 and 281, n. 285, an exhaustive bibliography; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 8, 3764–3765; Ibn
ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 18, 314–316. On Barkuwārā, see Yāqūt, Muʿjam (Beirut ed.), 1, 410; Le Strange
1905, 52. See also al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1627, where we find the phrase al-atrāk wa-l-mawālī (in
al-Mustaʿīn’s army); Gordon 2001, 224, n. 242, argues that the mawālī mentioned here are
Turks as well: “there is good reason to think Turks are meant here as well. In other words, a dis-
tinction is made here between two groups of Turks.” See also al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1582 (year 251
H/865 CE): “The Shākiriyya and the Abnāʾ [contingents] support[ed] al-Muʿtazz while the Turks
and their supporters broke rank and fought against him”: مهفناكنموكارتألالزتعاوءانبألاوةيركاشلاهباجاو
هوبراحو . It is noteworthy that there is a distinction here between the Shākiriyya and the Turks; for
the involvement of the Shākiriyya corps in the civil war, see for example, Saliba 1985, index
(“Shākiriyyah”); for a historical survey of the civil war, see Shaban 1976, 2: 80–85, but esp. Gor-
don 2001, 90ff., and 224, n. 238 for further bibliography.
 Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh was for a long time ascribed to Abū Zayd Aḥmad b. Sahl al-Balkhī
(d. 322 H/934 CE), mainly due to the assertion of Ḥājī Khalīfa in Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1, 227, but see
also Ibn al-Wardī, Kharīda, 249 (mentioned by Morony 1988, 353); van Ess 1978, 322 (S. 581);
Adang 1996, 49. On al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī (a brief mention of the author and his
book), see Goitein 1982, 192–193 (the original Hebrew version of this article appeared in 1953);
Sarkīs 1928–30, 1: 241–242; al-Zirikli 1980, 1: 133–134, 7: 253, 8: 285; Kaḥḥāla 1957–61, 12: 294;
“Al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir,” p. 762a; GAL, I, p. 337; S. I, p. 222; Sezgin 1967, 1: 337; Rosenthal 1968,
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[It] recalls al-Masʿūdī’s Murūj [al-Dhahab], but history here is envisaged from a more phil-
osophical and certainly from a more critical point of view. The author displays a good
knowledge of ancient and alien religions, whose cultural value he stresses without however
ceasing to place Islam above them. He follows the usual order. Beginning with the creation
of the world, he devotes the first three volumes (half of the whole work) to ancient history
and to philosophical, theological, geographical, etc. considerations and does not reach a
consideration of Islam until the fourth volume (cf. the parallel lay-out of al-Masʿūdī’s
work, in which these earlier topics occupy only two volumes out of five), finally reserving
a restricted place for the Umayyads and ʿAbbāsīds….Such a disdain may possibly arise pre-
cisely from the originality and free thought of a writer who seems to have maintained a cer-
tain independence and not to have been an adherent of any religious movement of the age
when he lived.³⁵
The historical parts of this work preserve many pieces of evidence of utmost im-
portance, which are not found in other sources known to me.³⁶
In the introduction to the historical section of his work, the author asserts
that it “is based on what we have found in the books of the authors of history
( رابخألالهأبتكيف ).” From a cursory reading it is clear that Ibn Ṭāhir relied heavily
on earlier sources, including well-known works such as al-Ṭabarī’s (or his sour-
ces; this should be established by a special study).³⁷ Many times he quotes writ-
ten works or transmitters from which he accumulated his historical information.
This is done according to the traditional methodology of the great historical writ-
ten Arabic works. The examples are numerous and it is sufficient to cite only a
few here.³⁸
From a cursory check of Ibn Ṭāhir’s work al-Badʾ wa-l-Taʾrīkh it is clear that
he was very learned in ḥadīth, fiqh, historical and other kinds of Islamic litera-
ture. The sections of pre-Islamic history that deal with al-mabdaʾ and qiṣaṣ al-
anbiyāʾ until the beginnings of Muḥammad’s mission, the life of the Prophet
index, esp. 114–115; Khālidī 1976. Khālidī quotes the short mention of the author by Sezgin,
Rosenthal and Miquel (see the bibliographical citation above in this note); Miquel 1967, 1:
212–217, and index; see also Khālidī 1994, 153–154; Adang 1996a, esp. pp. 48–50, and index;
Adang 1996b, esp. 59–60; Morony 1988.
 “Al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir.” But see Khālidī 1976, who considers him a Muʿtazilī.
 See the short evaluation of the man and his work in this vein by Sezgin 1967, 1: 337 (quoted in
Gil 1992, 421).
 For example, compare al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir, al-Badʾ, 6, 75–76, to al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 85–86
(partly related by al-Ṭabarī from al-Madāʾinī); see full discussion below (ʿAbbāsīs, no. C/3 [20])
 E.g., II, p. 150: هبنملانببهونعانيور ; or: فراعملاباتكيفةبيتقنبملسمنبهللادبعىورو ; p. 151: باتكيفو
هب[ذادرخنباخيرأت ]; p. 152: جنرزرابخأباتكيفتبصأو ; p. 153: ريكبنبسنويهنعهيورياميفقاحسإنبدمحمةياور ; or:
ءايبنألاخيراوتاوركذميجنتلالهأضعببتكيفتيأرلو ; p. 154: نعةمركعنعةداتقنعمامهىوردقو]هبنملانب[بهوىورو
هنعهللايضرسابعنبا ; p. 155: سابعنبأنعسيردإنبمعنملادبعىوررابخألالهأهاورامركذ ; p. 156: رفعجوبأىورو
يبلكلاةياوريفو.…سنأنبعيبرلانعهيبأنعيزارلا ….
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and the history of the caliphate are written in the familiar tradition of the impor-
tant Islamic historians of the 9th and 10th centuries. Even an anecdote about an
alleged disputation between the chief commander of the Arab force in front of
Yazdajird (no. A/1.3, below), is written in accordance with the style, spirit and
contents of many of the traditions of the early Arab-Muslim conquests, as
found in the early Arabic Futūḥ literature—for example, the works of Abū Mikh-
naf (d. 157 H/774 CE), al-Azdī (d. around 190 H/805–806 CE or 210 H/825–826
CE), al-Qudāmī (d. between 201 H/816–17 CE or 210 H/826–27 CE), Muḥammad
b. ʿĀʾidh (d. 232 H/847 CE) or Sayf b. ʿUmar (d. ca. 184 H/800 CE). Ṭāhir seldom
quotes his historical sources in these early sections. Although his work has long
been edited and used in research, it has not been properly studied; I do not
know of an in-depth study of the author or his important work.³⁹
Though it is tempting to compare the Shākiriyya and the institution of
knighthood in the European Middle Ages (as argued by Barthold and Beck-
with⁴⁰), there should be reservations regarding the equation. It is refuted, for ex-
ample, and treated with great caution and reservation by De La Vaissière.⁴¹ If
such comparisons are made, they should be put forward in great detail and
with profound caution. The regimes in the east and in the west were very differ-
ent in character.⁴²
Other researchers mention the Shākiriyya but do not discuss it or attempt to
clarify its character.⁴³
The Term Shākirī/Shākiriyya in the Arabic Sources
Used to mean military contingents: marked MC
 See Khālidī 1976, 2.
 Beckwith 1984, 35 and note 26: comparing the Shākiriyya guard corps with “the system
found among the Germanic peoples of late Classical and early medieval Europe,” the comitatus.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 83–84, argues against Beckwith but mainly against two articles by P.
Golden from 2001 and 2004 (not read by A. E.).
 For example, see the reservations of Cahen and Lambton in their discussion of the iqṭāʿ re-
gime in the east and attempts to compare this regime with European feudalism, Lambton 1965;
Cahen, “Iḳṭāʿ”, EI2, 3, 1088–1091.
 Pipes 1981, 137, note 215; Lassner 1980, 136 (regarding al-Muʿtaṣim’s period). Levy 1969, 418–
419, translates the Shākiriyya of al-Mutawakkil (847–861) as referring to new recruits in contrast
to the old regiments. He was mistaken in his understanding of the term. In relation to the citation
(al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1510) according to which al-Abnāʾ wa-l-Shākiriyya rebelled against the
Turks, he believes that Abnāʾ means “sons”, that is, new recruits. What is meant here are in
fact the veteran Abnāʾ regiments.
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Used to mean non-military, servant or slave: marked NM/SE/SL
A) The Period of the Conquest of al-ʿIrāq (14 H/636 CE): MC? Instead of S/:
SE/NM?
These may be the earliest pieces of evidence at our disposal, recording the term
Shākiriyya/Shākirī as in use in the year 14 H/636 CE[!], during the battle of al-
Qādisiyya in al-ʿIrāq. Two versions of these terms appear in the sources. Both de-
scribe the army of Rustam, the chief general of the Persian army.
A/1) The First Version, According to Ṭabarī
This version is recorded by al-Ṭabarī from Sayf b. ʿUmar (d. ca. 184 H /800 CE),
who transmitted the following tradition from three informers: “The army of Rus-
tam consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand men. Sixty thousand were
accompanied by the Shākirī man; and from among these sixty thousand fifteen
thousand noblemen (also) were accompanied.”⁴⁴ Friedmann renders the term
Shākirī in this sentence as “servant:” “The army of Rustam consisted of one hun-
dred and twenty thousand men. Sixty thousand were accompanied by servants
(shākirī); from the [other] sixty thousand, fifteen thousand were noblemen ac-
companied [by dependents].”⁴⁵
In another place, al-Ṭabarī (via Sayf b. ʿUmar) records: “Rustam set out with
one hundred and twenty thousand men, all of them accompanied by depend-
ents. Together with their dependents they numbered more than two hundred
thousand. He set out from al-Madāʾin with sixty thousand men, accompanied
by dependents.”⁴⁶ In this version the Shākiriyya are not mentioned.
A/1.2) The second version, According to Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-l-Taʾrīkh
“Rustam arrived and encamped in al-Ḥīra at the head of sixty thousand regular
(paid) soldiers, besides (the accompanying units) of the supporters, the followers
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 1, 2258: ةسمخافلأنيتسلانمو,يركاشلالجرلاعمعوبتمفلأنيتس:افلأنيرشعوةئامهدنجناكو
عوبتمفيرشفلأرشع .
 Friedmann 1992, 53.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 1, 2250: ,فلايتئامنمرثكأمهعابتأباوناكو,عوبتممهلك,فلاةئامونيرشعيفمتسرجرخو
عوبتمفلأنيتسيفنئادملانمجرخو ; the translation is that of Friedmann 1992, 46.
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and the Shākiriyya:” عابتألاوعايشألاىوسةلتاقملانمافلأنيتسيفةريحلالزنفمتسرءاجو
ةيركاشلاو .⁴⁷
Here, the Shākiriyya is mentioned not as part of the regular paid army but as
one of the auxiliary units. ⁴⁸
A/1.3) The Shākiriyya of Yazdajird: MC?/; S/NM?
Ibn Ṭāhir relates in another tradition that several senior commanders were sent
to Yazdajird by Saʿd b. Abī Waqqāṣ to persuade the king to recognize the supe-
riority of Islam, demanding that he become a Muslim or “pay the jizya while
being humiliated,⁴⁹ standing while a whip is over his head” تنأواهيدؤتةيزجلاف(
.)كسأرىلعطوسلاومئاقرغاص They were received by Yazdajird’s son who responded:
“If you were not messengers I would have killed you.” So they answered: “We
shall take your land and send you to exile from it.” So he asked: “What is
your proof (for this)?” and they said: “Our Prophet (ṣalʿam) informed us about
this, and there was nothing that he informed us about which did not material-
ize.” Yazdajird’s son (or is it the king himself?) said something in Persian to
one of his Shākiriyya )هتيركاشضعبنطارف( and he came quickly with a date-basket
which contained dust of the earth, and he said: “Take this, this is what you’ll get
from me…”⁵⁰
This tradition is undoubtedly a topos, a literary convention, with many par-
allels in early Islamic sources on the conquests. Still, it was woven around some
solid historical events, incorporating the names of real Arab commanders and
places. Whoever spread this tradition was certain that the Sāsānian prince
and/or king had a Shākiriyya. The nature of the Shākirī himself is not clear
from this anecdote; he may have been a servant, or a soldier who belonged to
a Shākiriyya military institution.
It is also noteworthy that this example is from a very early period, and that it
deals with the Sāsānian (Persian) army in al-ʿIrāq; it does not touch on Central
Asia.
 Al-Maqdisī, al-Badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh, 5, 171.
 For a different analysis and interpretation of this evidence, see De La Vaissière 2007, 73, who
doubts the authenticity of this evidence (quoting only al-Maqdisī); and see the discussion above.
 This is a paraphrase of the well-known Qurʾānic verse (9 (al-tawba):9), as well as an inter-
pretation of this verse, which clearly attests to the later origin of the text.
 Al-Maqdisī, al-Badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh, 5, 172.
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B) The Umawī Period
B/1) al-ʿIrāq: MC
The first time the Shākiriyya is mentioned is in 77 H/696–697 CE, during the
fierce battles between al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf and Shabīb b. Yazīd al-Shaybānī al-
Khārijī in al-ʿIrāq (mainly near al-Kūfa). One of al-Ḥajjāj’s notables and
commanders, Khālid b. ʿAttāb al-Riyāḥī al-Tamīmī,⁵¹ was sent from al-Kūfa at
the head of his Shākiriyya (fī Shākiriyyatihi) to fight Shabīb. The tradition was
recorded by al-Ṭabarī from ʿUmar b. Sahabba through Khallād b. Yazīd from
al-Ḥajjāj b. Qutayba.⁵²
B/1.1) MC
Miskawayh relates that Khālid b. ʿAttāb headed a company of soldiers of Ahl al-
Kūfa together with his mawālī and his Shākiriyya.⁵³
B/1.2) MC
Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd relates that Khālid b. ʿAttāb “came out with a group of his
mawālī and his Shākiriyya and his cousins:” همعينبوهتيركاشوهيلاومنمعمجيفجرخف .⁵⁴
On the face of it, this is an exception to the geographic-social pattern estab-
lished by some scholars, since its setting is not connected to the east (Khurāsān)
and certainly not to Transoxania. Khālid b. ʿAttāb was a Kūfī, who during his ca-
 On Khālid b. ʿAttāb, see Crone 1980, 112; al-Ziriklī 1980, 2: 297 (his entry); see also Ibn Ḥazm,
Jamhara, 227; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 12, 161–162; Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 16, 172–175: his biography;
172: governor of al-Rayy; Ibn al-Kalbī, Jamhara (ed. Ḥasan), 217 and al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 12,
161: governor of Iṣfahān after his father; al-Balādhurī, Ansāb, 7, 403: governor of al-Rayy; al-
ʿAskarī, Taṣḥīfāt, 2, 872.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 965 ( هتيركاشيفباتعنبدلاخءاجو ; my emphasis); the isnād is on pp. 963 and
964: ʿUmar b. Sahabba < Khallād b. Yazīd< al-Ḥajjāj b. Qutayba [b. Muslim?]. In some of the tra-
ditions, ʿiṣāba (a company of soldiers) appears instead of the Shākiriyya (see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh,
2, 961; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, 5, 333), or jamāʿa (Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, 9, 24: a jamāʿa of 4000 sol-
diers). See also the next footnote.
 Miskawayh, Tajārib al-umam, 2, 308. The text is slightly garbled: ؟ةباصعهعمو=؟[ةباصعبهعمجرخف
هتيركاشوهيلاومعمةفوكلالهأنم]؟ةباصعيفجرخف .
 Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ, 4, 271; Forand 1962, 10. His conclusions regarding this and other ex-
amples are farfetched.
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reer served as the governor of al-Rayy and Iṣfahān in the Jibāl district (also far
away from Transoxania). This was the heart of the Sāsānian kingdom. Did he re-
cruit his Shākiriyya there?
Crone has already noted that at least two members of Khālid b. ʿAttāb’s sub-
tribe (Riyāḥ b. Yarbūʿ) were connected to Khurāsān. The first was Ḥabīb b. Qurra
[b. Nuʿaym b. Qaʿnab…b. Hammām b. Riyāḥ b. Yarbūʿ], who was the governor of
Balkh in 29 H/649–650 CE on behalf of ʿUthmān.⁵⁵ But there is a chronological
gap of about 50 years between Khālid b. ʿAttāb’s campaign and Ḥabīb b. Qurra’s
governorship. The evidence in al-Ṭabarī (from 29 H/649–650 CE) is the only men-
tion of Ḥabīb b. Qurra in the sources. Nothing more is known of him, certainly
not about any Shākiriyya contingents of his, nor is anything known about his re-
lations with the family of Khālid b. ʿAttāb.
The second person mentioned by Crone is al-Abrad b. Qurra b. Nuʿaym, the
brother of Ḥabīb.⁵⁶ His daughter was married to Yazīd b. Qurrāʿ al-Riyāḥī or al-
Ḥanẓalī al-Tamīmī, who lived in Marw.⁵⁷ As in the case of Ḥabīb b. Qurra, no con-
nection is recorded between Khālid b. ʿAttāb and al-Abrad b. Qurra or between
their families. It seems that the Khurāsānī background and connections of Khāl-
id b. ʿAttāb with these distant relatives and with the districts of Khurāsān and
Transoxania need to be established on firmer ground.⁵⁸
All the other pieces of evidence from the Umawī period (except two) are con-
nected to Khurāsān and Transoxania.
 Crone 1980, 113 (according to al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 1, 2831).
 On him, see Ibn al-Kalbī, Jamhara, 216; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamhara, 227; Ibn Mākūlā, al-Ikmāl, 1, 10–
11; he is only mentioned in these sources.
 Crone 1980, 113 (according to al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1569: al-Riyāḥī); but see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh,
2, 1691: al-Ḥanẓalī, a different sub-tribe of Tamīm.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 72–73, note 193, mentions the evidence (according to al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾr-
īkh) about Khālid b. ʿAttāb’s Shākiriyya in al-Kūfa (al-ʿIrāq), but argues, relying on Crone’s ob-
servation, that “mais Crone 1980, p. 113, souligne les forts liens de sa famille avec le Khorassan
(elle compte dans ses rangs un gouverneur de Balkh).” Crone’s assertion (1980, 113) about the
Khurāsānī connection of Khālid and his father ʿAttāb to Khurāsān is not attested to by the sour-
ces she quotes. Furthermore, she confuses ʿAttāb and his son Khālid, mistakenly arguing that it
was ʿAttāb who had a Shākiriyya (quoting al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 950). ʿAttāb’s different contin-
gents are mentioned on this page, but no Shākiriyya contingents are listed. I am unable to
trace any connection between ʿAttāb and his son Khālid and Khurāsān.
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B/2) Khurāsān: MC
In 82 H/701–702 CE Thābit and Ḥurayth, the sons of Quṭba, mawālī of Khuzāʿa
and two commanders of the governor of Khurāsān al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra,
left al-Muhallab’s camp with “three hundred of their Shākiriyya and their loyal
and close Arab adherents.” The isnād is as follows: al-Ṭabarī < ʿAlī b. Muḥam-
mad al-Madāʾinī (most probably from a written work) < al-Mufaḍḍal b. Muḥam-
mad b. Yaʿlā al-Ḍabbī (d. ca. 163 H/780 CE),⁵⁹ whose “father was one of the au-
thorities of al-Ṭabarī on the events in the wars of the Arabs on the frontiers of
Khurāsān in 30–90 H/651–709 CE.”⁶⁰
B/3) Transoxania: MC
In 85 H/704–705 CE, Thābit and Ḥurayth, the two tribal leaders and commanders
mentioned above, found a refuge in Tirmidh (in Transoxania, on the Oxus river)
dominated by Mūsā b. ʿAbdallāh b. Khāzim al-Sulamī.⁶¹ At a certain stage Thābit
turned against Mūsā and with the help of the princes of Transoxania fought
against him. Thābit had to guard against assassination and ordered a group of
his Shākiriyya “to guard him, to sleep in his house at night, and with them, a
group of Arabs ( برعلانمموقمهعمو )”.⁶²
Barthold argued for the Iranian origin of this personal guard (Shākiriyya),
but no indication of this guard’s ethnicity is included in the source he quoted.
He further argued that the phrase “and with them, a group of Arab tribes”
means Thābit’s enemies in the camp of the leader of Khuzāʿa. The text is not
as clear-cut as Barthold deems, and it is definitely possible to assume that the
Shākiriyya that appears in this text also included Arabs.⁶³
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1082: برعلانمامهيلإنيعطقنملاوامهتيركاشنمةئامثالثيفاجرخف ; Forand 1962, 11; the
expression نيعطقنملاو is rendered by Hinds 1990 as: “three hundred of their shākiriyya and Arab
adherents [my emphasis]” and by De La Vaissière 2007, 71 as “et leur suivants arabes [my empha-
sis].”
 Lichtenstädter, “al-Mufaḍḍal b. Muḥammad….al-Ḍabbī,” EI2, 7, 305–306.
 On Mūsā b. ʿAbdallāh b. Khāzim al-Sulamī, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, index, esp. 1145ff.; Sha-
ban 1979, index, esp. 58–49, 58–62; on al- Thābit and Ḥurayth, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, index,
esp. 1145ff.; Shaban 1979, index, esp. 57–61.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1155; برعلانمموقمهعموهراديفهدنعنوتيبيوهنوسرحيهتيركاشنماموقرمأو ; Barthold
1928, 183; De La Vaissière 2007, 71, note 181.
 Barthold 1928, 183; Hinds 1990, 99: “they being accompanied by some Arabs.”
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B/4) Transoxania: SE/NM
The Shākiriyya of Ṭarkhūn, the king of Samarqand and ruler of Soghdia, is men-
tioned in the year 85 H/704–705 CE. He is in a military camp, leading a coalition
of non-Arabs and Arabs against Mūsā b. ʿAbdallāh b. Khāzim al-Sulamī, who has
gained control over Tirmidh. Ṭarkhūn is described sitting in his tent, “and his
Shākiriyya had lit fires before him.” They scattered when they heard the voice
of one single enemy soldier who entered the tent and is killed by Ṭarkhūn.
Then the Shākiriyya returned and Ṭarkhūn scolded them, saying “You fled
from a [single] man.” Then his slave girls entered the tent and the Shākiriyya fled.
It seems that the Shākiriyya in this case are servants, not soldiers; certainly
not courageous warriors since they did not even try to resist their lord’s attack-
er.⁶⁴ The isnād is as follows: al-Ṭabarī < ʿAlī b. Muḥammad [al-Madāʾinī].⁶⁵ It is
unsound to conclude from this text, as Forand did, that “the Shākiriyya of the
Iranian rulers must have been slaves.”⁶⁶
B/5) Jurjān/Khurāsān: NM/SE?
In 98 H/716–717 CE, in the course of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab’s long siege of Jurjān
(located southeast of the Caspian Sea), “a non-ʿArab (soldier?) from Khurāsān—
who was with Yazīd—went out to hunt with a Shākiriyya of his.” While chasing a
wild mountain goat (antelope?: لعو ), he discovers a small path in the mountains
leading to the besieged fortress. This evidence is connected to the east via
Khurāsān (but not Transoxania); the identity of the “hunter” is not clear. Was
he a commander or an Iranian notable? The isnād is as follows: al-Ṭabarī <
ʿAlī b. Muḥammad [al-Madāʾinī] < “the group that transmitted to him the report
about Jurjān and Ṭabaristān.” ⁶⁷
Al-Ṭabarī records two additional conflicting versions (see below) of the iden-
tity of this soldier or commander who discovers the secret pass to the besieged
city while hunting. In these versions, the “heroes of the anecdote” are Arabs.
 Cf. De La Vaissière 2007, 71: “ils veillent sur sa tente mais ne résistent pas à une attaque.”
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1159–1160; the beginning of the long tradition (mention of al-Madāʾinī)
is on 1146; Barthold 1928, 180; Forand 1962, 10; De La Vaissière, 2007, 71, note 182 (quoting al-
Ṭabarī).
 Forand 1962, 11.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1330–1331: هلةيركاشهعموديصتيديزيعمناكناسارخمجعنملجرجرخذإ ; is it pos-
sible that the phrase هلةيركاش denotes a female Shākir?
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B/5.1)
The second version of this story is related by Hishām b. Muḥammad al-Kalbī (d.
204 H/819 CE) from Abū Mikhnaf (d. 157 H/774 CE), who reports that the “hunter”
was an Arab soldier from the Ṭayyiʾ tribe ( ءّيطنمهركسعنملجر ). He is accompa-
nied by a group defined as aṣḥāb, which may denote close associates and in this
case most probably means close commanders or soldiers who were attached to
him or were part of the contingents he commanded.⁶⁸ The term Shākiriyya/
shākiriyyatihi is not mentioned in this tradition or in the next version.
B/5.2)
The third version is recorded by al-Ṭabarī, who does not name his source and
uses the term “and it is said” ( لاقيو ). It may have originally been part of Ibn al-
Kalbī’s tradition. This third version says that the hunter’s name was al-Hayyāj
b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī, from the (Arab?) inhabitants or warriors of Ṭūs
( سوطلالهأنميدزألانمحرلادبعنبجايهلا ). According to this version, he came out
from Yazīd’s camp for the purpose of hunting.⁶⁹
B/5.3)
Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī records only the last, third version of this anecdote and
weaves it around al-Hayyāj b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī. No sources are recorded,
but it is most probably taken from al-Madāʾinī’s work. This is a long and detailed
tradition, describing how during the prolonged siege of the fortress by Yazīd b.
al-Muhallab, “one of his close associates/commanders, from the (Arab?) contin-
gents of al-Ṭūs, named al-Hayyāj b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī went out hunting
with a dog…and there were with him a group [of soldiers] from the army camp…”⁷⁰
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1331: نمللاقو…ديصتيءىيطنمهركسعنملجرجرخففنخميبأنعدمحمنبماشهلاقو
.ركسعلاىلإعجرمثهباحصأىلإلصوىتح..…مكناكماوفقهعم
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1331.
 Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ (Beirut ed.), 7, 218: هللاقيسوطلهأنمهباحصأنملجرجرخذإ
ركسعلانمموقهعمناكدقو..…بلكهعموديصلاىلإيدزألانمحرلادبعنبجايهلا [my emphasis]; al-Madāʾinī is men-
tioned in Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ (Beirut ed.), 7, 206. Ibn Aʿtham relied heavily on al-
Madāʾinī’s works; see Conrad 2015, 99, n. 77, 115–116, 118, 125; Lindstedt 2014, esp. 107–108, 110,
117.
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It is clear that we are again faced with a topos, but some elements of the an-
ecdote may have a grain of authenticity.⁷¹ It is interesting (and may be of impor-
tance) that the Shākiriyya is mentioned in connection with an Iranian. The two
other Arab commanders are not connected to a Shākiriyya.
Again, it is worth reminding ourselves that the term al-Shākiriyya was a com-
mon, well-known term in the mid–9th century when al-Madāʾinī lived and
worked.
B/6) Syria/Dābiq. Between 96 H/715 CE and 99 H/717 CE, the Reign of
Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik: NM/SE?
Yāqūt quotes an anecdote that he most plausibly copied from Akhbār al-Naḥa-
wiyyīn (The History of the Grammarians),⁷² a book by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-
Malik, Abū Bakr al-Sarrāj, known as al-Taʾrīkhī (d. 291 H/903–904 CE)⁷³: “And
he related in the tradition whose isnād concludes with al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ziml/
Zaml al-Saksakī, who was one of the close associates of al-Manṣūr نمناكو(
)روصنملاباحصأ ,⁷⁴ who said:
We were together with Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik [r. 96/715–99/717] in Dābiq,⁷⁵ when al-
Shaḥḥāj [b. Wadāʿ] al-Azdī al-Mawṣilī⁷⁶ rose up in his presence and said [in incorrect Ara-
 Cf. the summary of al-Madāʾinī’s tradition in al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ (Beirut, 1987), 471: “[Yazīd]
laid siege to the fortress for seven months, with no apparent results, then a man (a soldier?) di-
rected and guided them towards a road to their fortress”: الجرنإمث.…ءيشاهنمردقيالرهشأةعبساهيلعلزنف
مهتعلقىلإقيرطىلعمهلد …; De La Vaissière 2007, 71, note 183 (according to al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1331),
refers only to one man, “un Iranien de Ṭūs.” This combines the two versions and two different
commanders rendered by al-Ṭabarī.
 Yāqūt, Udabāʾ, 1, 27. Yāqūt copied the traditions from the book that was before him, see 1, 5
and 13; 2, 551: لاقنييوحنلارابخأيفيخيرأتلاكلملادبعنبدمحمباتكيفتلقنو …; this book was already men-
tioned by Ibn al-Nadīm, al-Fihrist, 95; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 46: نييوحنلاِخيرأتباتك ; see also GAL, S3,
157. It is not mentioned by Sezgin.
 On him, see al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 151; 11, 69: al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī used an au-
tograph of the author (quoted by Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 59, 254): يخيرأتلاكلملادبعنبدمحمباتكيفتأرق
هطخب ; al-Samʿānī, al-Ansāb, 1, 442; Yāqūt, Udabāʾ , 1, 5–6; al-Dhahabī, Taʾrīkh, 23, 278–279, who
does not give the exact date of his death; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 4, 35; al-Ṭihrānī, al-Dharīʿa, 21, 28
quotes Yāqūt and gives birth and death dates (200 H/815–816 CE to 291 H/903–904 CE).
 For this social-political institution within the early ʿAbbāsī court, see Elad 1995, 93, n. 17; al-
Ḍaḥḥāk should be added to the list of the ṣaḥāba of al-Manṣūr :روصنملاباحصأنمناكو.
 “A locality in the ʿAzāz region of northern Syria. It lies on the road from Manbij to Anṭākiya
upstream from Aleppo on the river Nahr Ḳuwayḳ.” Sourdel , “Dābiḳ,” EI2, 2, 72; see also Le
Strange 1890, 426.
 For more on him, see below.
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bic, not according to the rules of the Arabic grammar]: ‘Oh Commander of the Faithful, Our
father has died and left a large sum of money but our brother took control of our father’s
money and took it…’ Upon hearing the incorrect Arabic the caliph became very angry and
addressed the speaker with harsh bold words and added ‘Take this man who speaks incor-
rect Arabic from me.’ So one of the Shākiriyya took his hand saying [also in incorrect Ara-
bic]: ‘Get up for you have offended the Commander of the Faithful.’ Hearing the incorrect,
faulty Arabic, the caliph cursed the Shākirī and ordered to drag him away by his legs.⁷⁷
Yāqūt records only the last transmitter of the tradition, al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ziml/Zaml
b. ʿAmr al-Saksakī (Kinda), a well-known Umawī Arab notable who lived in Bayt
Lihyā, one of the villages of Damascus.⁷⁸ His father was one of the closest and
most senior associates of caliph Marwān b. al-Ḥakam (r. 64 H/684 CE–65 H/
685 CE). He was also a minor transmitter of ḥadīth.⁷⁹ His son, al-Ḍaḥḥāk b.
Zamal/Ziml related traditions about Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik; in another tra-
dition he gives an eyewitness description of the audience of caliph Yazīd b.
ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 101 H/720 CE–105 H/724 CE).⁸⁰ He was appointed by caliph
al-Walīd b. Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 125 H/743 CE–126 H/744 CE) as the governor
of al-Yaman.⁸¹ Yazīd b. al-Walīd (r. 126 H/744 CE) confirmed his appointment as
the governor of al-Yaman and Ḥaḍramawt where he remained as governor under
Marwān b. Muḥammad (r. 126 H/744 CE–132 H/750 CE) for two years and a few
months.⁸² His brother al-Ḥajjāj b. Ziml accompanied Marwān b. Muḥammad on
his flight to Egypt and was killed with him in Būṣīr.⁸³ Yāqūt adds an interesting
and otherwise unknown fact about him: that he continued to serve the ʿAbbāsī
caliphs as well and was one of the ṣaḥāba of caliph al-Manṣūr.




هلجرباوبحساهمأ .; the underlined words were spoken in incorrect Arabic; the text is quoted by al-
Maymanī, Simṭ al-laʾālī, 66, explaining that the meaning of the word Shākiriyya is al-khadam
(servants/eunuchs?) and it is derived from Persian: ةيسراف,مدخ .
 On him see Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 24, 263–266; Ibn Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh, 2, 384, 432; Ibn Abī
Ḥātim, al-Jarḥ, 4, 461; Ibn Ḥajar, al-Iṣāba, 4, 96.
 On him, see Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 19, 79: مكحلانبناورمباحصأهوجونمناكو .
 Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 24, 264: on Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik; 265: in the presence of Yazīd (=
al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 15: called Ibn Ramal instead of Ziml/Zaml); on the lineage of the fam-
ily, see Ibn al-Kalbī, Nasab Maʿadd, 1, 195.
 Ibn Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh, 2, 384.
 Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 24, 265; see also Ibn Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh, 2, 432.
 Al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 136–137: related by his brother al-Ḍaḥḥāk to al-Haytham b. ʿAdī;
Crone 1980, 104.
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Very little is known of al-Shaḥḥāj b.Wadāʿ al-Azdī al-Mawṣilī, who went from
al-Mawṣil to Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik in Dābiq.⁸⁴ In the year 101 H/719–720 CE,
he was sent by caliph Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik at the head of a force of 2,000 men
to fight the Khawārij near al-Kūfa. There he was killed by the Kḥārijites.⁸⁵
B/6.1)
A parallel tradition recorded by Ibn ʿAsākir gives us the complete isnād. It was
related by al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ziml/Zaml to the famous scholar al-Haytham b. ʿAdī
(d. 207 H/822 CE). The name of al-Shaḥḥāj b. Wadāʿ is not mentioned. Instead
an anonymous man (rajul) is mentioned: “….al-Haytham [b. ʿAdī]: It was related
to me (ḥaddathanī) by al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ziml who said: ‘I witnessed Sulaymān b.
ʿAbd al-Malik when he was checking (reviewing) horses in Dābiq when a man
rose up to him and said … [the same corrupted Arabic sentences about his father
and brother; then the angry answer (curse) of the caliph is mentioned and in-
stead of the Shākirī, the caliph calls to his slave ( مالغ )] : ‘Oh slave, bring the
whip (or: whip him)’.”⁸⁶
B/6.2)
A parallel tradition is recorded by al-Marzubānī. The only word that is omitted is
“the slave” (al-ghulām).⁸⁷
 Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 20, 142 [= Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 9, 4187]: Saḥḥāj instead of Shaḥḥāj.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1376 is the only source that mentions his father Waḍāʿ; see also al-Azdī,
Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 7.
 Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 24, 264: ليخلاضرعيوهوكلملادبعنبناميلستدهش:لاقلمزنبكاحضلاينثدحمثيهلاان.…
…طوسلامالغاي…كابأهللامحرال]كلملادبعنبناميلس[لاقف.…نإنينمؤملاريمأايلاقفلجرهيلإماقفقبادب
 Al-Marzubānī, Nūr al-qabas, 3: ليخلاضرعيوهوكلملادبعنبناميلستدهش:]لمز=[لمرنبكاحضلالاقو
…طوسلاكلامدرالوكاخأىفاعالوكابأهللامحرالف]كلملادبعنبناميلس[لاقف.…نإريمألاهللاحلصألاقفلجرهيلإماقفقبادب
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B/6.3)
A partially parallel tradition (again, not mentioning the Shākirī/ghulām) was re-
lated by al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ziml to another famous scholar, ʿAbdallāh b. al-Mubārak
(118 or 119 H/736 or 738 CE–181 H/797 CE).⁸⁸
A Short Analysis of this Tradition
The impression one gets from reading this tradition is that it has some grain of
authenticity. It was related by well-known notables and scholars (that is, real
historical figures). The last link is an Umawī/ʿAbbāsī notable, who was the asso-
ciate of both Umawī and ʿAbbāsī caliphs and himself an eyewitness to the event.
It is of importance that al-Haytham b. ʿAdī and ʿAbdallāh b. al-Mubārak, two
completely different famous scholars from different regions of the Islamic
world, both reported this tradition from al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ziml.
Both al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Ziml (the last transmitter) and al-Shaḥḥāj b. Wadāʿ al-
Mawṣilī were contemporaries of Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik; al-Shaḥḥāj came
to him to Dābiq, where this caliph lived for several years, and died there.⁸⁹
However, some of the main features of the tradition were related about an
anonymous man ( لجر ), who appears before Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān, the governor
of al-ʿIrāq (d. 53 H/672–673 CE), complaining in incorrect Arabic that his brother
had seized his father’s inheritance. Upon hearing his Arabic, Ziyād scolds and/or
curses him. No ghulām/shākirī is mentioned. No isnād is attached to this version
of the tradition; no names beside that of Ziyād are mentioned, and nor is any
geographical background or name. We are facing a stereotypical literary form
or topos. It is similar to other examples of this kind found in special chapters
in the adab literature dealing with anecdotes about the laḥḥānūn (those who
spoke incorrect Arabic).⁹⁰
 Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 20, 142 [=Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 9, 4187]: جاحس instead of… نبهللادبعانثدحلاق
بثوفكلهانيبانإنينمؤملاريمأايلاقفقبادبكلملادبعنباناميلسىلايلصوملا]جاحشلا=[جاحسلاماقلاقكاحضلانعكرابملا
كايحالوكلامكيلعدرالوكاخأىفاعالوكابأهللامحراللاقفهعطتقافانلامذخأفاناخأ
 Eisener , “Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik,” EI2, 9, 821–822.
 For the tradition about Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān and the man who was cheated by his brother,
see for example al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Bayān, 2, 222: ثاريميفهوخأولجردايزىلإعفترإ:مهضعبلاقو ….; al-Jāḥiẓ, al-
Maḥāsin wa-l-aḍdād, 8: كلهانيبأنإ:دايزللجرلاقو ….; Ibn Qutayba, ʿUyūn al-akhbār, 2, 159: لجرلخد
انبصغانيخأنإوكلهانيبأنإ:هللاقفدايزىلع ….; al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-Aʿshā, 1, 206–207: ىلعلجرلخدو
كلامنمهتعضأاممكيلعرضأكمالكنمهتعضأيذللدايزلاقفهلكأفانابألامىلعبثوانيخأنإوتامانوبأنإلاقفهيبأنبدايز .
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This last section has taken me beyond my field of expertise. My aim is to un-
derstand the social-military meaning of the Shākiriyya institution in the early Is-
lamic period, and I am afraid that this long discussion has brought me to a dead
end. Reading version A of the tradition gives the sound impression that it is au-
thentic. But after reading the second version (where Ziyād b. Abīhi is the main
figure instead of Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik), that seems less clear. All that
can be safely said is that the word was used in the middle of the 8th century,
and in this specific tradition about Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik and al-Shaḥḥāj
b. Wadāʿ it can denote a servant or a slave. In this case I prefer this meaning
to a military interpretation.
B/7) Transoxania; Soghdia: MC
In 104 H/722–723 CE, the governor of Khurāsān Saʿīd b. ʿAmr al-Ḥarashī led the
campaigns against Soghdia. Al-Ṭabarī reports the events of the conquest (as in
most of the traditions relating the history of Khurāsān during the Umawī period)
from the book[?] of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Madāʾinī (d. ca. 225 H/840 CE) from his au-
thorities (aṣḥābihi). Al-Ḥarashī’s army conquers the city of Khujanda.⁹¹ After
the city’s surrender, one of the Soghdian senior commanders, Kārzanj, sends a
message to his nephew that al-Ḥarashī is plotting to kill the Soghdian noble
commanders; therefore the nephew “took out pieces of green silk cloth, cut it
into strips and tied the strips around the heads of his Shākiriyya, then he
came out, he and his Shākiriyya and attacked the (Umawī soldiers) and killed
some.” The isnād is al-Ṭabarī < ʿAlī [b. Muḥammad al-Madāʾinī] < from his au-
thorities (ʿan aṣḥābihi).⁹²
B/8) Khurāsān; Transoxania: MC
In the year 111 H/729–730 CE during Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik’s reign, two army
commanders, ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmayr al-Ṣuraymī, al-Samarqandī, and Wāṣil b. ʿAmr al-
Qaysī, are mentioned as having fought the Turks in Transoxania and command-
ing a Shākiriyya with whom they attacked the enemy. The isnād is as follows: al-
 On the city, see Bosworth, “Khudjand(a)”, EI2, 5, 45–46.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1445: هتيركاشووهجرخمثهتيركاشسوؤرباهبصعوبئاصعاهعطقفءارضخةدنرفجرخأ
اسانلتقفسانلاضرتعاف ; mentioned by De La Vaissière 2007, 71, note 184; I do not know whether
the green colour had any significance in Transoxania/Soghdia; noteworthy is that al-Maʾmūn
changed the colour of the ʿAbbāsīs from black to green.
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Ṭabarī < ʿAlī b. Muḥammad [al-Madāʾinī] < Abū l-Dhayyāl [Zuhayr b. Hunayd al-
ʿAdawī].⁹³ We do not know anything about the ethnic character of the soldiers of
this Shākiriyya.
Abū l-Dhayyāl al-Zuhayr b. Hunayd was one of al-Madāʾinī’s main informers
about the battles of the Muslims in Khurāsān (especially in Transoxania) during
the Umawī period, mainly during the reign of Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 96 H/
715 CE–99 H/717 CE). Abū l-Dhayyāl most plausibly had a work about the Muslim
conquests of Transoxania. In that case the information in it was related to him by
members of his family, either by his uncle al-Muhallab b. Iyās, or perhaps direct-
ly by his grandfather Iyās b. Zuhayr b. Ḥayyān b. Qamīʾa, or by the latter’s two
brothers ʿUbaydallāh and ʿAbdallāh, commanders of the Arab forces in Transox-
ania in 96 H/714–715 CE during the governorship of Qutayba b. Muslim⁹⁴ and
probably later on as well. Iyās’ father Zuhayr b. Ḥayyān and Iyās himself were
in Khurāsān already in 65 H/684–685 CE and are mentioned among the Arab
commanders in Khurāsān who took part in the tribal war in the province follow-
ing the death of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya.⁹⁵ Zuhayr b. Ḥayyān was the leader of Banū
ʿAdī (Quraysh) and carried the clan’s flag in battle.⁹⁶
B/9) Khurāsān; Transoxania: MC/?
In the year 112 H/730–731 CE, within the framework of the battles of the governor
of Khurāsān al-Junayd b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān in Transoxania, al-Ṭabarī reports from
the book[?] of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Madāʾinī from Abū l-Dhayyāl [Zuhayr b. al-Hu-
nayd al-ʿAdawī (on him see the preceding note)], that in one of the battles (of
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1528: ةيركاشيفيسيقلاورمعنبلصاوويدنقرمسلاريمعنبمصاعجرخف ; mentioned by
De La Vaissière 2007, 71, note 185; cf. al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1528, note n, according to ms. BM:
هتيركاس [read: هتيركاش ] instead of ةيركاش ; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1528, lines 12–13: ةيركاشلاولصاولمحو
ودعلاىلع .
 Naqāʾiḍ Jarīr wa-Farazdaq, I, p. 357 (cited by Blankinship 1989, p. 42, note 189): correct Blan-
kinship 1989, p. 42, note 189, “al-Hunayd b. Iyās” to “Zuhayr b. Hunayd”; al-Ṭabarī records doz-
ens of his traditions via ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Madāʾinī. Abū l-Dhayyāl, Zuhayr b. Hunayd was
also a minor muḥaddith, for example, see Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb, 3, 305 and al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb, 9,
428. Is Abū l-Dhayyāl, a rāwī of Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, relating traditions about the battles of
Abū Muslim in Khurāsān in 129 H/746–747 CE, and also about the battles between Marwān b.
Muḥammad and the ʿAbbāsīs in 132 H/750 CE, Abū l-Dhayyāl al-ʿAdawī? See Ibn Khayyāṭ,
Taʾrīkh (index). Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 5, 370, informs us of a commander of the governor of
Khurāsān (Naṣr b. Sayyār) named Abū l-Dhayyāl fighting against the forces of Abū Muslim.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 495, ll. 7ff.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 490; 495: carrying the flag of Adī.
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that year), the Muslim army was defeated. One of the Muslim commanders re-
ceived a safe-conduct from Ghūrak, a Turkish prince of Samarqand, but the Khā-
qān of the Turks did not approve of the safe-conduct and Ghūrak consequently
apologized to the Arab commander for its withdrawal saying: “I am a slave of
the Khāqān, from his Shākiriyya.”⁹⁷
Beckwith concludes from this passage that:
…the relationship between lord and chākar was extremely close indeed; al-Iskand’s ally
Ghūrak, the king of Samarkand, speaks of his feudal relationship to his Western-Turkic
liege-lord…It appears therefore that the members of the central Asian guard corps spoke
of themselves as the slaves of their lord. [my emphasis]
De La Vaissière also stresses the importance of this text:
C’est un texte important. Il ne s’agit pas là d’une simple alliance militaire: le roi de Sog-
diane se définit comme le subordonné du qaghan dans la stricte continuité de l’histoire
longue de l’Asie centrale. Un siècle et demi après Maniakh, c’est bien sur la longue
durée que sont établis les liens politiques entre qaghans turcs et princes sogdiens.⁹⁸
Again, we need more than one (equivocal) piece of evidence to corroborate this
social-cultural and ethnic institution.
B/10) Transoxania: MC/?
In 119 H/737 CE, in one of the battles in Transoxania between the Khāqān of the
Turks (who was aided by al-Ḥārith b. Surayj al-Tamīmī)⁹⁹ and Asad b. ʿAbdallāh
al-Qasrī, the governor of Khurāsān, “the Khāqān drew support from Transoxania,
the inhabitants of Ṭukhāristān and Jīghawayh [read Jabghūyah?] al-Ṭukhārī,
along with their kings and their Shākiriyya, to the number of thirty thousand.”¹⁰⁰
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1542: هتيركاشنمناقاخلدبعانأ [my emphasis]; see also the discussion of Lee
Yonggyu above.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 96; ibid., 72 and 96: “Je suis l’esclave du Khāqān de sa shākiriyya: read-
ing ناقاخلا instead of ناقاخل .
 On him, see Kister, “al-Ḥārith b. Surayj,” EI2, 3, 223–224.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1604 (after the translation of Blankinship 1989, 140): no specific
source is given by al-Ṭabarī (“it is said”: wa-yuqālu) لهأورهنلاءارونمدمتسادقوناقاخلبقأولاقيو
افلأنيثالثبمهتيركاشومهكولمبيراخطلا]؟هيوغبج=[هيوغيجوناتسراخط mentioned by Forand 1962, 10, and trans-
lated by De La Vaissière 2007, 72, note 188.
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B/11) Transoxania. The Same Year, 119 H/737 CE: MC
Within the same framework of the battles of Asad b. ʿAbdallāh, who appointed
al-Qāsim b. Bukhayt al-Maghārī al-Azdī in charge of the overall order of the army.
“He put the Azd, the Banū Tamīm and al-Juzjān b. al-Juzjān and his Shākiriyya on
the right wing.” The transmitter, ʿAmr b. Mūsā, is not otherwise identified.¹⁰¹
B/12) Transoxania (al-Khuttal). The Same Year, 119 H/737 CE, Once Again
within the Framework of the Battles of Asad b. ʿAbdallāh in Transoxania:
SE/SL? NM?
Asad led an army against al-Khuttal, conquered the city, captured its king and
executed him. It is related that during the battles, Asad “came upon a river,
while thirsty—with none of his servants around, he asked for water.” One of
his commanders, al-Sughdī b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, Abū Ṭuʿma al-Jarmī, had with
him a Shākirī, who had with him a Tibetan horn; so al-Sughdī took the horn,
put sawīq¹⁰² in it, and then poured water from the river on it, turned it and
gave the drink to Asad and a small number of the senior commanders of the
army.¹⁰³ There is no indication that this Shākirī was a soldier; he may have
been a servant.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1609: هتنميمهتيركاشوناجزوجلانبناجزوجلاوميمتينبودزألالعجف ; ibid., note i, in
ms. B: ةنميم ; the name of the transmitter is on 1608, l. 16; mentioned by Forand 1962, 11, and De
La Vaissière 2007, 72.
 Blankinship 1989, 163: “parched barley;” for the meaning of the term, see Waines, “Sawīḳ,”
EI2 , 9, 93.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1631: يدغسلاناكوىقستسافهمدخنمدحأنكيملوشطعدقورهنىلإىهتناىتحدسأىضمو
نمءامهيلعببصواقيوسهيفلعجفنرقلايدغسلاذخأفّيتَّبُتنرقيركاشلاعموهليركاشهعميمرجلاةمعطوبأنمحرلادبعنب
دنجلاءاسؤرنماموقوادسأىقسوهكرحورهنلا ; Beckwith 1984, 37, note 40 (correct: 1637 to 1631); De la Vais-
sière 2007, 72; Beckwith 1984, 37, speaks about al-Iskand, “the displaced king of Kish and
Nasaf…against whom the Arabs-including Naṣr b. Sayyār-had fought for nearly a decade. Al-Is-
kand was known to the Chinese as the “King of the Chākars.” [quoting Wang Ch’in-jo, et al., ed.
Li Ssu-ching, Ts’e fu yüan kuei, i-xx, Taipei, 1972]. “…in 737 Naṣr was with Asad in the so-called
Battle of the Baggage [quoting al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1597] against the Qaghan of the Turkish who
had al-Iskand…with his chākars and their allies.” And on p. 38, Beckwith speaks again of al-Is-
kand and his chākars (quoting al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1717–1718); I was unable to find al-Iskand’s
chākars (Shākiriyya) in al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1597, or 1717–1718, or in any other page of this work.
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B/13) Secretary/ Transoxania; Farghāna: NM
In 121 H/739 CE, Naṣr b. Sayyār, the governor of Khurāsān, sent Sulaymān b. Ṣūl
to the ruler of Farghāna with the written pact of reconciliation between them
( امهنيبحلصلاباتكب ). When Sulaymān reached the ruler’s court, the latter asked
him, “Who are you?” Sulaymān answered: “a Shākirī, the deputy of the (chief)
secretary of the governor ( ريمألابتاكةفيلخ,يركاش ).”¹⁰⁴ Who is this Sulaymān b.
Ṣūl? This is the only source that mentions him. It is highly plausible that this
Shākirī’s father was the ancestor of the famous family of scholars and notables
known by the nickname al-Ṣūlī. Ṣūl was of Turkish origin, the ruler of Dihistān
(near Jurjān) and then for a short time the lord of Jurjān, who (according to one
version) was converted to Islam by Yazīd b. al-Muhallab when he conquered
Jurjān in 98 H/716–717 CE. According to family tradition, though, Yazīd b. al-Mu-
hallab sent him to become a Muslim at the hands of Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik,
and he was sent by the latter to al-Madīna where he converted to Islām.¹⁰⁵ Many
of his descendants are known to have had flourishing careers under the early
ʿAbbāsīs. His son, Muḥammad b. Ṣūl, was one of the 70 duʿāt of the ʿAbbāsī
“Revolution.”¹⁰⁶ If our assumption is correct, an unknown son of Ṣūl worked
as a secretary at Naṣr b. Sayyār’s court in Marw. In any case, he defines himself
as a “Shākirī, the deputy of the (chief) secretary of the governor.” In this case, the
meaning of the term does not seem to be connected to military service.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1695; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 4, 449; cf. De La Vaissière 2007, 72: “Je suis
shākir et l’envoyé secrétaire de l’émir.” (“I am a shākirī, the messenger, secretary of the Amīr.”)
 The first version: al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 6, 115; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, 1, 45; the
second version: al-Sahmī, Taʾrīkh Jurjān, 236; the tradition is recorded from the Taʾrīkh of al-Sal
[l?]āmī (that is, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn b. Aḥmad al-Bayhaqī al-Sallāmī; lived around 350/961); his
book was entitled ناسارخةالورابخأيفخيرأتلاباتك usually mentioned as خيرأتلاباتك . On him, see Sezgin
1967, 1: 352 (rendering his name as al-Salāmī); and esp. Rosenthal 1968, 321–322 and n. 7 (al-Sal-
lāmī); for quotation from al-Sallāmī’s book, see for example, Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt, 2, 521[= al-
Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 16, 228]: ناسارخةالورابخأيفيمالسلالاق .
 On the family and some of the its most important members, see Leder, “al-Ṣūlī,” EI2, 9,
846–848. On Muḥammad b. Ṣūl, one of the 70 duʿāt, see Akhbār al-ʿAbbās, index; al-Ṭabarī,
index. Ṣūl died in the “battle of al-ʿAqr,” that is, ʿAqr Bābil near Karbalāʾ, al-ʿIrāq, at the side
of his master Yazīd b. al-Muhallab who rebelled against Yazīd II in 101 H/720 CE. See Ibn Khal-
likān,Wafāyāt, 1, 45–46; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 6, 115; for detailed accounts of the revolt
and battles, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, II, 1395ff (Ṣūl is not mentioned though); Shaban 1976, 93–95;
Crone 1980, 133; Hawting 2000, 75–76.
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B/14) Khurāsān; Marw: MC? NM?
In the year 121 H/738–739 CE the noted ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmayr (no. 8) served as
commander of the army of the people[?] of Samarqand.¹⁰⁷ In the year 128 H/
745–746 CE he came (from Samarqand?) to Naṣr b. Sayyār, the governor of Khur-
āsān, and joined him along with additional Arab forces in his battle against Abū
Muslim and his armies.¹⁰⁸ In the year 131 H/748–749 CE ʿĀṣim was captured and
executed by Abū Muslim. The tradition tells that while yet captive and before he
was killed, a Shākirī that he had in Khurāsān recognized him and ordered his
slave [? ghulām] to hide him in a subterranean place (a conduit by which
water enters?:sarab), and not to disclose this hiding place to anyone.¹⁰⁹ I do
not know if what is meant is a servant or a soldier of the Shākiriyya army with
whom he fought in Transoxania. It is noteworthy that this Shākirī owned a
slave. Perhaps he was well-to-do and of noble Iranian (Turkish?) descent. Well-
hausen,who most probably had before him a large part of the sources (though he
does not cite them) explains that:
…following the example of the distinguished Iranians, the Arab gentlemen took with them
into the field a personal following of servants (Shākiriyya). These servants also took part in
the fighting and sometimes decided the struggle.¹¹⁰
B/15) Khurāsān; Marw: MC
In the year 128 H/745–746 CE, during the fierce tribal wars in Khurāsān between
the coalition of governor Naṣr b. Sayyār’s Muḍarī (Qaysī) and the Azd and Rabīʿa
led by Judayʿ b. ʿAlī al-Kirmānī al-Azdī, the governor’s forces in Marw were on
the verge of defeat. “Tamīm b. Naṣr b. Sayyār, sent his Shākiriyya,who were sta-
tioned[?] in the Dār of Janūb bt. al-Qaʿqāʿ [b. al-Aʿlam al-Azdī], but the soldiers of
al-Kirmānī shot at them from the roofs, so they (the Shākiriyya) knew of the
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1690: دنقرمسلهأدنجىلعوهو
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1920.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 8: on his Shākirī (mentioned by Shaban 1976, 2: 65): هلناكيركاشهيقلف
ادحأهناكمىلعّنَُعلطتالوهبْظفتحإهلمالغللاقوبَرَسيفهلخدأف.…هفرعفناسارخب ; cf. De La Vaissière 2007, 72,
with a different translation: “ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmayr ….est fait prisonnier par un chākar, qui le connais-
sait car il lui avait été attaché au Khorassan.” On the execution of ʿĀṣim b. ʿUmayr, see al-Ṭabarī,
Taʾrīkh, 2, 1691; on him, see also Akhbār al-ʿAbbās, index.
 Wellhausen 1963, 496.
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enemy and were on their guard against them.” The isnād is as follows: ʿAlī b.
Muḥammad [al-Madāʾinī] < his authorities (ashyākhihi).¹¹¹
B/16) Khurāsān; Marw: NM/SE?
The same date (128 H/745–746 CE), the same isnād. Two commanders of al-
Kirmānī unhorsed Aʿyan, the mawlā and one of the chief clerks (in charge of
the ink stand) of the governor Naṣr b. Sayyār, killed him, and killed some of
his Shākiriyya (as well). ¹¹² While the previous source references the Shākiriyya
of a distinguished Arab tribal leader (most probably of a military nature), this
evidence speaks of the Shākiriyya of the chief clerk of the governor, a mawlā.
One wonders whether this Shākiriyya consisted of soldiers at all. Nothing is
said regarding their ethnic origin or social status.
B/17) Between 105 H/724 CE and 107 H/725–726 CE: NM/SE?
Ibn al-ʿAdīm quotes from the book of Abū Ḥafṣ, ʿAmr b. al-Azraq al-Kirmānī
(flourished in the first half of the 9th century), “The History of the Barmakīs”
(Akhbār al-Barāmika),¹¹³ who heard from an eyewitness (Isḥāq al-Balkhī the
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1927, ll. 12–14: باحصأمهامرفعاقعقلاتنببونجلاراديفمهوهتيركاشرصننبميمتثعبو
مهباورذنوحوطسلانمينامركلا ; [my emphasis]; Forand 1962, 11; the Shākiriyya were stationed in a dār.
This must have been a huge dār with a large court. There are many examples of descriptions in
the Arabic sources of such very big dārs comprising many buildings and a very large court.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1928, ll. 4–5: نمارفناولتقورصنةاودبحاصناكوهولتقورصنىلومنيعأاوعرصف
هتيركاش ; the isnād starts on 1917.
 Very little is known about Abū Ḥafs, ʿAmr [ʿUmar?] b. al-Azraq al-Kinānī. He is thoroughly
discussed in Bosworth 1994. He wrote a book on the history of the Barmakīs, briefly discussed by
Bouvat 1912, 19, who quoted Abū Ḥafṣ especially through the citations of the mid–14th century
Persian work of ʿAbd al-Jalīl Yazdī, Taʾrīkh Āl Barmak (Bouvat 1912, 10–13); Sourdel 1959–60,
129, mainly relying on Bouvat. Both Sourdel (1959–60, 130–131) and Bouvat noticed several ci-
tations from Abū Ḥafṣ’ work, mainly in Yāqūt, Muʿjam (Wüstenfeld ed.), 4, 817 (Beirut ed., 5,
307) [= Ibn al-Faqīh, Buldān, 232–235 (with slight changes)]. Yāqūt is the only Arabic source
quoted by Bouvat and Sourdel that mentions our author by name (rendering ʿUmar instead
of ʿAmr), but neither he nor Ibn al-Faqīh mention the title of the author’s book. The first to
cite the title Akhbār al-Barāmika was Rosenthal 1968, 429, footnote 3, according to the manu-
script of Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughyat al-ṭalab (Paris ms. ar. 2138, fol. 15b.). Rosenthal 1968 and Bos-
worth 1994 name him ʿUmar, but in all cases he is quoted by Ibn al-ʿAdīm (Bughya, 3, 1547; 7,
3019 (ed. Sezgin, 6, 651); 10, 4706 (ed. Sezgin, 10, 451); 4753 (ed. Sezgin, 10, 484), his name is
ʿAmr; but see al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 10, 184; Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 16, 7 (the title of the
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poet, of whom it is said that he lived in Ruṣāfat Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik during
the latter’s reign) who saw Barmak (the ancestor of the Barmakīs), arriving at Hi-
shām’s palace in al-Ruṣāfa at the head of 500 Shākirī.¹¹⁴ This occurred at the be-
ginning of Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik’s reign (between 105 H/724 CE and 107 H/
725–726 CE).¹¹⁵
Barmak was a Buddhist high priest of the temple of Nawbahār near al-
Balkh.¹¹⁶ According to Abū Ḥafṣ, ʿAmr b. al-Azraq al-Kirmānī, Barmak arrived
at al-Ruṣāfa with his son Khālid, where (according to several traditions) he
was converted to Islam at the hands of the caliph himself.¹¹⁷ Even if the number
book is rendered differently [?]: مهلئاضفوةكماربلارابخأيف ; Yāqūt, Muʿjam (Wüstenfeld ed.), 4, 817
(Beirut ed., 5, 307): in the last three sources his name is given as ʿUmar. He transmitted directly
from al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 H/869 CE) (Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 7, 3020). In another tradition, transmitted
by the famous poet Abū Tammām, Ḥabīb b. Aws (d. 231 or 232 H/845 or 846 CE), caliph al-
Maʾmūn (d. 218 H/833 CE) demands Abū Ḥafṣ, ʿUmar [read ʿAmr] b. al-Azraq al-Kirmānī to be
his wazīr and the latter refuses politely and wittily (al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, ibid.).
 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya (ed. Zakkār), 3, 1547 [ed. Sezgin, 4, 40]: رعاشلايخلبلاقاحسإينثدحو …. ناكو
همايأيفكلملادبعنبماشهةفاصرب , كمربنبدلاخيبأكمربنعىكح …. تأرق [= ديمعلانبإ ] صفحيبأفيلأتةكماربلارابخأيف
لاقينامركلاقرزألانبورمع : رعاشلايخلبلاقاحسإينثدحو …. يركاشةئامسمخيفكلملادبعنبماشهىلعمدقكمربىأرهنأ .
لاق : همركأف ىلعأو هتلزنم .
 In 107H/725–726 CE, Barmak was appointed as governor of Balkh by Asad b. ʿAbdallāh al-
Qasrī. See al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1490 [= Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil (Beirut ed.), 4, 378]; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-
Muntaẓam, 6, 118; Ibn Taghrībirdī, al-Nujūm, 1, 261.
 Sourdel 1959–60, 1: 129–133; Abbas 1988; Barthold-[Sourdel]), “al-Barāmika,” EI2, 1, 1033.
 Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya (ed. Zakkār), 3, 1547 [ed. Sezgin, 4, 40]; see also the long and detailed
traditions of Abū Ḥafṣ al-Kirmānī about Barmak and his son, Khālid at Hishām’s court at al-Ru-
ṣāfa. Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya (ed. Zakkār), 7, 3019ff. Cf. the reserved and cautious remarks of Crone
1980, 76 (relying on Bouvat 1912, 32): “…a similar behavioural pattern is exemplified in the story
that Barmak had gone to the caliph’s court to convert.” Sourdel 1959–60, 1: 132 casts doubt on
the authenticity of the traditions about Barmak’s associations with the Umawī caliphs ʿAbd al-
Malik and Hishām, arguing against Bouvat’s assertions (“mais tout le reste paraît être pure lé-
gende…Nous n’oserons donc pas dire, après L. Bouvat, que ‘Barmak et son fils Khalid, par leurs
mérites et leurs richesses, exercèrent une grande influence à la cour des khalifes umayyades).’”
D. Sourdel, in Barthold-[Sourdel]), “al-Barāmika,” EI2, 1, 1033: “He is a figure known to us by
information which is to a large extent legendary. Thus it is that he is held to have possessed med-
ical knowledge and to have treated among other patients [the text lists only one patient, Masla-
ma; no other person is mentioned] on which he bases the Umayyad prince Maslama b. ʿAbd al-
Malik (al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1181).” See also Sourdel 1959–60, 1, 132, note 2: “mais tout cela reste
très hypothétique.” It seems that the information about Barmak’s skills as a physician is corro-
borated by the tradition recorded by Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Bughya, 7, 3019. The prince was Maslama b.
Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik, and not Maslama b. ʿAbd al-Malik as Sourdel believed (his source, al-
Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1181 mentions Maslama, with no name of the father added). The tradition was
related by Saʿīd b. Maslama b. Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik to Abū Ḥafṣ, ʿAmr b. al-Azraq al-Kirmā-
nī, and was read by Ibn al-ʿAdīm from the former’s book on the History of the Barmakīs, describ-
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of Shākirīs is exaggerated, the narrator defines a big company who came with
Barmak as Shākirīs. In the case of Barmak the Buddhist priest, it is doubtful
that they were a personal military guard and so were probably not similar to
the Shākiriyya contingents in the service of the Soghdian noblemen in Transox-
ania. Nothing is said about their ethnic origin or social status.
It is noteworthy that both Bosworth and De La Vaissière interpret this text
differently. Bosworth’s translation reads: “[H]e saw Barmak brought before Hi-
shām b. ʿAbd al-Malik in a body of 500 slaves (shākirī). Hishām treated him
with honour…”¹¹⁸ It seems that the sentence: يفكلملادبعنبماشهىلعمدقكمربىأرهنأ
يركاشةئامسمخ should be rendered: “He arrived [at Hishām’s court] at the head
of 500 shākirī.” De La Vaissière translated (following Bosworth): “Barmak fut
conduit devant Hishām b. ʿAbd al-malik au sein d’un groupe de 500 shākir….”
De La Vaissière concludes in regard to this text that:
Un corps de 500 chākar aurait été présenté au calife omeyyade Hishām (724–743) à Damas.
Ce sont sans doute des prisonniers capturés au Tokharestan, car parmi eux se trouvait l’an-
cêtre des Barmécides, gardien du grand monastère bouddhique, le Nawbahar de Balkh.¹¹⁹
This text has served as a basis for arguing for the Central Asian rather than Mid-
dle Eastern origin of the Shākiriyya in the early ʿAbbāsī period within the elites of
the ʿAbbāsī court. The Barmakīs are also considered by De La Vaissière to have
been military troops (“étant donnée l’origine centre-asiatique des troupes
comme des Barmécides…”),¹²⁰ but this cannot be deduced from the Arabic text.
Partial Conclusion
Forand argues, following some of the examples above (nos. B/4, B/10; see also n.
121 below, al-Aghānī), that:
…the shākiriyyah as it occurs in the Arabic sources refers to a corps of slaves, partly domes-
tic and partly military, in attendance upon the person of local potentates in Iran and central
ing how Barmak treated his father and cured him (perhaps of impotence). These traditions from
the book of Abū Ḥafṣ were not known to Sourdel; Ibn al-ʿAdīm’s Bughya was still unprinted
when Sourdel’s book was published. See the detailed discussion of this matter by Bosworth
1994, 270–271.
 Bosworth 1994, 273–274.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 144; see also 155.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 150: argues against Gordon’s view of the Middle Eastern origin of
these units.
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Asia…it is impossible to establish beyond a doubt that individuals constituting a shākir-
iyyah among the Umayyads were of servile status the shākiriyyah of the Iranian rulers
must have been slaves.
This unequivocal conclusion cannot be derived from the texts quoted by For-
and.¹²¹ He finds support for this assertion from the fact that in all the cases he
checked the term Shākiriyya “occurs with the possessive pronominal suffix and
in each case it would be rendered into English as ‘his shākiriyyah’, possibly in-
dicating the master’s actual possession of the servant.”¹²² Unfortunately, mere
use of the possessive pronoun does not enable us to understand the nature of
the Shākiriyya nor the nature of the connection between the leader and his
Shākiriyya. Moreover, one of the decisive pieces of evidence for the slave nature
of the Shākiriyya is the “passage in Ṭabarī (II, 1159–1160), where an incident is
described in which Ṭarkhūn threatens to exercise his right of life and death
over the members of his shākiriyyah.”¹²³ The Arabic text (al-Ṭabarī, II, 1159–
1160) does not imply any such assertion. Forand’s conclusions were accepted
in full by Yonggyu, so the same reservations regarding Forand’s conclusions
and method can be applied to Yonggyu’s treatment of the Arabic sources regard-
ing al-Shākiriyya.¹²⁴ In regard to the last piece of evidence adduced by Forand,
Yonggyu says inaccurately that, “In fact Ṭabarī provides many examples [! my
emphasis] that the Iranian ruler had the right of life and death over the members
of the Shākiriyya.”¹²⁵
 Forand 1962, 10 (al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 1159–1160, 1604); 11: corps of slaves. The text in al-
Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī (ed. Būlāq), 14, 110: ةيراشمأيهةأرملانأيركاشينربخأفاههجوترتسيهجويفْتَرظناملف
ميهاربإةيراج , is certainly equivocal. See also the discussion below.
 Forand 1962, 11.
 Forand 1962, 11.
 Yonggyu 2004, 41–42, 68, quoting Forand’s text and sources, 10–11; 68: “The great Islamic
historian Ṭabarī seems to have understood the chākar as someone who was possessed by the
ruler.” Here Yonggyu also follows Forand’s argument about the use of “the possessive pronomi-
nal suffix with the term Shākiriyya” concluding “Thus, this Arabic expression…is used to indi-
cate the master’s actual possession of the servant.” It is almost superfluous to remark that
this is not al-Ṭabarī’s interpretation, but that of his early sources.
 Yonggyu 2004, 68, quoting Forand 1962, 11; and several references from al-Ṭabarī, also
after Forand, but the only citation for this matter brought by Forand, that is al-Ṭabarī,
Taʾrīkh, 2, 1160, is not mentioned by Yonggyu.
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C) The ʿAbbāsī Period
C/1) [18]: MC/SE?
The first piece of evidence is connected to the famous 2nd/8th-century ṣūfī Ibrā-
hīm b. Adham (ca. 112 H/730–161 H/777 CE).¹²⁶ It is recorded by Abū Nuʿaym
al-Iṣfahānī (d. 430 H/1038–1039 CE) through ʿAbdallāh b. Aḥmad b. Sawāda
(d. 285 H/899 CE in Ṭarsūs), ¹²⁷ < al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad (unidentified) <
Bakr (unidentified): ʿAbbās b. al-Faḍl al-Marʿashī (unidentified) related to me:
I met ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Abī Rawwād and we exchanged memories regarding Ibrāhīm b. Ad-
ham’s matter [that is, his becoming a Ṣūfī]. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz said: ‘May God have mercy on
Ibrāhīm b. Adham, I have seen him in Khurāsān, whenever he rode there were about 20
Shākirīs in front of him, but [in spite of all this], may God have mercy on him, he was look-
ing for the middle place [that is, the best part] in Paradise.’¹²⁸
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Abī Rawwād (d. 159 H/775–776 CE) was a mawlā of al-Muhallab
b. Abī Ṣufra al-Azdī, a pious (Ṣūfī) ḥadīth scholar and adherent of the Murjiʾa
school. His family was originally from Khurāsān, where he could have met Ibrā-
hīm b. Adham. He moved to Mecca, where he died.¹²⁹
C/1.1–1.3) [18.1–3]
Three variants of this tradition were recorded by Ibn ʿAsākir. The first was trans-
mitted through Abū ʿUthmān al-Aswad, ʿAbd al-Malik b. Saʿīd, whose nickname
was rafīq Ibrāhīm b. Adham (the companion [in travels/journeys] of Ibrāhīm b.
Adham),¹³⁰
 On him, see Jones, “Ibrāhīm b. Adham,” EI2, 3, 985–986.
 On him, see Ibn Ḥibbān, Ṭabaqāt al-muḥaddithīn, 3, 292; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 9,
381; Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 27, 31–33.
 Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥilya, 7, 371: يللاق:لوقيركبنعدمحمنبنسحلاتعمس:لاقةداوسنبدمحأنبهللادبعنعتربخأ
دقل,مهدأنبميهاربإهللامحر:زيزعلادبعلاقفمهدأنبميهاربإرمأانركاذتفداوريبأنبزيزعلادبعتيقل:يشعرملالضفلانبسابع
ةنجلاةحوبحببلطهللاهمحرهنكلو,يركاشنيرشعنموحنهيدينيبرضحبكراذإناسارخبهتيأر .
 On him, see al-Bukhārī, al-Kabīr, 7, 22: Mawlā al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra al-Azdī; Ibn
Ḥibbān, al-Majrūḥīn, 2, 136–138; Ibn Mākūlā, al-Ikmāl, 4, 105–107: biographies of his extended
family; al-Dhahabī, Mīzān, 4, 364–365; idem, Siyar, 7, 184–187; al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb, 18, 136–139.
 Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 37, 18 (a short biography). I was not able to find additional information
on him.
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… from Abū ʿUthmān al-Aswad,who accompanied Ibrāhīm b. Adham for 14 years,who said:
“I went to Mecca for the Ḥajj and I met ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Abī Rawwād who said to me: ‘What
has become of your brother?’ I said: ‘He is in al-Shām, in such and such a place.’ He said: ‘I
met him and saw him in Khurāsān, riding with 30 Shākirīs in front of him but he preferred
to be in the best place (centre) of Paradise.’
The two variants are very similar with minor changes.¹³¹
C/1.2) [18.2]
Another similar but garbled tradition is allegedly transmitted by a different well-
known ṣūfī, Shaqīq b. Ibrāhīm al-Balkhī, who relates in the first person how he
met Ibrāhīm b. Adham in al-Shām:
And I had seen him in al-ʿIrāq [sic.Variant reports: Khurāsān [?]] with 30 Shākirīs in front of
him. I said to him: ‘You have left the kingdom of Khurāsān )ناسارخكلمتكرت( and departed
from your pleasant privileged life;’ but he said: ‘Be silent, I have not enjoyed bread [life?: ام
شيعلابتينهت ], except here [that is, in al-Shām].’¹³²
C/1.3) [18.3]
Several sources record the last part of the tradition without the section that men-
tions al-ʿIrāq and the 30 Shākirīs in the kingdom of Khurāsān. It seems that Ibn
Kathīr mixed together two different separate traditions.¹³³
As is well known, Ibrāhīm b. Adham was born in Balkh, Khurāsān, and mi-
grated to Syria some time before 137 H/754 CE. Jones claims that:
 1) Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 6, 293: … تججح:لاقةنسةرشععبرأمهدأنبميهاربإقفاردقناكودوسألانامثعيبأنع
نوثالثهيدينيببكريلهناوهبيدهعنإ:لاقفاذكواذكعضوميفماشلابتلق؟كوخألغفام:يللاقفداوريبأنبزيزعلادبعتيقلف
ةنجلايفحبحبينأبحأهنكلوناسارخيفايركاش .; 2) Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 6, 293 and 293–294, similar parallels
with small changes (Khurāsān is omitted); 3) Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 6, 293, another parallel, the
same transmitter: دواديبأنبديعس instead of داوريبأنبزيزعلادبع , but see the exact parallel text
in Ibn Manẓūr, al-Mukhtaṣar, 4, 23: دواديبأنبزيزعلادبع .
 Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, 10, 146 (biography of Ibrāhīm b. Adham).
 The last part is recorded as a separate tradition by Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥilya, 7, 369; Ibn al-Jawzī,
Ṣafwat al-ṣafwa, 4, 155; al-Dhahabī, Siyar, 7, 390; al-Mizzī, Tahdhīb, 2, 33: ايميهاربإلتلقوقيقشلاق
ماشلادالبيفالإشيعلابتينهتاملاقفناسارختكرتميهاربإ the isnād (in Abū Nuʿaym’s and al-Mizzī’s
works): …Abū Yaʿlā < ʿAbd al-Ṣamad b. Yazīd I heard Shaqīq al-Balkhī…; ʿAbd al-Ṣamad b.
Yazīd was a well-known muḥaddith and Ṣūfī who died in 253/867. On him, see for example,
Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt, 7, 415; Ibn Abī Ḥātim, al-Jarḥ, 6, 52; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 11,
40; al-Dhahabī, Mīzān, 4, 356; Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdhīb, 6, 293.
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Ibrāhīm b. Adham is known widely in legend as the ruler of Balkh, who abdicated his
throne to take up the ascetic life…[but there]…seems to be no historical basis for this belief.
The first source to give him royal status is al-Sulamī (d. 412 H/1021 CE), the legendary nature
of whose account is sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that it includes a description of
Ibrāhīm’s encounter with the immortal prophet Khiḍr; however, from al-Sulamī onwards
this legend is found firmly rooted in the accounts of Ibrāhīm’s life.¹³⁴
Without going deeper into this topic which is far from my scholarly expertise,
suffice it to say that even from a cursory reading of some of the relevant sources
on Ibrāhīm b. Adham (e.g., the works of Abū Nuʿaym, al-Qushayrī, al-Sulamī and
Ibn ʿAsākir), it can be argued that these authors did not invent the traditions,
they relied upon earlier sources and traditions and quoted them faithfully. By
checking the isnāds of the (relatively) late sources, it can be safely argued that
Ibrāhīm’s noble Iranian [?] origin was well established in the 8th century.¹³⁵
The imaginative, inventive, colourful and clearly biased traditions that describe
his revelations and awakening from the earthly, materialistic world must have
had some basis. Not every ṣūfī was a noble prince. Even if the traditions
about the 20 or 30 Shākirīs of Ibrāhīm b. Adham were invented, they were beau-
tifully invented, based on a real kernel of history. The term was widely current in
the 8th century and well known to the authors, who naturally assumed that a
noble Khurāsānī must have had Shākirs. What the nature of these Shākirs was
cannot be ascertained from these traditions.
The following examples are from the reign of Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ (r. 132
H/750 CE–136 H/754 CE).
C/2) [19] Khuttal, Transoxania, 133 H/750–751 CE: MC?
In this year, the governor of Balkh on behalf of Abū Muslim, Abū Dāwūd, Khālid
b. Ibrāhīm al-Rabaʿī, al-Dhuhlī,
set out from al-Wakhsh towards al-Khuttal and entered the city. The king of the province,
Ḥ.n.sh b. al-S.b.l offered no opposition to him; a group of the dahāqīn of al-Khuttal
came to him and entrenched themselves with him. Some of them fought in the roads,
mountain passes and the fortresses. When Abū Dāwūd laid a close siege on the fortress,
the king went out of the fortress at night; with him were his dahāqīn and Shākiriyya
until they arrived at the land of Farghāna, then he left it, and through the land of the
 Jones, “Ibrāhīm b. Adham,” EI2, 3, 985–986.
 The many traditions in his biographies in Abū Nuʿaym, Ḥilya, 7, 367–395; 8, 3–58, and Ibn
ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 7, 277–352, can serve as case studies.
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Turks reached the king of China; Abū Dāwūd took whoever he managed to take as prisoners
and brought them to Balkh, then he sent them to Abū Muslim.¹³⁶
C/3)[20] al-ʿIrāq, al-Kūfa/al-Hāshimiyya (?), 136 H/754 CE: SE/SL/NM?
Al-Muṭahhār b. Ṭāhir reports that Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ, under the influence of
his brother al-Manṣūr, plans to kill Abū Muslim, but at the last moment when
Abū Muslim enters the caliph’s chamber the latter “said to one of his Shākiriyya:
Tell Abū Jaʿfar not to do it” ( كلذلعفيالرفعجيبأللقهتيركاشضعبللاقف( …. ¹³⁷ This affair is
described at length by al-Ṭabarī, partially quoting al-Madāʾinī.¹³⁸ Ibn Ṭāhir com-
bined parts of these same traditions and created one long tradition, omitting his
sources. In al-Ṭabarī’s tradition, the Shākirī turns into a eunuch (khaṣiyy).
It was said (qīla) that Abū l-ʿAbbās [al-Saffāḥ], when he gave permission to Abū Jaʿfar [al-
Manṣūr, his brother] to kill Abū Muslim, the latter entered the audience of Abū l-ʿAbbās.
The caliph sent one of his eunuchs ordering him: ‘Go and see what Abū Jaʿfar is doing.’
The eunuch came to him and found him in a sitting position, his sword put against his
knees ( هفيسبايبتحم( . Abū Jaʿfar asked the eunuch: ‘Is the Commander of the Faithful sitting
(for an audience)?’ The eunuch answered: ‘He is getting ready for the sitting.’ Then the eu-
nuch came back to Abū l-ʿAbbās and told him what he saw; the caliph sent him back to Abū
Jaʿfar telling him: ‘Do not carry out what you had planned to do,’ so Abū Jaʿfar withdrew
from what he had planned.¹³⁹
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 74: شنحهيلععنتميملواهلخدف،ّلتخلاىلإشخولانمميهاربإنبدلاخدوادوبأهّجوتاهيفو
ىلعدوادوبأّحلأاملف.عالقلاوباعشلاوبوردلايفمهضعبعنتماو؛هعماونّصحتف،لتخلانيقاهدنمسانهاتأو،اهكلملبسلانب
ىلإعقوىتح،كرتلاضرأيفاهنمجرخمث؛ةناغرفضرأىلإاوهتناىتحُهتّيركاشوهُنيقاهدهعموًاليلنصحلانمجرخ،شنح
ملسميبأىلإمهبثعبمث،خلبىلإمهبزواجف،مهنمهبرفظنمدوادوبأذخأو؛نيصلاكلم [my emphasis]; Ibn al-Athīr,
al-Kāmil, 5, 448–449 (an abridged version; the name of the king: لبشلانبشيبح ; Gibb 1923, 95:
adding that in China the king was given the title Jabghu in recompense for his resistance.
Abū Dāwūd was one of the 12 nuqabāʾ of the ʿAbbāsī daʿwa, and one of its senior command-
ers; on him, see Agha 2003, Appendix One, 356, no. 237; on al-Khuttal, see Bosworth, “Khut-
talān, Khuttal,” EI2, 5, 75–76. Bosworth briefly mentions this event. On Wakhsh, located in the
vicinity of al-Khuttal on the Oxus, see Bosworth, “Wakhsh,” EI2, 11, 100–101; briefly men-
tioned by De La Vaissière 2007, 72: “le roi du Khuttal s’enfuit au Ferghana avec ses nobles
et sa shākiriyya.”
 Al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir, al-Badʾ, 6, 76.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 85–86.
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 86, ll. 5–11; partly translated and discussed by Ayalon 1999, 71–72: ليقو
عنصيامرظنافبهذالاقفهلايصخسابعلاوبأثعبفسابعلايبأىلعملسموبألخدوملسميبألتقيفرفعجيبألنذأاملسابعلاابأنإ
امبهربخأفسابعلايبأىلإيصخلاعجرمثسولجللأيهتدقهللاقفنينمؤملاريمأسلاجأيصخلللاقفهفيسبايبتحمهدجوفهاتأفرفعجوبأ
رفعجوبأفكفهذفنتالهيلعتمزعيذلارمألاهللقهللاقورفعجيبأىلإهدرفهنمىأر ; هفيسبايبتحم: Williams 1985, 210:
“sitting on his heels propped by his sword.” For a description of this kind of sitting, see Lane,
Lexicon, ḥ.b.w.: “for the Arabs not having walls in their deserts to lean against in their assem-
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Noteworthy is another parallel text (quoted almost verbatim from al-Ṭabarī or his
source) in (pseudo-) Ibn Qutayba’s al-Imāma wa-l-siyāsa, but here, the term eu-
nuch ( ّيِصخ ) is used interchangeably with another term, فيصو .¹⁴⁰ Ayalon con-
cludes his discussion on the waṣīf by saying:
As for the term itself, it was mainly used as a designation for a particular stage of slavery
(of non-eunuchs or eunuchs). It was also a proper name. Thus waṣīf (or waṣīfa) usually de-
noted a very young slave or slave-girl, at the early period of their service in their patron’s
court…¹⁴¹
Regarding the long tradition of al-Ṭabarī, Ayalon concludes: “Even if this ac-
count is not historically true, it certainly reflects truly the unlimited reliability
of the eunuch [or the Shākiryya of the caliph according to the first version of
the tradition].”¹⁴²
The following examples are from the reign of al-Manṣūr (r. 136 H/754 CE–158
H/775 CE).
C/4) [21] Irāq, Baghdād (?): MC?NM?
A long tradition related from Ṭayfūr, al-Manṣūr’s mawlā, who relates part of his
tradition from al-Rabīʿ b. Yūnus, al-Manṣūr’s mawlā and his ḥājib, who reports
in the first person about al-Manṣūr’s dream which caused him to leave Baghdād
at the head of the ḥajj caravan from al-ʿIrāq. The tradition is combined with exten-
sive legendary and literary motifs. On their way they stayed in al-Najaf for a few
days. Al-Rabīʿ says: “When al-Manṣūr ordered to move on, his army and [? the
bling, the man used to set up his knees in his sitting, and put against them a sword, or surround
them [and his back] with a piece of cloth, or knit his hands, or arms, together upon them, and
rest against them…”




 Ayalon 1999, 282; for the discussion on the waṣīf, see ibid., 281–284; on the interchangea-
bility of the terms, see ibid., 273ff.
 Ayalon 1999, 72. Ayalon did not analyse the account in al-Badʾ wa-l-Taʾrīkh, where the eu-
nuch (in al-Ṭabarī’s narration) becomes a Shākirī.
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word is unclear] moved on while I and he [the caliph] remained in the Qaṣr while
his Shākiriyya [was stationed] at the gate ( بابلابهتيركاشورصقلايفوهوانأتيقبو ).”¹⁴³
This is a typical conventional tradition, one of many that provides inner ‘do-
mestic’ information about al-Manṣūr such as dreams, palace or court intrigues
and the like, often from servants, mawālī or slaves/(both female and male), sec-
retaries or chamberlains of the caliph and even from his mother.¹⁴⁴
The following examples are from the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170 H/786
CE–193 H/809 CE).
C/5) [22]: SE?/MC?
The Shākiriyya of Yaḥyā b. Khālid al-Barmakī, al-Rashīd’s wazīr:
Ibn Mazrūʿ related from his father who said: ‘While riding along with the entourage of
Yaḥyā b. Khālid [al-Barmakī, d. 190 H/805 CE], a common man carrying a letter appeared
before him and said: “May God bestow his favours on the Amīr; sign this letter”; but the
Shākiriyya hastened towards him, chiding him away from the sides of his cortège, but he
(Yaḥyā) said: ‘Leave him alone’ … and he asked him to get closer and signed the letter
for him. ¹⁴⁵
Ibn Mazrūʿ is Naṣr b. Mazrūʿ al-Kalbī, one of the earliest Arab genealogists, who
composed a book about the vices of the Arabs (mainly dealing with defects in, or
causes of blame or reviling of, the lineage of Arab notables: بلاثم ).¹⁴⁶
 Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 32, 340–341: هدنجو]؟[هيناوب ; Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam, 8, 220, and Ibn al-
ʿArabī, al-Futūḥāt al-makiyya, 4, 546: هدنجوهباون ; the isnād :….. Manṣūr b. Abī Muzāḥim < Abū Sahl
al-Ḥāsib < Ṭayfūr; Manṣūr b. Abī Muzāḥim (Bashīr) was a kātib of Turkish origin, who held a
secretarial office in Baghdād. He left it to dedicate his life to the study and transmission of
ḥadīth and died in 235 H/850 CE; on him, see al-Bukhārī, al-Kabīr, 7, 349; Ibn Abī Ḥātim, al-
Jarḥ, 8, 170; Ibn Ḥibbān, al-Thiqāt, 9, 173; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 13, 80–82; Ibn
ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 60, 304–310; 305: هكرتوناويدهلناكو . I was not able to identify Abū Sahl al-Ḥāsib.
 For example, Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 32, 303; 69, 231; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 1, 87: a
similar isnād to the previously discussed tradition which ends, however, with al-Manṣūr’s moth-
er: ….Manṣūr b. Abī Muzāḥim < Abū Sahl al-Ḥāsib < Ṭayfūr mawlā amīr al-muʾminīn < Salāma
umm amīr al-muʾminīn: about a dream she had while pregnant with al-Manṣūr.
 Al-Bayhaqī, al-Maḥāsin wa-l-masāwī, 184: لاقهيبأنععورزمنباثّدحو : ريسأتنك دلاخنبىيحيبكوميف
نملجرهلضرعف لاقفباتكهعموةماعلا : لاقف،هبكوميشاوحنمهنورجزيةيركاشلاهيلإردابف،باتكلااذهمتخا،ريمألاهللاحلصأ :
هوعد …. هلهمتخفهاندتساو
 So far I have not found a biography dedicated to him; he is not mentioned by Rosenthal,
Duri (Conrad), Humphreys, Khalidi or Robinson, or by Brockelmann (Geschichte der Arabischen
Litteratur) and Sezgin 1967; nevertheless he is quoted in the sources (mainly relating to the ge-
nealogy of Arab tribes and notables), e.g. al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī (ed. al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya), 20, 75,
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C/6) [23]: SE?/MC?
From the second piece of evidence it is learned that Yazīd b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī
(d. 183 H/799–800 CE), one of Hārūn al-Rashīd’s senior commanders,¹⁴⁷ sent one
of his chamberlains (aḥad ḥujjābihi) from al-Raqqa in al-Jazīra with a gift of
money to the poet Muslim b. al-Walīd (d. 208 H/823 CE).¹⁴⁸ The ḥājib, dressed
in black clothes, a woolen head cover, and a girdle, was accompanied by a
Shākirī.¹⁴⁹ No information is given about this Shākirī, who may have been a sol-
dier, one of the Shākiriyya of Yazīd b. Mazyad (if he had one), or a domestic serv-
ant/slave.
C/7) [24] al-ʿIrāq. Baghdād (?): SL/SE
Al-Masʿūdī records an account by Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-ʿAbdī al-Khurāsānī al-
Akhbārī (d. after 332 H/943 CE),¹⁵⁰ related by him to caliph al-Qāhir (r. 320 H/
932 CE–322 H/934 CE): Zubayda, Umm Jaʿfar, Hārūn al-Rashīd’s wife and al-
Amīn’s mother, “was the first [among the caliphs’ wives?], who employed the
Shākiriyya, the eunuchs and the slave-girls in all kinds of duties and messages,
performing them on (the back of) riding animals, going out to fulfil her needs
with her letters and epistles.”¹⁵¹
where he is mentioned among those authors that composed a book on the mathālib [of the
Arabs] ; al-Masʿūdī, al-Tanbīh wa-l-ishrāf, 81, l. 13; Abū l-Baqāʾ, al-Manāqib al-mazyadiyya, 1,
302, 327–329, where he is termed Naṣr b. Mazrūʿ al-Kalbī al-Nassāba; Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrīkh, 47,
348; Ibn al-Athīr, Usd al-ghāba, 5, 605.
 On him, see Crone 1980, 169.
 On him, see al-Ziriklī 1980, 7: 223; Kaḥḥāla 1957–61, 12: 233; Sezgin 1967, 2, 528–529; I.
Kratschkowsky, “Muslim b. al-Walīd,” E.I2 , s.v.
 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī, 19, 42 (ed. Samīr Jābir, Beirut, Dār al-Fikr, n.d.):
يركاشهعموةقطنموةيشاشوداوسهيلعلجراذإف ….; see the parallel sources: Ibn Ḥamdūn, Tadhkira, 8,
50; Ibn Munqidh, Lubāb, 138.
 On him, see Rosenthal 1968, 52–53; al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 7, 658: index prepared by Ch. Pellat,
the editor.
 Al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 5, 213 [= 8, 298]: يفباودلاىلعنوفلتخييراوجلاومدخلاوةيركاشلاذختانملوأيهو
اهبتكواهلئاسرباهجئاوحيفنوبهذيواهتاهج ; mentioned by Forand (in connection with the Shākiriyya); part-
ly translated with a discussion (not on the Shākiriyya, though) by Ayalon 1999, 129 (translation)
and 130; I relied on Ayalon’s translation.
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I understand the expression al-Shākiriyya here not as a military unit, but per-
haps as household attendants. They are mentioned together with other domestic
servants and slaves who performed secret or discreet errands for Zubayda.¹⁵²
C/8) [25] al-ʿIrāq. Baghdād: MC
Al-Rashīd b. al-Zubayr records in his book al-Zakhāʾir wa-l-tuḥaf (written in 463
H/1070–1071 CE) a long tradition from al-Faḍl b. al-Rabīʿ (the son of the above-
mentioned al-Rabīʿ), the famous wazīr of Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Amīn, in which
he gives a long detailed description of the clothes, fine objects, weapons etc. that
were found in Hārūn al-Rashīd’s store houses ( نئازخلا ) upon al-Amīn’s ascend-
ance to the caliphate. Among the weapons he mentions “50,000 swords of
[for?] the Shākiriyya and the slaves ( ناملغلا ).”¹⁵³
C/9) [26] al-ʿIrāq, Baghdād (?): SE/NM
The famous singer Mukhāriq relates that he visited the poet Abū l-ʿAtāhiya alone
“and I had no ghulām (slave) and no shākirī with me ( يركاشالومالغيعمسيلو )”.¹⁵⁴
The following examples are from the reign of al-Amīn (r. 193 H/809 CE–197
H/813 CE).
C/10) [27]: SE/NM
Upon ascending the caliphate al-Amīn took the famous singer ʿArīb from her
owner for himself. Her owner ʿĪsā b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ismāʿīl, known as the Marākibī
 Forand’s translation of this text (1962, 11–12): “the first (of the Abbasid house) to form a
shākiriyya to wait upon her personally and serve as a mounted cortege when she went out in
public,” is not accurate. De la Vaissière 2007, 146 translates: “la première qui organisa une
troupe de chākar, d’eunuqes et de filles esclaves, qui chevauchaient à ses côtés, exécutaient
ses ordres…” I follow Ayalon’s translation of the Arabic phrase: اهتاهجيفباودلاىلعنوفلتخي .
 Ibn al-Zubayr, al-Zakhāʾir, 214 (the beginning of the inventory), 217 (the 50,000 swords) [my
emphasis]; quoted by al-Ḥamawī, Thamarāt al-awrāq, 405; al-Ghazūlī, Maṭāliʿ al-budūr, 2, 479
(both quote al-Rashīd b. al-Zubayr); De La Vaissière 2007, 146, note 382 (quoting al-Rashīd b.
al-Zubayr).
 Al-Raqīq al-Qayrawānī, Quṭb al-surūr, 622.
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(that is, the one who is in charge of the royal stables), passed by the new caliph
and wanted to kiss his hand but the caliph, who held a grudge against him,
ordered that he be held back (from him); the Shākirī did this, but theMarākibī beat him and
said: ‘Do you prevent me from kissing the hand of my master?’ When the caliph dismount-
ed, the Shākirī came and complained against al-Marākibī, so al-Amīn summoned him and
ordered that his head be cut off.¹⁵⁵
One wonders if the Shākirī who was beaten was really a soldier and one of the
caliph’s bodyguards, as asserted by Forand.¹⁵⁶
The following examples are from the reign of al-Maʾmūn (r. 198 H/813 CE–
218 H/833 CE).¹⁵⁷ There are a few instances in the early ʿAbbāsī caliphate in
which a Shākirī or a Shākiriyya are in the service of a caliph. In the period of
al-Maʾmūn’s rule, a military unit named “al-Shākiriyya” is mentioned in the serv-
ice of the caliph. It is also recorded by the sources that some of al-Maʾmūn’s se-
nior commanders had Shākiriyya contingents in their service.
C/11) [28]: MC
The first piece of evidence we have is from Marw, Khurāsān between the years
193 H/809 CE and 202 H/817 CE. It is related by al-Rayyān b. al-Ṣalt, one of
the close associates of al-Maʾmūn’s wazīr, al-Faḍl b. Sahl: “I was summoned
one day by him (al-Faḍl), who informed me that he wished to gather for me
4,000 [soldiers] from the Shākiriyya and the jund and appoint me as their
commander, thereby turning me into one of his commanders, with conditions
and rights of his commanders.” Al-Rayyān refuses this proposal.¹⁵⁸
 Al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī (Dār al-Kutub ed.), 21, 63 (Būlāq ed. XVIII, p. 180): ءاجةفالخلايلواملف
نأيديسدينمينعنمتأ:هللاقويبكارملاهبرضفيركاشلاكلذلعففهعفدوهعنمبرمأفهديلبقيلبكار]نيمألا[دمحمويبكارملا
هقنعبرضبرمأويبكارملابدمحماعدفهاكشفدمحملزنامليركاشلاءاجف؟اهلبقأ ; mentioned by Forand 1962, 12;
on al-Marākibī, see al-Ziriklī 1980, 5: 105.
 Forand 1962, 12 (quoting al-Aghānī (Būlāq ed.), 18, 180): “Amīn himself was served by
household attendants called, in the singular, shākirī, and who in one instance at least func-
tioned as his bodyguards.” The text does not allow for such farfetched conclusions.
 The following four pieces of evidence (no. 11[28]–14[31])were also dealt with in Elad 2010,
45–48.
 Al-Tanūkhī, al-Faraj, 2, 346: يفيناعدف,هتبانتساويبهتقثنمهيلعتنكامىلعلهسنبلضفلاةمدخيفتنك(
)…كلذنمهيلعتعنتماف,هداوقىرجمينيرجيو,مهيلعيندوقيوةيركاشلاودنجلانمفالآةعبرأيلإمضينأىلإتاقوألانمتقو ;
the long tradition was copied by al-Tanūkhī from the lost part of al-Jahshiyārī’s Kitāb al-Wuzarāʾ
wa-l-kuttāb; al-Tanūkhī’s text was copied by ʿAwwād 1964, 31–36 (the mention of the Shākiriyya
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In the tradition, the joining of the two expressions al-Shākiriyya and al-jund
may indicate the different expressions have different meanings, though the term
al-Shākiriyya seems to denote a unit with a military character. We do not know
the relative size of each unit with any precision, as the number 4,000 also in-
cludes soldiers from the army (al-jund). The combination of the terms al-jund
and al-Shākiriyya is most common during the Sāmarran period.¹⁵⁹
C/12) [29]: MC
The second tradition is from the year 201 H/816–817 CE, when al-Maʾmūn (still in
Khurāsān), decides to nominate ʿAlī l-Riḍā as Crown Prince. Therefore he sum-
mons the wulāt, the judges, the (senior) commanders (al-quwwād) and the
Shākiriyya and the offspring of al-ʿAbbās, explaining “he wants this matter to
be rooted in the hearts of al-ʿāmma, al-jund and al-Shākiriyya.” In the first
part of the tradition the army, al-jund, is not mentioned, and al-Shākiriyya ap-
pears by itself among groups of notables. Therefore it seems that the Shākiriyya
also has a special high status. In the second part, the pairing (this time reversed)
of al-jund and al-Shākiriyya appears again.¹⁶⁰
C/13) [30]: MC
From a tradition that describes the end of the siege of Baghdad in Muḥarram 198
H/September 813 CE, we learn that Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn also had a special unit
called Shākiriyya. Ṭāhir writes to al-Maʾmūn describing how he plans to trap
al-Amīn, who wanted to go over to Harthama b. Aʿyan’s camp:
…and I turned with the choicest of the faithful (khāṣṣat thiqātī) and I relied on them and
trusted that they would be brave and determined, and would be unsullied faithful advisors,
and I already prepared war ships (ḥarrāqāt)¹⁶¹ and (regular) ships (sufun)….And I went
down to them with a group that rode with me from among my faithful and my Shākiriyya.
and the jund is on p. 36); see also De La Vaissière 2007, 157 (according to ʿAwwād 1964): with a
different interpretation.
 See Gordon 2001, index (jund and Shākiriyya), esp. 40–42.
 Ibn Bābuyh al-Qummī, ʿUyūn akhbār al-Riḍā (al-Najaf ed.), 2, 148 (Beirut ed., 1, 161); al-
Majlisī, Biḥār, 49, 134: دنجلاوةماعلابولقيفخسرينأديرأامنإ…سابعلادلووةيركاشلاوةاضقلاوداوقلانومأملااعدو
رمألااذهةيركاشلاو ; 87, 360: the second part of the tradition, from al-Rayyān b. al-Ṣalt.
 Warships with installations for throwing fire at the enemy whilst at sea or on large rivers
(sometimes described as a warship that contains sailors and fighters, see Elad 1986, 68, note 53).
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And I sent a group of them (some of them) riding and some of them on foot between the
Gate of Khurāsān and al-Mashraʿa [the watering place in the river], and along the banks of
the river (al-shaṭṭ).¹⁶²
What is mentioned in this tradition is not the jund, the regular army, but the Shā-
kiriyya. The Shākiriyya is mentioned together with Ṭāhir’s closest and most loyal
adherents, and it is possible that the intent here is to a kind of personal select
guard, perhaps (though we have no proof of this) connected by ties of walāʾ
or even servitude to Ṭāhir. Almost nothing is given regarding their origin.¹⁶³
C/14) [31]: MC
The fourth tradition in which the Shākiriyya is mentioned is from the year 214 H/
829–830 CE. A number of military missions are defeated by a Khārijī rebel, Bilāl
al-Ḍabābī al-Shārī in al-Jazīra. In the end, al-Maʾmūn himself leaves Baghdad,
reaches al-Jazīra, camps in the village of al-ʿAlath, and afterwards sends the
commanders and al-Shākirdiyya after Bilāl al-Shārī.¹⁶⁴ From this tradition, it ap-
pears that the commanders are at the head of an army which is separate from the
special military unit, called Shākirdiyya and not Shākiriyya. Shākird is rendered
as a scholar, student, apprentice, a disciple; a boy servant, groom.¹⁶⁵ I do not
know what the difference (if any) is between the two words.
C/15) [32]: MC? SE?
Another senior commander of al-Maʾmūn, ʿAlī b. Hishām (d. 217 H/832 CE), had a
Shākiriyya.We learn this from the tradition relating how he sent the poet ʿUmāra
 Al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 928: اناسرفمهنمةدعتريصويتيركاشويتاقثةصاخنميعمبكرنممةدعيفاهتلزنف
طشلاىلعوةعرشملاوناسارخبابنيبةلاجرو ; De La Vaissière 2007, 157.
 Cf. De La Vaissière 2007, 157, for a different interpretation of this evidence. We know that
some of these soldiers spoke Persian and were also of non-Arabic origin, but it is hard to
prove that they indeed comprised the Shākiriyya contingents. On Ṭāhir’s army, see Elad 2010,
esp. 37–40, 53–54, 61, 67f.; Elad 2013, esp. 246–264.
 Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-Futūḥ (ed. Hyderabad), 7, 331: mentioned in a note by Shaban
1976, 2: 65, as proof that al-Shākiriyya were the mawālī of the ruler. There is no confirmation for
this in the sources quoted by him; on the revolt, see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1101–1102 (no mention
of al-Shākirdiyya, though). Al-ʿAlath is on the border of al-Jazīra-al-ʿIrāq, see Yāqūt,Muʿjam (Bei-
rut ed.), 4, 145–146.
 Steingass 1963, 724; see also Haim 1953, 486.
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b. ʿAqīl to Tamīm b. Khuzayma [b. Khāzim] al-Nahshalī al-Tamīmī¹⁶⁶ and then to
the house of Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī (Rabīʿa)¹⁶⁷ escorted by a
Shākirī from his Shākiriyya.
Al-Jāḥiẓ’s Opinion on al-Shākiriyya
The Shākiriyya’s closeness to the regime and to the ruler is also emphasized by
al-Jāḥiẓ. As part of his discussion of the various components of the army of the
caliphate he tries to diminish contradictions and differences as much as possi-
ble, and to stress what is equal and similar. As an example of this he compares
al-Shākiriyya and the army (al-jund):
People think that since there is a difference in the form of the script and the pronunciation
of the names of the (different) types of human race, that their character in reality and their
(internal) meaning is also different in the same way. However, things are not like they think.
For you will see that even if the name al-Shākiriyya is different in form and in pronunciation
from (the word) al-jund, the internal meaning (al-maʿnā) respecting both is close to each
other, for both stem from one meaning (one source) and one action…obedience to the ca-
liphs and support of the regime.¹⁶⁸
Al-Jāḥiẓ knows, of course, the Shākiriyya’s character; therefore he does not both-
er to explain it precisely to us. All he wants is to bridge the difference between
this unit and the army. Through this explanation, we nevertheless understand
that there is a difference and that this unit is not identical to the regular army
regiments.
In another place al-Jāḥiẓ mentions al-Shākiriyya, evidently in the period of
al-Muʿtaṣim or al-Wāthiq, but here too he does not clarify the character of this
military unit.¹⁶⁹ Relying on this text and on the previous text cited, ʿAbd al-
 The son of one of the most prominent commanders of al-Abnāʾ. On his father and grand-
father, see Crone 1980, 180ff. Tamīm is not mentioned by Crone.
 Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād, 286–289; al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī (ed. Būlāq), 20, 186–
187: ميمتبابىلعيبفقوىتحهتيركاشنمًايركاشيعمثعبف ; Ibn Ḥamdūn, Tadhkira, 2, 344f.; on Khālid b.
Yazīd b. Mazyad, see Crone 1980, 170, to which the three sources quoted should be added.
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Manāqib al-Turk, 30.
 Al- Jāḥiẓ, al-Ḥayawān, 2, 130; al-Jāḥiẓ describes a dog that used to attack the hoofs of the
horses of al-Shākiriyya which apparently accompanied Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik b. Abān b.
Ḥamza, known as Ibn al-Zayyāt.When this occurred is not said, but Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik
was a wazīr, first of al-Muʿtaṣim between 219–220 H/834–835 CE, then of al-Wāthiq (r. 227 H/842
CE–232 H/847 CE), and even for a short period in the first year of al-Mutawakkil’s reign (233 H/
847 CE), at the end of which he was executed. See Sourdel,”Ibn al-Zayyāt”, EI2, 3, 974. Although
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Salām Hārūn claims that the term means a mercenary army and that al-al-Jāḥiẓ
uses the word to denote an army.
Conclusion
The Importance of the Study of the Shākiriyya
In Islamic studies, controversies have emerged over the relation between the
Shākiriyya institution and the Mamlūk system, the dominant military mode in
medieval Islam. It has been the dominant view that the Shākiriyya system is
uniquely Islamic and indigenous to Islamic civilization (see the references
here to Ayalon, Pipes, Crone, Bosworth and most recently Gordon, and the de-
tailed discussion above). In the last few years a group of scholars has started
to test the prevailing views on the origin of the system. Noteworthy is Shaban,
who as early as 1976 argued that the chākar system stemmed from the Persian
tradition. Other scholars (Beckwith, Yonggyu, De La Vaissière) argue for the Cen-
tral Asian (Soghdian) origin of the institution of al-Shākiriyya.
Both Shaban and Beckwith, when referring to the Samarran period from al-
Muʿtaṣim’s rule on, identify the Shākiriyya regiments with the Turkish Shākiriyya
units. De La Vaissière argues that the Shākiriyya was a distinct institution in the
Soghdian army that made its way from Samarqand to Sāmarrāʾ.¹⁷⁰ Accepting
Shaban’s main argument (although arguing for a Central Asian origin and not
a Sāsānian one as suggested by Shaban), De La Vaissière dedicates a long and
exhaustive discussion in his book to the view that al-Muʿtaṣim organized his
new army units according to the Central Asian pattern. Gordon strongly refuted
this argument:
The arguments of Shaban and Beckwith [De La Vaissière’s book was not yet published],
which identify the Samarran Turkish guard with Iranian (Shaban) or Central Asian (Beck-
with) use of the chākar institution, are to be rejected…the Turks and Shākiriyya of Samarra
remained as entirely separate forces.¹⁷¹ [See the discussion above.]
it was not specifically stated that al-Shākiriyya rode immediately after or in front of the wazīr
Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik, it is possible that they constituted a kind of special personal
guard.
 De La Vaissière 2007, 59.
 Gordon 2001, 40.
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Yonggyu and De La Vaissière argue that the Inner Asian and the ʿAbbāsī institu-
tions of the personal guard, as well as that of the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE),
show similarities with the Shākiriyya. Their systems were based on a process
geared to generate loyalty to the ruler within the personally attached servitor
group. Thus, each system stressed the special individual relationship between
the ruler and his personal servitors and guards.
As my limited study has shown, it is a difficult if not impossible task to judge
where these similarities came from. Do the correlations stem from origin, or are
they (as Yonggyu argued¹⁷²) an indication that peoples of different regions hap-
pened to share similar political needs and consequently had similar institutions
that evolved separately and indigenously? Even if the Turkish/Central Asian tra-
dition was an influence, due to the different socio-cultural contexts we can ex-
pect that each region’s system developed in a way uniquely compatible and ac-
ceptable to the pre-existing cultural norms of the host society. When we gauge
the degree of possible influence coming from the steppe tradition of personal
guards, it is also important to inquire to what extent and in what ways the insti-
tutions Turks carried from their life in the steppe interacted with pre-existing so-
cial norms.
I started this research when I came upon the evidence of al-Shākiriyya units
in al-Maʾmūn’s army, hoping to gain a better understanding of this term or insti-
tution. It seems that the relatively large amount of evidence available from the
Umawī and the early ʿAbbāsī periods are still too limited to fully demonstrate
that a) the Shākiriyya units denote Turks and b) that these allegedly Turkish
units performed their service for the ʿAbbāsī caliphs according to concepts
and practices from the Central Asian steppe.
As already stated above, from the little on the Shākiriyya in the Arabic sour-
ces we can discern a distinct military character. Its other characteristics are dif-
ficult to understand. A number of army commanders in the Umawī period are
known to have had Shākiriyya. All of them (except two, B/1 and B/6), took
part in the Transoxanian campaigns, and the Shākiriyya units that are mentioned
are thus connected to Central Asia. We do not know the size of these units and
whether they were incorporated within the Umawī army in al-ʿIrāq. In some
cases, when the term Shākirī appears in the sources it does not seem to have a
military connection or connotation. Sometimes it can be rendered as a loyal ad-
herent or even a servant (B/6 and B/16); in other cases it is equivocal (B/12, B/14
and B/17).
 Yonggyu 2004, 34.
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During the early ʿAbbāsī period (the reigns of al-Saffāḥ until al-Maʾmūn), ex-
cept for two cases in which the term unequivocally denotes a military unit, the
few other texts are ambiguous and equivocal (C/1, C/3, C/4, C/5 and C/6); in sev-
eral cases a servant or non-military person or unit is alluded to (C/3, C/7, C/9 and
C/10). As to the military units (C/2 and C/8), the last piece of evidence (C/ 8) is
unique: the long and detailed description of the clothes, fine objects, weapons
and so forth found in Hārūn al-Rashīd’s store houses ( نئازخلا ) upon al-Amīn’s as-
cendance to the caliphate. Among the weapons he mentions “50,000 swords of
(for?) the Shākiriyya and the slaves ( ناملغلا )”.
This brings us to al-Maʾmūn’s reign. From the few pieces of evidence at our
disposal, it is clear that al-Maʾmūn already had military units in Khurāsān
named al-Shākiriyya. This Shākiriyya had a high status in al-Maʾmūn’s court. It
is most plausible that this unit consisted of non-Arabs. It seems that this caliph’s
army also included Shākiriyya units in al-ʿIrāq. The size of these Shākiriyya units
is not attested by the sources. At least in Khurāsān, it seems that the size of this
unit was not big.
Two of al-Maʾmūn’s senior commanders, Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn and his relative
ʿAlī b. Hishām, had Shākiriyya military units. Ṭāhir’s Shākiriyya is mentioned to-
gether with his closest and most loyal adherents, and it is possible that the in-
tent here is to describe a kind of personal select guard, perhaps—though there is
no proof of this—connected by ties of walāʾ or even servitude to Ṭāhir. The close-
ness of the Shākiriyya to the regime and its ruler is also emphasized by al-Jāḥiẓ,
but even he does not provide any information regarding their ethnicity and ori-
gin. The sources checked provide no information on the ethnic composition, mo-
bilization or military training of the Shākiriyya, or the possible ties between the
commander/master and his Shākir.
In later periods, we find al-Shākiriyya mentioned more frequently from 227
H/842 CE (the period of al-Wāthiq’s rule) and particularly during al-Mutawakkil’s
reign (232 H/247 847 CE–861 CE) and onwards (dozens of times), until the year
266 H/880 CE (the reign of al-Muʿtamid ʿalā Allāh, d. 279 H/892 CE), when this
unit is no longer mentioned by al-Ṭabarī. Al-Shākiriyya in this period is beyond
the scope of this article. No comprehensive study has yet been made of the
ʿAbbāsī army after the period of al-Maʾmūn’s reign.¹⁷³
 The most up-to-date study, mainly based on the Arabic sources, is Gordon’s; useful com-
ments with historical insight are rendered by Kennedy 1981; Shākiriyya are also mentioned (with-
out analysis) by Amabe 1995, 141, 147, 155–161, 255; for the term Shākiriyya in the Sāmarrān pe-
riod one should consult several volumes of al-Ṭabarī’s History in translation, esp. vols. 34–36
(indexes), which will enable thorough checking of the Arabic text. However, in order to conduct
a broad study of the term and institution, all the possible Arabic sources must be examined. This
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In my previous articles¹⁷⁴ I argued against the accepted view in research
which claims that from its foundation, the ʿAbbāsī caliphate is distinguished
by the decisive influence of non-Arab elements, and that this influence increases
rapidly and is already obvious at the time of the caliph al-Mahdī (r. 158 H/775
CE–169 H/785 CE).¹⁷⁵ Al-Maʾmūn’s reign (198 H/813 CE–218 H/833 CE) is consid-
ered by all scholars to be the peak of the non-Arab (mainly Iranian) penetration
of the caliphate, especially in the army. Students of the period of al-Maʾmūn’s
reign are united in the opinion that the major part of his army was composed
of non-Arab Khurāsānīs, mainly of Iranian origin.¹⁷⁶ However,
[s]crutiny of the political and social background in Khurāsān under al-Maʾmūn’s rule re-
veals… that this description of al-Maʾmūn’s armies and commanders is imprecise and
one-dimensional. An examination of this army, its mobilization, consolidation and battles,
from al-Maʾmūn’s arrival in Marw in 193/809 until his death in 218/833, provokes interesting
conclusions that transform the accepted picture of al-Maʾmūn’s activity in Khurāsān and of
the characteristics of the armies he raised in this province.¹⁷⁷…In all probability, al-Maʾ-
mūn’s army included non-Arab units, called ʿAjam or ʿAjam Ahl Khurāsan, but references
to them are very few.We have not found evidence of massive mobilization of non-Arab sol-
diers from Khurāsān or beyond it, in Transoxania.¹⁷⁸
Two pieces of evidence bear witness to relatively large non-Arab units in al-Maʾ-
mūn’s army. The first refers to the non-Arab units in Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn’s army,
units of Turks, Bukhārīs and Khwārizmīs.¹⁷⁹ From the second we learn of units
is possible to a large extent due to the extensive repository of Arabic literature recorded on com-
pact discs (such as the al-Turāth CDs, Ahl al-Bayt and al-Maktaba al-Shāmila), containing many
thousands of books from different genres of Arabic literature (ḥadīth, adab, fatāwā, fiqh, sīra,
Qur’ān, tafsīr, geography, biography, poetry and more) now at our disposal for the first time.
 Elad 1995; Elad 2005, esp. 317–320.
 Ayalon 1994, 2–4, 35–36 and the important information in the addenda; Crone 1980, 68 and
esp. 74; Kennedy 1981, 102–103; Elad 1995, 118–119.
 For a discussion and bibliography, see Elad 2005, 317, n. 151; Elad 2013, 279, nn. 272, 273;
add De La Vaissière 2007, 151ff.
 Elad 2005; the quotation is from 317; and see also Elad 2010 and 2013; see De La Vaissière
2007, 150ff. for a different interpretation; for two more examples cf. Elad, 2005, 295–316 (the long
text in al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 773–774: al-Maʾmūn’s appeal to the Arab tribes in Khurāsān) and
Elad 2010, 49–50 (in regard to the recruitment of non-Arab contingents by al-Maʾmūn), mainly
according to al-Balādhurī, Futūḥ, 430–431 (de Goeje’s ed.; ed. al-Ṭabbāʿ, 606): to De La Vais-
sière’s analysis and arguments in De La Vaissière 2007, 152.
 Elad 2005, the quotation is from 318; and cf. De La Vaissière 2007, 152.
 Turks: al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 799; Khwārizmīs: ibid., 801: at least 700 soldiers [!]; al-Masʿūdī,
Murūj, 4, 263; al-Bukhāriyya: al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 800, 802; the important and unique tradition
in al-Ṭabarī is related from Aḥmad b. Hishām, who was most probably the cousin of Ṭāhir b. al-
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of slave soldiers (ghulām; atrāk), most of whom were already purchased by al-
Muʿtaṣim already during his brother’s reign. They numbered between 3,000 to
4,000 soldiers.¹⁸⁰ In 213 H/828 CE a slave regiment of 4,000 soldiers is men-
tioned in al-Muʿtaṣim’s army in Egypt. This is the first time that a slave military
unit on such a large scale is mentioned.¹⁸¹ The Shākiriyya units in al-Maʾmūn’s
army mentioned above most probably bear witness to additional non-Arab re-
cruits from Khurāsān (Transoxania?).
What is the reason for this far-reaching research pattern regarding the non-
Arab makeup of al-Maʾmūn’s army? It seems the mere fact that al-Maʾmūn lived
in Khurāsān and chose it as the centre for his governorship, was sufficient for
scholars to argue in favour of this thesis. It is possible that this view developed,
at least in the case of Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, given the fact that the army he fielded
against ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā included non-Arab units (this is, as noted above, a rare evi-
dence).
Nonetheless, none of al-Maʾmūn’s senior commanders can be considered as
belonging to a new non-Arab Khurāsānī army. It is clear that al-Abnāʾ forces and
their commanders who joined al-Maʾmūn’s army cannot be included in the new
non-Arab Khurāsānī army.¹⁸² The picture is not one-dimensional. But the many
reports that Arab political and military power had not completely disappeared
in various regions of the caliphate; that al-Maʾmūn was required to take them
into consideration and to use them as a military force which he mobilized for
battle in the different parts of the caliphate; and that the tribal make-up of
this or that area often dictated the caliph’s policy¹⁸³ all cannot hide the clear
Ḥusayn (see Elad 2010, 39); he was ṣāḥib al-shurṭa of Ṭāhir’s camp (see al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 799–
802; according to al-Masʿūdī, Murūj, 4, 263–265, he is one of the senior commanders (min wujūh
al-quwwād)); he is also mentioned as one of the commanders of al-Maʾmūn and al-Muʿtaṣim
(Elad 2010, 39).
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Buldān, 256: مالغفالآةثالثءاهز ; al-Kindī, Wulāt, 212: هكارتأنمفالآةعبرأيف ; Ayalon
1994, 26; Ismāʿīl 1996, 14; Pipes 1981, 146–147; Lassner 1980, 113; Kennedy 1981, 167; Elad 2005,
318; De La Vaissière 2007, 155; but esp. Gordon 2001, 16ff.
 Al-Kindī, Wulāt, 212 (I follow the accepted rendering of the word atrāk as slaves); Pipes
1981, 51; Lassner 1980, 113; Kennedy 1981, 167; but cf. the careful rendering of Gordon 2001,
16: Turks.
 Elad 2005, 283ff. (al-Abnāʾ), but especially Elad 2010 and 2013.
 For examples, see 1) al-Jazīra: al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 326–327: year 196 H/811–812 CE;
ibid., 332–333; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 6, 300–301: year 198 H/808–809 CE; al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-
Mawṣil, 332, the same year: Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn’s leniency and favourism towards the southern
tribes in Mosul; ibid., 336–337; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 6, 317: year 199 H; al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Maw-
ṣil, 343–348; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 6, 349: year 202 H/817–818 CE; ibid., 350: in the same year al-
Maʾmūn bluntly interferes in the tribal feuds in Mosul; for other examples for tribal feuds in
Mosul during al-Maʾmūn’s reign, see al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 359–360: year 206 H/821–822
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waning of Arab power in the ʿAbbāsī caliphate, which reached its highest point
in the days of al-Muʿtaṣim.¹⁸⁴ They do, however, show that this process was a
slow and complex one.
Appendix
The Term Shākirī in the Meaning of Servant/Attendant from the Middle to the
End of the 9th Century.
A. Two of the imāms of the Shīʿa (al-Ithnā ʿAshariyya), are described as having
a Shākirī. The first is Mūsā (al-Kāẓim) b. Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 183 H/799 CE),
who is described as riding escorted by a Shākirī ( يركاشهعموبكار ). The second
is al-Ḥasan (al-ʿAskarī) b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Jawwād (d. 260 H/874 CE). A
Shākirī of his ( يلعنبنسحلادمحميبأانالومليركاش ), called Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥam-
mad al-Shākirī, relates some anecdotes about his master (ustādhī).¹⁸⁵
CE; 365–366: year 208 H/823–824 CE; 371: year 210/825–826; 373: year 211 H/826-827 CE; 422–423:
year 219 H/834–835 CE (al-Muʿtaṣim’s reign); 378, 380–382,386–394 (years 212–213 H/827–829
CE): the army and Arab commanders of Muḥammad b. Ḥumayd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, see discus-
sion in Elad 2013, 272–275); Diyār Bakr and the surroundings of al-Raqqa (the rebellion of
Naṣr b. Shabath), see Kennedy 1981, 169–170; al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 540; Ibn al-Athīr, al-
Kāmil, 6, 303–304: year 198 H/813 CE; Armenia and Ādharbayjān: al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 566;
al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 384: year 212 H/827–828 CE; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1112: year 212 H/
827–828 CE; 2) al-ʿIrāq: al- Daskara’s vicinity (50 miles north of Baghdād): al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-
Mawṣil, 364; Ibn al-Athīr, al-Kāmil, 6, 385; al-Kūfa and its vicinity: al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 956,
977; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Taʾrīkh, 12, 413; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1019, 1022: year 202 H/817–
818 CE [= Crone 1980, 110–111]; al-Baṣra: for the Muhallabī family in the city, see Crone 1980,
135; add al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī, 17, 46 (Būlāq ed.) [Dār al-Kutub ed., 18, 24] to her bibliography;
correct Crone 1980, 135, Dāwūd b. Bishr to Dāwūd b. Yazīd; see also, al-Yaʿqūbī, Taʾrīkh, 2, 557–
558: Muḥammad b. ʿAbbād al-Muhallabī, who is defined as: هنامزيفةرصبلالهأديسناكو ; Ibn Ḥazm,
Jamhara, 369: اديسناكو ; add him to Crone’s biographies of the family; al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī
(Būlāq ed.), 18, 19–20, 60 [=Dār al-Kutub ed., 20, 99–101; Ibn Ḥazm, Jamhara, 369, 370: the
poet Ibn Abī ʿUyayna al-Muhallabī and his strong satire against the northern tribes; Ibn
Khayyāṭ, Taʾrīkh, 384; al-Ṭabarī, Taʾrīkh, 3, 1144–1145: Banū Tamīm in al-Baṣra; Baghdād: al-
Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī (Būlāq ed.), 18, 29, 51, 53, 54, 60 [=Dār al-Kutub ed., 20, 120, 166–167, 170,
172, 186]; al-Azdī, Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, 239, 354; Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād, 286–289;
al-Iṣfahānī, al-Aghānī (ed. Būlāq), 18, 186–187; for socio-cultural examples of the period, e.g.
the Arab socio-cultural supremacy and Arabism that continued well into the early ʿAbbāsī ca-
liphate with an emphasis on al-Maʾmūn’s reign, see Elad 2005, 118–127.
 Ayalon 1994, 21–22; Kennedy 1981, 165; Pipes 1981, 150.
 Mūsā al-Kāzim: al-Ṭūsī, Ikhtiyār, 2, 735–736; al-Rāwandī, al-Kharāʾij, 2, 327; al-Irbilī, Kashf
al-Ghumma, 3, 43: يركاشهفلخو ; al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī: al-Ṭabarī (al-Imāmī), Dalāʾil al-Imāma, 429–430.
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B. In his epistle “An Answer against the Christians,” al-Jāḥiẓ remarks:
We have known them (the Christians) to possess hackneys of mixed breed
and excellent swift horses; they congregate in big crowds and play with
the curved sticks [while on horseback]; and they feign [to be dignified
Arabs] by donning al-Madīnī dress [? ينيدملااوفذحتو ] and are dressed in [clothes
made of the kind of cloth called] mulḥam and in clothes inlaid with precious
stones (muṭabbaqa); and they possess al-Shākiriyya, and they call them-
selves al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn and al-ʿAbbās, Faḍl and ʿAlī…¹⁸⁶
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Abū Nuʿaym, Aḥmad b. ʿAbdallāh al-Iṣfahānī (1933–38), Ḥilyat al-awliyāʾ wa-ṭabaqāt
al-aṣfiyāʾ, Cairo: Maktabat al-khanānjī.
Anonymous (1971), Akhbār al-dawla al-ʿAbbāsiyya wa-fīhi akhbār al-ʿAbbās wa-wuldihi,
edited by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Dūrī and ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Muṭṭalibī, Beirut: Dār ṣādir.
al-ʿAskarī, al-Ḥasan b. ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd b. Ismāʿīl (1402 H), Taṣḥīfāt al-muḥaddithīn, edited
by Maḥmūd Aḥmad Mīra, Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-ʿarabiyya al-ḥadītha.
ʿAwwād, Mikhāʾīl (1384/1964), Nuṣūṣ ḍāʾiʿa min kitāb al-wuzarāʾ wa-l-kuttāb li-Muḥammad
b. ʿAbdūs al-Jahshiyārī, Beirut: Dār al-kitāb al-lubnānī.
al-Azdī, Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yazīd b. Muḥammad b. Iyyās (1387/1967), Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, edited by
ʿAlī Ḥabība, Cairo.
al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā (1417/1996), Ansāb al-ashrāf, edited by Suhayl Zakkār and
Riyāḍ Ziriklī, Beirut: Dār al-fikr li-l-ṭibāʿa wa-l-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ.
al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā (1866), Kitāb Futūḥ al-buldān, edited by M. J. de Goeje, Leiden:
Brill.
al-Balādhurī, Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā (1407/1987), Kitāb Futūḥ al-buldān, edited by ʿAbdallāh Anīs
al-Ṭabbāʿ and ʿUmar Anīs al-Ṭabbāʿ, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-maʿārif li-l-ṭibāʿa wa-l-nashr.
al-Bayhaqī, Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad (1961?), al-Maḥāsin wa-l-masāwī, edited by Muḥammad
Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo: Dār al-maʿārif.
al-Bukhārī, Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl (n.d.), al-Taʾrīkh al-kabīr, edited by Hāshim al-Nadwī,
[Beirut?]: Dār al-fikr.
al-Dhahabī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (1416/1995), Mīzān al-iʿtidāl fī naqd al-rijāl,
edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd, Beirut: Dār
al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya.
al-Dhahabī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (1982–85), Siyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ, Beirut:
Muʾassasat al-risāla.
 Al-Jāḥiẓ, al-Radd ʿalā l-Naṣārā, 3, 317: ،تاقوجلااوذختاو،قاتعلاليخلاو،ةيرهشلانيذاربلااوذختامهنأانملعدقف
يلعولضفوسابعلاو،نيسحلاونسحلاباومستو،ةيركاشلااوذختاو،ةقّبَطُملاومحْلُملااوسبلو،ينيدملااوفذحتو،ةجلاوصلاباوبرضو .
Preliminary Notes on the Term and Institution of al-Shākiriyya 219
al-Dhahabī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (1408–21/1988–2000), Taʾrīkh al-Islām
wa-ṭabaqāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-aʿlām, edited by ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī, Beirut: Dār
al-kitāb al-ʿarabī.
al-Dīnawarī, Abū Ḥanīfa Aḥmad b. Dāwūd (1960), Kitāb al-Akhbār al-ṭiwāl, edited by ʿAbd
al-Munʿim ʿĀmir, Cairo: Dār iḥyāʾ al-kutub al-ʿarabiyya.
al-Ghazūlī, ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh al-Bahāʾī (1426/2006), Maṭāliʿ al-budūr fī manāzil al-surūr, Cairo:
Maktabat al-thaqāfa al-dīniyya.
Ḥājjī Khalīfa, Muṣṭafā b. ʿAbdallāh (1413/1992), Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asāmī l-kutub wa-l-funūn,
Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya.
al-Ḥamawī, Abū Bakr b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (1971), Thamarāt al-awrāq, edited by Muḥammad
Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo: Maktabat al-khānjī.
al-Ḥillī, Abū l-Baqāʾ Hibbat Allāh (1404/1984?), al-Manāqib al-mazyadiyya fī akhbār al-mulūk
al-Asadiyya, edited by Ṣāliḥ Mūsā Darādika and Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir Khuraysāt,
Amman: Maktabat al-risāla al-ḥadītha.
Ibn Abī Ṭāhir Ṭayfūr (1908), [al-Juzʾ al-sādis min] Kitāb Baghdād, edited by H. Keller, Leipzig.
Ibn al-ʿAdīm, ʿUmar b. Aḥmad (1986–90), Bughyat al-ṭalab fī taʾrīkh Ḥalab, edited by F.
Sezgin, Frankfurt: Maʿhad taʾrīkh al-ʿulūm al-ʿarabiyya wa-l-islāmiyya.
Ibn al-ʿAdīm, ʿUmar b. Aḥmad (1408/1988), Bughyat al-ṭalab fī taʾrīkh Ḥalab, edited by
Suhayl Zakkār, Damascus: Maṭābiʿ dār al-baʿth.
Ibn al-ʿArabī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī (n.d.), al-Futūḥāt al-makiyya, Beirut: Dār ṣādir.
Ibn ʿAsākir, Abū l-Qāsim ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan (1415–20/1995–2001), Taʾrīkh Madīnat Dimashq,
edited by ʿUmar b. Gharāma al-ʿAmr(aw)ī, Beirut: Dār al-fikr.
Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, Aḥmad Abū Muḥammad (1388–95/1968–75), Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Hyderabad:
Dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuthmāniyya.
Ibn Aʿtham al-Kūfī, Aḥmad Abū Muḥammad (1406/1986), Kitāb al-Futūḥ, Beirut: Dār al-kutub
al-ʿilmiyya.
Ibn al-Athīr, ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (1402/1982), al-Kāmil fī l-taʾrīkh, Beirut: Dār
ṣādir/Dār Beirut.
Ibn al-Athīr, ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (n.d.), Usd al-ghāba fī maʿrifat al-ṣaḥāba, Beirut:
Dār al-kitāb al-ʿarabī.
Ibn Bābūyh al-Qummī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā (1390/1970), ʿUyūn akhbār
al-Riḍā, al-Najaf.
Ibn Bābūyh al-Qummī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Mūsā (1404/1984), ʿUyūn akhbār
al-Riḍā, edited by Ḥusayn al-Aʿlamī, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-aʿlamī li-l-maṭbūʿāt.
Ibn al-Faqīh, Aḥmad b. Ibrāhīm al-Hamdhānī (1885), Mukhtaṣar kitāb al-buldān, edited by
M.J. De Goeje, Leiden: Brill.
Ibn Abī l-Ḥadīd, Abū Ḥāmid ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Hibat Allāh b. Muḥammad (1959–64), Sharḥ
nahj al-balāgha, edited by Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm, Cairo: Muṣṭafā al-Bābī
al-Ḥalabī.
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Shihāb al-Dīn Abū l-Faḍl (1972; repr. 1992), al-Iṣāba fī
tamyīz al-ṣaḥāba, edited by ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bijāwī, Cairo: Dār nahḍat Miṣr li-l-ṭabʿ
wa-l-nashr (repr. Beirut: Dār al-jīl).
Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī Shihāb al-Dīn Abū l-Faḍl (1404/1984), Tahdhīb
al-tahdhīb, Beirut: Dār al-fikr.
Ibn Ḥamdūn, Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī (1417 H), al-Tadhkira
al-Ḥamdūniyya, edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās, Beirut: Dār ṣādir.
220 Amikam Elad
Ibn Abī Ḥātim, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Idrīs al-Tamīmī al-Rāzī (1371–73/1952–53),
Kitāb al-Jarḥ wa-l-taʿdīl, Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth al-ʿarabī.
Ibn Ḥazm, ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd (1962), Jamharat ansāb al-ʿArab, edited by ʿAbd al-Salām
Muḥammad Hārūn, Cairo: Dār al-maʿārif.
Ibn Ḥibbān, Muḥammad Abū Ḥātim al-Bustī al-Tamīmī (1393–1403/1973–83; photocopy:
1395/1975), Kitāb al-Thiqāt, Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuthmāniyya (photocopy:
edited by Sharaf al-Dīn Aḥmad, Beirut: Dār al-fikr).
Ibn Ḥibbān, Muḥammad Abū Ḥātim al-Bustī al-Tamīmī (1395–1412/1975–92), Kitāb
al-Majrūḥīn min al-muḥaddithīn al-ḍuʿafāʾ wa-l-matrūkīn, edited by Maḥmūd Ibrāhīm
Zāyid, Aleppo: Dār al-waʿy.
Ibn Ḥibbān, Muḥammad Abū Ḥātim al-Bustī al-Tamīmī (1412/1992), Ṭabaqāt al-muḥaddithīn
bi-Iṣfahān, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-risāla.
Ibn al-ʿImrānī, Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad (1420/2001), al-Inbāʾ fī taʾrīkh al-khulafāʾ,
edited by Qāsim al-Sāmarrāʾī, Cairo: Dār al-āfāq al-ʿarabiyya.
Ibn al-Jawzī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Abū l-Faraj (1399/1979), Ṣafwat al-Ṣafwa,
edited by Maḥmūd Fākhūrī and Muḥammad Rawās Qalʿajī, Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa.
Ibn al-Jawzī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAlī b. Muḥammad Abū l-Faraj (1412/1992), al-Muntaẓam fī
taʾrīkh al-mulūk wa-l-umam, edited by Muḥammad Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā, Beirut:
Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya.
Ibn al-Kalbī, Hishām b. Muḥammad b. al-Sāʾib (1407/1986), Jamharat al-nasab, edited by
Nājī Ḥasan, Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub.
Ibn al-Kalbī, Hishām b. Muḥammad b. al-Sāʾib (1408/1988), Nasab Maʿadd wa-l-Yaman
al-kabīr, edited by Nājī Ḥasan, Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub/Maktabat al-nahḍa al-ʿarabiyya.
Ibn Kathīr, Abū l-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl b. ʿUmar (1408/1988), al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya fī l-taʾrīkh, edited
by ʿAlī Shīrī, Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth al-ʿarabī.
Ibn Khallikān, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm (1969), Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ
al-zamān, edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās, Beirut: Dār al-thaqāfa.
Ibn Khayyāṭ, Khalīfa al-ʿUṣfurī (1386/1967), Taʾrīkh, edited by Akram Ḍiyāʿ al-ʿUmarī, Najaf:
Maṭbaʿat al-ādāb.
Ibn Mākūlā, ʿAlī b. Hibat Allāh (1381–86/1962–67), al-Ikmāl fī rafʿ al-irtiyāb ʿan al-muʾtalif
wa-l-mukhtalif min al-asmāʾ wa-l-kunā wa-l-ansāb, vols. 1–6, edited by ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
b. Yaḥyā al-Muʿallimī, Hyderabad: Dāʾirat al-maʿārif al-ʿuthmāniyya.
Ibn Mākūlā, ʿAlī b. Hibat Allāh (1411/1990), al-Ikmāl fī rafʿ al-irtiyāb ʿan al-muʾtalif
wa-l-mukhtalif min al-asmāʾ wa-l-kunā wa-l-ansāb, vol. 7, Beirut: Dār al-kutub
al-ʿilmiyya.
Ibn Manẓūr, Muḥammad b. Mukarram (1404–11/1984–90), Mukhtaṣar taʾrīkh madīnat
Dimashq, Damascus: Dār al-fikr li-l-ṭibāʿa wa-l-nashr wa-l-tawzīʿ.
Ibn Munqidh, Usāma b. Murshid b. ʿAlī b. Muqallad (1407/1987), Lubāb al-ādāb, edited by
Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-sunna.
Ibn al-Nadīm, Abū l-Faraj Muḥammad b. Isḥāq (1971), al-Fihrist, edited by Riḍā Tajaddud,
Tehran.
Ibn Qutayba, Muslim b. Qutayba (1346/1928), Kitāb al-ʿUyūn wa-l-akhbār, Cairo: Dār
al-kutub.
(Pseudo) Ibn Qutayba, Muslim b. Qutayba (1388/1969), al-Imāma wa-l-siyāsa, Cairo:
Maṭbaʿat Mūsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī.
Preliminary Notes on the Term and Institution of al-Shākiriyya 221
Ibn Taghrībirdī, Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf (1348/1929), al-Nujūm al-zāhira fī mulūk
Miṣr wa-l-Qāhira, Cairo: Dār al-kutub.
Ibn Abī Uṣaybiʿa, Aḥmad b. al-Qāsim b. Khalīfa al-Anṣārī (1967), ʿUyūn al- anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt
al-aṭibbāʿ, edited by Nizār Riḍā, Beirut: Dār maktabat al-ḥayāt.
Ibn al-Wardī, ʿUmar Abū Ḥafṣ (1358/1939), Kharīdat al-ʿajāʾib wa-farīdat al-gharāʾib, Cairo:
Maṭbaʿat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī.
Ibn al-Zubayr, al-Rashīd (1959), Kitāb al-Dhakhāʾir wa-l-tuḥaf, edited by Muḥammad
Ḥamīdullāh, Kuwait: Dāʾirat al-maṭbūʿāt wa-l-nashr.
al-Irbilī, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b. Abī l-Fatḥ (1405/1985), Kashf al-ghumma fī maʿrifat al-aʾimma, Beirut:
Dār al-aḍwāʾ.
al-Iṣfahānī, Abū l-Faraj ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad (1284–85 H), Kitāb al-Aghānī, Būlāq.
al-Iṣfahānī, Abū l-Faraj ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad (1345–81/1927–61), Kitāb al-Aghānī,
vols. 1–16, edited by ʿAlī al-Najdī Nāṣif, Cairo: Dār al-kutub al-miṣriyya.
al-Iṣfahānī, Abū l-Faraj ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad (1389–94/1970–74), Kitāb al-Aghānī,
vols. 17–24, edited by Ibrāhīm al-Abyārī, Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-miṣriyya al-ʿāmma li-l-taʾlīf
wa-l-kitāb.
al-Iṣfahānī, Abū l-Faraj ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad (1394–99/1974–79), Kitāb al-Aghānī,
vols. 25–30, Cairo: Dār al-shaʿb.
al-Jāḥiẓ, ʿAmr b. Baḥr (1350/1932), al-Maḥāsin wa-l-aḍdād, Cairo: al-Maktaba al-tijāriyya.
al-Jāḥiẓ, ʿAmr b. Baḥr (1356/1938), Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, edited by ʿAbd al-Salām Hārūn, Cairo.
al-Jāḥiẓ, ʿAmr b. Baḥr (1384/1964), “Manāqib al-Turk. Risāla ilā l-Fatḥ b. Khāqān fī manāqib
al-Turk wa-ʿāmat jund al-khilāfa”, in: ʿAbd al-Salām Hārūn, ed., Rasāʾil al-Jāḥiẓ, Cairo, 1–
86.
al-Jāḥiẓ, ʿAmr b. Baḥr (1388/1968), al-Bayān wa-l-Tabyīn, Cairo: Maktabat al-khānjī.
al-Jāḥiẓ, ʿAmr b. Baḥr (1399/1979), al-Radd ʿalā l-naṣārā, edited by ʿAbd al-Salām
Muḥammad Hārūn, Cairo: Maktabat al-khānjī.
Jarīr wa-Farazdaq (1908–12), Naqāʾid, edited by A. A. Bevan, Leiden: Brill.
Kaḥḥāla, ʿUmar Riḍā (1957–61, repr: 1993?), Muʿjam al-muʾallifīn, Damascus: al-Maktaba
al-ʿarabiyya (repr. Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth al-ʿarabī).
al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Thābit Abū Bakr (1417/1997), Taʾrīkh Baghdād, edited
by Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā, Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya.
al-Kindī, Muḥammad b. Yūsuf (1379/1959), Wulāt Miṣr, edited by Ḥusayn Naṣṣār. Beirut: Dār
Beirut/Dār ṣādir.
al-Majlisī, Muḥammad Bāqir (1403/1983), Biḥār al-anwār, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-wafāʾ/Dār
iḥyāʾ al-turāth al-ʿarabī.
al-Marzubānī, Abū ʿUbaydallāh Muḥammad b. ʿImrān (1964), Nūr al-qabas al-mukhtaṣar min
al-muqtabas fī akhbār al-nuḥāt wa-l-udabāʾ wa-l-shuʿarāʾ wa-l-ʿulamāʾ, abridged by Abū
l-Maḥāsin Yūsuf b. Aḥmad b. Maḥmūd al-Yaghmūrī, edited by R. Sellheim, Wiesbaden:
Franz Steiner.
al-Masʿūdī, ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī Abū l-Ḥasan (1894), Kitāb al-Tanbīh wa-l-ishrāf, edited by
M. J. de Goeje. Leiden: Brill.
al-Masʿūdī, ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī Abū l-Ḥasan (1966–79), Murūj al-dhahab wa-maʿādin
al-jawhar, edited by Charles Pellat, Beirut.
al-Maymanī, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (1354/1935), Simṭ al-laʾālī fī sharḥ Amālī al-Qālī. Vol. III: Dhayl
al-laʾālī fī sharḥ dhayl Amālī al-Qālī, Cairo: Maṭbaʿat lajnat al-taʾlīf wa-l-tarjama
wa-l-nashr.
222 Amikam Elad
Miskawayh, Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Yaʿqūb (n.d.), Tajārib al-umam wa-taʿāqub al-himam,
edited by Abū l-Qāsim Imāmī, Tehran.
al-Mizzī, Jamāl al-Dīn Abū l-Ḥajjāj Yūsuf (1985–92), Tahdhīb al-kamāl fī asmāʾ al-rijāl, edited
by Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf, Beirut: Muʾassasat al-risāla.
al-Muʿāfā b. Zakariyyāʾ al-Nahrawānī, (1407/1987), al-Jalīs al-ṣāliḥ al-kāfī wa-l-anīs al-nāṣiḥ
al-shāfī, edited by Iḥsān ʿAbbās, Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub.
al-Muṭahhar b. Ṭāhir al-Maqdisī (1899–1916), Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh, edited by C. Huart,
Paris: Leroux.
al-Narshakhī, Muḥammad b. Jaʿfar b. Zakariyyāʾ (1954), Taʾrīkh Bukhārā: The History of
Bukhara, translated by Richard N. Frye, Cambridge, MA.
al-Qalqashandī, Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad b. ʿAlī (1407/1987), Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ,
Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya.
al-Raqīq al-Qayrawānī, Ibrāhīm b. al-Qāsim Abū Isḥāq (2010), Quṭb al-surūr fi awṣāf
al-anbidha wa-l-khumūr, edited by Sarra Barbouchi-Ben Yahia, Beirut/Baghdad:
Manshūrāt al-jamal.
al-Rāwandī, Quṭb al-Dīn (1409 H), al-Kahrāʾij wa-l-jarāʾiḥ, Qumm: Muʾassasat al-Imām
al-Mahdī.
al-Ṣafadī, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Khalīl b. Aybek (1420 H), al-Wāfī bi-l-wafāyāt, edited by Aḥmad
al-Arnāʾūṭ and Turkī Muṣṭafā, Beirut: Dār iḥyāʾ al-turāth.
al-Sahmī, Ḥamza b. Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm (1407 H), Taʾrīkh Jurjān, Beirut: ʿĀlam al-kutub li-l-ṭibāʿa
wa-l-nashr.
al-Samʿānī, Abū Saʿd ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad b. Manṣūr al-Tamīmī (1408/1988),
al-Ansāb, edited by ʿAbdallāh ʿUmar al-Bārūdī, Beirut: Dār al-jinān li-l-ṭibāʿa wa-l-nashr
wa-l-tawzīʿ.
al-Ṭabarī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr (1879–1901, repr. 1964), Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk,
edited by M. J. de Goeje, Leiden: Brill.
al-Ṭabarī al-Imāmī, Muḥammad b. Jarīr b. Rustum (1413 H), Dalāʾil al-imāma, Qumm: Markaz
al-ṭibāʿa wa-l-nashr fī muʾassasat al-baʿtha.
al-Tanūkhī, Abū ʿAlī al-Muḥassin b. ʿAlī (1398/1978), al-Faraj baʿda al-shidda, edited by
ʿAbbūd al-Shālijī, Beirut: Dār ṣādir.
al-Thaʿālibī, ʿAbd al-Malik b. Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl (1403/1983), Yatīmat al-dahr, edited by
Mufīd Muḥammad Qamḥiyya, Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya.
al-Ṭihrānī, Āghā Buzurg (1403/1983), al-Dharīʿa ilā taṣānīf al-shīʿa, Beirut: Dār al-aḍwāʾ.
al-Ṭūsī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan (1404 H), Ikhtiyār maʿrifat al-rijāl, edited by Mīr
Dāmād al-Astarābādī and Mahdī al-Rajāʾī, Qumm: Muʾassasat āl al-bayt.
al-Yaʿqūbī, Aḥmad b. Isḥāq b. Wāḍiḥ (1892), Kitāb al-Buldān, edited by M. J. de Goeje,
Leiden: Brill.
al-Yaʿqūbī, Aḥmad b. Isḥāq b. Wāḍiḥ (1882), Taʾrīkh, edited by M. Th. Houtsma, Leiden: Brill.
Yāqūt al-Rūmī, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī (1866–77), Muʿjam al-buldān, edited
by F. Wüstenfeld, Leipzig.
Yāqūt al-Rūmī, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī (1955–57), Muʿjam al-buldān, Beirut:
Dār ṣādir.
Yāqūt al-Rūmī, Shihāb al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdallāh al-Ḥamawī (1993), Muʿjam al-udabāʾ, edited by
Iḥsān ʿAbbās, Beirut: Dār al-gharb al-islāmī.
al-Ziriklī, Khayr al-Dīn (1980), al-Aʿlām, Beirut: Dār al-ʿilm li-l-malāyīn.
Preliminary Notes on the Term and Institution of al-Shākiriyya 223
Studies
Abbas, I. (1988), “Barmakids”, Encyclopaedia Iranica, 3, 806–809.
Adang, C. (1996a), Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible: From Ibn Rabban to Ibn
Ḥazm, Leiden/New York/Cologne: Brill.
Adang, C. (1996b), “Judaism and the Bible in al-Maqdisī’s ‘Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-l-Taʾrīkh’”, in:
Hava Lazarus-Yafeh, ed., Muslim Authors on Jews and Judaism: The Jews among their
Muslim Neighbours, Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center for Jewish History, 59–68 [in
Hebrew].
Agha, Salih Said (2003), The Revolution Which Toppled the Umayyads: Neither Arab nor
ʿAbbāsid, Leiden/Boston: Brill.
Amabe, F. (1995), The Emergence of the ʿAbbāsid Autocracy: The ʿAbbāsid Army, Khurāsān
and Adharbayjān, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press
Ayalon, D. (1964), “The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Muʿtaṣim, their Background and
Consequences,” Jerusalem (provisional publication). First publication in Ayalon’s
collected studies: Islam and the Abode of War: Military Slaves and Islamic Adversaries,
Aldershot: Variorum [collected studies series], no. I.
Ayalon, D. (1999), Eunuchs, Caliphs and Sultans: A Study in Power Relationships, Jerusalem:
The Magness Press.
Barthold, W. (1928), Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, English translation by W.
Barthold and H.A.R. Gibb (H.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, no. 5), London.
Bearman, Peri J. et al. (1960–2006), The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Leiden: Brill.
Beckwith, C. I. (1984), “Aspects of the Early History of the Central Asian Guard Corps in
Islam”, Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi 4: 29–43.
Blankinship, Khalid Y., trans. and ann. (1989), The History of al-Ṭabarī. The End of Expansion:
The Caliphate of Hishām A.D. 724–738/A.H. 105–120. Vol. 25, Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Bosworth, C. E., trans. and ann. (1989), The History of al-Ṭabarī. The ʿAbbāsid Caliphate in
Equilibrium. Vol. 30, Albany: State University of New York Press
Bosworth, C. E. (1994), “Abū Ḥafṣ al-Kirmānī and the Rise of the Barmakids”, Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies 57: 268–282.
Bouvat, L. (1912), Les Barmécides d’après les historiens arabes et persans, Paris: Leroux.
Brockelmann, C., Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, vol. 1 (Weimar, 1898); vol. 2 (Berlin,
1902). Second ed. 1945–49, Leiden: Brill. Supplementbände, vols. 1–3, 1937–42, Leiden:
Brill.
Conrad, L. I. (2015), “Ibn Aʿtham and His History”, Al-ʿUṣūr al-Wusṭā 23: 87–125.
Crone, P. (1980), Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
de la Vaissière, É. (2007), Samarcande et Samarra. Élites d’Asie centrale dans l’empire
abbasside, Louvain: Peeters.
Elad, A. (1986), “The Siege of Wāsiṭ (132/749): Some Aspects of ʿAbbāsid and ʿAlīd Relations
at the Beginning of ʿAbbāsid Rule”, in: Moshe Sharon, ed., Studies in Islāmic History
and Civilization in Honour of Professor David Ayalon, Jerusalem/Leiden: Cana Publishing
House/Brill, 59–90.
Elad, A. (1995), “Aspects of the Transition from the Umayyad to the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate”,
Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 9: 89–132.
224 Amikam Elad
Elad, A. (2005), “Mawālī in the Composition of al-Maʾmūn’s Army: A Non-Arab Takeover?”, in:
M. Bernards and John Nawas, eds., Patronate and Patronage in Early and Classical
Islam, Leiden: Brill, 278–325.
Elad, A. (2010), “The Armies of al-Maʾmūn in Khurāsān (193/809–202/817–818): Recruitment
of its Contingents and their Commanders and their Social-Ethnic Composition,” Oriens
38: 35–76.
Elad, A. (2013), “Al-Maʾmūn’s Military Units and Their Commanders up to the End of the
Siege of Baghdad (195/810–198/813)”, in: Monique Bernards, ed., ʿAbbasid Studies IV,
Exeter: Short Run Press, 245–284.
Forand, P. G. (1962), “The Development of Military Slavery under the Abbasid Caliphs of the
Ninth Century With Special Reference to the Reigns of Muʿtaṣim and Muʿtaḍid”, PhD
dissertation, Princeton University.
Friedmann, Y., trans. and ann. (1992), The History of al-Ṭabarī. The Battle of al-Qādisiyyah
and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine. Vol. 12, Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Gibb, H. A. R. (1923), The Arab Conquests in Central Asia, London: Royal Asiatic Society.
Gil, M. (1992), A History of Palestine, 634–1099, translated by Ethel Broido, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Goitein, S. D. (1982), “Jerusalem in the Arab Period (638–1099)”, in: L. I. Levine, ed., The
Jerusalem Cathedra: Studies in the History, Archaeology, Geography and Ethnography of
the Land of Israel, Jerusalem: Yad Iẓḥak Ben-Zvi/Detroit: Wayne State University Press,
168–196.
Gordon, M. S. (2001), The Breaking of a Thousand Swords. A History of the Turkish Military of
Samarra (A.H. 200–275/815–889 C.E.), Albany: State University of New York Press.
Haim, S. (1953), Persian English Dictionary, Tehran: Beroukhim.
Hawting, G. R. (2000), The First Dynasty of Islam. The Umayyad Caliphate AD 661–750,
London/New York: Routledge.
Hinds, M., trans. and ann. (1990), The History of al-Ṭabarī. The Zenith of the Marwānid
House. Vol. 23, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Ismāʿīl, Osman S. A. (1966), “Muʿtaṣim and the Turks”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 29: 12–24.
Kennedy, H. (1981), The Early ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, London: Croom Helm.
Khālidī, T. (1976), “Muʿtazilite Historiography: Maqdisī’s Kitāb al-Badʾ wa-l-taʾrīkh”, Journal of
Near Eastern Studies 35: 1–12.
Khalidi, T. (1994), Arabic Historical Thought in the Classical Period. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Lambton, A. K. S. (1965), “Reflections on the Iqṭāʿ”, in: George Maqdisi, ed., Arabic and
Islamic Studies in Honour of H.A.R. Gibb, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 358–
376.
Lassner, J. (1980), The Shaping of ʿAbbāsid Rule, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Le Strange, G. (1890), Palestine under the Moslems, London.
Le Strange, G. (1905), The Lands of the Eastern Caliphate, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Levy, R. (1969), The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Preliminary Notes on the Term and Institution of al-Shākiriyya 225
Lindstedt, I. (2014), “Al-Madāʾinī’s Kitāb al-Dawla and the Death of Ibrāhīm al-Imām”,
in: Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila and Ilkka Lindstedt, eds., Case Studies in Transmission,
Münster: Ugarit-Verlag, 103–130.
Minorsky, V. (1942), Marwazi on China, The Turks and India. Arabic Text, London.
Miquel, A. (1967), La géographie humaine du monde musulman, Paris/The Hague.
Morony, M. (1988), “Badʾ waʾl-Taʾrīḵ”, Encyclopaedia Iranica, 3, 352–353.
Pipes, D. (1981), Slave Soldiers and Islam. The Genesis of the Military System, New
Haven/London: Yale University Press.
Rosenthal, F. (1968), A History of Muslim Historiography, Leiden: Brill.
Saliba, George, trans. and ann. (1985), The History of al-Ṭabarī. The Crisis of the ʿAbbāsid
Caliphate. Vol. 25, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Sarkis, Yūsuf Ilyān (1346–49/1928–30), Muʿjam al-maṭbūʿāt al-ʿarabiyya wa-l-muʿarraba,
Cairo: Maktabat Sarkīs.
Sezgin, F. (1967), Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums, vol. I, Leiden: Brill.
Shaban, M. A. (1976), Islamic History. A New Interpretation, A.D. 750–1055 (A.H. 132–448),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shaban, M. A. (1979), The ʿAbbāsid Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sourdel, D. (1959–60), Le vizirat ʿabbāside de 749 à 936 (132 à 324 de l’hégire), Damascus:
Institut français de Damas.
Steingass, F. (1963), Persian-English Dictionary, London.
Van Ess, J. (1978), “Review of F. Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums. Band II,
Poesie bis ca. 430 H., Leiden. Brill, 1975”, Die Welt des Orients 9: 318–322.
Wellhausen, J. (1963), The Arab Kingdom and its Fall, translated by M. G. Weir, Beirut:
Khayyat’s Reprints.
Williams, J. A., trans. and ann. (1985), The History of al-Ṭabarī. The ʿAbbāsid Revolution. Vol.
27, Albany: State University of New York Press.
Yonggyu, Lee (2004), “Seeking Loyalty: The Inner Asian Tradition of Personal Guards and its
Influence in Persia and China,” PhD dissertation, Harvard University.
Zakeri M. (1995), Sāsānid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
226 Amikam Elad
The Eastern Mediterranean and the North

Alison Vacca
Khurāsānī and Transoxanian Ostikans of
Early ʿAbbāsid Armenia
Abstract: This chapter examines the relationship between Armenia and
Khurāsān in the early ʿAbbāsid period by focusing on the Khurāsānī governors
(ostikans) placed in the north between the rise of the ʿAbbāsids and the Samar-
ran period. It argues that the presence of Khurāsānī governors and troops in Ar-
menia challenges the idea that Armenia was separated or isolated from the
broader concerns of the Caliphate.
After a brief introduction to the ostikanate, the chapter discusses the Khurāsānī
governors chronologically along five main periods: (1) the ʿAbbāsid Revolution;
(2) the Battle of Bagrewand in 775; (3) Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Amīn; (4) the
fourth fitna; (5) the rise of Transoxanian ostikans. This discussion demonstrates
that ʿAbbāsid rule relied heavily on Khurāsānī ostikans and troops in Armenia. It
further establishes the caliphal north as a region where ʿAbbāsid power and at
times intra-Khurāsānī conflict played out.
Keywords: Armenia; Khurāsān; ʿAbbāsid; ostikan; Bagrewand; fourth fitna
Introduction
Sometime in or after the 12th century, an Anonymous Storyteller assembled a
treasure trove of Armenian oral histories about the Arcruni nobles of the 8th
and 9th centuries. His compilation patches together curious information from a
number of early sources and reveals plenty of anachronisms and manifestly in-
correct details, preserving tales that aimed to entertain rather than inform. In
one story, Arabs from the west chase the king of Baghdad out of his capital.
The king decides to flee to Khurāsān, where his relatives could provide funds
and troops to retake Baghdad. Along the way, the king’s servants abandon
him, so he travels to the city of Van to entreat the aid of Derēn, an Arcruni noble-
man. Derēn pays a guide to escort the king safely to Khurāsān, and when the
king retakes Baghdad the Armenian nobleman reaps the rewards for his loyalty.
I’d like to extend my thanks to the organizers of the conference Regional and Transregional
Elites—Connecting the Early Islamic Empire for all the work that went into planning and conven-
ing such a fascinating conference. I’d also like to thank Rob Haug and Amikam Elad for reading
through the draft of this paper and providing useful feedback
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Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
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This folktale inserts a celebrated Armenian notable into broader drama of ca-
liphal history. While he never identifies the king by name as al-Maʾmūn, the
storyteller suggests the loyalties of Armenian nobles during the fourth fitna,
and more importantly reveals that even centuries after the war people enjoyed
tales boasting of Armenian involvement in the drama of an ousted 9th-century
caliph and his relatives in Khurāsān.¹
This paper relies on Arabic and Armenian sources to explore the close rela-
tionship between Armenia and Khurāsān throughout the early ʿAbbāsid period,
a closeness that did not exist merely in exaggerated popular tales. In particular,
it examines the post of caliphal governor (ostikan) as evidence of Armenian-
Khurāsānī relations and posits that the Arab, Iranian, and Turkish elites in
the service of the ʿAbbāsid Caliphate served as direct links between the two fron-
tiers. ʿAbbāsid reliance on Khurāsānī troops extended well past the revolution
throughout the period of ʿAbbāsid control over the North, not just at moments
of Khurāsānī ascendancy such as the reign of al-Maʾmūn. Since most studies
of the ostikanate center on the Jazarī ostikans, this serves as a reminder that
ʿAbbāsid Armenia responded clearly to political and military impetuses from
the broader caliphate and particularly Khurāsān. As al-Muqaddasī notes in pass-
ing, Armenians and Albanians of the 10th century spoke Persian with a
Khurāsānī accent: “in Armenia, they speak Armenian and in Albania, they
speak Albanian. Their Persian is comprehensible and sounds similar to
Khurāsānī [Persian].”² There were direct lines of communication between the
two provinces.
 Anonymous Storyteller 1971, 117– 121. Like many of the stories preserved in the Anonymous
Storyteller’s compilation, this layers several different moments. The most recognizable storyline
here is the fourth fitna, when al-Maʾmūn gathered his powerbase in Khurāsān before taking the
caliphate from his brother al-Amīn. The war lasted from 195 H to al-Amīn’s death in 198 H. The
“Arabs from the west” likely refer to the maghāriba, also seen in this same work as małripikk‘.
The genealogy provided in this text for the nobleman Derēn presents a number of problems. The
best guess is that the Anonymous Storyteller refers to Grigor-Derenik, who ruled from 847 to 887
CE, making it unlikely he would have been old enough to aid al-Maʾmūn. The association be-
tween Derēn and Grigor-Derenik presents other chronological and genealogical inconsistencies,
too. Interestingly, al-Ṭabarī more believably places Derenik (in Arabic: Dayrānī) in the cam-
paigns of al-Muwaffaq against the Ṣaffārid Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth in 262 H and 263 H; al-Ṭabarī
1893, III, 1894– 1895. It is likely that the Anonymous Storyteller is conflating the famous war
with the actions of a celebrated nobleman who worked in the service of the caliphate half a cen-
tury later.
 Al-Muqaddasī 1906, 378.
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A Brief Introduction to Caliphal Armenia and the Ostikanate
Khurāsān serves as an excellent model to discuss Armenia as a caliphal prov-
ince. Khurāsān and Armenia were located on the edges of both Sasanian and ca-
liphal territory, where Islamization and Arabization stalled in the Umayyad and
early ʿAbbāsid periods. Once bastions of Parthian society, the Khurāsānī and Ar-
menian elite (the dihqāns in the East and the naxarars in the North) maintained
some semblance of social stability, slowing the effects of regime changes. The
provinces were the outskirts of the Iranian oikoumene, and while they were cul-
turally distinct exhibited extensive ties to the broader Iranian world. Early Islam-
ic texts use the imprecise and ill-defined catch-all terms mashriq (the East) and
jarbī (the North), underlining problems of mapping imperial power on the edges
of the empire, yet both provinces boasted specific frontier outposts (thughūr) that
delineated Islam/Iran from the “Other.”³ Sources chronicle massive gates along
the edges of both provinces, built by the Sasanians to protect Iran from Tūrān
and then maintained by the Umayyads and ʿAbbāsids to safeguard the caliphate
from Turkic hordes.
There is some evidence that historians writing in Arabic in the ʿAbbāsid pe-
riod also recognized the common ground between Khurāsān and Armenia. Al-
Masʿūdī, for example, explains that Khurāsān was a model for Sasanian rule
in the North:
…when Anushirwan built the town known as al-Bāb with its wall protruding into the sea,
and extending over the land and mountains, he settled there various nations and kings for
whom he fixed ranks and special titles and defined their frontiers, on the pattern of what
Ardashīr b. Bābak had done with regards to Khorasan.⁴
The legacy of Sasanian rule has continually informed discussions of caliphal Ar-
menia. In his 7th-century history, Sebēos employs ostikan to refer to a Sasanian
governor in Armenia. Modern scholars identify the word ostikan as an Armeni-
cized version of the Middle Persian ōstīgān (trustworthy); it is used to refer to
the caliphal governor over the North.
 On the North, see Ter-Łevondyan 1976b and, independently, Bates 1989; Vacca 2017b. Arme-
nia, Albania, and Azerbaijan continued to be administered together into the ʿAbbāsid period.
The East and the North were both inherited from the quadripartite division of the Sasanian Em-
pire; cf: the Sasanian-era geography by Širakac‘i, who identifies K‘usti Xorasan and K‘usti Kap-
koh (Armenicized versions of the MP “direction of Khurāsān” and “direction of the Caucasus,”
respectively). See Ter-Łevondyan 1958. The word jarbī appears in Arabic texts about the Sasanian
North; it renders the Syriac , or North.
 Minorsky 1958, 144; al-Masʿūdī 1861, II, 3–4.
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There are two problems moving the title of ostikan into the period of caliphal
rule. First, a recent study identifies ostikan as a loan word from Parthian, not
Middle Persian,⁵ suggesting that the term evokes the memory of Arsacid rather
than Sasanian power. Second, we have no evidence that the title was used to
refer specifically to the caliphal governor until the 10th century. Most medieval
historians who wrote about this period in the North, and in particular Łewond,
who wrote his history under the ʿAbbāsids, do not employ ostikan in reference to
the period of caliphal rule.Yovhannēs Drasxanakertc‘i, writing in the 10th century
after the collapse of ʿAbbāsid control in the North, is the first to reclaim ostikan
to describe caliphal governors.⁶ Prior to this, governors appear with a number of
other Armenian titles, including hramanatar (commander), karcec‘eal marzpan
(the so-called marzpan), zōrawar (general), zōraglux (commander), verakac‘u
(overseer), mec hazarpet (great chiliarch), išxan (prince), marzpan, and hawatar-
im (trustworthy); in Arabic, the governor appears as wālī, ʿāmil, or amīr.⁷ We can-
not look to the term ostikan to elaborate on the connection between Sasanian
and ʿAbbāsid rule.⁸
The ostikan claimed control over two posts. He was responsible for the tax
revenues of the province (ʿalā l-kharāj) and its administration (ʿalā l-ḥarb wa-l-
ṣalāt, literally: over war and prayer).⁹ Sources on the Marwānid and early ʿAbbā-
sid periods indicate a preoccupation with the military aspects of the ostikanate.¹⁰
Ostikans appear in these writings most regularly in response to unrest in the
North, including the revolts of Muḥammad b. ʿUbaydallāh al-Warthānī or Abū
Muslim al-Shārī, and threats beyond the imperial borders posed by the Byzan-
tines, the Khazars, and the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘. Quotidian administration seems
to have fallen to the regional Armenian, Albanian, Georgian, Arab, or Iranian
elites. To facilitate this decentralized model of rule, the ostikan appointed or ap-
 Gippert 1993, II, 217–219.
 It is not even clear that Drasxanakertc‘i defines the word ostikan as “caliphal governor”. Dras-
xanakertc‘i 1996, 110, specifies that a certain ostikan was made governor of Armenia.
 Ter-Łevondyan 1962; Ghazarian 1904, 194; Hübschmann 1908, 215–216.
 Vacca 2017b deals with the relationship between Sasanian and caliphal rule in the North in
depth, including (chapter 4) the position of the ostikan.
 There is only one example in ʿAbbāsid Armenia of these two posts being separated and given
to different individuals.
 This may relate to the position of Armenia as a frontier. See Nicol 1979, 209: “The very nature
of frontier provinces such as Armenia and Khurāsān required a governor with military experi-
ence.”
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proved one of the primary noblemen as Prince of Armenia,¹¹ thereby freeing him-
self for his military duties.
ʿAbbāsid ostikans served in Armenia for short periods before being assigned
to other provinces, usually for only one or two years though sometimes for up to
five. They tended to be Arabs or mawlās, but there were also Iranian ostikans.
Only one ostikan identified as Armenian, a Muslim named ʿAlī b. Yaḥyā al-Arma-
nī. The position was frequently hereditary, as is easily evidenced by the Shaybānī
and Sulamī lines. If we take a step back to view ʿAbbāsid governors as a group
instead of only considering those within Armenia, other families emerge across
the caliphate to boast several generations of governors. For example, the family
members of one of the more famous ostikans, al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba, served over
many decades as the governors of Khurāsān, Sīstān, Damascus, and Ṭabaristān.
Other families, such as the Banū Muhallab, are perhaps better known for their
governorship elsewhere, but appear occasionally in Armenia as well. This prac-
tice allowed the ʿAbbāsids to retain power in the hands of a few trusted families,
while short tenures kept governors from achieving the kind of local stability that
might empower them to threaten caliphal control.¹²
Armenia was frequently ruled as part of a much broader swath of territory.
Just as “Greater Khurāsān” or the “East” can refer to territories outside of the tra-
ditional boundaries of Khurāsān (encroaching typically over Transoxania), so
too does Armenia at times expand to include Caucasian Albania (roughly, the
modern Republic of Azerbaijan and eastern Georgia). It was part of a flexible
“North” including Armenia, Albania, Azerbaijan, and frequently al-Mawṣil
and/or al-Jazīra. It was also sometimes joined with Khurāsān and other eastern
provinces; for example, al-Mutawakkil assigned Armenia, Azerbaijan, Rayy,
Fārs, Ṭabaristān, and Khurāsān to his son al-Muʿtazz in 234 or 235 H.¹³ Armenia
and Khurāsān were also administered in tandem under al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā al-Bar-
makī and ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b. Māhān, as we will see below.
Beginning with the publication of J. H. Petermann’s 1840 De Ostikanis Ara-
bicis Armeniae Gubernatoribus, modern scholars have evinced a preoccupation
with the incumbents of the ostikanate. A number of studies list the ostikans chro-
nologically, outlining the relevant primary sources and expounding on each os-
tikan’s relationship with the local nobility. The most obvious threads through the
 Ter-Łevondyan 1964 and 1969. Interestingly, the Armenian word for “prince” (išxan) is etymo-
logically derived from Sogdian, like the title ikhshīd; see Benveniste 1929. See De La Vaissière
2007, 27 n. 42, for the Sogdian ʾxšyδ.
 Karev 2015, 346.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1893, III, 1395; Laurent / Canard 1980, 445–446 n. 76; Nalbandyan 1958, 121 n. 96;
Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 127 n. 106.
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rosters of early ʿAbbāsid ostikans are the Banū Shaybān and Banū Sulaym, two
Qaysī (North Arabian) tribes spread across the caliphate but located predomi-
nantly in al-Jazīra. The longevity of these family lines demonstrates their signifi-
cance in Armenian history, the close political ties between al-Jazīra and Armenia,
and the apparent preference in the ʿAbbāsid period for hereditary succession
within provincial positions. The Shaybānī and the Sulamī ostikans are also sig-
nificant because they signal the initiation of efforts to Arabize Armenia. Arab
tribes moved from al-Jazīra into the North to support the contested claims to
power the ostikans made against the comparatively stronger local nobility.¹⁴ In
later years, the Shaybānī and the Sulamī amīrs emerged as the leaders of post-
ʿAbbāsid Albania: the Banū Shaybān as the Sharwānshāhs and the Banū Sulaym
as the amīrs of Bāb al-Abwāb/Darband. Most modern studies therefore under-
standably center on the Shaybānī and Sulamī ostikans, linking Armenia to neigh-
boring al-Jazīra and avoiding the connection between Armenia and Khurāsān.
Khurāsānī and Transoxanian Ostikans and Their Armies
In his study of early ʿAbbāsid administration, Nicol identifies only two Khurāsānī
ostikans: ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b. Māhān and Ḥātim b. Harthama, who ruled Armenia for a
combined total of just four years. The present paper challenges and explains Nic-
ol’s conclusion to explore how Armenia integrated into much larger networks of
power reaching far beyond its immediate neighbors. The prosopographical study
of the early ʿAbbāsid ostikans demonstrates that the political fate of Armenia,
like that of the caliphate as a whole, was clearly tied to Khurāsānī generals
and armies.
The ʿAbbāsid period is here divided into subsections: (a) the ʿAbbāsid Rev-
olution; (b) the Khurāsāniyya at the Battle of Baghrawand/Bagrewand; (c) the
ostikanates of Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Amīn; (d) Armenia during the fourth
fitna; and (e) the rise of Transoxanian administrators. These divisions are intend-
ed to facilitate discussion rather than impose strict periodization and should
consequently be understood merely as an organizational tool.
 Ter-Łevondyan 1976a.
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a The ʿAbbāsid Revolution
The idea that the ʿAbbāsids relied on Khurāsānī governors and troops is certainly
nothing new. Even the Armenian priest Łewond, writing at the start of Hārūn al-
Rashīd’s reign, mentions that the ʿAbbāsid Revolution relied on a Khurāsānī
army: the relatives of the Lawgiver called the sons of Hešm “united the troops
of the land of Xorasan and appointed generals over them, Kahat‘ba [Qaḥṭaba
al-Ṭāʾī] and a certain Abu Mslim [Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī], who was cunning
in astrological sorcery.”¹⁵
Al-Yaʿqūbī dates the appointment of the first ʿAbbāsid ostikan to either 132 or
133 H,when Abū l-ʿAbbās appointed Muḥammad b. Ṣūl to govern Armenia.¹⁶ Mu-
ḥammad b. Ṣūl belonged to a Persianized Turkish family in Khurāsān. His father
Ṣūl, whose name was an Arabized version of the Turkish title Chür, was a king of
Jurjān who converted from Zoroastrianism to Islam under the Marwānids and
served as governor of the East. Al-Azdī specifies that there were Khurāsānī troops
under Muḥammad when he was governor of al-Mawṣil, before he moved to Ar-
menia. Since al-Yaʿqūbī claims that he transferred from al-Jazīra to Armenia
with a large force at his command, we may surmise that Muḥammad brought
these same Khurāsānī troops into Armenia as ostikan. However, no explicit evi-
dence supports this.¹⁷
Al-Ṭabarī and al-Balādhurī both skip over Muḥammad entirely, although al-
Balādhurī claims that Abū Jaʿfar (the future al-Manṣūr) sent a Khurāsānī leader
(qāʾidan min ahl Khurāsān) against the Umayyad troops under Musāfir b.
Kathīr.¹⁸ M. Canard, while recognizing that this could refer to Muḥammad b.
Ṣūl, points out that it could equally mean Ṣāliḥ b. Ṣubayḥ al-Kindī. Ṣāliḥ, who
appears in Armenian as the “lawless and bloodthirsty” Calēh. He served as os-
tikan in 133 and 134 H and was apparently appointed on the orders of al-Saffāḥ,
although the chain of command is again blurry. Łewond claims that “Abdla”
placed Ṣāliḥ/Calēh over Armenia: while al-Saffāḥ and al-Manṣūr share the
 Łewond 1857, 156– 157. See also Asołik 1885, 131; Vardan 1927, 55.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 357. NB: Forand 1969, 91 n. 9, claims that al-Saffāḥ appointed an Azdī gov-
ernor from Banū Muhallab as the first ʿAbbāsid governor of Armenia in 133 H based on his read-
ing of al-Azdī, 1967, 145–146. On Muḥammad, see Amabe 1995, 45; Crone 1980, 244 n. 428; Gor-
don 2001, 157– 158; Laurent / Canard 1980, 423–424 n. 24; Nalbandyan 1958, 111 n. 24; Nicol 1979,
89–90 n. 1; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 120 n. 24; Vasmer 1931, 7.
 Forand 1969, 91 n. 9.
 Al-Balādhurī 1866, 209.
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name ʿAbdallāh, here Łewond refers to al-Saffāḥ as Abdla and al-Manṣūr as “the
other Abdla.”¹⁹
b The Khurāsāniyya at the Battle of Baghrawand/Bagrewand
The reliance of the early ʿAbbāsid state on its Khurāsānī military persists into the
Armenian ostikanate well past the revolution. Al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba al-Ṭāʾī, the
“ferocious” (katałi) son of the famous general of the ʿAbbāsid Revolution,²⁰
served as ostikan twice. His first appointment lasted from 136 to 141 H and his
second from 154 to 158 H.²¹ Ibn Aʿtham explains that al-Ḥasan remained in Ar-
menia and appointed his sons to regional posts in the North, placing Qaḥṭaba b.
al-Ḥasan over al-Bāb/Darband, Ibrāhīm over Tiflīs/Tp‘ilisi, and Muḥammad over
Qālīqalā/Karin and Khilāṭ/Xlat‘.²² Łewond further notes that al-Ḥasan’s army
was composed of Khurāsānī soldiers when he entered Armenia: “When the gov-
ernor Hasan son of Kahadba assaulted this land of Armenia along with a large
regiment from the house of the land of Xorasan, who frequently committed lew-
der and disgusting acts, they also increased the miseries and woes of this
land.”²³
According to Łewond, two significant battles between the Khurāsāniyya and
Armenian nobles took place in 158 H during al-Ḥasan’s second tenure as ostikan,
first at Arjīsh/Arčēš and then at Baghrawand/Bagrewand. In her description of
the ostikanate, N. Garsoïan claimed that the Armenian defeat at Baghrawand/Ba-
grewand “marked one of the darkest hours in Armenian history.”²⁴ The Mamiko-
nean family united various Armenian houses there, with the notable exception of
the Bagratunis (some of whom abstained from the battle), against the caliphal
army.
 Łewond 1857, 129. On Ṣāliḥ, see Ghazarian 1904, 187; Laurent / Canard 1980, 425 n. 26; Nal-
bandyan 1958, 111 n. 27; Nicol 1979, 91 n. 2(b); Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 120 n. 27; Vasmer 1931, 8.
 Vardan 1927, 56
 On al-Ḥasan, see Amabe 1995, 72–73; Ghazarian 1904, 187; Laurent / Canard 1980, 426–427
n. 28 and 428–429 n. 30; Markwart 1903, 37; Nalbandyan 1958, 112 n. 29 and 112–113 n. 32; Nicol
1979, 91–92 n. 3; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 121 n. 29 and 121 n. 33; Vasmer 1931, 8 ff.
 Ibn Aʿtham 2016, VIII, 366.
 Łewond 1857, 131– 132. Nalbandyan 1958, 112– 113 n. 32, claims that these Khurāsānī troops
are Arabs, but there is no explicit evidence for their ethnicity. Al-Balādhurī 1866, 187; Nicol 1979,
92 notes that al-Ḥasan was with the governor of al-Jazīra at the head of an army of Khurāsānī
soldiers, but these troops were engaged in raids against Byzantium, not Armenia, in 140 H.
 Garsoïan 2004, 132.
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Łewond specifies that the caliphal army was Khurāsānī and under the com-
mand of a certain Amr, identified as the Khurāsānī general ʿĀmir b. Ismāʿīl al-
Ḥārithī.
[Abdla, meaning al-Manṣūr] gathered the best cavalrymen, some 30,000 choice riders in
heavy armor from the regiment of the house of the land of Xorasan. He handed them
over to a general whose name was Amr and sent him from him, from the vast and famous
city that Abdla had built, fortified for safety with extremely strong and impregnable walls,
called by the name Baghdad. The general rose up from the regions of Syria and arrived in
the city Xlat‘ [Khilāṭ] in this land of Armenia very cautiously and readily armed. When he
arrived in the city, he was informed by the citizens there about the state of the Armenian
forces…²⁵
Łewond’s phrase “of the house of the land of Xorasan” (i tohmē Xorasan ašxar-
hin) renders the Arabic min ahl Khurāsān and so refers to military units (gund in
Armenian, analogous to the Arabic jund) from the East. These units were com-
prised in large part of Arab soldiers, many of whom were banawīs or supporters
of the ʿAbbāsid Revolution and their descendants.²⁶ We might wonder if the ap-
pearance of this phrase in an Armenian history indicates familiarity with Arabic
expressions and/or the oral transmission of akhbār across linguistic lines. One of
Łewond’s sources is “the enemy himself” and the story of Baghrawand/Bagre-
wand may have served as a shared point of interest between Muslims and Chris-
tians in the North.
Al-Balādhurī explains that al-Manṣūr sent troops under ʿĀmir b. Ismāʿīl, al-
lowing al-Ḥasan to defeat Mushāʾil al-Armanī or Mušeł Mamikonean.²⁷ At first
glance it seems plausible that the Arabic accounts may well confirm the refer-
ence to the Khurāsāniyya found in Łewond’s history. Yet Arabic sources in fact
complicate the usual narrative of Baghrawand/Bagrewand. The first clue that
there might be a problem with Łewond’s rendition is a chronological hiccup.
Łewond claims that the Battle of Arjīsh/Arčēš occurred on a Saturday, the fourth
day of the Armenian month hrotic‘, while the Battle of Baghrawand/Bagrewand
was on a Monday, the fourteenth day of hrotic‘. Modern scholars have identified
this as April 15 and 24, 775 CE, which corresponds to the 9th and 18th of jumādā II
158 H. Łewond further clarifies that al-Manṣūr “received the curses of the proph-
et and soon died there desperately in that same year.” This confirms the year he
 Łewond 1857, 177. Vardan 1927, 108 n. 1: Muyldermans inexplicably labels these forces as
Turks.
 Elad 1996, 98; Elad 2005, 281 and 318 on non-Arab elements (ʿajam ahl Khurāsān); perhaps
these were Iranian? See Kennedy 2001, 105.
 Al-Balādhurī 1866, 210.
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is discussing, as al-Manṣūr died on the 6th of dhū l-ḥijja 158 H, or October 7, 775
CE. However, ʿĀmir b. Ismāʿīl in fact died in Baghdad in 157 H. The caliph him-
self prayed over his body and he was buried in the ʿAbbāsid family cemetery.²⁸
Assuming, of course, that ʿĀmir did not command forces in Armenia after his
own death, we are left to either explain away ʿĀmir’s date of death as misinfor-
mation, reject Łewond’s date for the battle, and/or revisit the story in a broader
context. This latter solution also requires revisiting Łewond’s claim regarding the
involvement of the Khurāsāniyya.
Ibn Aʿtham supplies pivotal information about the Khurāsāniyya in Armenia
during the ostikanate of al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba that forces us to reread Łewond’s
text. Al-Manṣūr appointed al-Ḥasan, who immediately faced a rebellion of the
Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘, a Christian people who lived in Khākhīṭ/Kaxet‘i, farther
north than the Armenian heartland. Ibn Aʿtham explains that al-Ḥasan moved
against them with a mixed army of 50,000 min ahl Khurāsān wa-ahl al-Shām
wa-l-ʿIrāq, but he was not able to pacify them and wrote to the caliph to request
reinforcements. These came in the form of ʿĀmir b. Ismāʿīl al-Jurjānī [al-Ḥārithī],
ʿĪsā b. Mūsā al-Khurāsānī, al-Faḍl b. Dīnār, and Muqātil b. Ṣāliḥ, along with
30,000 cavalry.²⁹ If we follow the hypothesis above regarding this oral transmis-
sion, we may speculate that Ibn Aʿtham is reporting the same khabar as Łewond:
he describes 30,000 cavalry (fāris) under the command of someone named
ʿĀmir, moving north on al-Manṣūr’s orders. Ibn Aʿtham’s account, though, has
ʿĀmir defeat the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘ and then return to Iraq without engaging
with the Armenians at all.
This campaign is also corroborated in al-Yaʿqūbī’s history. He explains that:
…the Ṣanāriyya rebelled in Armenia. Abū Jaʿfar [al-Manṣūr] sent al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba as
governor (ʿāmil) over Armenia. He fought them, but he did not have their strength. So he
wrote to Abū Jaʿfar to inform him of them and how many of them [there were]. He [al-Man-
ṣūr] sent to him [al-Ḥasan] ʿĀmir b. Ismāʿīl al-Ḥārithī with 20,000 [men].
ʿĀmir defeated the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘, killed 1,600 of them, and returned to Ti-
flīs/Tp‘ilisi.³⁰ Like Ibn Aʿtham, al-Yaʿqūbī does not place ʿĀmir against the Arme-
nians.
Ibn Aʿtham continues his discussion of al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba’s ostikanate
with the most detailed explanation of the battle of Baghrawand/Bagrewand ex-
tant in medieval Arabic sources. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba (who ap-
 Al-Ṭabarī 1893, III, 380.
 Ibn Aʿtham 2016, VIII, 366.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 372.
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pears in Łewond’s history as an unidentified Mahmet) was responsible for ad-
ministering Qālīqalā/Karin and Khilāṭ/Xlat‘ in his father’s name. The patrician
Mūshābidh (read: Mušeł Mamikonean)³¹ challenged his authority. Mūshābidh
gathered the Armenian nobles against al-Ḥasan’s rule, inspiring Ḥamra b. Jurjīq
(read: Ḥamza b. Jājīq for Hamazasp the son of Gagik Arcruni) to move against
Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥasan.³² Al-Ḥasan was not able to rally his forces effectively
against the Armenians and so wrote again to al-Manṣūr to request aid. This ar-
rived in the form of 10,000 soldiers min ahl al-ʿIrāq. They met al-Ḥasan in Khi-
lāṭ/Xlat‘, a detail that aligns with Łewond’s account. After routing the Armenian
army, al-Manṣūr’s forces looted a Mamikonean church and beheaded the leaders
of the Armenians, including Mūshābidh, sending their heads to al-Manṣūr. Ibn
Aʿtham’s next khabar is the death of al-Manṣūr, which is in line with the tradi-
tional date of Baghrawand/Bagrewand.
While modern scholars have long recognized the battle of Baghrawand/Ba-
grewand as a significant moment in the history of ʿAbbāsid Armenia, we learn
several things by bringing the Arabic sources regarding it into dialogue with
the Armenian. First, and most relevantly for our present purposes, Łewond’s ac-
count showcases the significance of the Khurāsāniyya in maintaining the ʿAbbā-
sid presence in the North: al-Manṣūr sent a Khurāsānī army under the supervi-
sion of several Khurāsānī generals to reinforce a Khurāsānī ostikan. Yet the
Arabic sources do not allow for this. According to Ibn Aʿtham, whose history of-
fers the only detailed description of the battle in Arabic, al-Ḥasan relied on Iraqi
troops at Baghrawand/Bagrewand. If we create a narrative of al-Ḥasan’s ostika-
nate based on Arabic sources, then, we find that ʿĀmir b. Ismāʿīl led the Khurā-
sāniyya north against the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘, returned to Baghdad, and died in
157 H. In 158 H, the Armenians rebelled. Al-Manṣūr sent Iraqi soldiers north to
reinforce al-Ḥasan at the Battle of Baghrawand/Bagrewand and died soon there-
after.
It is striking how many common threads are shared in the Arabic and the
Armenian accounts, despite a few glaring differences. Stories about the Khurā-
sāniyya may well have circulated orally in the North, potentially accounting
for the common ground between Łewond and Ibn Aʿtham. If that is the case,
Łewond’s placement of the Khurāsāniyya at the Battles of Arjīsh/Arčēš and
 The corruption of Mušeł’s name here is a result of the similarity of لئاشوم and ذباشوم in Arabic.
 Hamazasp would have been in Basfurrajān/Vaspurakan, so it seems out of place that Ibn
Aʿtham further identifies Hamazasp as the lord of Georgia. To my knowledge, the Arcruni family
did not hold positions in Georgia at this time. It is likely that the title ṣāḥib bilād Jurzān ( دالببحاص
نازرج ) is a scribal error for ṣāḥib al-Basfurrajān ( ناجرفسبلابحاص ), the Lord of Vaspurakan. Vacca
2019.
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Baghrawand/Bagrewand in fact conflates the akhbār about two separate rebel-
lions against the ʿAbbāsids in the North during al-Ḥasan’s ostikanate, one of
the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘ and the other of the Armenians. Ibn Aʿtham’s version re-
ports the akhbār separately but back-to-back; perhaps the stories of both rebel-
lions circulated as a pair.³³ Details about ʿĀmir’s arrival at the head of 30,000
Khurāsāniyya from Baghdad filtered into Łewond’s description of the battle
even though the information originally referred to the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘. It is
clear Łewond did not preserve the information completely correctly because
(1) the rebellion of the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘ is corroborated elsewhere in al-Yaʿqū-
bī’s history and (2) we know from al-Ṭabarī that ʿĀmir was already dead by the
date Łewond provides for Baghrawand/Bagrewand.
This reexamination of accounts about the battle of Baghrawand/Bagrewand
does not imply that the Khurāsāniyya were not important in enforcing ʿAbbāsid
rule in the North. Indeed, their appearance against the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘ con-
firms the significance of the Khurāsānī army and its generals in upholding al-
Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba’s authority. Yet Łewond’s claims regarding their involvement
at Baghrawand/Bagrewand cannot be substantiated.
c The Ostikanates of Hārūn al-Rashīd and al-Amīn
As both heir apparent and caliph, Hārūn al-Rashīd appointed a number of
Khurāsānī ostikans. Yaḥyā b. Khālid al-Barmakī sometimes appears among the
lists of ostikans under al-Mahdī during Hārūn al-Rashīd’s viceroyalty, although
there is no compelling evidence for his ostikanate.³⁴ However, one of the most
famous and well-attested ostikans under Hārūn was Khuzayma b. Khāzim al-Ta-
mīmī, whose family was from Marw al-Rūdh. Known in both the Arabic and Ar-
menian sources as a harsh governor, Khuzayma served as ostikan for a year and
two months in 169 and 170 H. He was associated with over-taxation and severe
oppression, so much so that Łewond confirms that his name Xazm referred to his
character: the Armenian adjective xazmarar means warlike.³⁵ Drasxanakertc‘i re-
 This is reminiscent of Conrad’s study of Arwād, where akhbār about the conquest of one is-
land shift to that of another; Conrad 1992.
 Laurent / Canard 1980, 429–430 n. 34, has Hārūn al-Rashīd as ostikan and Yaḥyā as finan-
cial administrator; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 121 n. 37; Nalbandyan 1958, 114 n. 36. The passage in
question is al-Ṭabarī 1893, III, 500.
 Łewond 1857, 195–196; for more on his name, see Laurent / Canard 1980, 430–431 n. 37; on
Khuzayma, see also Nalbandyan 1958, 114 n. 39; Nicol 1979, 98–99 n. 13; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 122
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counts his residence in Dabīl/Duin and details his plots to wrest land from the
patriarchate unjustly, since he was “led astray by his wicked desires and demon-
ic avarice.”³⁶ Al-Faḍl b. Yaḥyā al-Barmakī also served as ostikan under Hārūn al-
Rashīd. He was in Khurāsān in 175 H, but there are Armenian coins minted in his
name in the same year; written sources describe him as viceroy over Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Jibāl, and Ṭabaristān in 176 H. This list was expanded in 177 H to in-
clude Khurāsān and Sīstān.³⁷
Coins minted in Armenia and al-Bāb attest the rule of Yaḥyā al-Ḥarashī, who
served as ostikan in 178 and 179 H. This Yaḥyā was probably Khurāsānī, but we
cannot identify his ancestry or provenance with certainty.³⁸ Regardless,Yaḥyā re-
lied on Khurāsānī troops to face two rebellions in the North. Al-Yaʿqūbī explains
that when Hārūn al-Rashīd appointed the Jazarī Aḥmad b. Yazīd al-Sulamī as os-
tikan in 179 H, Aḥmad faced a rebellion of troops min ahl Khurāsān: “those who
came with al-Ḥarashī and who were there before al-Ḥarashī” (man kāna fī l-
balad min ahl Khurāsān miman qadima maʿ al-Ḥarashī wa-qabla al-Ḥarashī).
The fact that he had to face not just al-Ḥarashī’s troops, but also those “who
were there before al-Ḥarashī” implies that some of the Khurāsānī troops were
stationed there prior to becoming part of the retinue of any particular ostikan.
Unsurprisingly, they claimed significant political clout. To assuage the displeas-
ure of these Khurāsānī troops in Armenia, for example, Hārūn al-Rashīd recalled
Aḥmad b. Yazīd and sent Saʿīd b. Salm al-Bāhilī to serve as ostikan in 181 H.³⁹
After Saʿīd b. Salm’s ostikanate, Hārūn al-Rashīd appointed the governor of
Khurāsān, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b. Māhān, over Armenia. Armenian sources omit the
n. 41; Vasmer 1931, 28–29. Note that Łewond and others claim he was appointed by al-Hādī; oth-
ers say Hārūn.
 Drasxanakertc‘i 1987, 115; Drasxanakertc‘i 1996, 114.
 On al-Faḍl, see Amabe 1995, 79; Laurent / Canard 1980, 432 n. 43; Nalbandyan 1958, 115 n. 45;
Nicol 1979, 102 n. 17; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 122–123 n. 48; Vasmer 1931, 32.
 Studies on the ostikanate identify him as Yaḥyā b. Saʿīd al-Ḥarashī. There are a few Saʿīd al-
Ḥarashīs who could be his father. Al-Ṭabarī 1990, 196–197 n. 637, has his full name as Yaḥyā b.
Saʿīd b. Dāwūd; this Saʿīd was a Turk deployed in Khurāsān against al-Muqannaʿ in 163 H.
Amabe 1995, 79 assumes that this identification is correct, but calls him Yaḥyā b. Dāwūd, the
son rather than the grandson of Dāwūd. Crone 1980, 144– 145 suggests that he was a descendent
of Saʿīd b. ʿAmr, the Qaysī general from Qinnasrīn. Alternatively, he could be the son of Saʿīd b.
Muḥammad al-Ḥarashī, himself the son of a Ḥarrānī ostikan named in al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 426 for
the year 177 H. I would like to thank Prof. Amikam Elad for sharing a draft of a paper in which he
offers another suggestion: that al-Ḥarashī ( يشرحلا ) may be a misreading of al-Khursī ( يسرخلا ), an
alternative form of Khurāsānī. He cites al-Tanūkhī re: a Saʿīd al-Khursī as min awlād mulūk
Khurāsān under al-Manṣūr. On Yaḥyā, see also Forand 1969, 97–98; Laurent / Canard 1980,
433 n. 48; Nalbandyan 1958, 115 n. 51; Nicol 1979, 105– 106 n. 22; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 123 n. 54.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 427.
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Khurāsānī ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā’s ostikanate entirely, but we find Armenian and Albanian
dirhams minted in his name in 183 H.⁴⁰ According to al-Yaʿqūbī, “when he ar-
rived, his conduct was terrible. The people of Sharwān rose against him and
the land was in disarray. And so al-Rashīd appointed Yazīd b. Mazyad al-
Shaybānī and he returned ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā to Khurāsān.”⁴¹ When ʿAlī returned to
the East, he faced more complaints of oppression and tyranny until the caliph
himself started the fateful campaign to reign him in.⁴² After the ostikanates of
three Shaybānīs in short succession, Khuzayma b. Khāzim returned to Armenia
as ostikan in 187 H. Al-Yaʿqūbī claims that he remained for only a short time, but
there are coins minted in his name every year from 187 to 191 H.⁴³ These last two
Khurāsānī ostikans (ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā and Khuzayma b. Khāzim) served as the heart of
al-Amīn’s army during the siege of Baghdad. Since Armenian coins survive mint-
ed in al-Amīn’s name during Hārūn al-Rashīd’s reign, we can assume that the
North entered the fourth fitna on his side.
d Armenia During the Fourth Fitna
Soon after Hārūn al-Rashīd’s death, though, the North fell squarely into al-Maʾ-
mūn’s territory. The first ostikan under al-Amīn was Khurāsānī: Muḥammad b.
Zuhayr b. al-Musayyab al-Ḍabbī. He was appointed ostikan before Hārūn’s
death in 193 H, the same year that his father and brothers joined al-Maʾmūn
in Marw. We do not know when Muḥammad’s ostikanate officially ended, but
it is reasonable to assume that he did not remain in control of Armenia long
after al-Amīn took office.⁴⁴ In fact, Armenian sources suggest the land was en-
 Vardanyan 2011, 37 n. 52 and 64 n. 127.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 428; Markwart 1903, 456.
 Nicol 1979, 109 n. 29: There is an Armenian coin in his name as late as 187 H. By this point,
Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī was ostikan and ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā was back in Khurāsān.
On ʿAlī, see Pellat, “ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b. Māhān,” EIr; Sourdel, “Ibn Māhān,” EI2; Laurent / Canard
1980, 433 n. 52; Nalbandyan 1958, 116 n. 55; Nicol 1979, 107– 108 n. 26; Ter-Łevondyan 1977,
123 n. 59; Vasmer 1931, 39.
 On Khuzayma’s second tenure, see Laurent / Canard 1980, 433 n. 52; Nalbandyan 1958, 116 n.
55; Nicol 1979, 107–108 n. 26; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 123 n. 59; Vasmer 1931, 39.
 Vardanyan 2011, 123, 71 n. 148, 72 n. 149: There are Albanian dirhams from 194 H in his name,
but Zambaur and Vasmer date his ostikanate only to 193 H. On Muḥammad, see Crone 1980,
186– 188; Laurent / Canard 1980, 435 n. 59; Nalbandyan 1958, 116 n. 63; Nicol 1979, 112 n. 35;
Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 124 n. 69; Vasmer 1931, 43. On his family’s involvement with al-Maʾmūn:
Elad 2010, 56; Elad 2013, 268.
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tirely independent during this time and ruled by local princes.⁴⁵ While al-Amīn
did appoint ostikans, they were Jazarī or ʿAbbāsid.
Extant coins provide evidence both for al-Maʾmūn’s contested claims over
the North during the fourth fitna and for potential ties between Armenia and
Khurāsān. There are Armenian coins minted in the name of Aḥmad b. Yazīd b.
Usayd al-Sulamī during al-Amīn’s reign,⁴⁶ which led Ter-Łevondyan and Nicol
to conclude that Aḥmad served as ostikan in 195 and 196 H despite a lack of writ-
ten evidence (Aḥmad did in fact serve as a ostikan, but earlier—from 179 to 181
H). Aḥmad would later fight alongside Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn. He may have changed
loyalty over the course of the war,⁴⁷ but if we assume that he supported al-
Maʾmūn even at the start of al-Amīn’s reign, then his Armenian coins potentially
add weight to the theory that local powers in the North supported al-Maʾmūn
and perhaps even confirm the hypothesis that al-Maʾmūn’s generals were recruit-
ing Arab troops from the North to fight against al-Amīn.⁴⁸
Studies on the ostikanate have identified Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad al-Ṣanʿānī as
al-Maʾmūn’s first ostikan. His earliest Armenian coins date to 196 H, two years
before the death of al-Amīn.⁴⁹ Nicol marks this Ṭāhir as “ancestry unknown,”
but Amabe instead renders al-Yaʿqūbī’s text with the nisba al-Ṣaghānī ( يناغصلا ),
meaning that Ṭāhir was from Chaghāniyān in Transoxania instead of Ṣanʿāʾ
( يناعنصلا ).⁵⁰ Whether from Chaghāniyān or Ṣanʿāʾ, Ṭāhir’s appointment suggests
that Armenia was looking to Khurāsān, not Baghdad, as the center of the caliph-
ate. Al-Yaʿqūbī claims that either al-Maʾmūn or Harthama b. Aʿyan sent Ṭāhir b.
Muḥammad to the North, where he allied with the Armenian and Albanian pat-
 Vardan 1927, 58.
 Vasmer 1931, 54.
 Elad 2013, 260: “We have no information of his activities during al-Amīn’s rule,” so it is ad-
mittedly entirely possible that he had not yet declared for al-Maʾmūn and was in al-Amīn’s serv-
ice in the North.
 Elad 2013, 267 and 273.
 Vardanyan 2011, 72 n. 151, 73 n. 152, 73 n. 153.
 Amabe 1995, 100 and 131. He cites both al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 461 and al-Ṭabarī, III, 802: the
former clearly reads يناعنصلا and the latter does not refer to either nisba and concerns Ṭāhir b.
al-Tājī. Amabe explains that “In Hamadān Harthama sent Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad of Chaghāniyān
to Armenia and Adharbayjān as governor.” This relies on his reading of al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 461.
Amabe clearly reads Harthama as the subject and Ṭāhir as the direct object of the verb ههجو ,
meaning that [some say that] Harthama dispatched Muḥammad. Nicol 1979, 113 n. 39 cites
the same passage in passive voice: “It is said that Harthama b. Aʿyan was sent from Ḥamadān
while Ṭāhir was headed for Iraq and then towards Warthān in the prefecture of Azerbaijan.”
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ricians in 196 H to lay siege to Bardhaʿa/Partaw in order to take the province
from al-Amīn’s ostikan.⁵¹
The connection between the administration of Khurāsān and Armenia con-
tinued in the first days of al-Maʾmūn’s reign. A few curious coins minted without
the name of a governor in Maʿdan Bājunays/Apahunik‘ in 199 H bear the title dhū
l-riyāsatayn, or “possessor of the two posts.” Vasmer concludes that “die Dir-
hems von Maʿdin Bāǧunais 199…geben leider gar keinen Aufschluß darüber,
wer um diese Zeit Statthalter war.”⁵² Yet this title is well attested and commonly
refers to al-Faḍl b. Sahl, who at that time would have been al-Maʾmūn’s governor
of Khurāsān, where he served from 197 to 202 or 203 H.⁵³ While studies of the
ostikanate do not typically include al-Faḍl b. Sahl, these coins suggest that his
authority did indeed reach as far as the North. Al-Ṭabarī explains that al-Faḍl
controlled the East from Tibet to the Indian Ocean and the “sea of Daylam
and Jurjān.”⁵⁴ It stands to reason that Armenia was part of al-Faḍl’s East. The Ar-
menian coins represent an extension of the power of the Banū Sahl, and of
course al-Maʾmūn, outside Khurāsān. Furthermore, Ter-Łevondyan mentions a
comparable coin minted with that title in Albania in 197 H, even before al-
Amīn’s death.⁵⁵
Al-Maʾmūn appointed Harthama b. Aʿyan’s son Ḥātim b. Harthama as osti-
kan in either 200 or 201 H.⁵⁶ His father, one of the main generals of the fourth
fitna and former governor of Khurāsān, had fallen out of favor and died in a pris-
on in Marw.When the news of Harthama’s death reached Armenia, Ḥātim wrote
to the local patricians (wa-kātaba al-baṭāriqa wa-wujūh ahl Armīniya) to muster a
 On Ṭāhir, see Laurent / Canard 1980, 435 n. 62; Markwart 1903, 457; Nalbandyan 1958, 117 n.
67; Nicol 1979, 113–114 n. 39; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 124 n. 75; Vasmer 1931, 55 (his coins read Ṭāhir
b. Muḥammad, so they cannot add anything to the discussion of the correct reading of the
nisba).
 Vasmer 1931, 58–59; see photos in Vardanyan 2011, 97 n. 217–218.
 Sourdel, “al-Faḍl b. Sahl b. Zad ̲h ̲ānfarūk ̲h̲,” EI2; Bosworth, “Fażl, b. Sahl b. Zādānfarrūḵ,”
EIr. On al-Faḍl’s coins with the title dhū l-riyāsatayn, see Karev 2015, 322; Nastich 2012,
39–40 (although his Samarqandī coin has since been corrected to Shirāzī online).
 Al-Ṭabarī 1893, III, 841.
 Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 124 n. 76: he attributes this coin to Sulaymān b. Aḥmad b. Sulaymān al-
Hāshimī, citing al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 462. The passage in question identifies Sulaymān as al-
Maʾmūn’s ostikan. This coin does not appear in Vardanyan.
 On Ḥātim, see Amabe 1995, 116; Crone 1980, 177– 178; Laurent / Canard 1980, 436 n. 66;
Lewis, “Ḥātim b. Harthama,” EI2; Markwart 1903, 458; Nalbandyan 1958, 118 n. 73; Nicol 1979,
115 n. 44; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 125 n. 79; Vasmer 1931, 57.
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rebellion,⁵⁷ one that did not survive his death in 203 H. Crone identifies this re-
bellion as in line with comparable movements in Khurāsān:
It must have been the mutual fear between the caliph and Khurāsān that triggered the sur-
prisingly numerous revolts by apparent pillars of the regime who made sudden changes of
allegiance. Ziyād b. Ṣāliḥ apart, Jahwar b. Marār, Zuwāra al-Bukhārī, al-Ishtākhanj, ʿAbd al-
Jabbār, and Rāfiʿ b. Layth are all in that category. There is a later example in Ḥātim b. Har-
thama, the governor of Azerbaijan who had hitherto been a pillar of the regime along with
his father, who planned to rebel when he heard that his father had been executed: he must
have assumed (undoubtedly correctly) that he was next on the list. The only reasonable ex-
planation of the behaviour of the earlier Khurāsānīs is that, like Ḥātim, they suspected that
they had fallen out of favour.⁵⁸
Ḥātim was not dragging Armenian patricians into a battle to pitch the
Khurāsānīs against the caliph, but rather into an intra-Khurāsānī struggle for in-
fluence over the caliph. Harthama’s main concern was the extensive power the
Banū Sahl wielded under al-Maʾmūn. In this he was perhaps similar to Rāfiʿ
b. al-Layth, whose rebellion against the caliph was sparked by the abuses of
ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā. Harthama did not set out to challenge the caliph or even the “Abba-
sid-Khurāsānī axis of power.”⁵⁹ His fight was to determine who represented
Khurāsānī power within that axis. In calling upon the Armenian elites to join
his rebellion, Ḥātim drew the North into broader political patterns, some of
which were internal to Khurāsān.
e The Rise of Transoxanian Administrators
In his passage on Ḥātim’s rebellion, al-Yaʿqūbī explains that he wrote not only to
the Armenian patricians, but also to Bābak; Crone dismisses this as “implausi-
ble.”⁶⁰ This does mark a shift in the ostikanate, though, as the administration
of Armenia is certainly sidelined by the ongoing Khurramī rebellion in neighbor-
ing Azerbaijan (usually administered with Armenia and Albania as a single prov-
ince). From that point, all of the ostikans, whether Jazarī or Khurāsānī, were gen-
erals appointed in hopes of their fighting Bābak. Khurāsānī ostikans of this time
 Al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, II, 462.
 Crone 2012, 119.
 Daniel 1979, 157. He calls it “the supposed Abbasid-Khurāsānī axis of power.” I have dropped
the “supposed” because it seems quite clear that there was a relationship between ʿAbbāsid
power and Khurāsān. Daniel’s concern is to account for Khurāsānī resistance to the said axis.
 Crone 2012, 65, though she is responding to Ibn Qutayba.
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include banawīs⁶¹ who were either Arabs or mawlās of Arab tribes, such as
Yaḥyā b. Muʿādh b. Muslim al-Dhuhlī (204–5 H),⁶² Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Muʿādh
(205 H),⁶³ ʿĪsā b. Muḥammad b. Abī Khālid (205–208 H),⁶⁴ Muḥammad b. Hu-
mayd al-Ṭūsī (212–213H),⁶⁵ and ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir (214 H).⁶⁶ Al-Muʿtaṣim
named al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī al-Bādhghīsī as ostikan; he was either a mawlā or a rel-
ative of al-Maʾmūn; he appears as Badołi in Armenian, where Բադողի (Badołi) is
a corruption of Բադղսի (Badłsi).⁶⁷
In the wake of the fourth fitna, ʿAbbāsid policy towards Transoxania shifted
and the effects are visible in the ostikanate. According to al-Balādhurī, al-
Maʾmūn and following him al-Muʿtaṣim sent envoys to Transoxania with gifts
to encourage Transoxanian leaders to join the caliphal army. They recruited sol-
diers by entering their names into the dīwān:⁶⁸ “cette action d’al-Maʾmūn donne
l’occasion à beaucoup de nobles de faire une brillante carrière au califat…mais
elle arrive trop tard pour qu’ils puissant rattraper leur position politique et écon-
omique au Māwarāʾannahr même.”⁶⁹ With the Sāmānid takeover of Transoxania
in 205 H, these generals and soldiers were sent elsewhere, including to Armenia.
Several of the ostikans have nisbas from the East, i.e., Khurāsān itself and
“Greater” Khurāsān, including Transoxania.⁷⁰ Al-Muʿtaṣim appointed one of
the most famous ostikans: al-Afshīn Ḥaydār b. Kāʿūs al-Usrūshanī, Apʿšin in Ar-
 I am using this term as it commonly appears in modern scholarship, though Crone 1998, 5
points out that some of the more famous banawī actually do not claim that nisba explicitly in our
primary sources.
 On Yaḥyā, see Crone 1980, 184; Elad 2010, 43; Laurent / Canard 1980, 436 n. 67; Nalbandyan
1958, 118 n. 74; Nicol 1979, 115 n. 46; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 125 n. 80; Vasmer 1931, 59 f.
 On Aḥmad, see Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 125 n. 81; Vasmer 1931, 60.
 On ʿĪsā, see Laurent / Canard 1980, 436–437 n. 68; Markwart 1903, 458; Nalbandyan 1958,
118 n. 75; Nicol 1979, 115–116 n. 47; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 125 n. 82; Vasmer 1931, 60–61.
 On Muḥammad, see Amabe 1995, 117; Crone 1980, 175; Elad 2013, 272–275; Nalbandyan 1958,
119 n. 79; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 125 n. 88; Vasmer 1931, 64–65.
 On ʿAbdallāh, see Bosworth, “ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāher,” EIr; Laurent / Canard 1980, 438 n. 70;
Markwart 1903, 459; Nalbandyan 1958, 119 n. 80; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 125 n. 89; Vasmer 1931,
65 and 71.
 Dowsett 1957, 457 n. 1 argues convincingly that Markwart’s attempt to read Բադողի as Ազդի
to refer to Muḥammad b. Sulaymān al-Azdī al-Samarqandī is incorrect; cf: Markwart 1903, 462.
On al-Ḥasan, see Amabe 1995, 140; Crone 2012, 63 n. 118; Elad 2010, 41–42; Laurent / Canard
1980, 439–441 n. 72; Nalbandyan 1958, 120 n. 86; Nicol 1979, 119 n. 51(d); Ter-Łevondyan 1977,
126 n. 96; Vasmer 1931, 81.
 Al-Balādhurī 1866, 431; Kennedy 2001, 118– 119 and 124; Gordon 2001, 31; De La Vaissière
2007, 174– 175.
 Karev 2015, 350.
 On the definition of Khurāsān, see Rante 2015.
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menian, the general who finally routed Bābak and forced him to flee to the Al-
banian lord Sahl b. Sinbāṭ. This lord, whose name is Persianized in Armenian as
Sahl-i Smbatean, offered Bābak sanctuary but then handed him over to al-Af-
shīn, all while disparaging the idea that caliphal governors could ever hold
sway over him. Al-Muʿtaṣim awarded al-Afshīn the governorship of Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Jibāl, and Sind. From 220 to 225 H, al-Afshīn was based in Barzand
and sent a number of ostikans to rule Armenia in his name, including Muḥam-
mad b. Sulaymān al-Samarqandī⁷¹ and Muḥammad b. Khālid Bukhārakhudā.
This last ostikan’s title is corrupted in Armenian to read Bulxar Xoyta P‘atgos;
p‘atgos is the Armenicized version of the Persian padhgospān.⁷² Afshīn similarly
appointed his brother-in-law Mankjūr al-Farghānī over Azerbaijan in 224 H. This
shifts al-Muʿtaṣim’s ostikans from Arabs andmawlās to Turks and from Khurāsān
proper to the edges: Usrūshana, Farghāna, Samarqand, and Bukhārā.
These generals were charged with continuing the campaigns against Bābak
and other upheavals in the North, but also administered Armenia and Albania.
The Albanians assumed that the ostikans had a direct line of communication to
the caliph himself, not one made via the viceroy al-Afshīn. For example, Dasxur-
anc‘i explains that Badołi (al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī) was established in al-Nashawā/Nax-
čawan in 283 AE “at the command of the prince of the Tačiks called Amir
Mumin,” where he martyred an Armenian Christian.⁷³ The same source claims
that the Bukhārakhudā received the catholicos Yovhannēs, whom Dasxuranc‘i
identifies as “the Lord of Lords, the lord of the Armenians, Georgians, and Alba-
nians,” and served as an intermediary between the Armenians and “the court of
the Amir Momnin” in 287 AE (the same year as the sack of Amorium, 223 H).⁷⁴
His attention was pulled north against the Ṣanāriyya/Canark‘ and Isḥāq b. Is-
māʿīl, the independent amīr of Tiflīs/Tp‘ilisi.
Abū Saʿīd Muḥammad b.Yūsuf, known as Apusēt‘ in Armenian, was another
Khurāsānī commander who fought against Bābak. He later returned to Armenia
 On Muḥammad, see Amabe 1995, 115; Ghazarian 1904, 189; Laurent / Canard 1980, 441–443
n. 73; Nalbandyan 1958, 120 n. 88; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 126 n. 98; Vasmer 1931, 63.
 Dowsett 1957, 459 n. 7 and 461 n. 2 and 3 offer manuscript variants of this title: Բովխար
Խուտա Փատգոս, Բուլխար Խոյտա Փատգոս, and Բուլխարխոյ Տափատգոս, but Dowsett
leaves P‘atgos unresolved. Minorsky 1958, 57 identifies the word p‘atgos as an abbreviation of
padhgospān in reference to another ostikan mentioned in Dasxuranc‘i’s text: Muḥammad b.
Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī. On the Bukhārakhudā, see De La Vaissière 2007, 175–
176; Laurent / Canard 1980, 441–443 n. 73; Markwart 1903, 461; Nalbandyan 1958, 120 n. 89;
Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 126 n. 99; Vasmer 1931, 84.
 Dasxuranc‘i 1961, 216; Dasxuranc‘i 1983, 329.
 Dowsett 1957, 459; Dasxuranc‘i 1983, 330–331: “the court of the Amir Momnin” is rendered as
ամիր մոմնւոյ դարապաս․
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as ostikan for al-Mutawakkil from 234 to 236 H. Abū Saʿīd was a mawlā of Banū
Ṭayy from Marw. T‘ovma Arcruni, the Armenian historian who offers the most ex-
tensive discussion of Abū Saʿīd’s ostikanate, describes him as a noble (naxarar)
who was, interestingly, “familiar with Hebrew literature.”⁷⁵ The two main noble
Armenian families at the time, the Bagratunis and Arcrunis, refused Abū Saʿīd
entrance to their territories and so he returned to Sāmarrāʾ.⁷⁶ Al-Mutawakkil
sent Abū Saʿīd’s son, Yūsuf b. Muḥammad al-Marwazī, Yovsēp‘ in Armenian,
to Armenia as ostikan following his father’s death in 236 H. Facing the caliphal
army, the Armenian families capitulated immediately. Ostensibly in revenge for
the humiliation of the Bagratuni patrician, the Khuwaythiyya/Xut‘ (inhabitants
of the region of Khoyṭ/Xoyt‘) killed Yūsuf al-Marwazī, triggering the Caucasian
campaigns of Bughā al-Kabīr which devastated the North from 237 to 241 H.⁷⁷
This marked the end of the Khurāsānī presence in the ʿAbbāsid administration
of Armenia, if only because the backbone of the ʿAbbāsid army had shifted.
Bughā entered Armenia with an army of Turkish and Maghribī Arabs (al-atrāk
wa-l-maghāriba).
Conclusions
This selective narrative of the ostikanate demonstrates how early ʿAbbāsid rule in
Armenia relied heavily on Khurāsānī ostikans and troops. Nicol has come to the
opposite conclusion, i.e., that very few Khurāsānīs served as ostikan, for a few
reasons. First, he labels mawlās as a separate category without recognizing
that most of his examples, like Muḥammad b. Ṣūl and Yaḥyā b. Muʿādh, were
also Khurāsānī. Second, some ostikans such as the Barmakīs appear in his
study as “Iranian” ostikans despite their familial ties to Khurāsān. Finally,
Arab Khurāsānīs frequently appear in Nicol’s study as representatives of their
tribes instead of their regions. This is particularly surprising since he also incor-
rectly identifies his two Khurāsānī ostikans, ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā and Ḥātim b. Harthama,
as Arabs.⁷⁸ In order to conclude that Armenia rarely saw a Khurāsānī ostikan, we
would have to take our cues from al-Jāḥiẓ and draw definitive lines between the
 T‘ovma Arcruni 1985a, 174; T‘ovma Arcruni 1985b, 170․
 On Abū Saʿīd, see Ghazarian 1904, 190; Laurent / Canard 1980, 446 n. 77; Nalbandyan 1958,
121–2 n. 97; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 127 n. 107; Vasmer 1931, 92.
 On these campaigns, see Vacca 2017a. On Yūsuf, see Laurent / Canard 1980, 447 n. 78; Nal-
bandyan 1958, 122 n. 98; Ter-Łevondyan 1977, 127 n. 108; Vasmer 1931, 93.
 Crone 1998, 8: ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā was Iranian, the son of a mawlā of Banū Khuzāʿa. Crone 1980, 177:
Harthama b. Aʿyan was a mawlā of Banū Ḍabba.
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mawlās, the Iranians, the Khurāsānīs, and the Arabs as if these were distinct and
mutually exclusive identities.⁷⁹
By focusing on the Khurāsānī ostikans, this partial narrative of the ostikanate
demonstrates how Armenia was integrated into caliphal politics and not just an
extension of al-Jazīra or a buffer between the caliphate and Byzantium or Kha-
zaria. Since the ostikanate was primarily a military position, these Khurāsānī os-
tikans came from the backbone of the ʿAbbāsid army and accordingly were usu-
ally Arabs or affiliated with Arab tribes through walāʾ.
It is entirely possible to write wholly different narratives about the ostikanate
than that presented here: for example, the close connection between al-Jazīra
and Armenia, focusing on the Shaybānī and Sulamī ostikans, would offer signif-
icant insight into regional politics. But this paper has sought to make sense of
the Khurāsānī element specifically because it has never been noted in the liter-
ature on the ostikanate. It centers the discussion of Armenia in an ʿAbbāsid im-
perial setting.
Along with Islamic numismatics, the ostikanate is one of the few well-re-
searched topics concerning caliphal rule in Armenia, but even studies of caliphal
governors demonstrate the pervasive presumption that Armenia is separate from
the caliphate. Articles on the ostikans seek to make sense of discrepancies in the
sources, listing dates, sources, and deeds of each incumbent without reference to
the broader political schemas in which they lived. Scholars have studied the os-
tikans based on what they did in Armenia and to a lesser extent how they inter-
acted with Armenian and Albanian elites, not for their role in the caliphal ad-
ministration. Yet without the broader lens of both imperial concerns and
transregional elites, we cannot trace responses to political stimuli outside of Ar-
menia such as the fourth fitna or the rising influence of Transoxanian adminis-
trators. Accordingly, these studies underestimate the significance of the caliphal
North as a region where ʿAbbāsid power and (as in the case of Ḥātim’s rebellion)
intra-Khurāsānī conflict played out. Their assumption that Armenia differs from
the rest of the caliphate also predicates modern understandings of extant sour-
ces. Armenian sources, if “othered,” appear to serve as independent corrobora-
tion for the Arabic, but the accounts of Baghrawand/Bagrewand demonstrate
discourse and engagement, not isolation. Accordingly, focusing on the relation-
ship between Armenia and Khurāsān can help us maneuver around modern ex-
pectations of ethnoreligious borders to tell a story of a far-flung but integrated
caliphate.
 Al-Jāḥiẓ identifies the branches of the ʿAbbāsid army as the Khurāsāniyya, abnāʾ, mawālī,
Arabs, and Turks. Crone 1998, 5–6; Kennedy 2001, 104.




al-Azdī, Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yazīd b. Muḥammad (1967), Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, ed. by ʿAlī Ḥabība,
Cairo: Dār al-taḥrīr.
al-Balādhurī, Abū l-Ḥasan Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. Jābir (1866), Futūḥ al-Buldān, ed. by M. J. de
Goeje, Leiden: Brill.
Ibn Aʿtham, Abū Muḥammad Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Kūfī (2016), Kitāb al-Futūḥ, accessed online:
http://ar.lib.eshia.ir/40046/1/5, last accessed 4 May 2017.
al-Masʿūdī, Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn b. ʿAlī (1861), Les Prairies d’or, French translation
by Charles de Meynard & Abel de Courteille, Paris: Société Asiatique.
al-Muqaddasī, Muḥammad b. Aḥmad b. Abī Bakr (1906), Kitāb Aḥsan al-taqāsim fī maʿrifat
al-aqālīm, ed. by M. J. de Goeje, Leiden: Brill.
al-Ṭabarī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr b. Yazīd (1893), Taʾrīkh al-rusul wa-l-mulūk, ed. by
M. J. de Goeje, Leiden: Brill.
al-Ṭabarī, Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad b. Jarīr b. Yazīd (1990), The History of al-Ṭabarī XXIX:
al-Manṣūr and al-Mahdī, English translation by Hugh Kennedy, Albany: SUNY.
al-Yaʿqūbī, Aḥmad b. Abī Yaʿqūb b. Jaʿfar (1960), Taʾrīkh, Beirut: Dār ṣādir.
Armenian
Anonymous Storyteller (1971), Patmut‘iwn ananun zruc‘agri karcec‘eal Šapuh Bagratuni, ed.
by Margarita Darbinjan-Melikjan, Erevan: Haykakan SSH Gitut‘yunneru Akademiayi
Hratarakč‘ut‘yun.
Asołik, Step‘anos Tarōnec‘i (1885), Patmut‘iwn tiezerakan, ed. by Step‘an Malxasyanc, Saint
Petersburg: I. N. Skorokhodovi.
Dasxuranc‘i, Movsēs (1961), History of the Caucasian Albanians by Movses Dasxuranc‘i, trans.
by Charles James Frank Dowsett, London: Oxford University Press.
Dasxuranc‘i, Movsēs (1983), Patmut‘iwn ałuanic‘ ašxarhi, ed. by Varag Aṙak‘elyan, Erevan:
Haykakan SSH Gitut‘yunneru Akademiayi Hratarakč‘ut‘yun.
Drasxanakertc‘i, Yovhannēs (1987), History of Armenia, trans. by Krigor H. Maksoudian,
Atlanta: Scholars Press.
Drasxanakertc‘i, Yovhannēs (1996), Hayoc‘ patmut‘iwn, ed. by Gevorg Babkeni T‘usunyan,
Erevan: Yerevani hamalsarani hratarakč‘ut‘yun.
Łewond (1857), Aršawank‘ Arabac‘ i Hays, ed. by Karapet Chahnazarian, Paris: E. Thunot &
Co.
T‘ovma Arcruni (1985a), History of the House of the Artsrunik‘: Translation and Commentary,
trans. By Robert Thomson, Detroit: Wayne State Press.
T‘ovma Arcruni (1985b), Patmut‘iwn Tann Arcruneac‘, ed. by Vrez Vardanyan, Erevan: Erevani
hamalsarani hratarakč‘ut‘yun.
250 Alison Vacca
Vardan Arewelc‘i (1927), La domination arabe en Arménie: extrait de l’histoire universelle de
Vardan, traduit de l’arménien et annoté étude de critique textuelle et littéraire, ed. by
Joseph Muyldermans, Louvain: J-B Istas.
Studies
Amabe, Fukuzo (1995), The Emergence of the ʿAbbāsid Autocracy: The ʿAbbāsid Army,
Khurāsān and Adharbayjān, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.
Bates, Michael L. (1989), “The Dirham Mint of the Northern Provinces of the Umayyad
Caliphate”, Armenian Numismatic Journal / Hay dramagitakan handes 15/1: 89–111.
Benveniste, Emile (1929), “Titres iraniens en arménien”, Revue des Etudes Arminiennes 9:
5–10.
Bosworth, Clifford E., “Abdallāh b. Tāher”, EIr, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/abdal
lah-b-taher-governor (accessed on 29 April 2017).
Bosworth, Clifford E., “Fażl b. Sahl b. Zādānfarruḵ”, EIr, http://www.iranicaonline.org/ar
ticles/fazlb-sahl-b-zadanfarruk (accessed on 29 April 2017).
Conrad, Lawrence (1992), “The Conquest of Arwād: a Source-Critical Study in the
Historiography of the Early Medieval Near East”, in: Averil Cameron and Lawrence
Conrad, eds., The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East, Vol. 1: Problems in the Literary
Source Material, Princeton: Darwin Press, 317–401.
Crone, Patricia (1980), Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Crone, Patricia (1998), “The ʿAbbāsid Abnāʾ and Sāsānid Cavalrymen”, Journal of the Royal
Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 8/1: 1–19.
Crone, Patricia (2012), The Nativist Prophets of Early Islamic Iran: Rural Revolt and Local
Zoroastrianism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Daniel, Elton L. (1979), The Political and Social History of Khurasan under Abbasid Rule,
747–820, Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica.
Dowsett, Charles (1957), “A Neglected Passage in the ‘History of the Caucasian Albanians’”,
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 19/3: 456–68.
Elad, Amikam (1996), “Aspects of the Transition from the Umayyad to the ʿAbbāsid
Caliphate”, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 19: 89–132.
Elad, Amikam (2005), “Mawālī in the Composition of al-Maʾmūn’s Army: a Non-Arab
Takeover?”, in: Monique Bernards and John Nawas, eds., Patronate and Patronage in
Early and Classical Islam, Leiden: Brill, 278–325.
Elad, Amikam (2010), “The Armies of al-Maʾmūn in Khurāsān (193–202/809–817/18):
Recruitment of its Contingents and their Commanders and their Social-Ethnic
Composition”, Oriens 38: 35–76.
Elad, Amikam (2013), “Al-Maʾmūn’s Military Units and their Commanders up to the end of the
Siege of Baghdad”, Abbasid Studies IV: 245–84.
Forand, Paul G. (1969), “The Governors of Mosul according to al-Azdī’s Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil”,
Journal of the American Oriental Society 89/1: 88–105.
Garsoïan, Nina G. (2004), “The Arab Invasions and the Rise of the Bagratuni (640–884)”, in:
Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. 1: the
Khurāsānī and Transoxanian Ostikans of Early ʿAbbāsid Armenia 251
Dynastic Periods from Antiquity to the Fourteenth Century, New York: St. Martin’s Press,
117–42.
Ghazarian, Mkrtitsch (1904), “Armenien unter der arabischen Herrschaft bis zur Entstehung
des Bagratidenreiches nach arabischen und armenischen Quellen bearbeitet”, Zeitschrift
für armenische Philologie 2: 149–225.
Gippert, Jost (1993), Iranica Armeno-Iberica: Studien zu den iranischen Lehnwörtern im
Armenischen und Georgischen, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften.
Gordon, Matthew S. (2001), The Breaking of a Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish
Military of Samarra, AH 200–275 / 815–889 CE, Albany: SUNY Press.
Hübschmann, Heinrich (1908), Armenische Grammatik, Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel.
Karev, Yury (2015), Samarqand et le Sughd à l’époque ʿAbbāsside: histoire politique et
sociale, Paris: Association pour l’Avancement des Études Iraniennes.
Kennedy, Hugh (2001), Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State,
New York: Routledge.
Laurent, Joseph / Canard, M. (1980), L’Arménie entre Byzance et l’Islam depuis la conquête
arabe jusqu’en 886, Lisbon: Librairie Bertrand.
Lewis, Bernard, “Ḥātim b. Harthama”, EI2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573–3912_islam_SIM_
2804 (accessed on 29 April 2017).
Markwart, Josef (1903), Osteuropäische und ostasiatische Streifzüge: Ethnologische und
historisch-topographische Studien zur Geschichte des 9. und 10. Jahrhunderts
(ca. 840–940), Leipzig: Dieterich’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Minorsky, Vladimir (1958), A History of Sharvān and Darband in the 10th–11th Centuries,
Cambridge: Heffer.
Nalbandyan, H. (1958), “Arabayi ostikannerə Hayastanum”, Hayastan SSR Gitut‘yunneri
akademiayi tełekagir 8: 105–24.
Nastich, Vladimir N. (2012), Early Islamic Copper Coinage of Transoxiana: A Generic Survey
Focused on Newly Discovered Coin Types, Trieste: EUT.
Nicol, Norman D. (1979), Early ʿAbbāsid Administration in the Central and Eastern Provinces,
132–218 AH / 750–833 AD, PhD Dissertation, University of Washington.
Pellat, Charles, “ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā b. Māhān”, EIr, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ali-b-isa-b-
mahan (accessed on 29 April 2017).
Rante, Rocco (2015), “‘Khorasan Proper’ and ‘Greater Khorasan’ Within a Politico-Cultural
Framework” in: Rocco Rante, ed., Greater Khorasan: History, Geography, Archaeology
and Material Culture, Berlin: De Gruyter.
Sourdel, Dominique, “al-Faḍl b. Sahl b. Zadhānfarūkh”, EI2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/
1573–3912_islam_SIM_2228 (accessed on 29 April 2017).
Sourdel, Dominique, “Ibn Māhān”, EI2, http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573–3912_islam_SIM_3277
(accessed on 29 April 2017).
Ter-Łevondyan, Aram N. (1958), “K‘usti kapkoh varč‘akan miavori verapruknerə xalifayut‘yan
žamanak”, Haykakan SSR Gitut‘yunneri akademiayi tełekagir 9: 73–77.
Ter-Łevondyan, Aram N. (1962), “Ditołut‘yunner ‘ostikan’ baṙi masin”, Patma-Banasirakan
Handes 4: 243–248.
Ter-Łevondyan, Aram N. (1964), “‘Hayoc‘ išxanǝ’ arabakan tirapetut‘yun žamanakašrǰanum”,
Patma-Banasirakan Handes 2: 121–134.
252 Alison Vacca
Ter-Łevondyan, Aram N. (1969), “‘Hayoc‘ išxan’ titłosi cagumǝ ev Hayoc‘ tirut‘yunǝ 7-rd
darum”, Banber Erevani Hamalsarani I: 241–247.
Ter-Łevondyan, Aram N. (1976a), Arab Emirates in Bagratid Armenia, trans. Nina Garsoïan,
Lisbon: Livraria Bertrand.
Ter-Łevondyan, Aram N. (1976b), “Arabakan xalifayut‘yan hyusisayin p‘oxark‘ayut‘yunə”,
Merjavor ev miǰin arevelk‘i erkrner ev žołovurdner III: arabakan erkrner, Erevan:
publisher unknown.
Ter-Łevondyan, Aram N. (1977), “Arminiayi ostikanneri žamanakagrut‘yunǝ”, Ēǰmiacin 3:
34–39.
Vacca, Alison M. (2017a), “Conflict and Community in the Medieval Caucasus”, al-ʿUṣūr
al-Wusṭā 25: 66–112.
Vacca, Alison M. (2017b), Non-Muslim Provinces under Early Islam, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Vacca, Alison M. (2019), “Al-Basfurraǧān and Banū l-Dayrānī: Vaspurakan and the Arcrunik‘ in
Arabic Sources”, in: Zaroui Pogossian & Edda Vardanyan, ed., The Church of the Holy
Cross of Ałt‘amar: Politics, Art, Spirituality in the Kingdom of Vaspurakan. Leiden: Brill,
67–99.
de la Vaissière, Étienne (2007), Samarcande et Samarra: Élites d’Asie centrale dans l’empire
abbasside, Paris: Association pour l’Avancement des Études Iraniennes.
Vardanyan, Aram R. (2011), Islamic Coins Struck in Historic Armenia. I: Armin̄iya, Arran̄
(Madin̄at Arran̄), Bardaʻa, Dabil̄, Har̄un̄abad / Har̄un̄iya and Maʿdan Baj̄unays: Early
ʿAbbas̄id Period, 142–277 AH / 759–891 AD, Erevan: Tigran Mec.
Vasmer, Richard (1931), Chronologie der arabischen Statthalter von Armenien unter den
Abbasiden, von as-Saffach bis zur Krönung Aschots I, 750–887, Vienna:
Mechitharisten-Buchdr.
Khurāsānī and Transoxanian Ostikans of Early ʿAbbāsid Armenia 253

Simon Gundelfinger & Peter Verkinderen
The Governors of al-Shām and Fārs in the
Early Islamic Empire – A Comparative
Regional Perspective
Abstract: This paper compares patterns of gubernatorial appointments in early
Islamic al-Shām and Fārs until the reign of al-Muʿtamid. The provincial, sub-
provincial and super-provincial governors it identifies are listed in the attached
appendix. By examining their backgrounds, the paper locates appointment
patterns. Finally, the patterns in both provinces are compared and their diver-
gence interpreted as an indication of an imperial strategy adapted to local cir-
cumstances.
Keywords: Governors; administration; Fārs; al-Shām; early Islamic Empire; ap-
pointments
Introduction
Governors were arguably the most important link between the provincial and im-
perial levels in the early Islamic Empire. They were the representatives of the
central government in the provinces, and the contact point between the central
administration and its local representatives and subjects.
Early Islamic literature gives the impression that much of what governors ac-
tually did was decided in and guided by the center (by caliphs, viziers, and so
forth). However, the distances involved and the slowness of communication
must have meant that if the center gave any orders regarding the province, it
could provide only general guidelines, and governors must have had a large ex-
tent of autonomy.
Either way, the identification and recording of governors of the early Islamic
Empire is a vital step in detecting the actual links between the administration of
the distinct provinces of the empire and the authorities at the caliphal center.
Most early Islamic historiography tends to focus on events and actors at that cen-
ter. Our knowledge of the actual agents on the ground is thus much more limited,
at least in areas with no surviving primary evidence from papyri and similar
documents.
The ERC project ‘The Early Islamic Empire at Work: The View From the Re-
gions Toward the Center’ tries to invert this focus, aiming at a closer view of the
political, religious and economic elites of the provinces.We have tried to compile
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comprehensive lists of governors, whom we identified in the literary sources and
the numismatic record.We have further gathered information on their tribal/eth-
nic, religious, geographic, and family backgrounds, as well as their previous ex-
perience in civil administration, the military, and/or the religious field.
In this paper, we will limit ourselves to discussing the governors of al-Shām
and Fārs during the period from the advent of the Umayyad caliphate up to al-
Muʿtamid, when the Ṭūlūnids seized power in al-Shām and the Ṣaffārids took
over Fārs. We focus on their tribal/ethnic backgrounds in order to identify pat-
terns that point to election strategies and improve our understanding of the
power dynamics between the regions and the center. A full prosopographical
study on these governors, including all the above-mentioned aspects, will be
the subject of future publication.
Terminology
The term ‘governor’ does not exactly accord with any one term that we find in the
primary sources. The most frequent Arabic terms that are customarily translated
as ‘governor’ are ʿāmil, wālī, amīr, and ṣāḥib. Although some of them acquired
more specific meanings over time,¹ they are generic terms that basically indicate
the person in question was given charge of a specific area.Within these sources,
the responsibilities of such a governor are usually called his aʿmāl (sg. ʿamal).
ʿAmal is often understood as a term that refers to the territory under a governor’s
authority (and thus is often translated as “province” or “district”). It should be
understood more generally as an ‘area of responsibility’ in a non-exclusively geo-
graphical sense. The most important responsibilities (aʿmāl) of a governor were
keeping a particular area under military control (ḥarb) and making sure that tax-
ation money flowed towards the center (kharāj). Additional aʿmāl could include
providing justice, religio-political leadership and security for the Muslim com-
munity (respectively qaḍāʾ,² ṣalāt, shurṭa), minting coins (sikka), and producing
robes of honor (ṭirāz).
When a governor was appointed over a province (ʿalā Fārs/ʿalā l-Shām), it is
usually understood that he was responsible for all or most of these aʿmāl. At
times, though, it appears that the central government chose to split up the re-
 E.g.ʿāmil acquired the specific meaning of the fiscal agent in a province.
 The ʿamal of qaḍāʾ seems to have evolved quite quickly into a separate office, that of the qāḍī;
nevertheless, dispensing justice (especially redress for wrongs committed by government
ʿummāl) remained an important role of the governor. For qāḍīs in the Jazīra, see Hannah-
Lena Hagemann’s contribution to this volume.
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sponsibilities within one province over a number of persons.³ Most frequently,
military and civilian functions were divided and someone was appointed ʿalā
ḥarb while another person was placed ʿalā kharāj. Over time, some of these
aʿmāl evolved into separate offices.
The exact same terminology is frequently used for varying levels of hierar-
chy: an ʿāmil can be ʿalā Sābūr (one of the five kūras of Fārs) or ʿalā l-Mashriq
(i.e., the entire east of the empire). For analytical purposes, we introduce three
categories here. We will use the term ‘provincial governor’ in a specific sense:
to refer to governors in charge of a single ‘classical’ province (e.g. al-Shām,
Fārs),⁴ even if they were only in charge of the civilian or military branch of gov-
ernment in that province. The term ‘sub-governor’ will refer to people responsi-
ble for one or more subunits of a province (mainly referred to as jund in the case
of al-Shām⁵ and kūra in Fārs). We refer to a governor responsible for more than
one province as a ‘super-governor’ and use ‘super-province’ to indicate the terri-
tory under his control. It should be noted that the middle ʿAbbāsid period saw
the vast super-provinces of al-Maghrib and al-Mashriq, which at times contained
smaller super-provinces themselves. Finally, the term ‘governor’ without any fur-
ther specification is used in reference to an official belonging to any of these cat-
egories.
It has to be assumed that the hierarchy of administration was much more
complex than this three-fold model suggests. Moreover, the very structure of
the administrative hierarchy itself was subject to changes during the period cov-
ered by this study. The current paper does not attempt to give a full-fledged anal-
ysis of the structure of provincial government and the exact nature of the rela-
tionships between actors within this hierarchy.⁶ It rather aims to contribute to
such a discussion, by providing the most comprehensive lists of governors pos-
sible at this point and by analyzing individual governors’ backgrounds and pat-
terns of appointment.
In many cases the sources do not tell us who appointed a particular gover-
nor. Even if they do, information on appointments remains highly problematic.
First, there are a few cases in which contradictory information exists regarding
 The first time this is attested to in literary and documentary sources in Egypt is in the year 98
H/716–717 CE (Legendre 2014, 213, 217).
 The word province is used here in the sense of the buldān of al-Iṣṭakhrī and the aqālīm of al-
Muqaddasī.
 Often it is difficult to make a distinction between ‘sub-governors’ of cities or of districts. This
particularly applies to the central parts of al-Shām, where Dimashq and Ḥimṣ are the names of
both junds and their corresponding main cities.
 For comparable work on the Seljuq period, see Paul 1996.
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who appointed a specific governor. Second, ‘appointment’ may refer to two dif-
ferent kinds of events: either the selection of a particular agent, or a higher of-
ficial’s confirmation of such a selection. Particularly in cases in which a caliph is
reported to have appointed governors from the lower strata, it cannot be ruled
out that he may merely have confirmed the selection made by another official
(super-governor, wazīr etc.). Third, sources may misrepresent earlier events, for
example by retrojecting later practices.
As these problems can never be fully solved, this paper mostly lists appoint-
ers as they appear in the literary source material. If there are reasonable indica-
tions that a source’s account is flawed, these are indicated in the appendix foot-
notes.
Corpus and Methodology
Since there were no comprehensive lists of governors available for our provinces
in the secondary literature,⁷ the first step was to find the names of as many gov-
ernors as possible. The best sources available for detecting these governors are
the historiographical works and biographical dictionaries of the first 10 Islamic
centuries.
In order to identify the governors of our provinces and their subunits, one of
our tools is Jedli, a search toolbox we developed within the framework of the
project that helps us retrieve information from the vast corpus of digitized Arabic
source material.⁸ Jedli’s Context Search tool allows us to carry out a combined
search of a list of place names related to a province and a list of key terms linked
to the office of governor (e.g. wālī, ʿāmil, ʿalā Fārs/al-Shām) or likely to crop up
in the context of interactions between the central government and governors as
well as between governors and their subordinates (e.g. wallā, qallada, ʿazala,
ḍamma).⁹ Additional information about governors can be found in the Islamic
 Eduard von Zambaur conducted groundbreaking work in this field in 1927. Later works, such
as those of Patricia Crone, Paul Cobb, and others, provide valuable contributions to the proso-
pography of early Islamic governors, but there has been no further attempt to provide compre-
hensive lists of governors.
 Our digital corpus currently consists of 3,083 works of all genres that predate the year 1000.
The bulk of these texts come from the largest corpus of digital texts available online, al-Maktaba
al-Shamela, to which were added a number of missing works. Jedli and the corpus can be down-
loaded from our website. https://www.islamic-empire.uni-hamburg.de/en/publications-tools/
digital-tools/downloads/jedli-toolbox.html (last accessed 24 October 2019).
 For further information on the Jedli toolbox, see Haro Peralta/Verkinderen 2016 and 2016b.
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coinage,¹⁰ which frequently mentions names of officials (caliphs, governors,
etc.).¹¹ The names of the governors we found, their appointers, the areas
under their control, and the dates of their governorships are now listed in
spreadsheets, an excerpt of which is given in the appendix to this paper.¹²
As the next step in our research for this paper, we had to identify the people
behind these names and uncover their tribal/ethnic backgrounds. If this was not
clearly indicated in the primary sources, we turned to secondary literature. Here
the Encyclopaedia of Islam, the appendices to Patricia Crone’s Slaves on Horses,
and the footnotes to the translation of al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh stood out for their use-
fulness. If no satisfactory information for a governor was found in the secondary
material, we returned to the primary sources by using the Jedli search tools to
find more occurrences of his name in the corpus.¹³
In the analysis, we identified several patterns in the backgrounds of these
governors.While this involves counting numbers of governors who shared a par-
ticular attribute, it is of crucial importance to note that these numbers cannot be
taken as reliable statistics and must be treated with utmost caution for two rea-
sons. First, there is an indefinite number of governors whose names have simply
not come down to us. Second, some of our identifications remain doubtful,¹⁴
which could not be reflected in the aggregate numbers given in this paper but
is specified in the appendix. The proportions provided by this paper must be
seen as an approximation and cannot be statistically extrapolated.
 While governors’ names on any type of coins from al-Shām are rare, copper coins and pre-
reform Ṣaffārid and Būyid dirhams from Fārs do regularly carry the governor’s name. The main
sources used for the numismatic part of the research were Album 2011, Diler 2009, Vasmer 1930
(with additions from Bosworth 1994), and the online coin database Zeno (www.zeno.ru).
 In combination with the corresponding mint and year, coins provide a valuable check on in-
formation derived from the literary sources and may fill in gaps (e.g. the length of rule of a gov-
ernor for whom only the appointment date is known). Coins sometimes also contain names of
officials totally unknown in the literary sources, or not known in connection to our specific
provinces. Since these officials are usually not provided with a title, it is not certain what
their function was. Since the vast majority of the names on the coins are identifiable as either
caliphs or governors, we consider it likely that these persons were governors of the provinces or
districts in which these coins were minted.
 References to the distinct governors discussed in this paper will therefore not be given in
footnotes but can be found in the appendix.
 Usually, we ran a search for the person’s name in a subsection of the corpus that contains
the most relevant historiographical and biographical works; if we were still not satisfied with the
results, we ran another search of the entire corpus.
 This might relate to the tribal/ethnic background of a person, an assumed misspelling of
names, or ambiguities in the source material.
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Criteria Used
Ethnicity is a highly problematic category. It is not considered as an exclusively
biological category here: language, geographical extraction, genealogy, race,
and group affiliation all played a role. During the Umayyad period, the most de-
bated ethnic divide was the one between Arabs and non-Arabs (aʿjam), with
Arabs considering themselves as deserving a special place in the Islamic Empire
because of their historical connection to the birth place of Islam.¹⁵
The ethnic background of a person is difficult to grasp if not stated explicitly.
Arabic names (or the absence of non-Arabic names) in a family tree are no proof
of Arab ethnicity. On the other hand, obviously non-Arabic names in a genealog-
ical tree point to a likely non-Arab extraction. Tribal, ethnic, and geographic nis-
bas can provide some indication about a person’s ethnic background, but are
riddled with problems. Mawālī sometimes took over the tribal nisbas of their
Arab patron’s tribe.¹⁶ Geographic nisbas can refer to different relationships be-
tween a person and the place in question (he could have been born there, stud-
ied there, had a grandfather who came from there, etc.). Most regions of the em-
pire had populations of mixed ethnic backgrounds. Finally, ethnic nisbas like ‘al-
Khurāsānī’, ‘al-Kurdī’, and ‘al-Turkī’ are notoriously vague.¹⁷
For our analysis, we aim at a broad categorization of non-Arabs, keeping
broad labels like khurāsānī, kurdī, and turkī as they are used in the sources
and classifying as ‘Iranian’ those native populations of the eastern half of the
empire who do not fall under these three labels.
In the context of this paper, those from a family of known Arab pedigree are
considered Arabs.¹⁸ If this condition is not met but there are no other indications
of a non-Arab background, those with an Arab tribal nisba are also tentatively
considered Arabs, notwithstanding the previously discussed issue of mawālī tak-
 Peter Webb has recently argued that awareness of Arab identity only arose in this context
(see Webb 2016).
 In our corpus, one such case is Tawba b. Kaysān al-ʿAnbarī, governor of Sābūr in Fārs for
Yūsuf b. ʿUmar al-Thaqafī (120– 126 H/738–744 CE). His family originated in Sijistān and his
tribal nisba was derived from the Banū l-ʿAnbar of Tamīm, the tribe of his patron in Baṣra
(Ibn Saʿd 1990, 7:178).
 In particular al-Turkī generally refers to soldiers brought from Central Asia, whatever their
ethnic background was. For further discussion of nisbas, see Nef 2010 and Sublet 1991.
 Usually a personal entry in one of the great genealogical works (al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-ash-
rāf, Ibn al-Kalbī’s Jamharat al-nasab, and so on) would count as proof. But as Crone (2003, 39)
has shown in discussing the family of the prominent Umayyad general al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra,
even this is not watertight; Abū Ṣufra is in one source portrayed as the raʾīs of the Azd tribe in
Baṣra and in another as an Iranian born on an island in the Persian Gulf.
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ing over the tribal nisba of their patrons. People with Arab names but no tribal or
ethnic nisba are categorized as ‘unidentified’.
For governors identified as Arabs, we also look into their tribal affiliations. It
is important to note that, in the words of Ulrich, “tribes were not units bound by
blood as they were often represented, and that groups could and did change trib-
al affiliations in different circumstances.”¹⁹ The early Islamic period saw impor-
tant changes in the tribal system, such as the creation of large tribal confedera-
tions like Muḍar and Yemen.²⁰ We will look into patterns of governors’ tribal





Early Islamic al-Shām roughly covered the Roman-Byzantine provinces of Syria,
Phoenicia, Palaestina, and Arabia. It had fertile soil and wealthy cities along its
coast and in the mountainous interior, but also included desert-like eastern and
southern areas. Arabs were based mainly in these latter fringe areas long before
the advent of Islam.
Byzantine rule had not recovered from the last lengthy war against the Sa-
sanians (602–628) when the Muslims conquered the region in the period of
the Rāshidūn caliphs. After some 25 years of Arab rule over what was now called
al-Shām, the region became the center of the rapidly growing empire during the
Umayyad caliphate. Yet even in the heartland of this empire, Umayyad authority
was challenged by ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr during the second fitna. Later, caliphal
rule over al-Shām was challenged by inner-Umayyad rivalries rather than by out-
side threats, until the third fitna evolved into the ʿAbbāsid revolution that put an
end to Umayyad rule.
Once the revolution’s dust had cleared, the early ʿAbbāsid caliphs secured
al-Shām by frequently appointing their own family members to rule over the
province. Even though it led to an internal power struggle after the death of
Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ, this control strategy continued, which is at least partly
explained by strong pro-Umayyad sentiments that led to several uprisings in
 Ulrich 2008, 8.
 See for example Crone 2003, Crone 1993, and Ulrich 2008.
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the province during the early ʿAbbāsid period.²¹ This pattern was followed up to
the fourth fitna, after which ʿAbbāsid control over al-Shām became more indi-
rect.
From al-Maʾmūn up to the reign of al-Mutawakkil, the ʿAbbāsid caliphs in-
tervened directly in the province’s policy-making less frequently. From the lat-
ter’s rule onwards, though, the Central Asian military elite of the atrāk increas-
ingly dominated all levels of provincial administration. The ʿAbbāsids had thus
already largely lost control over al-Shām before the Central Asian dynasty of the
Ṭūlūnids put a preliminary end to caliphal rule over the province.²²
The frontier area with Byzantium (al-Thughūr/al-ʿAwāṣim),²³ a part of which
was already connected to al-Shām by name (al-Thughūr al-Shāmiyya/Thughūr
al-Shām), is assumed to have fallen outside of the traditional system of provin-
cial organization.²⁴ It should also be noted that Qinnasrīn’s affiliation with al-
Shām is not uncontested,²⁵ even though the late 3rd-/9th-century geographical de-
piction of Ibn Khurradādhbih suggests that Qinnasrīn formed part of early Islam-
ic al-Shām.²⁶ Frequent references to officials who governed Qinnasrīn in combi-
nation with al-Jazīra indicate that at certain times it was part of al-Shām’s
neighboring province. This issue cannot be adequately reflected in the current
paper. Subsequent analysis will thus focus on the governors of Filasṭīn, al-Ur-
dunn, Dimashq, Ḥimṣ, and Qinnasrīn, not taking into account those of al-Thugh-
ūr, al-ʿAwāṣim, and al-Jazīra.²⁷ State officials who governed Qinnasrīn in combi-
nation with al-Thughūr, al-ʿAwāṣim, and/or al-Jazīra can hardly be referred to as
‘super-governors’ in the sense defined above. They will subsequently be referred
to as ‘sub-governors’ for the sake of simplicity.
Finally, it should be noted that due to the local focus of authors such as Ibn
al-ʿAdīm, Ibn ʿAsākir, al-Ṣafaḍī, and Ibn Shaddād, we are provided with exten-
sive information on the sub-governors of Dimashq and Qinnasrīn, while Filasṭīn,
al-Urdunn, and Ḥimṣ are underrepresented. Moreover, these authors provide sev-
 The most successful uprisings took place parallel to the dynasty’s internal struggles: in 136
H/754 CE (after the death of al-Saffāḥ) and in 195 H/811 CE (during the fourth fitna). See Cobb
2001, 43–65.
 See Cobb 2001, 34–42.
 For the usage of the terms al-Thughūr and al-ʿAwāṣim as well as some administrative pat-
terns, see Bonner 1994, 17–24.
 See Qudāma 1981, 186–188.
 See Ibn al-Faqīh 1996, 160.
 Ibn Khurradādhbih 1889, 74–79.
 Likewise, Ḥumayd b. Maʿyūf ’s governorate over the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea (sawāḥil
baḥr al-Shām), addressed by al-Ṭabarī (1967, 8: 320), Miskawayh (2000, 3:557), and al-Dhahabī
(1948–9, 12:21), will not be addressed in the current paper. For this, see Borrut 1999–2000, 1–33.
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eral entries that cannot be verified by any other sources. In particular al-Ṣafadī’s
Umarāʾ Dimashq contains some equivocal references.²⁸
Governors of al-Shām in the Umayyad Period
For Umayyad al-Shām (including the brief Zubayrid rule over the southern and
central parts of the province in the mid–60s H/680s CE), 70 governors were iden-
tified. All fall in the ‘sub-governor’ category.²⁹ This seems to be explained by the
fact that in the Umayyad period al-Shām was the seat of the caliphate and there
was thus little need for any high-ranking governor other than the caliph himself.
For the Sufyānid period we know of seven sub-governors, two of whom ruled
for three years or longer.³⁰ Among these seven we find six Yemenīs (among them
two Kalbīs and two Kindīs) and one Qurashī but not a single Qaysī. This pattern
of Yemenī dominance over the subunits of al-Shām did not continue after the
brief Zubayrid rule over the southern and central parts of al-Shām.³¹ Already
under Marwān b. al-Ḥakam three out of four known sub-governors were
Umayyad family members,³² and the employment of sub-governors of their
own kin appears to have been the strategy of most of his successors to secure
Umayyad authority. This applies to ʿAbd al-Malik (five Umayyad, one Qaysī [Tha-
 One striking example is al-Ṣafadī’s statement that the Barmakid Jaʿfar b. Yaḥyā, who was
executed in 187 H/803 CE, (EI2, “Barāmika” (D. Sourdel)) became governor of Dimashq in 188
H/803–804 CE (Ṣafadī 1983, 188).
 While al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf in particular turned up frequently in our search results, being for
example referred to as amīr jamāʿat ahl al-Shām wa-waliya al-quttāl (al-Ṭabarī 1967, 6:348), it
is assumed here who he was not the ‘provincial governor’ of al-Shām but a general that com-
manded the province’s armies. It should furthermore be noted that during the Umayyad period
we know of three governors in charge of Qinnasrīn and al-Jazīra who according to the above con-
vention can be included as sub-governors of al-Shām: (1) Saʿīd b. Mālik b. Baḥdal, a Kalbī serv-
ing under Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya; (2) Muḥammad b. Marwān, an Umayyad appointed by his brother,
the caliph ʿAbd al-Malik; and (3) al-Kawthar b. Zufar b. al-Ḥārith, a Kilābī serving under Marwān
b. Muḥammad.
 Ḥassān b. Mālik b. Baḥdal, a cousin of the caliph Yazīd I, governed Filasṭīn and al-Urdunn
and apparently himself appointed Rawḥ b. Zinbāʿ over Filasṭīn in 64 H/683–684 CE. Al-Ḍaḥḥāk
b. Qays al-Fihrī served under the first two Umayyad caliphs as governor of Dimashq but after the
death of Yazīd I cast his lot with ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr.
 For the year 64 H/683–684 CE we hear of Zubayrid sub-governors in Filasṭīn (Nātil b. Qays),
Dimashq (al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays) and Qinnasrīn (al-Nuʿmān b. Bashīr).
 Khālid b.Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya, Abān b. ʿUqba b. Abī Muʿayṭ, and the later caliph ʿAbd al-Malik.
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qīf], one Yemenī [Mālik], and two mawālī³³ sub-governors), al-Walīd b. ʿAbd al-
Malik (six Umayyad, one Qaysī [ʿAbs] sub-governors), Sulaymān (one Umayyad
sub-governor), al-Walīd b. Yazīd (six Umayyad, three Qaysī [two Thaqafīs, one
Fazārī], one Yemenī [Azd] sub-governors), Yazīd b. al-Walīd (four Umayyad,
one Yemenī [Judhām], one Muḥāribī,³⁴ one unidentified sub-governor), and
Ibrāhīm (two Umayyad sub-governors). On the other hand, several caliphs
seem to have found it advisable to employ few or even no Umayyad family mem-
bers as sub-governors in al-Shām. This policy might have been introduced in
order not to foment inner-Umayyad tensions. It was followed by ʿUmar b. ʿAbd
al-ʿAzīz (two Yemenī, one unidentified sub-governors), Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik
(one Qurashī, one Murrī³⁵ sub-governors), Hishām (three Qaysī, one Umayyad,
two Yemenī, one Murrī³⁶ sub-governors), and Marwān b. Muḥammad (three
Umayyad, three Qaysī, five Yemenī [among whom two Kindī] sub-governors).³⁷
In the Marwānid period the appointment of sub-governors of al-Shām ap-
pears to have been a privilege reserved for the caliph. For almost two-thirds of
the Marwānids’ known sub-governors, the sources explicitly state that they
were appointed by the ruler himself. For the other third, we are not provided
with information on who appointed them.
For the Sufyānid period, the sources remain largely silent on who appointed
the sub-governors of al-Shām. In only one case, it is known to have been the ca-
liph Muʿāwiya b. Abī Sufyān. In a second, it was Ḥassān b. Mālik b. Baḥdal, the
sub-governor of al-Urdunn and Filasṭīn, who bequeathed the latter to Rawḥ b.
Zinbāʿ during the reign of Yazīd b. Muʿāwiya. All in all, the cases in which we
know who appointed the sub-governors of the Sufyānid period are too few to
draw conclusions.
Either way, the vast majority of sub-governors of Umayyad al-Shām were
Muslim Arabs,³⁸ with the possible exception of two mawālī³⁹ and two unidenti-
 Dīnār b. Dīnār was a mawlā of ʿAbd al-Malik, and Sulaymān b. Saʿd appears to have been a
mawlā of the Khushayn.
 Muḥārib may refer to several tribes.
 As in the case of Muḥārib, Murra may refer to several tribes.
 Al-Walīd b. Talīd served under both Yazīd b. al-Walīd and Hishām.
 Remarkably, al-Ṭabarī reports that the ahl of Ḥimṣ, Dimashq, al-Urdunn, and Filasṭīn were
allowed to elect their own sub-governors after swearing allegiance to Marwān b. Muḥammad
(al-Ṭabarī 1967, 7:312). See Cobb 2001, 73.
 Most can be assigned to Arab tribes and there is no indication that any were not Muslim.
 Dīnār b. Dīnār and Sulaymān b. Saʿd both appear to have been natives of al-Shām (al-Azdī
1988, 1:26; Ibn Manẓūr 1984, 10:161) and served as sub-governors under ʿAbd al-Malik. While
there is no evidence that Dīnār was a non-Muslim, Sulaymān is positively defined as Muslim
(Ibn Manẓūr 1984, 10:162).
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fied office-holders.⁴⁰ As mentioned above, Yemenī tribesmen constituted the
most important group among the sub-governors of al-Shām in the Sufyānid pe-
riod, while the Umayyads themselves dominated these offices in the Marwānid
period. Fewer in number than the Umayyads, Yemenīs and Qaysīs were almost
even in their provision of sub-governors for Marwānid al-Shām: in addition to
29 Umayyad sub-governors, we find 13 Yemenīs, 11 Qaysīs, 2 non-Umayyad Qur-
ashīs, as well as 1 Murrī and 1 Muḥāribī (names that might apply to several
tribes). This basically accords with other provinces of the Umayyad Empire.
The assignment of duties seems to have been cautiously balanced regarding
the rivalries between northern and southern Arab tribes.⁴¹ Surprisingly, we do
not find a single Kalbī and only one other Qụdāʿī among the sub-governors of
Marwānid al-Shām.⁴² This is particularly striking as it is assumed that Quḍāʿa
provided vital support for the Umayyads in the second fitna.⁴³
While the apparent total lack of Kalb and the virtual absence of Quḍāʿa are
both remarkable, the general balance between northern and southern Arab
tribesmen among the sub-governors of Marwānid al-Shām presumably reflects
some form of Umayyad policy intended to keep tribal tensions away from the
heartland of the empire. The events of the second and third fitna proved devas-
tatingly that this was not a successful strategy.
Be that as it may, the apparent absence of provincial and super-governors
from Umayyad al-Shām indicates that the province was an exception rather
than a typical example of an Umayyad province.⁴⁴ It does not come as much
of a surprise that the seat of power shows some distinctive features separating
it from the other provinces of the empire. In any case, the firm grip that the
Marwānids in particular had on al-Shām (at least for most of their rule) is further
reflected by the fact that we do not know of a single case in which a sub-gover-
nor of Marwānid al-Shām was appointed by anyone other than the ruling caliph
 Virtually nothing is known about Hilāl b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā (appointed over Qinnasrīn by ʿUmar b.
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz) and Ibn al-Ḥusayn (appointed over Ḥimṣ by Yazīd b. al-Walīd).
 For Fārs, see below. For Iraq see Crone 2003, 129– 153.
 Among the list of tribes attributed to al-Qụdāʿa by Kister (EI2, “Ḳụdāʿa”) we find only one
ʿUdhrī sub-governor: ʿUthmān b. Saʿīd who is said to have governed Dimashq under ʿUmar b.
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. However, we do find a couple of sub-governors from the tribal groups of Kinda
and Ghassān, which are not attributed to the Quḍāʿa but depicted as their allies (Crone 2003,
34–35; Cobb 2001, 69).
 See Crone 2003, 36; Cobb 2001, 69.
 Regarding the tribal composition of al-Shām, Patricia Crone also notes “faction was a purely
provincial phenomenon down to the Third Civil War because it was only in the provinces that
the generals took over as governors, Syria continuing to be ruled by old-fashioned kinsmen of
the caliph and tribal nobles” (Crone 1994, 744; see Cobb 2001, 68–71).
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himself. Finally, it should be noted that Umayyad influence on al-Shām contin-
ued to have an effect even after Umayyad rule itself had vanished; in the ʿAbbā-
sid period, we know of several insurgents who claimed Umayyad descent hoping
that would attract sympathy for their cause.⁴⁵
Governors of al-Shām in the Early ʿAbbāsid Period
For the early ʿAbbāsid (pre-Samarran) period—including ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī’s brief
rule as a caliphal contender in the second half of the 130s H/mid-750s CE—we
were able to identify 64 governors of al-Shām: 7 super-governors, 13 provincial
governors, and 44 sub-governors. In contrast to the Umayyad period, we now
find several Iranians (particularly Khurāsānians) among the governors of al-
Shām. All appear to have been Muslims.⁴⁶ While throughout the Umayyads’
reign we do not know of a single governor who held more than one term of of-
fice,⁴⁷ a number of ʿAbbāsid governors of al-Shām held multiple offices during
their careers,⁴⁸ in some instances receiving promotion from sub-governor to pro-
vincial governor.
In the first years of ʿAbbāsid rule over al-Shām the Umayyad custom of rul-
ing the province via members of the caliphal family and a balanced proportion
of northern and southern Arab tribesmen was continued. ʿAbdallāh and Ṣāliḥ b.
ʿAlī, the two uncles of al-Manṣūr who had played an active part in the conquest
of the province and were now the most influential figures in al-Shām,⁴⁹ appoint-
 There were two main ‘post-Umayyad’ rebellions during the ʿAbbāsid period: the first was car-
ried out by a certain Hāshim b. Yazīd b. Khālid, who after the death of al-Saffāḥ in 136 H/754 CE
tried to win over the ʿAbbāsid ʿAbdallāh b. Ṣaliḥ (see below) and some of his followers (see al-
Ṣafadī 1983, 108). The case of Abū l-ʿAmayṭar is better known. He tried to restore the old
Umayyad authority (without, however, claiming the disputed title ‘al-Sufyānī’) during the civil
war between al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn in 195 H/811 CE (see EI2 , “al-Sufyānī” (W. Madelung)).
For a detailed discussion on post-Umayyad claims to power in al-Shām see Cobb 2001, 43–65.
 The Barmakids were accused of unbelief (Bouvat 1912, 82–83). This accusation might be ex-
plained by the malevolence of other courtiers.
 Notably, the Yemenī al-Nuʿmān b. Bashīr b. Saʿd and the Qurashī al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays served
under both a Suyānid caliph and ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr.
 In particular, the ʿAbbāsid Ibrāhīm b. Ṣaliḥ b. ʿAlī is reported to have served four times as
sub-governor of Filasṭīn and Dimashq (sometimes including al-Urdunn, and Cyprus) under al-
Mahdī, al-Hādī, and al-Rashīd.
 According to several literary sources al-Saffāḥ appointed ʿAbdallāh as provincial governor of
al-Shām, while Ṣāliḥ became sub-governor of Filasṭīn. Al-Ṭabarī, however, states the pair ruled
the subunits of al-Shām together (Ṭabarī 1967, 7:459). This seems likely, as according to al-Ṣafadī
it was Ṣāliḥ who appointed Riyāḥ b. ʿUthmān over Dimashq (al-Ṣafadī 1983, 186).
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ed sub-governors on their own behalf.When al-Saffāḥ died in 136 H/754 CE, ʿAb-
dallāh b. ʿAlī claimed the caliphate for himself.⁵⁰ During his brief rule over al-
Shām as a caliphal contender, he appointed one Qaysī and four Yemenī sub-gov-
ernors. One was already mentioned as sub-governor of Dimashq under the
Umayyad al-Walīd b. Yazīd.⁵¹
In order to rid himself of the claims of his uncle, al-Manṣūr successfully sent
Abū Muslim against ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī, appointing the spearhead of the ʿAbbāsid
revolution over a super-province comprising al-Shām and Egypt. Despite this it
appears al-Manṣūr never really meant to install Abū Muslim as super-governor;
in 137 H/755 CE, soon after the defeat of ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī, the caliph had Abū
Muslim killed.⁵² During the long reign of al-Manṣūr, al-Shām was even more
closely controlled by members of the ʿAbbāsid family (eight ʿAbbāsid, two
other Hāshimid, two Khurāsānian, one Arab-Bajalī governors on all levels). No-
tably, this included close family members of the caliphal contender ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī. In particular, his brother Ṣāliḥ and the latter’s descendants continued to
play a crucial role in early ʿAbbāsid al-Shām and beyond.⁵³ While non-Hāshimid
Arabs virtually lost their previous importance as governors of al-Shām, Khurāsā-
nians now gradually filled the gap. However, al-Manṣūr supposedly sought to
limit the authority of the high-ranking governing officials of al-Shām. At any
rate, it seems to be no coincidence that we find no less than five provincial gov-
ernors during his reign (four ʿAbbāsids, one other Qurashī) who apparently lost
their privilege to appoint sub-governors themselves, two of whom were appoint-
ed provincial governors only after having served as sub-governors in the prov-
ince.⁵⁴ Al-Mahdī followed this policy of his father (one ʿAbbāsid provincial gov-
ernor, four ʿAbbāsid, and two Khurāsānian sub-governors). Al-Hādī appears not
to have made any changes regarding the administration of al-Shām during his
brief rule.
 It is in exactly this context that the above-mentioned ‘post-Umayyad’ insurgent Hāshim b.
Yazīd b. Khālid tried to win him and some of his followers over.
 In addition to this ʿUthmān b. ʿAbd al-Aʿlā b. Surāqa, we hear of Yazīd b. Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh
who is mentioned as sub-governor of Dimashq during the reign of both Marwān b. Muḥammad
and al-Manṣūr. In his case, it is not clear whether he was loyal to the last Umayyad caliph or
simply grasped his opportunity during the third fitna.
 While the details of Abū Muslim’s death need some further investigation, it seems certain al-
Manṣūr ordered his execution (EI3, “Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī” (S. S. Agha)).
 For a detailed discussion see Cobb 2001, 21–31. Besides the Ṣāliḥid branch of the ʿAbbāsids,
the family of Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad (the figurehead of the ʿAbbāsid revolution known as ‘Ibra-
hīm al-Imām’) produced numerous sub-governors of al-Shām in the early ʿAbbāsid period.
 This applies to the two ʿAbbāsids, Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb b. Ibrāhīm al-Imām.
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During the first years of his reign, Hārūn al-Rashīd likewise continued the
policies of his predecessors regarding the administrative structures of al-
Shām.⁵⁵ In 175 H/791–792 CE, two years after appointing his infant son al-
Amīn first successor to the throne, he put him in charge over a super-province
including al-Shām and Iraq. Al-Rashīd’s succession plans were subsequently
readjusted a couple of times, and it was only in 186 H/802 CE that the well-
known Meccan protocols were decreed. Even though al-Amīn was evidently
now confirmed as first successor to the throne (his brother al-Maʾmūn being sec-
ond in line of succession), the area covered by his super-governorate becomes
much less clear.While secondary literature largely accepts the idea that the em-
pire was essentially divided between al-Amīn (governing the Maghrib) and al-
Maʾmūn (ruling the Mashriq), sources prior to the 7th/13th century do not mention
al-Amīn as super-governor of the Maghrib but only of al-Shām and Iraq.⁵⁶ One
year later, al-Rashīd appointed a third son, al-Qāsim, over al-Shām,⁵⁷ and
there is no indication that al-Qāsim was subordinate to al-Amīn in this office.⁵⁸
Either way, unlike al-Rashīd, who himself had been appointed governor of
al-Shām by his father and took part in several expeditions against the Byzan-
tines, neither al-Amīn nor al-Qāsim are known to have played any role in the pol-
icy-making of al-Shām during the reign of al-Rashīd.⁵⁹ The actual provincial du-
ties were carried out by others: among the additional provincial governors in al-
Rashīd’s reign we know of only one ʿAbbāsid, two (Barmakid) Khurāsānians, and
two office-holders who seem to have been non-Hāshimid Arabs.⁶⁰ Before the dra-
matic fall of the Barmakid family in 187 H/803 CE, Mūsā and Jaʿfar b. Yaḥyā b.
Khālid were apparently not only the first non-Arab provincial governors of al-
 In fact, he even reappointed the ʿAbbāsid sub-governors Muḥammad b. Ibrahīm al-Imām
and Ibrāhīm b. Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī, both of whom had already held multiple governing positions in
al-Shām.
 The earliest source to add ākhir al-maghrib to al-Amīn’s super-governorate of al-Shām and
Iraq is Ibn al-Athīr (Ibn al-Athīr 1997, 5:344).
 Remarkably, al-Qāsim is partly said to have been appointed over “al-Shām, Qinnasrīn, al-
ʿAwāṣim, and al-Thughūr” (al-Ṭabarī 1967, 8:347), which indicates that Qinnasrīn was not consid-
ered an integral part of al-Shām at that time.
 Ibn al-ʿUmrānī even reports that al-Qāsim had originally been meant to become super-gov-
ernor of al-Shām, al-Jazīra, Egypt, and the Maghrib after al-Rashīd’s (?) death (Ibn al-ʿUmrānī
2001, 1:79).
 The same applies to al-Maʾmūn’s role in Khurāsān before he accompanied his father to the
eastern provinces shortly before al-Rashīd’s death in 193 H/809 CE.
 ʿĪsā b. al-ʿAkkī, who was appointed by Jaʿfar b. Yaḥyā and appears to have been a close con-
fidant of the Barmakids, can be connected to the Arab tribe of ʿAkk only by his name and might
thus have also been a mawlā. Yaḥyā b. Muʿādh, who was appointed by the caliph himself, ap-
pears to have belonged to the Bakr b. Wāʾil.
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Shām in early Islamic history, but also the first ones since the days of al-Saffāḥ
who enjoyed the privilege of appointing both sub-governors and their own suc-
cessors.⁶¹ Despite this the sub-governor level remained clearly dominated by
twelve ʿAbbāsid family members (in particular the descendants of Ṣāliḥ b.
ʿAlī⁶²). In addition to them we only find two non-Hāshimid Arabs⁶³ and two
mawālī⁶⁴ serving as sub-governors of al-Shām.
Al-Amīn appears to have deviated from his father’s personnel policy regard-
ing the province, mainly in order to buttress his position. As early as 194 H/809–
810 CE, he dismissed his brother al-Qāsim as provincial governor of al-Shām, re-
placing him with Khuzayma b. Khāzim. Later, as the conflict with al-Maʾmūn
turned into open war, al-Amīn appointed the ʿAbbāsid ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣāliḥ
b. ʿAlī over al-Shām. Notably, Khuzayma and ʿAbd al-Malik were experienced ad-
ministrators of al-Shām: both had already held sub-governorships under al-
Rashīd.⁶⁵ Among the sub-governors of al-Amīn’s reign, however, three ʿAbbāsids
were now outnumbered by four non-Hāshimid Arabs (among them two Qaysī
 Mūsā is said to have appointed Sindī b. Shāhak, a formermawlā of al-Manṣūr, over Dimashq.
Jaʿfar, who himself governed al-Shām only for a brief period of time, appointed his successor ʿĪsā
b. al-ʿAkkī to this office.
 In addition to them and the descendants of Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad we also find an increas-
ing number of sons of former caliphs such as Ibrāhīm and Manṣūr b. al-Mahdī, as well as Sulay-
mān b. al-Manṣūr.
 Rawḥ b. Ḥātim b. Qabīṣa, who is said to have governed Filasṭīn, is attributed to the Azd/
Yemen. In the case of Shuʿayb b. Ḥāzim b. Khuzayma, Ḥāzim seems to be a misspelling for
Khāzim. This would strongly indicate that Shuʿayb was a brother of the better-known Khuzayma
b. Khāzim b. Khuzayma, a Tamīmī tribesman who governed Qinnasrīn for al-Rashīd and the
whole of al-Shām for al-Amīn.
 The first, (al‐)Sindī b. Shāhak, was appointed over Dimashq by the Barmakid Mūsā b.Yaḥyā.
He was a mawlā of al-Manṣūr and appears to have been of Indian origin (see EI2, “Ibrahīm b. al-
Sindī” (C. Pellat)). The second, Harthama b. Aʿyan, was a governor/major military leader for al-
Rashīd and al-Maʾmūn and is said to have governed Filasṭīn for the former.While he appears to
have been a Khurāsānian of northern Arab background, he is mentioned as both a mawlā of the
Ḍabba (Ibn al-Athīr 1997, 5:179) and mawlā amīr al-muʾminīn (of al-Maʾmūn?; al-Ṭabarī 1967,
8:490; see also EI3, “Harthama b. Aʿyan” (J. P. Turner)).
 Khuzayma had already governed Qinnasrīn and al-ʿAwāṣim shortly before al-Rashīd’s death
and was appointed provincial governor of al-Shām in 194 H/809–810 CE. He continued to serve
al-Amīn as sub-governor of Qinnasrīn and al-ʿAwāṣim until the caliph’s death in 198 H/813 CE.
ʿAbd al-Malik had served as sub-governor of Qinnasrīn and slightly later of Dimashq (during the
first years of al-Rashīd’s reign), but for unknown reasons he was disgraced and imprisoned af-
terwards. Under al-Amīn, ʿAbd al-Malik was released (EI3, “ʿAbd al-Malik b. Ṣaliḥ” (P. Cobb)) and
appointed super-governor of al-Shām and al-Jazīra in 196 H/811–812 CE. ʿAbd al-Malik did not
live to see the outcome of the rivalry of al-Rashīd’s sons; he died the following year.
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tribesmen⁶⁶). In the final stages of the succession war between al-Amīn and al-
Maʾmūn, al-Shām was heavily affected. This political instability partly allowed
non-governmental actors to resume power.⁶⁷
Spending almost a third of his reign in Khurāsān, al-Maʾmūn seems to have
had no particular interest in organizing the administration of al-Shām.⁶⁸ Instead
he contented himself with appointing as super-governors his most important
military commander Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn, the latter’s son ʿAbdallāh, and his
own brother Abū Isḥāq (the future caliph al-Muʿtaṣim). While Abū Isḥāq gov-
erned al-Shām in combination with Egypt, the super-province ruled by both
Ṭāhir and his son encompassed al-Shām, al-Jazīra, Egypt, and al-Maghrib.
Given the above-mentioned ambiguity of the super-province al-Amīn governed
under al-Rashīd, Ṭāhir b. al-Ḥusayn appears to have been the first super-gover-
nor to govern the western section of the caliphate as one entity. The lack of ref-
erences to any provincial governors in the literary sources and the fact that both
ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir and Abū Isḥāq appointed (either Arab or Khurāsānian) sub-
governors on their own behalf strongly indicates that during the reign of al-
Maʾmūn there simply were no provincial governors of al-Shām.⁶⁹
Governors of al-Shām in the Middle ʿAbbāsid Period
In the middle ʿAbbāsid (the Samarran) period, the practice of not appointing any
provincial governor over al-Shām but instead administering the province exclu-
sively via super-governors and sub-governors was continued.With regard to the
composition of the personnel, the tables clearly turned. While the new Central
Asian troops introduced by the caliph al-Muʿtaṣim had already played an impor-
 Aḥmad and ʿAbdallāh b. Saʿīd al-Ḥarashī appear to have been the first Qaysīs to govern sub-
units of al-Shām since ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī’s claim to the caliphal throne. Their employment might
have been an expression of al-Amīn’s desperate search for support.
 While the second ‘post-Umayyad’ uprising led by Abū l-ʿAmayṭar is well known (see Cobb
2001, 55–62), Ibn al-ʿAdīm provides further information on several strongmen of unknown loy-
alty who controlled Qinnasrīn during this period (Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1996, 39).
 Even though he devoted the last years of his life to campaigns against Byzantium, al-
Maʾmūn appears to have been more interested in prestigious military campaigns than the prov-
ince of al-Shām itself (where he spent comparatively little time). An interesting example of this is
the case of Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ b. Bayhas, a strongman of the fourth fitna. It seems that al-
Maʿmūn simply left him in charge of Dimashq for several years, which underlines the assump-
tion that the caliph did not take a particular interest in al-Shām (see Cobb 2001, 95–96).
 This appears to be a part of al-Maʾmūn’s widely recognized break with ʿAbbāsid administra-
tive practices (see for instance Kennedy 1981, 28–29, or Cobb 2001, 34).
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tant role in al-Maʾmūn’s military campaigns against Byzantium, it was during the
caliphate of al-Muʿtaṣim and afterwards that these atrāk became increasingly in-
fluential in governorships on all levels. Therefore, among the 43 governors we
could identify from this period (4 super-governors⁷⁰ and 39 sub-governors),
only a little more than a third could be identified as Arabs (the majority of
whom remained ʿAbbāsids). Almost another third were atrāk and the ethnic
background of the majority of the last third remains unidentified. Khurāsānians
and other Iranians were, however, largely marginalized.
In the early years of al-Muʿtaṣim’s reign the caliph left the administrative
structures of al-Shām mainly unmodified. At an unknown point in time he ap-
pointed his son al-Wāthiq over a super-province consisting of al-Shām, al-Jazīra,
and Egypt. The actual administrative duties appear to have been carried out by
Ashinās,⁷¹ whom the caliph appointed over the same provinces and who was the
first Central Asian officer to rule al-Shām as a whole. On the sub-governor level,
we do not yet find any atrāk in al-Shām.⁷² It is unknown whether al-Wāthiq or
Ashinās appointed any of the seven known sub-governors of the province.
When al-Wāthiq himself became caliph, he does not seem to have intro-
duced any great innovation into the administration of al-Shām. After the death
of Ashinās in 230 H/844 CE he is said to have appointed ʿUbaydallāh b. ʿAbd
al-ʿAzīz b. ʿAbd al-Malik, who was seemingly a descendant of Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī,
over a super-province including al-Shām and al-Jazīra. Other than that we are in-
formed of five sub-governors during his reign. Two had already served under al-
Wāthiq’s predecessors.
Much like Hārūn al-Rashīd, al-Mutawakkil devised a plan for succession. It
proved fatal: while it is reported⁷³ that in 235 H/850 CE the empire was essential-
 A notable instance is the case of the later caliph al-Muntaṣir. During the reign of his father
al-Mutawakkil, he is reported to have governed vast parts of the empire, including Qinnasrīn, al-
ʿAwāṣim, and al-Thughūr.While he is thus said to have ruled only a part of what is considered al-
Shām (see introductory remarks above), his domains were too widely stretched to label him ‘sub-
governor’. Therefore al-Muntaṣir is the only case considered in this paper in which an official is
referred to as ‘super-governor’ without having ruled al-Shām as a whole.
 While the name Ashinās points to a particular turkī tribe (see de la Vaissière 2007, 92–94,
194–200), al-Ṭabarī (1967, 8:558) connects the name of the governor/military leader in question
to a particularly (supposedly Persian) expression.
 While the ethnic backgrounds of Rajāʾ b. Abī l-Ḍaḥḥāk and Muslim b. Muḥammad, both of
whom are mentioned as sub-governors of Dimashq, could not be identified, their names provide
no clear evidence of a Central Asian background.
 It should be noted that the numismatic evidence clearly challenges the common version of
al-Mutawakkil’s plan for succession. While a corresponding discussion would go beyond the
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ly divided between his sons al-Muntaṣir⁷⁴ and al-Muʿtazz, it was, again, a third
son, al-Muʾayyad, who was supposed to govern most of al-Shām.⁷⁵ Even though
al-Muʾayyad appears to have been involved in the policy-making of al-Shām as
little as al-Qāsim b. Hārūn al-Rashīd had been some 50 years earlier, we are
not informed of any agent carrying out his responsibilities on the ground. Al-
Muntaṣir on the other hand is reported to have appointed Bughā al-Kabīr sub-
governor of Qinnasrīn (part of his vast domains). Further sub-governors, namely
al-Shārbāmiyān and al-Fatḥ b. Khāqān,⁷⁶ likewise enjoyed the privilege of ap-
pointing their successors or deputies. As these names already indicate, it is dur-
ing the reign of al-Mutawakkil that for the first time we find atrāk among the
sub-governors of al-Shām. In fact, almost half of the identified sub-governors
of al-Shām in al-Mutawakkil’s reign were of Central Asian origin. In 244 H/858
CE al-Mutawakkil decided to take residence in Dimashq for a couple of months.
His reason for this is not entirely clear.⁷⁷
In addition to Bughā al-Kabīr, who remained in office, we are informed of
only one super-governor and one sub-governor of al-Shām during the brief
rule of al-Muntaṣir. It remains unknown whether or not the caliph appointed
them. Al-Mustaʿīn, on the other hand, is reported to have appointed one
super-governor and three out of four sub-governors of al-Shām on his own be-
half. In any case, Central Asian officers now ultimately gained the upper
scope of this paper, a close examination of these events and comparison with the succession
plans of Hārūn al-Rashīd should be the subject of a future publication.
 Among the vast domains al-Muntaṣir is reported to have been appointed over, al-Ṭabarīmen-
tions the whole Maghrib (including Egypt), al-Jazīra, parts of northern Iraq and of Fārs, Mecca,
Medina, the Yemen, Baḥrayn, as well as Qinnasrīn, al-ʿAwāṣim, al-Thughūr, and more (see al-
Ṭabarī 1967, 9:176). For further details on al-Muntaṣir’s office, see note 70 above.
 As al-Muʾayyad is said to have been in charge of Filasṭīn, al-Urdunn, Dimashq, and Ḥimṣ,
while Qinnasrīn was within the sphere of influence of al-Muntaṣir. Al-Muʾayyad must be consid-
ered a sub-governor of al-Shām given the convention above. Still, Qinnasrīn might have been
considered part of al-Jazīra at that time.
 While the name al-Shārbāmiyān points to a manorial background from the eastern Hindu
Kush region, al-Fatḥ b. Khāqān is well known to have been a close confidant of al-Mutawakkil.
As the latter held several prestigious offices, such as superintendent of work in Sāmarrāʾ and
provincial governor of Egypt, it is quite unexpected to find him as sub-governor of Dimashq. Tak-
ing into account the apparently complete absence of provincial governors of al-Shām since the
reign of al-Amīn, it is possible that during at least some points of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate sub-
governors of Dimashq had authority over large parts (if not all) of al-Shām.
 While the transfer of royal dīwāns to Dimashq mentioned in several sources indeed indicates
a removal of the capital, Paul Cobb has argued that al-Mutawakkil planned a large-scale cam-
paign against Byzantium which for unknown reasons was never carried out (Cobb 1999, 241–
257).
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hand. Arabs were reduced to a clear minority among the governors of al-Shām on
all levels.
Since at least the reign of al-Muʿtazz, the caliph was too busy struggling to
stay in power in Sāmarrāʾ to actively intervene in the policy-making of al-Shām.⁷⁸
Notably, in 254 H/868 CE the privilege of appointing sub-governors was appa-
rently gained by Ṣāliḥ b.Waṣīf, a Central Asian military leader of the second gen-
eration who is not known to have held any office in al-Shām.⁷⁹ It is from that
point at the latest that the loyalty of the governors on the ground must be ques-
tioned. The best example of this is the case of ʿĪsā b. al-Shaykh, who is men-
tioned as sub-governor for Filasṭīn (al-Urdunn and Dimashq) a couple of times
during the Samarran period⁸⁰ but managed to forge allegiances which eventually
allowed him to become the de facto ruler of large parts of the province.⁸¹ In fact,
it turns out that direct ʿAbbāsid rule over al-Shām came to a preliminary end al-




Fārs remained the heartland of the Sasanid dynasty, even after they had moved
their capital to Iraq. The main importance of Fārs for the early Islamic Empire lay
in the agricultural richness of the large irrigated valleys lying between its moun-
tain ridges and the resulting high tax income derived from the province, which
was second only to that gained from al-Sawād (Lower Iraq).⁸³
Sasanian Fārs consisted of six subunits (shahr), each centered around one of
the main cities of the province. These shahrs survived into the Islamic period as
the kūras of Fārs and were reduced to five at an undefined point (probably
 Among the seven sub-governors of al-Shām known to have taken office during the reigns of
al-Muʿtazz and al-Muhtadī, only one is reported as appointed by the reigning caliph.
 It appears that Ṣaliḥ entered the political stage by taking part in the assassination of al-Mu-
tawakkil in 247 H/861 CE (al-Ṭabarī 1967, 9.:227).
 Ibn al-Athīr 1997, 6:240, 290; Ibn Shaddād 2010, 1:82, 159– 160.
 Cobb 2001, 37–41; EI2, “ʿĪsā b. al-Shaykh” (M. Canard).
 For the desolate state of al-Shām at the dawn of Ṭūlūnid rule see Gordon 2017, 326–329;
Cobb 2001, 41.
 See the kharāj lists of Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ (el-ʿAlī 1971: 337–338), Ibn al-Faqīh (1996, 381–382,
390, 411), al-Jahshiyārī (1938, 319–326), al-Yaʿqūbī (1960, 2:202).
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around the end of the Sasanian or the beginning of the Islamic period): Iṣṭakhr,
Ardashīr Khurra, Arrajān, Sābūr, and Darābjird.⁸⁴
The first Muslim invasions into Fārs were carried out by tribesmen from al-
Baḥrayn and ʿUmān who crossed the Persian Gulf by boat and set up a miṣr at
Tawwaj around the year 19 H/640 CE.⁸⁵ During the next decade, the combined
forces of Baṣra and Tawwaj conquered the coastal plains and valleys closest
to them. In 29 H/649–650 CE, the new governor of Baṣra ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀmir
was put in charge of all armies in Fārs and conquered areas still in Sasanian
hands.⁸⁶ However, Muslim rule remained shaky over the next 15 years, with up-
risings by the “people of Fārs” and the akrād reported in 29 H/649–650 CE,⁸⁷
38–39 H/658–660 CE,⁸⁸ and 43 H/663–664 CE.⁸⁹
During most of the Umayyad period, Fārs remained a region highly contest-
ed by several actors: during the second fitna (ca. 64–71 H/683–691 CE), the
Umayyads had already lost control of the province to ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr. Re-
garding the 60s H/680s CE and 70s H/690s CE, our information about Fārs is do-
minated by the struggle of the central authorities (both the Zubayrids and the
Umayyads) against Khārijites in Fārs and neighboring areas. The rebels were fi-
nally defeated by al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra in 77 H/696–697 CE. Not even five
years later, the army commander Ibn al-Ashʿath rebelled in Sīstān against the
super-governor of Iraq and the East, al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf. On the way to Iraq, Ibn
al-Ashʿath took control of Fārs for two years. The akrād, who had already fought
al-Ḥajjāj’s army at Ibn al-Ashʿath’s side in 83 H/702–3 CE, took control of all of
Fārs again in the year 90 H/708–9 CE. After the death of ʿUmar II, Yazīd b. al-
Muhallab rebelled in Baṣra and took control of Fārs (from 101 H/719 CE until
102 H/722 CE).
During the third fitna, the ʿAlīd rebel ʿAbdallāh b. Muʿāwiya overran Fārs
and adjacent areas. He attracted a wide following that included Khārijites,
local akrād, and ʿAbbāsid family members; the Umayyads managed to quell
this rebellion shortly before they were ousted themselves by the ʿAbbāsid revo-
lution.
The beginning of the ʿAbbāsid period saw another uprising by akrād in Fārs
in the year 137 H/754–755 CE. Supporters of Ibrāhīm b. ʿAbdallāh, the brother of
 See Daryaee 2003, and al-Iṣṭakhrī 1927, 125.
 ʿUmān and al-Baḥrayn refer here to the Persian Gulf coast of the Arabian Peninsula rather
than the modern states.
 Hinds 1984.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1967– 1968, 1:2831; al-Balādhurī 1996, 10:142; al-Yaʿqūbī 1960, 1:172.
 Al-Balādhurī 2003, 2:364–372; al-Ṭabarī 1967– 1968, 1:3429–3435, 3449–3450.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1967– 1968, 2:54.
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al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, who had rebelled in Baṣra, controlled at least part of Fārs be-
tween 141 H/758 CE and 145 H/763 CE. During the next century or so, very little is
heard about Fārs (except for one more uprising by akrād in 231 H/845–846 CE).
This suggests that the province was firmly under ʿAbbāsid control until the year
250 H/864–865 CE, when it first succumbed to a mutiny of turkī commanders in
the ʿAbbāsid army,⁹⁰ subsequently fell into the hands of a local magnate named
Muḥammad b.Wāṣil,⁹¹ and was finally conquered by Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth al-Ṣaffār
in 255 H/868–869 CE. The Ṣaffārids’ control over Fārs, although not uncontest-
ed,⁹² lasted until the Būyids conquered the province.⁹³
Governors of Fārs in the Umayyad Period
In the Umayyad period, the area to the east of Iraq was divided into three large
clusters: those regions conquered by Kūfan armies, those conquered by Baṣran
armies, and Khurāsān. As a result of its conquest history, Fārs thus remained
part of the territory under control of the super-governor of Baṣra for the entire
Umayyad period. It seems to hold generally true that the caliph directly appoint-
ed the super-governor of Baṣra, and the governor of Fārs was subordinate to and
appointed by the super-governor of Baṣra. However, the latter’s freedom to ap-
point a provincial governor of his own choice over Fārs was not unlimited: the
sources preserve accounts of at least two cases in which the caliph forced his
choice upon the super-governor.⁹⁴
From the year 50 H/670–671 CE until the end of the Umayyad period, the
super-provinces of Baṣra and Kūfa were usually held by a single super-governor
of Iraq,⁹⁵ who consequently also controlled the territories conquered by the
Baṣran and Kūfan armies and appointed his own governors to rule over these
areas. At times, Khurāsān was also added to this super-governor’s responsibili-
 Al-Yaʿqūbī 1883, 2:608–609.
 See Jürgen Paul’s contribution to this volume.
 For an historical overview of Ṣaffārid rule in Fārs, see Bosworth 1994.
 There is to date no comprehensive overview of the early Islamic history of Fārs. The brief
overview above of the main uprisings in Fārs was mainly put together from the works of al-Yaʿ-
qūbī, Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, al-Ṭabarī, al-Balādhurī, al-Iṣṭakhrī, Miskawayh, and Ibn al-Athīr.
 In the first case ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib ordered his super-governor of Baṣra Ibn ʿAbbās to appoint
Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān over Fārs; in the second, ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān forced his brother Bishr to
re-appoint al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra.
 Exceptions include the years 53–60 H/672–680 CE, 64–75 H/683–695 CE, and 99–102 H/
717–721 CE.
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ties, making him in effect super-governor of the entire eastern half of the empire.
These super-governors of Iraq were directly appointed by the caliph.
Our search turned up 82 governors on all levels for Umayyad Fārs: 29 super-
governors, 19 provincial governors, 26 sub-governors, and eight officials where it
is unclear whether they were active on the provincial or the sub-provincial level.
All super-governors of Baṣra and all provincial governors of Fārs found in
the sources seem to have been Arab Muslims.⁹⁶ On the lower levels, those
known by name can usually be identified as Arabs; of the others, three are iden-
tified as Iranians,⁹⁷ two are not mentioned by name,⁹⁸ and two have Arabic
names but are not identifiable. Arab governors on all levels are often explicitly
identified by their tribal nisbas in the sources, and it is thus likely that their trib-
al identity was an important factor in their selection.
We have an exhaustive list of the super-governors of Baṣra/Iraq for the 22
years of Sufyānid rule (41–64 H/661–683 CE). In all but three years of this peri-
od, this position was given to Qurashīs. The first of these was not an Umayyad:
ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀmir of the ʿAbd Shams clan (governed 42–45 H/662–664 CE), who
had been governor of Baṣra before under ʿUthmān (29–35 H/644–655 CE). After
three years, Muʿāwiya seems to have tried to get closer control of Baṣra and
southern Iran by appointing an Azdī from al-Shām (someone without local loy-
alties) as super-governor of Baṣra,⁹⁹ The caliph had to retract his decision within
months after protest by the Baṣrans, and installed Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān (governed
45–53 H/665–673 CE), whom he had recently recognized as his half-brother, as a
replacement.¹⁰⁰ After the latter’s death and two unsuccessful short-term Qaysī
 At least two had Christian mothers: al-Qubāʿ al-Ḥārith b. ʿAbdallāh al-Makhzūmī (governed
Baṣra and dependencies in 64–67 H/684–686 CE for Ibn al-Zubayr), and Khālid al-Qasrī (gov-
erned Iraq and the East in 105– 120 H/724–738 CE). One was probably a recent Muslim convert
(Yazīd b. Abī Muslim, al-Ḥajjāj’s kātib).
 Dādhbeh al-Muqaffaʿ, Farrūkhzād Gushn-anūshān, and Khālid al-Qasrī’s unnamed ʿāmil of
Dārābjird, a dihqān.
 They are only referred to as ʿāmil ʿAdī b. Arṭāt and ʿāmil ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar.
 Al-Ḥārith b. ʿAbdallāh/ʿAmr al-Azdī.
 Ziyād was born out of wedlock; his father was unknown and he was called Ziyād b. Abīhi
(“son of his father”) by his detractors. His mother may have been a slave girl. He was adopted by
a Thaqafī and became a half-brother of Abū Bakra, who would become a famous magnate in
Baṣra. Later (al-Ṭabarī 1967–1968, 2:70 mentions this event in passing in his entry on the
year 44 H), Muʿāwiya adopted him as his half-brother, confirming him as the son of Abū Sufyān
(much to the dislike of other Umayyads). See EI2, “Ziyād b. Abīhi” (I. Hasson), “al-Ḥārith b. Ka-
lada” (C. Pellat), and “Abū ʿUbayda” (H.A.R. Gibb); and Wellhausen 1927, 119–122.
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super-governors,¹⁰¹ Ziyād’s son ʿUbaydallāh b. Ziyād (governed 55–64 H/674–
684 CE) ruled Baṣra until the Zubayrid takeover.
This pattern—Qurashī super-governors exercising control over Baṣra and its
conquered territories on behalf of the caliph—continued under the Zubayrids
(64–71 H/683–691 CE) and in the first years of Marwānid rule. ʿAbdallāh b.
al-Zubayr’s four super-governors of Baṣra all belonged to his own family or
other (non-Umayyad) Qurashī clans;¹⁰² ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān (up to 75 H/
694 CE), appointed his own brother Bishr and another Umayyad who was not
a close family member.¹⁰³
On the lower levels, the pattern is not as clear, partly because there are more
gaps in our data. Under the Sufyānid super-governors of Baṣra/Iraq,we know the
names of only two provincial governors of Fārs and two sub-governors.¹⁰⁴ This is
not enough to draw wide-ranging conclusions. One sub-governor belonged to the
Bakr b.Wāʾil tribe, and the other was an Azdī sharīf; the latter was later appoint-
ed provincial governor twice,¹⁰⁵ and the other provincial governor was an
Umayyad. Finally, on dirhams minted in Iṣṭakhr we find a governor whose
name has not been definitively read and who has not been identified.¹⁰⁶ The Su-
fyānids seem to have tried to divide the lower-level governorships among the dif-
ferent tribes. This is suggested by the few appointments known from textual
sources and also by a khabar reported by al-Balādhurī, according to which Muʿā-
wiya was worried that the Banū l-Ḥārith b. Kaʿb/Azd were becoming too power-
ful because Ziyād b. Abī Sufyān had appointed too many of them.¹⁰⁷
 Ziyād’s deputy in Baṣra, Samura b. Jundab of Fazāra/Qays, was confirmed as super-gover-
nor of Baṣra for six or 18 months and then replaced by a former shurṭa commander of Baṣra,
ʿAbdallāh b. Ghaylān of Thaqīf/Qays; the latter was dismissed within six months after com-
plaints by the Baṣrans.
 The Zubayrids belonged to the Asad b. ʿAbd al-ʿUzzā clan themselves. In addition to Muṣʿab
b. al-Zubayr and Ḥamza b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr, ʿAbdallāh also employed ʿUmar b. ʿUbaydal-
lāh b. Maʿmar of the Taym (the clan of the caliph Abū Bakr, who was ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr’s
grandfather; see EI2, “Taym b. Murra” (M. Lecker)) and al-Qubāʿ b. al-Ḥārith of Makhzūm/Qur-
aysh.
 Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh b. Khālid b. Asīd (appointed twice, in 71 H/690–691 CE or 72 H/691–92
CE, and 74 H/693–94 CE) belonged to the Abū l-ʿĪṣ clan of Umayya.
 Their dates of appointment remain unknown.
 Sharīk b. al-Aʿwar; he is mentioned as provincial governor under Ziyād and ʿUbaydallāh b.
Ziyād. He had already been sub-governor of Iṣṭakhr for ʿAbdallāh b. ʿĀmir in Muʿāwiya’s reign.
 ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. MDWR, see Album 2011, 25.
 These included his provincial governor of Fārs (at that point apparently including Kirmān),
Sharīk b. al-Aʿwar. According al-Balādhurī 1979, 159– 160, Muʿāwiya sent a letter to Ziyād re-
proaching him, and Ziyād replied he had selected them only for their merits; even if he had
found Zanj (black Africans) with these merits, he would have hired them.
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Under the Zubayrids, we know of only two provincial governors of Fārs and
two sub-governors. Because the Azraqī Khārijites had overrun Fārs, famous gen-
erals were appointed provincial governors at the time.¹⁰⁸ Of the sub-governors,
one belonged to Quraysh, the other to Rabīʿa.
For the provincial governors and sub-governors of Fārs in the first years after
ʿAbd al-Malik regained control over Baṣra for the Umayyads, we have an excep-
tional amount of information: we have 10 names of governors in Fārs serving
under his super-governor Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh b. Khālid b. Asīd. Khālid seeming-
ly did not appoint any provincial governor over Fārs, but divided authority over
the kūras of Fārs between two of his sons. He appointed a sub-governor over
each kūra, all of whom were taken from two families: that of top general al-Mu-
hallab b. Abī Ṣufra of the Azd,¹⁰⁹ and that of ʿĀmir b. Mismaʿ, the Baṣran chief of
the Bakr b.Wāʾil/Rabīʿa.¹¹⁰ A story in al-Ṭabarī’s Taʾrīkh may serve to explain the
appointment of four members of the latter family: Mālik b. Miṣmaʿ had reported-
ly hidden Khālid in Baṣra when Muṣʿab b. al-Zubayr wanted to have him arrest-
ed.¹¹¹ On the other hand, the importance of tribal identity in these appointments
is underlined by the fact that one of these Bakrīs, Muqātil b. Mismaʿ, minted
coins in Bīshāpūr with the inscription ‘Bakriyya’: the first (and only) reference
to Arab tribes on Islamic coins.¹¹²
To sum up, almost all of the governors of Baṣra/Iraq and Fārs (on all levels)
appointed by Sufyānids, Zubayrids, and in the first years of ʿAbd al-Malik’s reign
had strong links with Baṣra and its conquest armies, the one exception to this
rule being Muʿāwiya’s ill-fated appointment of a super-governor from al-Shām.
All of them seem to have had previous experience in government, having served
before as governors, deputy governors, or shurṭa chiefs. Many of them were mili-
tary commanders, and those who were not Umayyads often belonged to leading
families in their tribes and/or had marriage ties with the Umayyads.
Two years after forcing the Zubayrids out of Iraq, ʿAbd al-Malik appears to
have changed tactics. Instead of appointing more Umayyads or sharīfs of other
tribes, he relied on al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf to head the Iraqi super-province (governed
75–95 H/694–714 CE). In contrast to most of the previous super-governors
(though not unlike Ziyād), al-Ḥajjāj had very humble origins and worked his
 Al-Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra/Azd and ʿUmar b. ʿUbaydallāh b. Maʿmar/Umayya.
 Al-Mughīra b. al-Muhallab (twice) and Saʿīd b. al-Muhallab.
 ʿĀmir b. Mismaʿ himself, his sons Mismaʿ and Numayra, and his brother Muqātil.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1967, 6:152.
 See Album 2011, 25.
278 Simon Gundelfinger & Peter Verkinderen
way up through different military and administrative positions.¹¹³ His clan, the
Aḥlāf of Thaqīf, was not very prominent either.¹¹⁴ His appointments in Fārs
were varied. He kept the Azdī general al-Muhallab in charge of the battle against
the Azāriqa. This brought al-Muhallab back to Fārs, where he remained in office
until his final victory in 77 H/696 CE.
After al-Muhallab was moved to Khurāsān, al-Ḥajjāj appointed one of his
own relatives¹¹⁵ and another Qaysī¹¹⁶ provincial governor of Fārs. All of his
sub-governors known from the textual sources carried Arabic names, and all
but one (still unidentified) came from northern Arab tribes (Tamīm, Bakr b.
Wāʾil, Fazāra). However, early in al-Ḥajjāj’s super-governorship we find the
name of one Iranian official, Farrūkhzād Gushn-anūshān,¹¹⁷ on dirhams and
copper coins from mints in Fārs. Nothing is known about him from the texts.
After al-Ḥajjāj’s death, tribal tension reached new heights in Iraq. Yemenīs
and Qaysīs took turns as super-governors of Baṣra, each appointing fellow tribes-
men over Fārs.¹¹⁸ Vindictiveness between the two parties was high and led to a
vicious cycle in which a new super-governor would arrest and torture his pred-
ecessor and the latter’s ʿummāl.¹¹⁹ Hishām b. ʿAbd al-Malik’s appointment of the
Bajalī Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī (governed 105– 120 H/724–738 CE) has been
seen as an attempt to temper the tribal tension in Baṣra, because Bajīla was not
closely related to any of the rival confederations.¹²⁰ Khālid still employed the
 He is said to have come from a poor family of stone carriers and started his career as a
schoolmaster in Ṭāʾif. He was subsequently governor of Tabāla (in the Tihāma), head of the
shurṭa of Damascus, commander of the successful expeditions against Muṣʿab and ʿAbdallāh
b. al-Zubayr, governor of the Ḥijāz, Yemen, and Yamāma in 73 H, and leader of the ḥajj in 74
H. See EI2, “al-Ḥadjdjādj b. Yūsuf” (A. Dietrich).
 See EI2, “Thaḳīf” (M. Lecker).
 Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim b. Abī ʿAqīl al-Thaqafī, whom al-Iṣṭakhrī (124) calls al-Ḥajjāj’s pa-
ternal cousin; according to Ibn al-Balkhī (132, 157, 170), al-Ḥajjāj appointed his own brother Mu-
ḥammad b. Yūsuf. It cannot be ruled out that they were both sent to govern Fārs at different
times.
 Qaṭan b. Qabīṣa al-Hilālī, of the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa/Qays. The exact dates of his governorship
are unknown.
 The patronymic is mentioned only on copper coins from mint DShT; the other coins all have
only farrūkhzād. See the discussion in the appendix.
 Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (Azd/Yemen; 96–99 H/715–717 CE); ʿAdī b. Arṭāt (Fazāra/Qays; 99–
101 H/717–719 CE); rebellion by Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (Azd/Yemen, 101– 102 H/719–720 CE);
ʿUmar b. Hubayra (Fazāra/Qays; 102– 105 H/720–724 CE); Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī (Bajīla,
105– 120 H/723–738 CE); Yūsuf b. ʿUmar (Thaqīf/Qays; 120–126 H/738–744 CE); Manṣūr b. Jum-
hūr (Kalb/Yemen; 126 H/744 CE).
 See also Crone 2003, 44.
 EI2, “Khālid b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḳasrī” (G. R. Hawting).
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same policies as the Yemenī and Qaysī super-governors: he appointed a member
of his own tribe provincial governor of Fārs, and tortured at least one of the
ʿummāl of his predecessor.¹²¹ This pattern was only broken at the very end of
the Umayyad period, when the first super-governor of Umayyad stock in more
than 50 years was appointed over Baṣra.¹²²
Very few sub-governors in Fārs were found in the sources for the period be-
tween 80 H/699 CE and 126 H/744 CE: only four Tamīmīs¹²³ and two dihqāns
could be identified. This is the first time that textual sources explicitly mention
sub-governors of Iranian stock in Fārs. We do not have enough data to say
whether appointing dihqāns as sub-governors was a common practice in this pe-
riod, but there is reason to assume that this practice was particular to the ap-
pointer of these two specific dihqāns, Khālid b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī. For instance,
the Khārijite Bahlūl reportedly intended to have Khālid al-Qasrī killed at least
partly because Khālid put Zoroastrians in positions of power over Muslims.¹²⁴
Governors of Fārs in the ʿAbbāsid Period
All in all, our search turned up 45 governors for the ʿAbbāsid period (until the
takeover by the Ṣaffārids): 14 super-governors, 20 provincial governors, and 11
sub-governors.
Immediately after the ʿAbbāsid revolution, the struggle for power within the
ʿAbbāsid movement played out in Fārs as well. Abū Salama, Abū Muslim’s rival
in the ʿAbbāsid movement, had appointed ʿummāl over Fārs (we do not know
who they were), but Abū Muslim sent his own ʿāmil, Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath,¹²⁵
to Fārs and had Abū Salama’s ʿummāl killed. Al-Saffāḥ tried twice to replace Ibn
al-Ashʿath with a paternal uncle,¹²⁶ but to no avail: al-Manṣūr was the first ʿAb-
bāsid caliph to successfully install his own governors in Fārs, perhaps only after
Abū Muslim’s death in 137 H/755 CE.
 He tortured Hāshim/Hushaym b. Ṣafwān al-Fazārī (of Qays), ʿUmar b. Hubayra’s provincial
governor of Fārs. See al-Balādhurī 1996, 9:85.
 ʿAbdallāh, a son of caliph ʿUmar II (governed 126– 128? H/744–746? CE).
 Naṣr b. Ḥassān [al-ʿAnbarī] for Khālid al-Qasrī, and ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Māzinī, ʿAbdallāh b.
Ṭāriq al-ʿAnbarī, Tawba b. Kaysān al-ʿAnbarī (the latter a mawlā of Sijistānī origin) for Yūsuf b.
ʿUmar.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1967, 7:131; see also EI2, “Khālid b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḳasrī” (G. R. Hawting) for Khāl-
id’s alleged preference for non-Muslims.
 This is not the famous ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath of Kinda, but a man of
the tribe Khuzāʿa/Azd.
 ʿĪsā and Ismāʿīl b. ʿAlī b. ʿAbdallāh b. al-ʿAbbās.
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Among al-Manṣūr’s early provincial governors of Fārs were his brother, his
uncle,¹²⁷ and Khālid b. Barmak, who had been al-Saffāḥ’s secretary. Khālid
was the first non-Arab to be appointed to this position.¹²⁸ It thus appears that
close personal relations trumped religious pedigree and tribal considerations
under the first two ʿAbbāsid caliphs. This may have been part of a wider strategy
used by al-Saffāḥ and al-Manṣūr to keep Fārs (and other provinces) under strict
caliphal control. Probably for the same reason, they seem to have done away
with the system of super-governors; they appointed their provincial governors
of Fārs directly, and these were independent from Baṣra. The sources suggest
that al-Manṣūr even directly appointed two sub-governors in Fārs.¹²⁹
At the end of his caliphate al-Manṣūr seems to have taken steps toward larg-
er governing units; in 156, he appointed his mawlā ʿUmmāra b. Ḥamza over
Kuwar Dijla,¹³⁰ al-Ahwāz, and Fārs (but from all we know, not over Baṣra itself).
In the same period, he also appointed a number of Tamīmīs and an Asadī tribes-
man to Fārs and its kuwar.¹³¹
Starting with al-Mahdī, the ʿAbbāsids seem to have gradually relaxed their
direct grip on the province. Al-Mahdī brought the super-province of Baṣra
back, but its composition had changed: from now on, the super-province was
no longer defined as all areas conquered by the Baṣran armies. Baṣra had lost
its special position, and it became just another component in an ever-changing
conglomerate of provinces, of which it formed the core along with Kuwar Dijla,
al-Ahwāz, and Fārs. At times, Kirmān, the Arabian Peninsula (especially its Per-
sian Gulf provinces), and the Jibāl were added to these.
Hārūn al-Rashīd kept the system of the super-governorship of Baṣra that in-
cluded Fārs in place at least until the year 173 H/789 CE, when the super-gover-
nor of Baṣra Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. ʿAlī died. In the same year, he appoint-
ed his infant son Muḥammad al-Amīn heir apparent, and in 175 H/791–792 CE he
put him in charge over al-Shām and Iraq. A decade later, al-Maʾmūn was ap-
pointed second successor to the throne and put in charge of (greater) Khurāsān,
which is described in the reports on this event as the area stretching from the
 Yaḥyā b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī and Ismāʿīl b. ʿAlī.
 According to Ibn al-ʿAdīm (7:3023), the appointment of Khālid was the result of machina-
tions by al-Manṣūr’s kātib al-Mūriyānī, who wanted to get his rival far away from the court.
 Wāṣil b. ʿUlaym over Iṣṭakhr and Naṣr b. Ḥarb al-Tamīmī over the frontier (? thaghr) of Fārs.
 The agricultural districts along the lower Tigris.
 Wāṣil b. ʿUlaym (Tamīm – Iṣṭakhr), Yazīd b. Iqbal (Tamīm – Fārs), Naṣr b. Ḥarb (Tamīm –
Thaghr Fārs), Shaykh b. ʿUmayra (Asad – Fārs).
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limits of Hamadhān to the furthest part of al-Mashriq.¹³² Since Fārs (and the rest
of southern Iran) are not mentioned in these arrangements, it is not clear to
whose sphere of influence it belonged. In any case, there is no indication that
either of the two heirs apparent had any direct influence on policies and appoint-
ments in Fārs before al-Maʾmūn’s reign.¹³³
Under al-Mahdī and Hārūn al-Rashīd, an unbroken succession of super-gov-
ernors governed the provinces along the Persian Gulf in the years 160– 173 H/
776–789 CE; three out of four appointees were close family members, the
other a mawlā of the caliph.¹³⁴ When the last of this chain of super-governors,
Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. ʿAlī, died in the year 173 H/789 CE, al-Rashīd confis-
cated the enormous wealth he had amassed during his nine-year governorship.
For the later years of al-Rashīd’s reign (173– 193 H/789–809 CE), the sources
mention several governors of Baṣra (all ʿAbbāsid family members except for
one caliphal mawlā)¹³⁵ but it is not clear whether or not these ruled Baṣra as
a super-province. Only one of them, al-Manṣūr’s grandson ʿĪsā b. Jaʿfar, is explic-
itly said to have had authority over multiple provinces, including Fārs. There is
no evidence any of them were actively involved in the administration of Fārs.
This lack of evidence may be related to the general dearth of information
about events in Fārs during this period, rather than the limitation of the
power of Baṣra’s governor.
The textual sources provide only scant references to one sub-governor¹³⁶ and
four provincial governors of Fārs under al-Mahdī¹³⁷ and al-Rashīd.¹³⁸ Copper and
lead coins further suggest that Muḥammad b. Yaḥyā al-Barmakī may have served
as provincial governor of Fārs¹³⁹ and provide the names of three more officials
 Al-Ṭabarī 1967, 8:269 (Khurāsān wa-mā yattaṣilu bihā ilā Hamadhān), 8:275 (min ḥadd Ham-
adhān ilā ākhir al-Mashriq).
 A number of officials are mentioned on copper coins from this period. One of them was
likely a provincial governor of Fārs, since he appears on coins from all kuwar; the others may
have been sub-governors. In any case, the coins do not provide information on who appointed
them.
 Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. ʿAlī (160–163 H/776–780 CE), Ṣāliḥ b. Dāwud b. ʿAlī (164 H/
780–781 CE), Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. ʿAlī (167– 173 H/783–789 CE), and al-Muʿallā mawlā
amīr al-muʾminīn (165– 167 H/781–783 CE).
 Khalīfa 1977, 461–462; al-Ṭabarī 1967, 8:346.
 ʿAmmār b. ʿAlī served as sub-governor in Fasā, the de facto capital of the kūra Darābjird,
under al-Rashīd.
 Shaykh b. ʿUmayra al-Asadī, who was already governor of Fārs under al-Manṣūr (perhaps
his governorship was simply extended by al-Mahdī), and Khālid b. Barmak.
 Al-Mahdī’s mawlā Ḥamawayh, and the Ḍabbī sharīf ʿAbdallāh b. al-Musayyib.
 His name is on copper coins from all kūra capitals of Fārs in the years 182 H/798–799 CE
and 183 H/799–800 CE.
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who may have served as sub-governors. They cannot be further identified and it
is not clear who appointed them.¹⁴⁰ The provincial governors who can be iden-
tified show that al-Mahdī and al-Rashīd used both mawālī and Arabs in this po-
sition. However, since we do not have dates of service or appointment informa-
tion for most of them, we cannot draw more pointed conclusions.
For most of the caliphate of al-Amīn, we have no information regarding the
administration of Fārs. Under al-Maʾmūn, Fārs became part of the dominions of
the former protégés of the Barmakids, al-Faḍl and al-Ḥasan b. Sahl. The latter’s
father had been a Zoroastrian landowner in Iraq with Iranian roots. In 196 H/812
CE, al-Maʾmūn, already hailed as caliph by his own troops even before the death
of al-Amīn, appointed al-Faḍl b. Sahl over the super-province of al-Mashriq,
which is now said to stretch from Hamadhān to Tibet and from the Persian
Gulf to the Caspian Sea.¹⁴¹ Al-Faḍl then appointed his brother over the western
part of his territory (including Fārs) in 198 H/814 CE, and al-Ḥasan in turn ap-
pointed Wahb b. Saʿīd b. ʿAmr, a kātib from a Christian family of kuttāb, over
Fārs and Kirmān.¹⁴² Therefore it seems that al-Maʾmūn installed a more cascaded
form of hierarchy, in a departure from the attempts of the first two ʿAbbāsids to
appoint provincial governors directly.
For the next thirty years, the textual sources do not provide any information
about governors of Fārs on any level. After the assassination of al-Faḍl b. Sahl in
202 H/818 CE and the subsequent retirement of his brother al-Ḥasan, control over
Fārs probably went to the Ṭāhirids. However, Fārs is not explicitly mentioned as
part of their territories until the early 230s H/mid-840s CE, when the Ṭāhirid Mu-
ḥammad b. Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥusayn b. Muṣʿab was appointed provincial governor
of Fārs during the reign of al-Wāthiq. Nor is Fārs mentioned as part of a super-
province of Baṣra.We only know of three (unidentified) officials in Fārs over this
thirty-year period from copper coins.¹⁴³
In the year 235 H, al-Mutawakkil divided the empire among his sons.¹⁴⁴ Fārs
became part of the lot of al-Muʿtazz. Interestingly, additional super-provinces
were created that were not contained within the territory of one heir; for in-
 Al-Rabīʿ b. Khaṭīr (Iṣṭakhr 159 H/775–776 CE and 167 H/783–784 CE; Arrajān, Ardashīr
Khurra and Jūr 167 H; but not mentioned on coins from Sābūr and Fasā from the same year),
Muhalhil b. Ṣafwān (Arrajān 182 H/798–799 CE), al-Amīr Manṣūr ([Sīrāf] 188 H/804 CE).
 Al-Ṭabarī 1967, 8:424.
 Wahb b. Saʿīd b. ʿAmr hailed from a family of kuttāb that had been in the service of the
Umayyads since Muʿāwiya, then that of the ʿAbbāsids and the Barmakids.
 Al-Qāsim b. Naṣr (mint: Fārs, dates: 214 H/829–830 CE and 220 H/835 CE); al-Ḥasan b. Mu-
ḥammad and Yaḥyā b. Salaf (Fasā, 220s H/835–845 CE).
 See note 73.
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stance, the Ṭāhirid Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm was put in charge of a super-
province consisting of aʿmāl that belonged to both the territory of al-Muʿtazz and
that of al-Muntaṣir. In addition, he also held the command over the shurṭa of
Baghdad, which was awarded to him by al-Mutawakkil himself. Ibn Isḥāq
then appointed his cousin as governor of Fārs (see Fig. 1).
The only name of a non-Ṭāhirid governor of Fārs we have for al-Mutawak-
kil’s reign is that of al-Ḥasan b. Rajāʾ, who died while in charge of Fārs and
al-Ahwāz in 244 H/858–859 CE. Like Wahb b. Saʿīd b. ʿAmr under al-Ḥasan b.
Sahl, he belonged to an Iraqi family with a long-standing tradition in the dīwāns.
During the period of unrest in Sāmarrāʾ after the assassination of al-Muta-
wakkil in 247 H/861 CE, caliphal control over Fārs was lost after two uprisings
by the jund of Fārs and shākiriyya troops¹⁴⁵ against consecutive Ṭāhirid gover-
nors.¹⁴⁶ In the complex struggle that followed between various factions of the
ʿAbbāsid army, akrād, and Yaʿqūb b. al-Layth al-Ṣaffār, the caliph al-Muʿtamid
and his regent al-Muwaffaq for the first time appointed atrāk commanders
over a super-province including Fārs.¹⁴⁷ In a desperate attempt to stop the Ṣaf-
fārids and keep the taxes of Fārs flowing to Iraq, al-Muʿtamid bestowed the gov-
ernorship of Fārs on a powerful local man of Arab (Tamīmī) stock, Muḥammad
b.Wāṣil.¹⁴⁸ This is, as far as is known, the first time someone from the local elite
was appointed governor of Fārs.
Fig. 1: Graphical representation of the appointment of Muḥammad b. Isḥāq al-Ṭāhirī
 For the shākiriyya, see Amikam Elad’s contribution to this volume.
 Al-Ḥusayn b. Khālid, appointed by Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir; and ʿAbdallāh b.
Isḥāq b. Ibrāhīm.
 Mūsā b. Bughā (256–261 H/870–875 CE) and Masrūr al-Balkhī (261–262 H/875–876 CE).
 See Jürgen Paul’s contribution to this volume.
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The profile of the governors under ʿAbbāsid rule is thus markedly different
from that of the governors of Umayyad Fārs.Whereas none of the Umayyad pro-
vincial governors or super-governors we found could be identified as a non-Arab
or a non-Muslim, almost half of their ʿAbbāsid counterparts could be positively
identified as (mostly Khurāsānian) Iranians. In addition to these, a number were
mawālī of unknown background. Almost all of these ʿAbbāsid governors presum-
ably were Muslims; only one was likely a Christian,¹⁴⁹ and none was positively
identified as Zoroastrian. There does not seem to have been an aversion to em-
ploy recent converts.¹⁵⁰ For the sub-governors, however, we do not have enough
data for meaningful analysis.
Summary and Conclusion
The above discussion shows that the patterns of governor appointments clearly
differed in Fārs and al-Shām. Moreover, these patterns changed over time. These
shifts occurred at different times in the two provinces, and did not always follow
the classical periodization (into Sufyānid, Zubayrid, and Marwānid, or pre-Sa-
marran and Samarran). In fact, the only classical watershed clearly detectable
in the structures and appointments in both provinces was the ʿAbbāsid revolu-
tion.
Apart from the fact that the vast majority of all governors of the Umayyad
period in al-Shām and Fārs were Arab Muslims, there are very few parallels be-
tween both provinces in the appointments of governors. We assume that as the
heartland of the Umayyad Empire, al-Shām had a special significance that set it
apart from other provinces. As not a single provincial governor or super-governor
could be identified for Umayyad al-Shām, it seems likely that essential adminis-
trative functions of the province were carried out directly at the caliphal court.
Fārs, on the other hand, was part of the territory under control of the super-gov-
ernor of Baṣra/Iraq, who appointed provincial governors over Fārs and sub-gov-
ernors over its kūras.
For al-Shām, two different phases can be identified during the Umayyad pe-
riod. For the first phase, which covers the Sufyānid and the Zubayrid periods, lit-
tle information is available on the sub-governors of al-Shām. From what we
know, Yemenīs played a crucial role, while we hardly find any Qurashī or
 Wahb b. Saʿīd b. ʿAmr, governor of Kirmān and Fārs in the 180s–190s H/796–815 CE.
 E.g. Ṣāʿid b. Makhlad, a recently converted Christian from the Jazīra (EI2, “Ibn Makhlad” (D.
Sourdel)), and al-Faḍl and al-Ḥasan b. Sahl, who converted at the beginning of their careers (EI2,
“al-Faḍl b. Sahl b. Zadhānfarūkh” and “al-Ḥasan b. Sahl” (D. Sourdel)).
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Qaysī. Furthermore, we hear of only one sub-governor appointed by an official
other than the caliph.
In the Marwānid period, all sub-governors appear to have been appointed by
the caliph himself, and the province was to a large extent governed by Umayyad
family members. As for non-Umayyad sub-governors, balance was carefully
maintained between Qaysīs and Yemenīs. While Kalbīs were the dominant
group within the Yemenī faction and a main pillar of early Marwānid power,¹⁵¹
it is striking that we do not find a single Kalbī and only few of their Quḍāʿa allies
among the sub-governors of al-Shām.
For Fārs, we identified three distinct phases that do not accord with the clas-
sical periodization of the Umayyad period into a Sufyānid, Zubayrid, and Marwā-
nid phase. The first phase covers the period from Muʿāwiya until the first years of
ʿAbd al-Malik’s rule, including the Zubayrid period.With a few short-lived excep-
tions, all of the super-governors of this phase belonged to Quraysh. However, the
tribal affiliation of the provincial governors and sub-governors of Fārs was more
mixed and does not follow a detectable pattern. What the super-governors and
the provincial governors of Fārs do have in common is a strong connection
with Baṣra and its conquest armies.
The second phase apparently represents a shift after the first years of ʿAbd
al-Malik’s rule. By appointing al-Ḥajjāj b. Yūsuf, the caliph introduced a twofold
innovation: instead of relying on super-governors from Quraysh who were close-
ly connected to Baṣra, he now appointed a strongman from a minor Muḍarī tribe
with no connections to Baṣra. Al-Ḥajjaj’s provincial governors and sub-governors
were mainly of Muḍarī background. Under his rule we also encounter the first
Iranian official who appears to have served as sub-governor.
The third phase spans the period between al-Ḥajjāj’s death (95 H/714 CE)
and the end of Umayyad rule. In this phase, Qaysī and Yemenī super-governors
alternated, each appointing mainly members of his own tribe over Fārs and its
kūras. In this period we also find the first explicit mentions of two Iranian
sub-governors in Fārs.
In the beginning of the ʿAbbāsid period, the caliphs secured their control
over both provinces by appointing senior family members as provincial gover-
nors over al-Shām and Fārs. Apart from the caliphal family, Arabs lost their
quasi-monopoly on governorships and tribal affiliation lost much of its rele-
 See Crone 2003, 36; Cobb 2001, 69.
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vance. Muslim faith, on the other hand, remained a precondition for governor-
ships above the sub-governor level.¹⁵²
These broad similarities aside, the patterns of appointments identified for al-
Shām and Fārs are again very different. As in the Umayyad period, changes in
the appointment patterns occurred at different times in the two provinces.
We divide the governorships in ʿAbbāsid al-Shām into four phases, which
cross the classical lines distinguishing the pre-Samarran and Samarran period.
The first phase covers the period from the ʿAbbāsid revolution up to the appoint-
ment of al-Amīn and al-Maʾmūn as heirs apparent. Even though the custom of
appointing close family members as super-governors or provincial governors
led to an internal power struggle after the death of al-Saffāḥ, this practice was
continued under the subsequent caliphs—the one exception being the ambigu-
ous case of Abū Muslim. From the reign of al-Manṣūr onwards, it appears that
these governors were deprived of their privilege to appoint sub-governors,
most of whom were also now members of the ʿAbbāsid family.
The second brief phase stretches from the later part of al-Rashīd’s reign until
the death of al-Amīn. These two caliphs relied less heavily on their own kin to
govern al-Shām. Even though al-Amīn was made heir apparent and super-gover-
nor of al-Shām and Iraq by his father, it appears to have been the Barmakids who
were exercising actual control and appointing governors on their own behalf. In
fact they were the first non-Arabs to govern al-Shām.When, after their fall in 187
H/803 CE, governorships on all levels were dominated by Arabs again, non-Hā-
shimid Arabs can also be found serving as provincial governors. In the caliphate
of al-Amīn, there even appears to have been a slight preponderance of non-Hā-
shimid Arabs on the sub-governor level.
Starting with al-Maʾmūn’s reign, which marks the beginning of the third
phase, the caliphs seem to have had a comparatively low interest in policy-mak-
ing in al-Shām. As far as we can tell, no more provincial governors were appoint-
ed over the province but al-Shām was ruled as part of different super-provinces.
While the first turkī super-governor is found in this period, there were no atrāk
among the known contemporary sub-governors. These sub-governorates were al-
most evenly divided among ʿAbbāsids, non-Hāshimid Arabs, and Iranians/Khur-
āsānians.While in the majority of known cases sub-governors were appointed by
the caliphs themselves, one ʿAbbāsid and one Ṭāhirid super-governor are report-
ed to have also enjoyed this privilege.
 One possible exception is Wahb b. Saʿīd b. ʿAmr, who governed Fārs and Kirmān in the
180s–190s H and may have been Christian.
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From the reign of al-Mutawakkil onwards we find an increasing number of
atrāk among the sub-governors of al-Shām, rapidly challenging the role that ʿAb-
bāsid family members played on this level. In parallel, the caliphs gradually lost
control over al-Shām. By the reign of al-Muʿtazz, they had largely forfeited their
authority over the province, which is demonstrated by two events: Ṣāliḥ b.Waṣīf,
a turkī general who is not known to have held any office in al-Shām, is reported
to have appointed a sub-governor on his own behalf; and ʿĪsā b. al-Shaykh, a
Shaybānī tribesman, managed to forge alliances which allowed him to exercise
actual power over large parts of the province. It thus becomes obvious that ʿAb-
bāsid authority over the province had vanished even before the Ṭūlūnids took
over in 264 H/878 CE.
For ʿAbbāsid Fārs, we can distinguish three broad phases. It should be noted
that due to the lack of meaningful data, sub-governors are left out of the equa-
tion here. The first short phase covers the time from the ʿAbbāsid takeover until
the end of al-Manṣūr’s reign. During this period, provincial governors of Fārs
were either family members of the caliph or confidants closely connected to
the court, and were directly appointed by the caliph. Fārs was at this time not
part of a super-province.
The second phase starts with al-Mahdī’s reintroduction of a super-province
of Baṣra, which stayed in place at least until 173 H/789 CE.¹⁵³ Only ʿAbbāsid fam-
ily members and personal mawālī of the caliph were appointed over Baṣra in this
period. Below the super-governor level, no provincial governors of Fārs are
known from this time, but the scarcity of the available material does not allow
us to conclude whether this means that the office was abolished as a result of
the reorganization.
During the third phase, we can detect an additional layer of super-governor-
ships above the previously found super-governorships; these are commonly
known as the governorships of al-Mashriq and al-Maghrib and are first men-
tioned in the context of Hārūn al-Rashīd’s succession plan. However, the exact
extent of the heirs’ territories and their actual involvement in the super-provin-
cial administration is never clearly defined in the sources. The ‘super-governor-
ship of the East’ was exclusively held by heirs apparent and members of the im-
portant governor dynasties of the Sahlids and the Ṭāhirids.While we do not find
ʿAbbāsid family members below the level of the super-governorship of al-Mash-
 In this year, al-Rashīd dismissed Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, who had been in charge of the
super-province of Baṣra, including Fārs. For the later years of al-Rashīd’s reign, the sources men-
tion a large amount of governors of Baṣra, but it is not clear whether or not these governors
ruled Baṣra as a super-province. Only one of them is explicitly said to have ruled Baṣra as a
super-province, including Fārs.
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riq, Sahlids and Ṭāhirids did hold both the super-governorship of al-Mashriq and
the super-governorship of Baṣra. On the provincial level, we find the offspring of
classical kuttāb families in addition to a small number of Ṭāhirids. During the
anarchy in Sāmarrāʾ, shākiriyya troops rose up against the Ṭāhirid provincial
governor of Fārs in 249 H/863–4 CE, leading to a power vacuum eventually filled
by the Ṣaffārids and bringing continuous, direct caliphal rule over the province
to an end.
To conclude: for most of the period considered in this paper, the primary
sources’ references to governors and their appointments in both al-Shām and
Fārs draw only a fragmentary picture, one that becomes even more patchy
when dealing with the lower levels of authority.
Our analysis of these references revealed patterns of appointments that were
clearly different in Fārs and al-Shām. Moreover, both provinces faced changes in
the appointment patterns at different points in time. This divergence in the pat-
terns of appointments is assumed to reflect a divergence in the imperial strat-
egies for both provinces. As, however, the sources remain largely silent in this
regard, these imperial strategies can only be deduced from their (imperfect) im-
plementations.
In the Umayyad period this divergence might be explained by the fact that
al-Shām held a special position as the seat of the caliphate. But even in the ʿAb-
bāsid period, it appears that caliphs introduced a uniform strategy for provincial
government only in two instances: at the beginning of ʿAbbāsid rule, senior
members of the caliphal family were appointed directly by the caliph over
both al-Shām and Fārs, and in al-Maʾmūn’s reign the absence of provincial gov-
ernors suggests that this office lost its relevance and was perhaps even abolish-
ed, perhaps as part of an attempt to further centralize the imperial administra-
tion. In both cases, these uniform strategies were short-lived and soon
abandoned in favor of policies tailored to the specific situation in each province.
In fact, it appears that a good part of the decision-making process was trial and
error, reacting to the current situation in the province and at the caliphal court.
This study is based on data collected exclusively from al-Shām and Fārs. In
order to test the above hypotheses, similar work on additional provinces has to
be added to the discussion. Ultimately, this approach, if applied to a wider range
of provinces, has the potential to answer bigger questions related to the function-
ing and evolution of the hierarchical structure of government in the early Islamic
Empire, and the putative delegation of power through a chain of command link-
ing caliphal authority directly to the sub-provincial level.
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Appendix : Governors of al-Shām and Fārs
Introductory notes to the appendix:
– The appendix contains lists of governors of al-Shām and Fārs for the period
from Muʿāwiya (41 H/661 CE) until the year 255 H/869 CE.
– Table columns: 1 = dynasty served, 2 = date, 3 = governor’s name, 4 = area
under governor’s control, 5 = governor type, 6 = appointer’s name, 7 = ap-
pointer’s function, 8 = governor’s ethnicity
– The references refer only to the period of the governors’ employment in our
provinces; a full prosopographical study of the governors will be the subject
of future publications.
– For reasons of space, dates in the appendix are limited to hijrī dating
– Time spans that cannot be narrowed down more exactly are between brack-
ets. E.g., (41–60)–64 means the governor was appointed at some unknown
time between 41 and 60 H, and served until 64 H.
– If the exact beginning or end of a term is not known, this may be indicated
by a trailing hyphen. E.g., 145– 152– means the governor was appointed in
145 H, and was in office until an unknown date after 152 H.
– Governor type abbreviations: cal.cont. = caliphal contender, gov = governor,
reb = rebel, sub = sub-governor, sup = super-governor
– Ethnicity abbreviations: Ar-Y = Arab – Yemen, Ar-M = Arab – Muḍar, Ar-Q =
Arab – Qays, Ar-R = Arab – Rabīʿa
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Governors of al-Shām
       
U (–) ¹)1(دعسنبريشبنبنامعنلا Ḥimṣ sub Muʿāwiya I caliph Ar-Y






sub Ar-Y – Kalb
U – ⁴يرهفلاسيقنبكاحضلا Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh
U (–) ⁵لدحبنبكلامنبديعس Qinnasrīn,
Jazīra
sub Ar-Y – Kalb
U (–) ⁶لئاننبريمننبنيصح Ḥimṣ sub Ar-Y – Kinda
U (–) ⁷عابنزنبحور Filasṭīn sub نبكلامنبناسح
لدحب
sub Ar-Y – Judhām
 ⁸ثراحلانبرفز Qinnasrīn sub Ar-Q – Hawāzin –
ʿĀmir?
Z  ⁹)2(دعسنبريشبنبنامعنلا Ḥimṣ sub Ar-Y
Z  ¹⁰ديزنبسيقنبلتان Filasṭīn sub Ibn al-Zubayr cal. cont. Ar-Y – Judhām
U (–) ¹¹سمنلايبأنبديزي Dimashq sub Ar-Y – Azd –
Ghassān
 ʿAdīm B 10.4625; Dhah 5.158– 159. Al-Nuʿmān became governor of Ḥimṣ a second time during
the rule of Ibn al-Zubayr (see below).
 Dhah 5.137.
 Bal A 6.258–259, 264; Athīr K 3.238; ʿAdīm B 5.2236; ʿAsāk 12.449.
 Dhah 4.86, 5.81, 261; ʿAsāk 2.364; Bal A 5.350; 6.275, 278; 11.46; Mas 1.266; Ṭab 5.531; Athīr K
3.241. After the death of Yazīd I al-Ḍaḥḥāk threw in his lot with ʿAbdallāh b. al-Zubayr for whom
he claimed all of al-Shām.
 Dhah 5.75, see also ʿAdīm B 8.3801.
 ʿAsāk 14.382; ʿAdīm B 6.2818.
 Bal A 6.264, 286; Athīr K 3.238, 242; ʿAdīm B 5.2236; Ṭab 5.531. In 64 Rawḥ was expelled from
Filasṭīn by the Zubayrid governor Nātil b. Qays but soon afterwards reinstated by Marwān I.
 Bal A 6.266; Ṭab 5.535; Athīr K 3.241; Dhah 5.81. While in in the year 64 Zufar is said to have
temporarily acknowledged Ibn al-Zubayr (Dhah 5.81), he appears to have been originally ap-
pointed by some (?) Umayyad caliph.
 Ṭab 5.535, 539;Yaʿq 2.256 ; Athīr K 3.241; see also Bal A 6.266. Al-Nuʿmān had already served as
governor of Ḥimṣ under Muʿāwiya I (see above).
 Ṭab 5.531, 540; Bal A 6.258; Yaʿq 2.255.
 Bal A 6.269. Yazīd expelled al-Ḍaḥḥāk b. Qays from Dimashq but (according to Balādhurī)
soon afterwards passed the command on to ʿAbd al-Malik.
The Governors of al-Shām and Fārs in the Early Islamic Empire 297
       




¹³ةيواعمنبديزينبدلاخ Ḥimṣ sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U – ¹⁴طيعميبأنبةبقعنبنابأ Ḥimṣ sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U  ¹⁵هللادبعنبنمحرلادبع Dimashq sub ʿAbd al-Malik caliph Ar-Q – Thaqīf
U – ¹⁶ناورمنبدمحم Qinnasrīn,
Jazīra
sub ʿAbd al-Malik caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U  ¹⁷رانيدنبرانيد Qinnasrīn sub mawlā of the ca-
liph
U  ¹⁸دعسنبناميلس Urdunn sub ʿAbd al-Malik caliph mawlā of Arab –
Khushayn?
U (–) ¹⁹ناورمنبنابأ Filasṭīn²⁰ sub ʿAbd al-Malik caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ²¹دسأنبديزينبهللادبع Dimashq sub ʿAbd al-Malik caliph Ar-Y – Mālik
U (–) ²²كلملادبعنبديلولا Dimashq sub ʿAbd al-Malik caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ²³ةبقعنبديلولانبنابأ Ḥimṣ, Qin-
nasrīn




Ḥimṣ sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
 Bal A 6.285.
 Dhah 5.159; Bal A 5.363–364. Supposedly, Abān b. ʿUqba was his deputy on the ground.
 Bal A 7.52; Athīr K 3.388. Supposedly, Abān was subordinate to Khālid b. Yazīd.
 Ṭab 6.140; Bal A 7.42; Athīr K 3.356.
 Bal A 8.74; Shadd 1.114.
 Bal F 1.188. Dīnār appears to have been born a slave (Qut Sh 1.337) in Ḥimṣ (Azd 1.26).
 Bal F 1.193; Māw 1.301. Sulaymān appears to have been born in al-Urdunn and is mainly
known for the prominent role he held in the organization of the dīwān (Manẓ 10.161; see also
Ṭab 6.181; Khal Trkh 1.299, 312, 319).
 Bal A 6.310.
 According to Ibn ʿAsākir, Abān was only in charge of al-Balqāʾ (ʿAsāk 6.158, 9.217).
 Bal A 7.42.
 Bal A 7.43.
 Bal A 9.349.
 Dhah 5.315. Elsewhere Yaḥyā is only mentioned as governor of Medina (Bal A 7.136, 219; Ṭab
6.202).
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U (–) ²⁵ديلولانبزيزعلادبع Dimashq,
Qinnasrīn
sub al-Walīd I caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ²⁶كلملادبعنبديعس Filasṭīn sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ²⁷كلملادبعنبناميلس Filasṭīn sub al-Walīd I caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ²⁸يسبعلازربنبدلاخ Dimashq sub al-Walīd I caliph Ar-Q – Ghaṭafān –
ʿAbs
U (–) ²⁹كلملادبعنبهللادبع Ḥimṣ sub al-Walīd I caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ³⁰ديلولانبسابعلا Ḥimṣ sub al-Walīd I caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ³¹ديلولانبرشب Qinnasrīn sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U  ³²موثلكنبديوسنبدمحم Dimashq sub Sulaymān caliph Ar-M – Quraysh
U (–) نبنامحرلادبعنبكاحضلا
³³بزرع
Dimashq sub ʿUmar II caliph Ar-Y – Ashʿar
U (–) ³⁴ديعسنبنامثع Dimashq sub Ar-Y – Ḥimyar –
ʿUdhra
U (–) ³⁵ىلعألادبعنبلاله Qinnasrīn sub ʿUmar II caliph
U (–) نبنمحرلادبعنبّهللادبع
³⁶ةبتع
Dimashq sub Yazīd II caliph Ar-M – Quraysh
U (–) ³⁷ديلتنبديلولا Dimashq sub Arab – Murra?
 Ṣaf 1.185; Dhah 7.92; Bal A 8.73–74.
 Ṭab 7.266; Misk 3.197; Athīr K 4.310.
 Bal F 1.145; Bal A 8.99; Mas 1.311.
 Bal A 13.194; ʿAsāk 16.5.
 Bal A 7.196; Khal T 1.298.
 Bal A 8.71; Dhah 8.88.
 Bal A 8.71; Athīr K 4.331; ʿAdīm Z 1.28; ʿAdīm B 6.2888.
 Ṣaf 1.85; Dhah 7.145.
 Ṣaf 1.65, 85; Dhah 7.63.
 Ṣaf 1.75, 185.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.27.
 Ṣaf 1.70, 185.While virtually nothing is known about ʿAbdallāh, his father is said to have gov-
erned Egypt for Ibn al-Zubayr (Bal A 6.259).
 Ṣaf 1.185. Elsewhere al-Walīd is mainly known as governor of al-Mawṣil (Ṭab 7.260; Bal A
9.107, 13.134).
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sub Hishām caliph Ar-Q – Ghaṭafān –
ʿAbs
U (–) ⁴¹ديلخنبعاقعقلانبديلولا Qinnasrīn sub Hishām caliph Ar-Q – Ghaṭafān –
ʿAbs
U (–) ⁴²روثنبسيقنبورمع Ḥimṣ sub Ar-Y – Kinda –
Sakūn
U (–) ⁴³ماشهنبديعس Ḥimṣ sub Hishām caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya




Dimashq sub al-Walīd II caliph Ar-Q – Thaqīf
U  دبعنبجاجحلانبزيزعلادبع
⁴⁶كلملا








Dimashq sub Ar-Y – Azd
U (–) دبعنبّهللادبعنبناورم
⁴⁹كلملا
Ḥimṣ sub al-Walīd II caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
 According to Ibn al-Athīr (Athīr K 4.296), however, Kulthūm governed Dimashq in the year
126.
 Ṣaf 1.90, 185; Bal A 9.103; Dhah 8.5.
 Ṭab 7.237; ʿAdīm Z 1.27–28. As Ibn al-ʿAdīm (ʿAdīm Z 1.28) notes that ʿAbd al-Malik and al-
Walīd, the two sons of al-Qaʿqāʿ, might have been mixed up, it seems reasonable to follow al-
Ṭabarī here.
 Ṭab 7.237; ʿAdīm Z 1.27–28. Al-Walīd was the maternal uncle of Hishām’s brother Sulaymān.
 Bal A 8.404.
 Bal A 8.406.
 ʿAsāk 8.270, 272.
 Ṣaf 1.186; Ṭab 7.233, 240; Bal A 9.172; Athīr K 4.302.
 Ṭab 7.249; Bal A 9.180; Athīr K 4.303–304. In fact, it appears that ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz never accept-
ed the governorate offered to him by al-Walīd II but continued to support Yazīd III.
 Ṣaf 1.79, 186
 Ṣaf 1.186. Notably, ʿUthmān is said to have been reinstated as governor of Dimashq by ʿAb-
dallāh b. ʿAlī (see below).
 Ṭab 7.262; Bal A 9.203.
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U (–) ⁵⁰ديلولانبمكحلا Dimashq sub al-Walīd II caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ⁵¹ديلولانبديزي Dimashq sub al-Walīd II caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ⁵²ديلولانبنامثع Ḥimṣ sub al-Walīd II caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya





Dimashq sub Ar-Q – Thaqīf
U  ⁵⁵حورنبناعبض Filasṭīn sub Yazīd III caliph Ar-Y – Judhām
U  ⁵⁶لالبنبدوسألا Urdunn sub Arab – Muḥārib?
U  دبعنبديلولانبميهاربإ
⁵⁷كلملا
Urdunn sub Yazīd III caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U  ⁵⁸كلملادبعنبديعس Filasṭīn sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U  ⁵⁹نيصحلانبا Ḥimṣ sub Yazīd III caliph
U  ⁶⁰ديلولانبرورسم Qinnasrīn sub Yazīd III caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya






Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U  ⁶³زيزعلادبعنبسحامرلا Filasṭīn⁶⁴ sub Marwān II caliph Ar-M – Kināna
 Bal A 9.151; Yaʿq 2.331; ʿAdīm B 6.2891; ʿAsāk 15.80.
 Bal A 9.182; ʿAdīm B 9.3930–3931.
 Bal A 9.151; Yaʿq 2.331; ʿAdīm B 6.2891; ʿAsāk 15.80.
 Dhah 8.384; ʿAdīm Z 1.28.
 Ṣaf 1.186; Misk 3.183.
 Ṭab 7.268; Misk 3.199; Athīr K 4.311.
 ʿAsāk 9.67; Ṭab 7.268.
 Ṭab 7.268; Athīr K 4.311; Misk 3.199.
 Misk 3.197; Ṭab 7.266; Athīr K 4.310.
 Ṭab 7.268; Misk 3.199.
 Ṭab 7.268; Misk 3.199; ʿAdīm Z 1.28.
 Ṭab 7.300; Athīr K 4.331; see also ʿAdīm Z 1.28; ʿAdīm B 6.2888.
 Ṣaf 1.186; Yaʿq 2.338.
 Ṭab 7.314; Athīr K 4.338; Misk 3.228.
 According to al-Balādhurī (Bal A 9.320), al-Ramāḥis governed al-Urdunn.
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U  ⁶⁵ناورمنبةيواعمنبديلولا Dimashq sub Marwān II caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U – ⁶⁶يلماعلاةمالسنبةبلعث Urdunn sub Ar-Y
U (–) دوسألاّهللادبع/ديبعنبرثوك
⁶⁷يونغلا
Dimashq sub Marwān II caliph Ar-Q
U (–) ⁶⁸ثراحلانبرفزنبرثوكلا Qinnasrīn,
Jazīra
sub Ar-Q – Kilāb
U (–) ⁶⁹ةعرزنبميعننبتباث Filasṭīn (,Ur-
dunn)
sub Marwān II caliph Ar-Y – Judhām
U (–) ⁷⁰نيصحنبديزينبةيواعم Ḥimṣ sub Marwān II caliph Ar-Y – Kinda –
Sakūn
U (–) ⁷¹ةرجشنبهللادبع Ḥimṣ sub Marwān II caliph Ar-Y – Kinda
U (–) ⁷²يونغلارثوكلانبكلملادبع Qinnasrīn sub Marwān II caliph Ar-Q
U (–) ⁷³يكسكسلاورمعنبلماز Dimashq
(,Ḥimṣ)
sub Marwān II caliph Ar-Y – Ḥimyar
(–) (⁷⁴(هللادبعنبدلاخنبديزي Dimashq sub Arab – Bajīla
 Ṭab 7.438; Ṣaf 1.111, 186; Bal A 4.121, 6.309, 11.12; Athīr K 5.18. He appears to be identical with
al-Walīd b. Muʿāwiya b. ʿAbd al-Malik (see Misk 3.279 / Ṭab 7.370) and Muʿāwiya b. al-Walīd b.
ʿAbd al-Malik (see Dīn 1.357). According to an additional passage in al-Ṭabarī’s Tarīkh (Ṭab
7.312), al-Walīd was elected governor by the ahl al-Urdunn after swearing allegiance to Marwān
II in 127.
 Ṭab 7.438; Bal A 9.320.
 Ṣaf 1.90, 186, 222.
 Bal F 1.189; ʿAdīm B 1.236.
 Bal A 9.224–225; ʿAsāk 11.143–144. According to al-Ṭabarī (Ṭab 7.312), Thābit was elected
governor by the ahl Filasṭīn after swearing allegiance to Marwān II in 127. At a later point, how-
ever, Thābit appears to have rebelled against Marwān II (see EI2, “Marwan II” (G.R. Hawting)).
 Bal A 9.224; see also Ṭab 7.263.
 Bal A 9.224, 228; ʿAsāk 15.83. According to al-Ṭabarī (Ṭab 7.312), ʿAbdallāh was elected gov-
ernor by the ahl Ḥimṣ after swearing allegiance to Marwān II in 127.
 Bal A 9.224–225; ʿAdīm Z 1.29.
 Ṣaf 1.55, 186; ʿAdīm B 8.3731–3732; ʿAsāk 16.316. According to al-Ṭabarī (Ṭab 7.312), Zāmil was
elected governor by the ahl Dimashq after swearing allegiance to Marwān II in 127.
 Ṣaf 1.113, 186. Yazīd came to power over Dimashq after Marwān II’s governor Zāmil was
forced out. While Yazīd is said to have been made governor of Dimashq again under al-
Manṣūr (see below), it is not known whether he acknowledged ʿAbbāsid suzerainty already at
this early point.
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A – ⁷⁵يلعنبهللادبع Shām gov al-Saffāḥ caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A  ⁷⁶يعبرنبديمحلادبع Dimashq Sub يلعنبهللادبع gov Ar-Y – Qahtān –
Kahlān – Ṭayyiʾ
A (–) ⁷⁷نامثعنبحاير Dimashq sub يلعنبحلاص gov Arab – Murra?
A – ⁷⁸)1(يلعنبحلاص Filasṭīn (,Di-
mashq)
sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A (–) ⁷⁹ديزينبسابعلانبهللاديبع Qinnasrīn sub al-Saffāḥ caliph Ar-Y – Kinda
A (–) ⁸⁰)1(يلعنبدمصلادبع Qinnasrīn Sub يلعنبهللادبع gov Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A (–) ⁸¹حورنبناعبضنبمكحلا Filasṭīn sub ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī
cal. cont. Ar-Y – Judhām
A (–) نبىلعألادبعنبنامثع
⁸²)2(ةقارس
Dimashq sub ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī
cal. cont. Ar-Y – Azd
A (–) ⁸³يمرضحلاحيرشنبرمع Dimashq sub ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī
cal. cont. Ar-Y?
A (–) ⁸⁴مصاعنبرفز Qinnasrīn sub ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī
cal. cont. Ar-Q – Khasafa –
Hawāzin – Hilāl
A  ⁸⁵ةبطحقنبديمح Qinnasrīn sub ʿAbdallāh b.
ʿAlī
cal. cont. Ar-Y – Ṭayyiʾ?
 Athīr K 5.35, 44; Dhah 8.235; Dīn 1.378. Al-Ṭabarī (Ṭab 7.459, see also 460, 467) states for the
year 133 that it was both ʿAbdallāh and Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAlī who were in charge of the ajnād al-Shām.
 Ṣaf 1.186; Ṭab 7.444.
 Ṣaf 1.186. Elsewhere Riyāḥ is mainly known to have governed Medina for al-Manṣūr (Khal T
1.420–421; Bal A 3.115, 13.132; Ṭab 7.517; Athīr K 5.97, 107; Dhah 9.9).
 Ṭab 7.460, 465, 467; Athīr K 5.44; Ṣaf 1.63, 186; Dhah 9.291. Despite the insurrection of his
brother ʿAbdallāh against al-Manṣūr, Ṣāliḥ continued to hold several governorates under the lat-
ter’s rule (see below).
 Bal A 8.234.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.31. Some forty years later, when ʿAbd al-Ṣamad must have been an elderly man, he
is mentioned again as governor of Dimashq under al-Rashīd (see below).
 Bal A 4.106, 9.323.
 Bal A 4.106; Dhah 8.325. According to al-Ṣafạdī (Ṣaf 1.186), ʿUthmān had already been gov-
ernor of Dimashq under Walīd II (see above).
 Ṣaf 1.79, 186.
 Bal A 4.106.
 Bal A 4.106.
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sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A  ⁸⁷ملسموبأ Shām, Miṣr⁸⁸ sup al-Manṣūr caliph Khurāsānian?
A  (⁸⁹(هللادبعنبدلاخنبديزي Dimashq sub Arab – Bajīla
A  ⁹⁰ىيحينبثعشأنبدمحم Dimashq sub Khurāsānian
A (–) ⁹¹يلعنبدمحمنبسابعلا Shām gov Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid




sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A – ⁹³)3(يلعنبحلاص Shām gov Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid








Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
Hāshim
 Ṣaf 1.75, 187; Dhah 9.342; ʿAsāk 15.10. Later in al-Manṣūr’s reign, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was ap-
pointed over al-Shām as a whole (see below).
 Ṭab 7.482; Bal A 4.202; Dhah 8.238. In fact, it appears that Abū Muslim was never meant to
become governor of al-Shām but his appointment was part of al-Manṣūr’s plan to get rid of ʿAb-
dallāh b. ʿAlī and subsequently Abū Muslim himself.
 Other texts mention Abū Muslim as governor of al-Shām and al-Jazīra (Bal A 4.107) or simply
of al-Shām (ʿAdīm B 8.3803; ʿAdīm Z 1.34; Misk 3.351).
 Ṣaf 1.113, 187. Yazīd had already governed Dimashq during the ʿAbbāsid revolution (see
above).
 Ṣaf 1.187; Dhah 9.164.
 Ṣaf 1.69, 187; Dhah 12.109.
 Ṭab 7.511; ʿAdīm Z 1.34; Yaʿq 2.383–284, 390; see also Dhah 9.291. Ṣāliḥ had already governed
Filasṭīn (and Dimashq) under al-Saffāḥ (see above).
 Athīr K 5.90; ʿAdīm B 1.467; Dhah 9.5.
 Athīr K 5.120; Ṭab 7.561.
 Ṭab 7.623; ʿAdīm Z 1.35. While according to al-Ṭabarī, al-Fạdl governed Qinnasrīn already in
145, Ibn al-ʿAdīm states that he became governor only after the death of his father in 151 or 152.
 Al-Dhahabī refers to al-Fạdl as the governor of al-Shām as a whole (Dhah 9.291).
 Ṣaf 1.187.
304 Simon Gundelfinger & Peter Verkinderen
       
A (–) مامإلاميهاربإنبباهولادبع
)2(⁹⁸
Shām gov al-Manṣūr caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid










Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid





Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid




Filasṭīn sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A (–) ¹⁰⁷ثعشألانبدمحمنبرصن Filasṭīn sub Khurāsānian?













sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
 Bal A 4.127; ʿAsāk 7.45. Earlier in al-Manṣūr’s reign, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb had already governed
Dimashq (and Filasṭīn) (see above).
 Bal A 4.127. Muḥammad already governed Mecca, Medina and al-Yaman when his brother
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb died and he additionally became governor of al-Shām
 Bal A 4.276.
 Ṣaf 1.95, 187; ʿAsāk 7.44.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.35.
 While according to al-Ṣafạdī, al-Fạdl governed Dimashq under al-Manṣūr (Ṣaf 1.74), al-Dha-
habī states that this was the case under al-Mahdī (Dhah 11.161).
 Ṣaf 1.74, 187; Dhah 11.161.
 Ṣaf 1.95, 187; Dhah 12.197; ʿAsāk 7.44.
 Ṭab 8.148; Athīr K 5.233.
 Ṭab 7.438; Athīr K 5.20.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.37.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.36; Bal F 1.190.
 Ṣaf 1.187; Dhah 11.13; ʿAsāk 6.445.
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A – ¹¹¹)3(مامإلاميهاربإنبدمحم Dimashq, Ur-
dunn




Dimashq sub al-Rashīd caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A  ¹¹³نيمألا Shām, Iraq
(Maghrib)
sup al-Rashīd caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid




Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid




Qinnasrīn sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A –¹¹⁸ ¹¹⁹دلاخنبىيحينبىسوم Shām¹²⁰ gov al-Rashīd caliph Khurāsānian –
Barmakid
A  ¹²¹نيعأنبةمثره Filasṭīn sub al-Rashīd caliph Khurāsānian –
mawlā of the ca-
liph
 Ṣaf 1.95, 187; ʿAsāk 6.445.
 Ṣaf 1.187; Athīr K 5.294; ʿAsāk 6.445. According to Ibn ʿAsākir, Ibrāhīm ruled Dimashq three
times during the caliphate of Hārūn al-Rashīd.
 Ṭab 8.275; Athīr K 5.344.
 Ṭab 8.251; Dhah 7.11; see also Ṣaf 1.106, 187. While al-Ṣafaḍī addresses him as Mūsā b. ʿĪsā b.
Muḥammad, his actual name appears to have been Mūsā b. ʿĪsā b. Mūsā b. Muḥammad.
 Ṣaf 1.187; ʿAdīm B 3.1375; Athīr K 5.294.
 Athīr K 5.293–294; Dhah 12.150; ʿAsāk 6.445–446. ʿAbd al-Ṣamad is mentioned as governor
of Qinnasrīn already under al-Saffāḥ (see above). Either this is a mistake or he was quite old by
the reign of al-Rashīd.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.36–37. Slightly later ʿAbd al-Malik became governor of Dimashq and even of the
whole of al-Shām under al-Amīn (see below).
 Al-Dhahabī dates Mūsā’s appointment to the year 175 (Dhah 11.7).
 Ṭab 8.251; Misk 3.518; Dhah 13.225; ʿAdīm Z 1.37.
 Al-Ṣafạdī mentions Mūsā as governor of Dimashq only (Ṣaf 1.187).
 Ṭab 8.256; Athīr K 5.304.
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gov al-Rashīd caliph Khurāsānian –
Barmakid
A  ¹²⁴يلعنبىسيعنبقاحسإ Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid








Filasṭīn sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A  ¹²⁹يكعلانبىسيع Shām gov ىيحينبرفعج gov Arab – ʿAkk?
A – ¹³⁰يلعنبحلاصنبليعمسإ Qinnasrīn
(, ʿAwāṣim,
Dimashq)
sub al-Rashīd caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A – ¹³¹يدهملانبميهاربإ Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A  ¹³²)1(روصنملانبناميلس Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A – ¹³³ةميزخنبمزاحنببيعش Dimashq sub al-Rashīd caliph Ar-M – Tamīm?
A  ¹³⁴)2(روصنملانبناميلس Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
 Al-Ṣafạdī states that Jaʿfar was made governor of Dimashq in 188 (Ṣaf 1.188), which seems
impossible, as he is known to have been executed in 187 (EI2, “al-Barāmika” (D. Sourdel)).
 Misk 3.524; ʿAdīm Z 1.37;Yaʿq 2.410; see also Dhah 12.53. Jaʿfar was made “interim governor”
to put an end to the ʿaṣabiyya turmoil and soon afterwards appointed ʿĪsā l-ʿAkkī over al-Shām.
 Ṣaf 1.187; Dhah 14.29; ʿAsāk 8.268.
 ʿAsāk 8.106, 226.
 According to Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Isḥāq even became governor of al-Shām as a whole (ʿAdīm B
3.1467).
 ʿAsāk 8.268; see also Ṣaf 1.187; Yaʿq 2.410. According to al-Ṣafạdī, ʿAbd al-Malik was dis-
missed already in 178.
 Dhah 11.14.
 Ṭab 8.263; Misk 3.524; Dhah 12.53; ʿAdīm Z 1.37.
 ʿAdīm B 4.1648– 1649; ʿAdīm Z 1.37; Dhah 12.36.
 Ṣaf 1.188; ʿAsāk 7.115.
 Ṣaf 1.188; see also Yaʿq 2.409; Dhah 13.114, 16.39.
 Dhah 12.18, 99. It is assumed here that Ḥāzim is a defective spelling of Khāzim and Shuʿayb
was the brother of Khuzayma (see below).
 Ṣaf 1.188; see also Yaʿq 2.409; Dhah 13.114, 16.39.
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sub al-Rashīd caliph Ar-M – Tamīm
A (–) ¹³⁷كهاشنبيدنس Dimashq sub نبىيحينبىسوم
دلاخ
gov mawlā of al-
Manṣūr
A (–) ¹³⁸)1(يدهملانبروصنم Filasṭīn sub al-Rashīd caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid








Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A – ¹⁴²ديشرلانبمساقلا Shām, Qin-
nasrīn,
Thughūr
gov al-Rashīd caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A – ¹⁴³ةبطحقنبنسحلانبيلع Dimashq sub Ar-Y – Ṭayyiʾ?












 Ṭab 8.323; Athīr K 5.379.
 ʿAdīm B 7.3256; ʿAdīm Z 1.38.
 Ṣaf 1.187; Dhah 14.94.
 Bal A 4.278.
 Athīr K 5.279.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.37.
 ʿAsāk 7.113.
 Dīn 1.391; Dhah 13.10; ʿAdīm Z 1.37–38; Ṭab 8.373, 374; Athīr K 5.399; ʿAdīm B 7.3256, 3258;
Misk 4.31; Shadd 1.115.
 Ṣaf 1.188. Elsewhere ʿAlī is mainly mentioned as governor of Khurāsān (Khal T 1.462–463;
Ṭab 8.347; Athīr K 5.391).
 Ṣaf 1.188; Dhah 17.182.
 Ṭab 8.374; Misk 4.31; Dhah 13.10; ʿAdīm B 7.3256, 3258; ʿAdīm Z 1.38; Shadd 1.115.
 Ṣaf 1.188.
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A , >y ¹⁴⁷يشرحلاديعسنبّهللادبع Ḥimṣ sub al-Amīn caliph Ar-Q
A – ¹⁴⁸يلعنبناميلسنبقاحسإ Ḥimṣ sub al-Amīn caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid










sub al-Amīn caliph Ar-M – Tamīm
A (–) ¹⁵²ديزمنبديزي Qinnasrīn sub Ar-R – Bakr b.
Wāʾil – Shaybān
(–) ¹⁵³كلملادبعدبعءاقرو Qinnasrīn sub Ar-R – Bakr b.
Wāʾil – Shaybān?
A /– ¹⁵⁴نيسحلانبرهاط Shām, Jazīra,
Miṣr and
Maghrib







sup al-Maʾmūn caliph Khurāsānian –
Ṭāhirid
A (–) ¹⁵⁶نامثعنبةقدص Dimashq sub رهاطنبهللادبع sup Arab – Murra?
A – ¹⁵⁷مصتعملا Shām, Miṣr sup al-Maʾmūn caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A – ¹⁵⁸)1(نومأملانبسابعلا Qinnasrīn
(, Jazīra),
sub al-Maʾmūn caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
 Ṭab 8.388.
 Ṭab 8.374, 388; ʿAdīm B 3.1467.
 Ṣaf 1.188; Ṭab 8.415; Athīr K 5.419; Dhah 13.114.
 Ṭab 8.424–425; Athīr K 5.425–426; Yaʿq 2.434, 440; ʿAdīm B 7.3256; Misk 3.547, 4.73; Dhah
12.16– 17, 13.156; ʿAdīm Z 1.38; Shadd 1.115.
 ʿAdīm B 7.3256; ʿAdīm Z 1.38–39.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.39. Elsewhere Mazyad is mainly addressed as governor of Armenia for al-Rashīd
(Dīn 1.390; Ṭab 8.236, 270; Misk 3.526; ʿAsāk 5.331; Dhah 4.11, 5.12).
 (sic) ʿAdīm Z 1.39. This account bears no information on Warqāʾ’s loyalties.
 Ṭab 8.527; Athīr K 5.460;Yaʿq 2.454–455; Misk 4.113; Jawz 10.52; Dhah 13.22, 42; ʿAdīm Z 1.39;
Shadd 1.115–116.
 Ṭab 8.595; Athīr K 5.550; Yaʿq 2.456; ʿAdīm Z 1.39, 40; see also Ṣaf 1.70, 188.
 Ṣaf 1.64, 188.
 Ṭab 8.620; Athīr K 5.557; Misk 4.165; Dhah 15.5; see also Ṣaf 1.188.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.40; Athīr K 5.557.
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ʿAwāṣim,
Thughūr






















A (–) ¹⁶³ىيحينبفويعمنبديمح Dimashq sub Ar-Y?
A (–) ¹⁶⁴كلامنبةزمحنبرصن Dimashq sub Khurāsānian
A , >y ¹⁶⁵دازنبهللادبعنبرانيد Dimashq sub al-Muʿtaṣim caliph Iranian – Sahlid
A – /يماسلامهجلانبدمحم
¹⁶⁶يماشلا
Dimashq sub al-Muʿtaṣim caliph Ar-M – Quraysh?
A (–) ¹⁶⁷قثاولا Shām, Jazīra,
Miṣr
sup al-Muʿtaṣim caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A (–) ¹⁶⁸كاحضلايبأنبءاجر Dimashq sub
A (–) ¹⁶⁹سيردإنبىسيعنبمساقلا Dimashq sub Ar-R – Bakr b.
Wāʾil – ʿIjl
A (–) ¹⁷⁰)1(دمحمنبملسم Dimashq sub
 ʿAdīm Z 1.40.
 Ṣaf 1.188; Ṭab 8.646; Dhah 17.51, 18.32; ʿAsāk 8.302.
 Ṭab 8.631; ʿAdīm Z 1.40–41.
 Ṣaf 1.103, 188. Elsewhere Maʿyūf is mainly known to have led several military campaigns
against Byzantium (Khal T 1.427, 429, 445; Ṭab 8.43, 57, 203–204; Athīr K 5.179, 208, 263).
 Ṣaf 1.188. Ḥumayd had earlier governed the coast of al-Shām under al-Rashīd (Ṭab 8.320;
Misk 3.557; Dhah 12.21).
 Ṣaf 1.188. Elsewhere Naṣr is mainly known to have governed the eastern part of Baghdad
(Ṭab 8.546; Misk 4.126; Athīr K 5.480).
 Ṣaf 1.51, 188; Dhah 16.13; ʿAsāk 17.319.
 Ṣaf 1.96, 188; ʿAsāk 17.319.
 Dhah 19.62.
 ʿAsāk 13.84.
 Ṣaf 1.188; Dhah 16.194
 Ṣaf 1.188.
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A – ¹⁷¹سانشأ Shām, Jazīra
(and/or
Miṣr)¹⁷²
sup al-Muʿtaṣim caliph Turkī













Dimashq sub Khurāsānian –
Khuttalī
A (–) ¹⁷⁷)2(دمحمنبملسم Dimashq sub
A (–) ¹⁷⁸بيبحنبنمحرلادبع Dimashq sub Ar-M – Quraysh
A (–) نبهللادبعنبحلاصنبدمحم
¹⁷⁹حلاص





sub Ar-R – Taghlib




sup al-Mutawakkil caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid





al-Mutawakkil caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
 ʿAdīm B 4.1919; Dhah 16.13; Shadd 1.116; see also ʿAsāk 9.163; Ṣaf 1.189.
 Ibn ʿAsākir and al-Ṣafạdī mention Ashinās not as super-governor but as governor of Di-
mashq under al-Wāthiq (ʿAsāk 9.163; Ṣaf 1.189).
 Ṣaf 1.115, 188– 189; Dhah 16.15– 16.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.42.
 Shadd 1.116. This entry might actually refer to ʿUbaydallāh b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. al-Fạdl b.
Ṣāliḥ.
 Ṣaf 1.189; ʿAsāk 8.302.
 Ṣaf 1.189.
 Ṣaf 1.189.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.42.
 Ṣaf 1.94, 189; Dhah 19.251.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.44; Ṭab 9.175–176.
 According to Ibn Shaddād al-Muntaṣir was put in charge of all of al-Shām and al-Jazīra
(Shadd 1.116).
 Ṭab 9.176.
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A  ¹⁸⁴)1(يسابعلاحلاص Dimashq sub Turkī / mawlā of
Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A – ¹⁸⁵نوديرفإ Dimashq sub Turkī
A  ¹⁸⁶ناقاخنبحتفلا Dimashq sub Turkī
A (–) ¹⁸⁷نيكتايلك Dimashq sub ناقاخنبحتفلا sub Turkī




A  ¹⁹⁰ةجراطنبسنوي Dimashq sub
A  ¹⁹¹نايمابراشلا Qinnasrīn,
ʿAwāṣim
sub al-Mutawakkil caliph Turkī?
A (–) ¹⁹²حلاصنبليعامسإنبيلع Qinnasrīn,
ʿAwāṣim
sub نايمابراشلا sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAlid










¹⁹⁵ريبكلااغب Qinnasrīn¹⁹⁶ sub رصتنملا sup Turkī
A (–)-

¹⁹⁷فيصو Shām, Jazīra sup Turkī
 Ṣaf 1.64, 189; Ṭab 9.199.
 Ṣaf 1.189; Dhah 17.8.
 Ṣaf 1.189. Elsewhere al-Fatḥ is mainly addressed as a close confidant of al-Mutawakkil and
is said to have been in charge of the akhbār (Ṭab 9.184; Misk 4.298).
 Ṣaf 1.189.
 Ṣaf 1.189; Dhah 17.81.
 Ṣaf 1.189; see also Dhah 20.37.
 Ṣaf 1.189.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.43.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.43.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.44.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.44.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.44.
 According to Ibn Shaddād, Bughā was al-Muntaṣir’s deputy over al-Shām and al-Jazīra as a
whole (Shadd 1.116).
 Shadd 1.116.
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A –
(–)
¹⁹⁸يرشونلادمحمنبىسيع Dimashq sub Turkī / Khurāsāni-
an?
A  ¹⁹⁹هللاديبعنبرديك Ḥimṣ sub Ushrūsanī
A  ²⁰⁰ريغصلااغب Filasṭīn sub al-Mustaʿīn caliph Turkī
A – ²⁰¹نراقنبلضفلا Ḥimṣ sub Iranian
A  ²⁰²اغبنبىسوم Ḥimṣ,
Qinnasrīn
sub al-Mustaʿīn caliph Turkī
A – ²⁰³)1(دلوملادمحأ Shām, Jazīra sup al-Mustaʿīn caliph
A (–) ²⁰⁴بيبحنبنامحرلادبع Ḥimṣ sub al-Mustaʿīn caliph Ar-Y – Azd
A (–) ²⁰⁵)2(يسابعلاحلاص Dimashq sub Turkī / mawlā of




²⁰⁶ليجاطنبىرشون Dimashq sub Turkī
A  ²⁰⁷)2(دلوملادمحأ Qinnasrīn sub al-Muʿtazz caliph
A – ²⁰⁸خيشلانبىسيع Filasṭīn
(, Urdunn)
sub Ar-R – Bakr b.
Wāʾil – Shaybān
 Ṣaf 1.81; Athīr K 6.182. Notably, the table given by al-Ṣafạdī (Ṣaf 1.189) does not provide any
information on the reign of al-Mustaʿīn.
 Ṭab 9.259; Yaʿq 2.495.
 Ṭab 9.264; Athīr K 6.195; ʿAsāk 10.327.
 Ṭab 9.276; Dhah 18.15; Yaʿq 2.495.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.45.
 Shadd 1.116.
 Yaʿq 2.495.
 Ṣaf 1.64. Notably, the table given by al-Ṣafạdī (Ṣaf 1.189) does not provide any information
on the reign of al-Mustaʿīn.
 Yaʿq 2.496, 500. He might be identical with ʿĪsā b. Muḥammad al-Nūsharī.
 ʿAdīm B 3.1296, 6.2753; ʿAdīm Z 1.45.
 ʿĪsā appears to have been appointed over Filasṭīn (and al-Urdunn) (Athīr K 6.240; Shadd
1.82; see also Yaʿq 2.508) and only later seceded from ʿAbbāsid suzerainty.While he is sometimes
mentioned as (legitimate?) governor of Dimashq (Athīr K 6.290; Shadd 1.159– 160; Ṣaf 1.190) or
even al-Shām as a whole (Athīr K 6.290), he took over the central and northern parts of the prov-
ince by force (Athīr K 6.240; Shadd 1.82, 116; Ṣaf 1.80; Dhah 20.101). Due to the extremely invo-
lute references to his governorate(s), the exact stages of his political career remain notoriously
vague (see Cobb 2001, 37–41; EI2, “ʿĪsā b. al-Shaykh” (M. Canard)).
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sub فيصونبحلاص general Ushrūsanī












sub Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A (–) ²¹⁴روجكمي Dimashq sub Turkī
A (–)/
(–)?
²¹⁵مرصأ Dimashq sub Turkī
 ʿAdīm B 7.3477; ʿAdīm Z 1.45–46.
 According to Ibn Shaddād, al-Muʿtazz appointed Abū l-Sāj Dīwdād over al-Shām and al-Ja-
zīra, which he ruled at least until 255 (Shadd 1.116).
 Ṣaf 1.25, 189.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.45.
 ʿAdīm Z 1.45.
 Ṣaf 1.116, 189– 190.
 ʿAsāk 9.174; Ṣaf 1.30. Both Ibn ʿAsākir and al-Ṣafạdī note that it is not entirely clear whether
Aṣram was appointed under al-Muʿtazz or under al-Muhtadī.
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sup Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U – ²¹⁷رماعنبهللادبع Baṣra, Fārs,
Sijistān,
Khurāsān
sup Muʿāwiya caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbd Shams







sup Muʿāwiya caliph Ar-Y – Azd
U – ²²⁰نايفسيبأنبدايز Baṣra, Kūfa,
Ḥijāz
sup Muʿāwiya caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ²²¹رمحأنبريمأ Sābūr sub نايفسيبأنبدايز sup Ar-R – Bakr b.
Wāʾil – Dhuhl b.
Shaybān / Yashkur
U (–) ²²²ديسأنبدلاخنبهللادبع Fārs gov نايفسيبأنبدايز sup Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U (–) ²²³روعألانبكيرش Fārs, Kirmān gov نايفسيبأنبدايز sup Ar-Y – Azd – al-
Ḥārith b. Kaʿb
U – ²²⁴يرازفلابدنجنبةرمس Baṣra sup Muʿāwiya caliph Ar-Q – Fazāra
 Bal A 2.188, 2.435, 3.47, 5.189–190; Ṭab 5.122, 5.137, 5.155, 5.170, 5.177, 5.178– 180. Ziyād’s fa-
ther was unknown, but shortly before Ziyād’s appointment over Baṣra, Muʿāwiya recognized
Ziyād as his own half-brother, and he was henceforth referred to as Ibn Abī Sufyān.
 Khal Trkh 161; dirhams: Album 2011: 24 no. 6, 7.
 Ṭab 6.301; Athīr K 2.439.
 Khal Trkh 207; Ṭab 5.215.
 Khal Trkh 207, 210; Yaʿq 1.196, 200; Bal A 5.161; Ṭab 5.217, 234; dirhams: Album 2011: 24
no. 8. Kūfa was added to his responsibilities in the year 50, and the Ḥijāz shortly before his
death.
 Kalbī M 1.81; Khal Trkh 164, 180; Bal F 382, 390, 396; Bal A 5.199; Ṭab 5.224–226.
 Kalbī J 1.8; Zub 1.188; Ḥazm 1.113– 114; Bal A 5.280, 458.
 Kalbī M 1.281; Bal F 380, 391–392; Bal A 2.78–79, 2.271, 2.295, 5.112, 5.159, 5.170, 5.242, 7.391;
Dīn 232; Ṭab 4.301, 5.193, 5.321; Iṣf A 18.437, 441; Iṣf M 99– 101; Qud Khar 402; Māk 3.400. Undated
Byzantine-style copper coins minted in the name of Sharīk b. al-Ḥārith, which have Sharīk’s
name in Arabic and which Album tentatively dated to the 90s most probably belong to Sharīk
b. al-Aʿwar, whose father’s real name was ثوغينبهللادبعنبثراحلا (see, e.g., Bal A 2.79).
 Ibn Saʿd 6.108–109, 7.35; Khal Ṭbq 1.97; Khal Trkh 219; Bal A 1.249, 1.496, 1.527, 5.210– 12,
240–241, 6.440, 6.443, 10.385–386, 13.33, 13.185; Bal F 104, 367, 374; Ṭab 5.234, 5.236–38,
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U – ²²⁵ناليغنبورمعنبهللادبع Baṣra sup Muʿāwiya caliph Ar-Q – Thaqīf²²⁶
U – ²²⁷دايزنبهللاديبع Khurāsān,
Baṣra, Kūfa²²⁸
sup Muʿāwiya caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U –/ ²²⁹روعألانبكيرش Kirmān
(, Fārs?)
gov دايزنبهللاديبع sup Ar-Y – Azd – al-
Ḥārith b. Kaʿb
 ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b.
MDWR²³⁰
Iṣṭakhr only? ? ?
Z  رمعمنبهللاديبعنبرمع
²³¹يميتلا
Baṣra sup ʿAbdallāh b.
al-Zubayr
cal. cont. Ar-M – Quraysh –
Taym
Z – ²³²عابقلا Baṣra sup ʿAbdallāh b.
al-Zubayr
cal. cont. Ar-M – Quraysh –
Makhzūm
Z – ²³³زيفق “Part of Fārs”
(incl.
Bīshāpūr)
sub عابقلا sup Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbd Shams
Z – ²³⁴ريبزلانببعصم Baṣra sup ʿAbdallāh b.
al-Zubayr
cal.cont. Ar-M – Quraysh –
Asad
5.291, 5.295, 6.66, 6.107, 6.112; Dīn 1.225, 1.309; Wakīʿ 296. Dirhams in his name only at Darābjird
mints (DA, DAP), with frozen date 43, see Album 2011: 24 no. 9.
 Khal Trkh 1.223; Ṭab 5.215, 5.295, 298–299; Bal A 5.161, 5.241.
 Or: Ar-M – Hudhayl.
 Khal Trkh 1.223; Bal F 339; Dīn 225; Ṭab 5.299–300, 5.304, 5.308, 5.314, 5.315, 5.321, 5.338,
5.348, 5.399, 5.474, 5.477, 5.503, 5.524, 5.528. Dirhams, from nearly 30 mints: see Album 2011: 24
no. 12 (in addition to fulūs from Iṣṭakhr and Ardashīr Khurra: ibid. no. A13).
 Ibn Ziyād combined governorships of Khurāsān (from 53/54) with Baṣra and dependencies
(from 55) and Kūfa and dependencies (from 60).
 Kalbī M 281; Dīn 232–34; Bal F 380, 391–392; Bal A 2.78–79, 2.271, 2.295, 5.159, 5.170, 5.242;
Ṭab 2.44, 2.51–52, 2.53–54, 2.195– 196, 2.244–249; Iṣf M 99–101; Iṣf A 18.450; Māk 3.400.
 Only known from a dirham of which only two specimens are extant (Sears 2002). The gov-
ernor’s name is written in Pahlavi: APDWLACYC Y MDWRAN. Still unidentified.
 Zub 1.288–289; Kalbī J 1.15; Bal A 1.503, 5.465, 6.342, 6.433; Ṭab 5.582.
 His ism was يموزخملايشرقلاةعيبريبأنبهللادبعنبثراحلا . Kalbī J 1.17, 32; Ibn Saʿd 5.21; Zub 1.318;
Bal A 5.400, 6.382, 6.382, 6.433–434, 6.452, 7.11– 14, 7.86, 7.115, 7.157, 7.165, 13.313; Tab 6.93; Iṣf A
1.109, 4.530.
 His ism was رماعنبهللادبعنبكلملادبع . Bal A 9.363; on dirhams from Bīshāpūr: Album 2011: 25
no. 20.
 Zub 1.240; Khal Trkh 1.269, 296; Yaʿq 1.215; Bal A 1.500, 5.464–465, 6.293, 6.398, 6.433–434,
6.452–453, 7.8–23, 7.163– 165, 7.178, 10.143–144; Dīn Akhbār 274, 307; Ṭab 5.619, 6.93, 6.117– 119,
6.127, 6.139, 6.152, 6.160; Maqd 6.22. Dirhams in his name are known (Album 2011: 25 no. 17), but
not from mints in Fārs.
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Z (–) ²³⁵ريبزلانبهللادبعنبةزمح Baṣra sup ʿAbdallāh b.
al-Zubayr
cal.cont. Ar-M – Quraysh –
Asad
Z (–) ²³⁶ةملسنبةنيذأنبهللادبع Fasā wa-
Darābjird
sub Ar-R – ʿAbd al-
Qays
Z  ²³⁷ةرفصيبأنببلهملا Fārs gov ريبزلانببعصم sup Ar-Y – Azd
Z – رمعمنبهللاديبعنبرمع
²³⁸يميتلا
Fārs gov ريبزلانببعصم sup Ar-M – Quraysh –
Taym
Z (–) ²³⁹رعسنبةعاجم kharāj
Iṣṭakhr?
sub? Ar-M – Tamīm
U / ²⁴⁰نابأنبنارمح Baṣra sup (people of al-
Baṣra)










( sons of Khālid b.




sup Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
 Zub 1.240; Khal Trkh 1.436; Zub Jamh 40, 47; Yaʿq 1.215; Qut M 1.226; Bal A 6.434, 6.444,
6.453, 7.9–11, 7.18, 7.86–88, 7.165; Bal F 372; Ṭab 6.117– 118.
 Only known as governor of Fasā wa-Darābjird from al-Wazīr al-Maghribī’s al-Īnās (p. 15),
where he is mentioned in the context of his more famous brother, who was al-Ḥajjāj’s qāḍī of
al-Baṣra.
 Al-Muhallab was in the first place the leader of the military operations against the Khāri-
jites; that he was also formally governor of Fārs is only stated in a couple of sources: Bal A
6.428–429, 7.8; Ṭab 6.94, 6.301.
 Zub 1.288–289; Bal A 6.434, 6.436, 7.8–9, 7.99, 7.164– 165, 7.189–190; Ṭab 6.119, 6.158; Ḥazm
1.140. Dirhams from mints in Fārs from 67–72, see Album 2011: 25 no. 21 (also very rare copper
coins, only from Iṣṭakhr: ibid. no. 21E).
 According to a khabar in al-Balādhurī’s Ansāb al-Ashrāf (Bal A 7.165), Mujāʿa saved ʿUmar
b. ʿUbaydallāh b. Miʿmar’s life in a battle against the Khārijites, and ʿUmar rewarded him by let-
ting him keep 700.000 dirhams he (Mujāʿa) had levied from the kharāj of Iṣṭakhr. In al-Mubar-
rad’s version of the events (Mub 3.242), Mujāʿa is given the right to levy the kharāj after the bat-
tle, which does not necessarily imply that he had any official position in Iṣṭakhr.
 Bal A 3.52, 5.472, 5.555; Ṭab 5.167, 6.165. Dirhams from the mint of Ardashīr Khurra only
(ART, year 72): see Album 2011: 25 (no. 23).
 Khal Trkh 1.268, 1.293, 1.296; Bal A 1.500, 5.464, 5.473–474, 6.313, 6.316, 6.327, 7.101, 7.107,
7.111, 7.273, 7.299, 7.379, 7.411, 7.422, 7.450, 9.48; Ṭab 6.165, 6.169, 6.172, 6.178; Mas M 3.105, 3.110;
Ḥazm 218. Dirhams from mints Baṣra, Bīshāpūr and Arrajān: see Album 2011: 25 (no. 24).
 Bal A 7.411.
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U /
–?
²⁴³عمسمنبرماع Sābūr sub نبهللادبعنبدلاخ
ديسأنبدلاخ

















sup Ar-R – Bakr b.
Wāʾil
U  Numayla b. Mālik²⁴⁶ Arrajān? sub نبهللادبعنبدلاخ
؟ديسأنبدلاخ




²⁴⁷بلهملانبةريغملا Iṣṭakhr sub نبهللادبعنبدلاخ
ديسأنبدلاخ
sup Ar-Y – Azd




sup Ar-Y – Azd




sup Ar-Y – Azd




? Ar-R – Nimr b.
Qāsiṭ
U – ²⁵¹ناورمنبرشب Baṣra, Kūfa²⁵² sup ʿAbd al-Malik caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
 Ṭab 6.196.
 Ṭab 6.196; dirhams from mint Bīshāpūr (BYSh, years 72 and 73): Album 2011: 25 no. 22.
 Ṭab 6.196.
 Only known from coins: see Album 2011: 26 no. A32. DeShazo (2000) read the Pahlavi name
of this subgovernor xxx b. Mālik, and identified him as the son of Mālik b. Mismaʿ, which makes
sense, because we know from the historical sources that two brothers and (another) son of Mālik
b. Mismaʿ were in charge of districts of Fārs in these years. In a later article (DeShazo 2004), he
read the name as Numayla b. Mālik, and identified him as Numayla b. Mālik b. Sāriya of the
Banū Numayr, whom he found in al-Ṭabarī. Given the context, I think his first identification
is more likely, even though Numayla b. Mālik b. Mismaʿ is not found in the historical sources.
 Ṭab 6.169, 6.320.
 Khal 268; Ṭab 6. 169.
 Khal 268.
 His governorship of Fārs/Ardashīr Khurra is not known from historical sources; dirhams in
his name are known from Ardashīr Khurra only, from the year 72: Album 2011: 25 no. 23. It is not
impossible that the dirhams were struck in his name in his position as governor of al-Baṣra, even
after he was fired.
 Khal 249; Fas 37; Bal A 6.316, 7.273, 7.421; Ṭab 6.194, 6.197. Dirhams known only from Baṣra,
Kūfa and Jayy, see Album 2011: 26 no. 27.
 He had been governor of Kūfa since 71; al-Baṣra and its dependencies were added to his
responsibilities in 73.
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U – نبدلاخنبهللادبعنبدلاخ
²⁵³ديسأ










sup Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U – ²⁵⁵فسوينبجاجحلا Iraq, Mashriq sup ʿAbd al-Malik caliph Ar-Q – Thaqīf
U –– ²⁵⁶ةرفصيبأنببلهملا Fārs gov جاجحلا sup Ar-Y – Azd






 Bal A 7.273; Ṭab 6.194, 6.197, 6.209.
 His governorship is only suggested by dirhams struck in mints ART (Ardashīr Khurra) and
TART (Tawwaj of Ardashīr Khurra) in 74 (Album 2011: 25 (no. 25K)); in the historical sources, he
is said to have been appointed by his brother Khālid to fight the Khārijite Qaṭarī in Fārs: Bal A
7.411, 7.417, 12.352.
 Khal T 293–294; Yaʿq T 219, 227; Ṭab 6.202, 6.493; etc. On dirhams from Bīshāpūr, Ardashīr
Khurra, Tawwaj, Iṣṭakhr, Yazd, Darābjird and Fasā: see Album 2011: 26–27 (nos. 35, 36, 37).
 Bal A 7.423–428, 431; Ṭab 6.301. Al-Muhallab was put in charge of Fārs by al-Ḥajjāj to defeat
the Khārijites there; as soon as he had expelled them from Fārs, he was made governor of
Khurāsān. Dirhams from Bīshāpūr, Ardashīr Khurra, Tawwaj and other mints in Fārs (75–79):
see Album 2011: 26 no. 31.
 Known only from coins dating 75–79. The patronymic is mentioned only on copper coins
from mint DShT, the dating of which is debated (see Album 2001, 68 for an overview of the dis-
cussion), the other coins have only farrūkhzād, which Gyselen (2009, 71–73) thinks may be an
epithet (“born with glory”) for the governor, rather than the personal name of another official.
I agree with Album (Album-Goodwin 2002, 68) that all attestations of farrūkhzād on coins from
Fārs probably refer to the same person, Farrūkhzād son of Gushn-anūsh. His name appears on
dirhams from Ardashīr Khurra, together with al-Muhallab’s (75–76); with al-Ḥajjāj’s on dirhams
struck in mints in the kūras Ardashīr Khurra (ART and TART, 77–79) and Sābūr (BYSh, 77–79);
and solo on copper coins from cities in Ardashīr Khurra (Jūr and Tanbūk/Shīrāz (undated), and
Dasht (76?)), see Album 2011, 26–28. On the copper coins, Farrūkhzād’s name takes the position
traditionally assigned to the issuer of the coin (to the right of the bust on the obverse of the
coin). On the dirhams, al-Ḥajjāj’s and al-Muhallab’s names take this position, while Farrūkh-
zād’s name is in the lower left margin of the obverse of the coin (ObQ3), where usually no offi-
cial’s name is mentioned; until then, only a few governors had used this place to put a second
mention of their own name (Album 2011, 25 nos. 17, 23, 25, 35.2), in addition to the main mention
to the right of the bust. On one dirham type from Jayy in the year 74, we also have another name
in ObQ3, in addition to the governor’s name next to the bust (Album 2011, 26 no. 27.2), but since
this name is also unidentified, it does not help us to determine what Farrūkhzād’s function was.
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 Abū Saʿīd b.
Numayla?²⁵⁸
Arrajān only? sub Ar-R – Bakr b.
Wāʾil?
U  ²⁵⁹كيهننبمكحلا Fārs/Arrajān gov/
sub




Fārs, Kirmān gov جاجحلا sup Ar-Q – ʿĀmir b.
Ṣaʿṣaʿa – Hilāl
U (–) ²⁶¹يفقثلافسوينبدمحم Fārs gov جاجحلا sup Ar-Q – Thaqīf
U –() يبأنبمساقلانبدمحم
²⁶²ليقع
Fārs gov جاجحلا sup Ar-Q – Thaqīf




gov Arab – undefined
U ? ²⁶⁴يرازفلادثرمنبمدرك Fārs (kharāj) gov/
sub
جاجحلا sup Ar-Q – Fazāra







جاجحلا sup Ar-Y – Kinda
/ ²⁶⁷يميمتلاورمعنبةشرخ Fārs gov نبنمحرلادبع
ثعشألانبدمحم
rebel Ar-M – Tamīm
 Known only from a single dirham, minted in Arrajān (Zeno #96408). Son of Numayla b.
Mālik, known from the Arrajān dirhams of 73?
 Al-Balādhurī (F 380) says he was governor of Fārs for al-Ḥajjāj, but also that he built the
mosque and the dār al-imāra of Arrajān; and coins in his name are only known from Arrajān
(Zeno #8141); so perhaps he was only in charge of Arrajān rather than all of Fārs. Later, he
was governor of Kirmān for al-Ḥajjāj (Bal A 13.60–61).
 Khal Ṭbq 56, 184; Qud 3991; Bal F 380. Also governor of Sijistān (Saʿd 622) and Iṣbahān
(Nʿm 2.122).
 Balkhī 132, 157, 170. Al-Ḥajjāj’s brother; perhaps mistake by Ibn al-Balkhī, for Muḥammad b.
al-Qāsim b. Abī ʿAqīl?
 Khal Trkh 1.288; Yaʿq 1.226; Bal F 420; Ṭab XI 641; Iṣṭ 124. In the year 90 or 92, al-Ḥajjāj
appointed him over al-Sind and al-Hind.
 Bal A 12.12; Balkhī 157.
 Bal A 7.431, 7.268.
 Only known from undated copper coins from mints Bīshāpūr and Tanbūk (Album 2011: 28
thinks they date from about 80).
 Was appointed governor of Sijistān by al-Ḥajjāj but fell out with him and conquered Fārs on
his way to confront al-Ḥajjāj in al-ʿIrāq: Bal A 7.317, 7.389, 8.326, 12.12; Ṭab 6.338. Coins in his
name from Fārs mints in the years 82–84 (Album 2011: 27) prove he was in actual control of
the province.
 Appointed by Ibn al-Ashʿath while the latter was on his way to confront al-Ḥajjāj in al-ʿIrāq:
Bal A 12.12; Jawz VI 225.
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caliph Ar-Y – Kinda





caliph mawlā of Ar-Q –
Thaqīf
U – ²⁷¹بلهملانبديزي Iraq and
Khurāsān
[incl. Fārs?]
sup Sulaymān caliph Ar-Y – Azd
U – ²⁷²يرازفلاةاطرأنبيدع Baṣra sup ʿUmar II caliph Ar-Q – Fazāra












sub بلهملانبديزي rebel Ar-Y – Azd
U  ²⁷⁸كلملادبعنبةملسم Iraq,
Khurāsān
[incl. Fārs]
sup Yazīd II b.
ʿAbd al-Malik
caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U – ²⁷⁹يرازفلاةريبهنبرمع Iraq, Mashriq sup Yazīd II b.
ʿAbd al-Malik
caliph Ar-Q – Fazāra
 Bal A 11.391. Sent by al-Ḥajjāj to raid the qalaʿas of Fārs; it is uncertain if he was really ap-
pointed governor.
 Bal A 8.289; Ṭab 6.493.
 Ṭab 6.493.
 Tab 6.585.
 Khal Trkh 320, 322; Bal A 8.149, 8.245, 8.295, 11.103, 12.199; Bal F 84, 340, 359; Ṭab 6.554,
6.556, 6.578–579.
 Bal A 8.194– 196.
 Ṭab 6.585. Not entirely clear if Khurāsān was included in his responsibilities.
 Or, if Ḥakamī refers to al-Ḥajjāj’s grandfather al-Ḥakam b. Abī ʿAqīl: Arab – Qays – Thaqīf.
 Bal A 8.310.
 Bal A 8.310.
 Khal Trkh 1.325, 1.327, 1.333; Yaʿq 236; Fas 2.265; Bal A 6.302; Bal F 412; Dīn 334; Ṭab 6.604,
6.615.
 Khal Trkh 1.328, 1.332, 336; Yaʿq 236–237, 240; Dīn 365; Fas 2.265; Bal A 8.252–253, 8.268,
8.275; Bal F 412, 450; Jah 48; Ṭab 6.620, 7.17, 7.26; Mas M 3.201; Maqd 6.49.
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U ?–– ناوفصنبميشه/مشاه
²⁸⁰يرازفلا
Fārs gov ةريبهنبرمع sup Ar-Q – Fazāra
U /–

²⁸¹يرسقلاهللادبعنبدلاخ Iraq, Mashriq sup Hishām (or
Yazīd II)







sup Arab – Bajīla (nei-
ther Yemen nor
Muḍar)
U – ²⁸³دايزيبأنبقراط Fārs gov هللادبعنبدلاخ
يرسقلا
sup ?




sup Iranian – dihqān





sup Iranian – dihqān
U (–) ²⁸⁶يدنكلاسابعلانبهللاديبع Fārs gov هللادبعنبدلاخ
يرسقلا
sup Ar-Y – Kinda
U (–) ²⁸⁷يميتلاناسحنبرصن Iṣṭakhr sub هللادبعنبدلاخ
يرسقلا
sup Ar-M – Tamīm –
ʿAnbar
U – ²⁸⁸يفقثلارمعنبفسوي Iraq, Mashriq sup Hishām caliph Ar-Q – Thaqīf
U (–) ²⁸⁹ينزاملاميركلادبع Fasā wa-
Darābjird
sub Ar-M – Tamīm –
Māzin?
 Bal A 9.86, 13.181.
 Zub 1.9; Khal Trkh 336, 350, 358;Yaʿq 237; Qut M 365, 398; Bal A 8.277, 8.379, 8.386, 9.39, 9.79,
9.98, 12.101; Bal F 413; Jah 51; Ṭab 7.26–28, 7.39, 7.138; etc.
 Yaʿq T 241; Bal A 9.86–87, 12.93.
 Yaʿq T 241.
 Bal A 9 89.
 Father of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ; Bal A 4.218; Waf 2.155.
 Kalbī M 1.155; Ḥazm 1.427: Crone (2003, 152– 153) doubts the stories about all his governor-
ships are true, and sees him only as shurṭa chief in Kūfa and governor for Ibn Jumhūr.
 Dhah 13.397. Since this Naṣr was the grandfather of the Baṣran qāḍī Muʿādh b. Muʿādh al-
ʿAnbarī, it is likely that Naṣr’s nisba was al-Tamīmī rather than al-Taymī (see Bal A 13.25 for
Muʿādh’s pedigree).
 Khal Trkh 350, 358–359; Yaʿq T 243; Qut M 365, 507; Bal A 3.233, 4.118, 9.58, 9.96, 9.100; Dīn
337; Ṭab 7.159, 7.179, 7.254. 7.270.
 Bal A 9.114.
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sup Ar-M – Tamīm –
ʿAnbar
U (–) ²⁹¹يربنعلاناسيكنبةبوت Sābūr sub رمعنبفسوي
يفقثلا
sup mawlā of Ar-M –
Tamīm – ʿAnbar
U  ²⁹²يبلكلاروهمجنبروصنم Iraq sup? Yazīd III caliph Ar-Y – Kalb
U –/ دبعنبرمعنبهللادبع
²⁹³زيزعلا
Iraq sup Yazīd III caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
Umayya
U –/ ²⁹⁴يشرحلاديعسنبرضنلا Iraq sup Yazīd III caliph Ar-M
U –/ (unnamed ʿāmil of
ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUmar)²⁹⁵
Iṣṭakhr Sub رمعنبهللادبع sup ?
U – ²⁹⁶بيسملانبملس/ملسم Shīrāz gov/
sub
رمعنبهللادبع sup Arab – Bajīla
– /– ²⁹⁷ةيواعمنبديزإي Fārs gov ةيواعمنبميهاربإ rebel Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAlid
–  ²⁹⁸ةيواعمنبهللادبع Fārs? Iṣṭakhr? gov/
sub?
ةيواعمنبميهاربإ rebel Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAlid
– (–) ²⁹⁹ةيواعمنبنسحلا Iṣṭakhr sub ةيواعمنبميهاربإ rebel Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAlid
U –/ ³⁰⁰يراوحلانبحبسملا Ardashīr
Khurra and/
or Sābūr
Sub رمعنبهللادبع sup Ar-Y – Azd – Atīk
 Bal A 9.114. ʿAbdallāh is said to have been sent by Yūsuf b. ʿUmar to deal with the akrād of
Fasā wa-Darābjird; it is uncertain if this means he was also appointed governor of this subdis-
trict.
 Saʿd 7.179.
 Khal Trkh 369, 370; Yaʿq T 247; Qut M 367; Bal A 9.193–196; Jah 61; Ṭab 7.270, 7.277, 7.280,
7.284.
 Khal Trkh 370, 382; Yaʿq 246; Qut M 363, 369; Bal A 2.63, 8.235, 9.195, 9.196; Ṭab 7.284, 7.299,
7.304, 7.318, 7.319.
 Bal A 8.299; Ṭab 7.318, 7.329.
 Ṭab 7.371.
 Ṭab 7.372; undated copper coins by Salm b. al-Musayyib from Iṣṭakhr: see Album 2011: 46
(#A201).
 Ṭab 7.372.
 Kalbī M 157; Bal A 2.64–66; Ṭab 7.371; copper coins in his name from Iṣṭakhr, dated 130: see
Album 2011: 47.
 Iṣf Ṭ 1.157. According to al-Ṭabarī (Ṭab 7.371), Ibn ʿUmar’s (unnamed) ʿāmil of Iṣṭakhr was
expelled by Ibn Muʿāwiya’s supporters in 129.
 Bal A 8.221; Tab 7.372.
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U – ³⁰¹ةريبهنبرمعنبديزي Iraq³⁰² gov/
sup
Marwān II caliph Ar-Q – Fazāra
A – (ʿummāl of Abū
Salama)³⁰³





















Fārs gov al-Manṣūr caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid




Fārs gov al-Manṣūr caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
–  ³¹⁰دادشنبورمع Fārs gov هللادبعنبميهاربإ rebel mawlā of Ar-M –
Quraysh – Jumaḥ
 ³¹¹دماحنبنوراه only Iṣṭakhr? sub? ?
A (–) ³¹²ميلعنبلصاو Iṣṭakhr sub al-Manṣūr caliph Ar-M -Tamīm – al-
Hujaym b. ʿAmr
 Khal Trkh 382, 409; Yaʿq 246–247; Qut M 369; Bal A 8.232, 9.197, 9.277, 9.309; Dīn 350; Ṭab
7.327, 7.411; Mas M 3.241.
 Including its dependencies, but not Khurāsān.
 Ṭab 7.458. Their identities are not specified.
 Bal A 4.89, 6.428; Ṭab 7.458, 7.460.
 Bal A 4.89; Ṭab 7.458. The caliph’s uncle. Appointed by al-Saffāḥ, he was not able to carry
out his functions due to threats by Abū Muslim’s governor.
 Ṭab 7.458, 7.460. Idem.
 Qut M 377; Bal A 4.281; Athīr K 5.46. The caliph’s brother. According to Ibn al-Athīr, he died
while in office in Fārs in the year 135, but al-Manṣūr came to power only at the end of 136.
 Jah 97; Dhah T 10.160.
 Yaʿq T 263, 266; Qut M 374; Fas 126; copper coins from Darābjird, Shīrāz and Jūr of the year
145: see Shamma 1998: 259, 265, 280.
 Ṭab 7.636, 8.50.
 Only known from copper coins in his name from mint Iṣṭakhr, year 149 (Zeno #77517).
 Bal A 13.61; Dur 209; Ḥazm 209.
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A – ³¹⁵ةزمحنبةرامع Kuwar Dijla,
Ahwāz, Fārs
sup al-Manṣūr caliph mawlā of the ca-
liph
A – ³¹⁶يميمتلابرحنبرصن Thaghr Fārs sub? al-Manṣūr caliph Ar-M – Tamīm
A (–) نايحنبةريمعنبخيش
³¹⁷يدسألا
Fārs gov al-Manṣūr caliph Ar-M – Asad
A (–) نايحنبةريمعنبخيش
()يدسألا ³¹⁸
Fārs gov al-Mahdī caliph Ar-M – Asad
A –? ³¹⁹كمربنبدلاخ Fārs gov al-Mahdī caliph Khurāsānian –
Barmakid




 Al-Iṣṭakhrī (141) says Yazīd was governor of Fārs at the time of the rebellion of Abū Sāra,
and al-Maʾmūn (r. 198–218) sent Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath from Khurāsān to fight Abū Sāra.
Al-Iṣṭakhrī’s story is fishy, because other sources (Bal A 11.31; Ḥab 487; Māk 2.506) put the rebel-
lion of Abū Sāra in the days of al-Manṣūr (r. 137– 158), and Muḥammad b. al-Ashʿath (al-Khuzāʿī;
g. Fārs 130– 133) died already in 149. The most likely interpretation is that al-Iṣṭakhrī mixed up
al-Maʾmūn and al-Manṣūr.
 Known only from a copper coin in Tübingen from Fasā 154 and Fasā n.d. (but mentioning
al-Mahdī and “Manṣūr” (Shamma 1998: 272).
 Jah 141; Ṭab 8.51, 8.53.
 Ṭab 8.201; Bal A 13.12; Jawz 8.201. Military commander of al-Manṣūr, and part of his guard
(Bal A 13.12; Ṭab 8.79). It is not clear what the hapax thaghr Fārs (border of Fārs) refers to exactly.
Ibn al-Athīr (K 5.207) and Ibn Khaldūn (Khld 3.255) simplify the text, making Naṣr governor of
Fārs.
 Bal A 11.165. Crucified the rebel Abū Sāra (Bal A 11.31; Ḥab 487), whose rebellion started
under Yazīd b. ʿIqāl.
 Bal A 11.165. Perhaps continuation of his governorship under al-Manṣūr?
 Jah 97; Dhah T 10.160.
 Only known from copper coins in his name. He appears alone,with his patronymic, on cop-
per coins from the year 159 (mint Iṣṭakhr); and simply as Rabīʿ, together with caliph al-Mahdī, on
copper coins with date 167 from Iṣṭakhr, Ardashīr Khurra, Jūr (the capital of Ardashīr Khurra)
and Arrajān. See Shamma 1998, 167, 259, 269–270.
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A – ³²¹يلعنبناميلسنبدمحم Baṣra, other
Gulf
provinces³²²
sup al-Mahdī caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A  ³²³يلعنبدووادنبحلاص Baṣra, other
Gulf
provinces ³²⁴
sup al-Mahdī caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid





sup al-Mahdī caliph mawlā of the ca-
liph
A  ³²⁶يلعنبرامع Fasā sub ? ?
A – ³²⁷يلعنبناميلسنبدمحم Baṣra, other
Gulf
provinces³²⁸







sup Hārūn caliph Ar-M – Quraysh –
ʿAbbāsid
A (–) ³³¹هيومح Ḥarb and
kharāj of Fārs
gov Hārūn caliph mawlā of al-Mahdī
 Khal Trkh 447, 448, 461; Bal A 3.129; Ṭab 7.655.
 Al-Baṣra and it’s aʿmāl, the Kuwar Dijla, al-Baḥrayn, ʿUmān, the harbours (al-furaḍ), Kuwar
al-Ahwāz and Kuwar Fārs.
 Khal Trkh 438, 440; Ṭab 8.150, 8.162; copper coin from Iṣṭakhr: Shamma 1998: 280–281.
 The ṣalāt and aḥdāth of al-Baṣra, the Kuwar Dijla, al-Baḥrayn, ʿUmān, al-furaḍ, Kuwar al-
Ahwāz, and Fārs.
 Ṭab 8.153, 8.163, 8.166.
 Fas 159.
 Khal Trkh 447, 448, 461; Bal A 3.129; Ṭab 7.655.
 Al-Baṣra, al-Baḥrayn, al-furaḍ, ʿUmān, al-Yamāma, Kuwar al-Ahwāz, and Fārs.
 Grandson of the caliph Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr; Qut M 379; Khal Trkh 461–62; Bal A 4.275; Ṭab
8.346. He figures three times in Khalīfa’s and al-Ṭabarī’s lists of Hārūn al-Rashīd’s governors of
al-Baṣra after the death of Muḥammad b. Sulaymān in 173; it is not clear whether all three times,
he was appointed as super-governor.
 According to Ibn Qutayba (Qut M 379), he was in charge of “al-Baṣra and its kuwar, and
Fārs, al-Ahwāz, al-Yamāma and al-Sind”; al-Balādhurī leaves out Fārs but adds al-Baḥrayn:
“aʿmāl al-Baṣra, Kuwar Dijla, al-Ahwāz, al-Yamāma, al-Baḥrayn and al-Sind” (Bal A 4.275).
The other sources only mention him as governor of Baṣra.
 His governorship of Fārs is only known from a story in the Kitāb al-Aghānī (Iṣf A 16.497)
that alleges Ḥammawayh received the governorship of Fārs for a period of seven years because
his singing girl, one of al-Rashīd’s favourites, had asked for this favour. In the year 191, Ḥamma-
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A ––? ³³²يكمربلاىيحينبدمحم Fārs? gov? Khurāsānian –
Barmakid
 ³³³ناوفصنبلهلهم Arrajān? sub? ?
 ³³⁴روصنمريمألا [Sīrāf] sub?
A –– نببيسملانبهللادبع
³³⁵ريهز
Fārs gov Ar-M – Ḍabba
A –? نبلهسنبلضفلا
³³⁶خورفناذاز







sup al-Maʾmūn caliph Iranian – Sahlid
A (–) ³³⁹ورمعنبديعسنببهو Kirmān, Fārs gov/
sup
لهسنبنسحلا Christian?
wayh was put in charge of the barīd of Khurāsān, and he was the one who sent the news of al-
Rashīd’s death to Baghdād in the year 193 (Ṭab 8.323, 365).
 Copper coins in his name from all kūra capitals in Fārs in 182 and 183: Zeno # 81269, 83227,
83479, 81297, 63155; Shamma 1998: 263, 266, 270, 271, 282.
 Only known from copper coins from Arrajān, 182 (Shamma 1998: 264).
 Lowick 1985: 27–28. Only known from 32 lead coins found in the Sīrāf excavations, on
which Manṣūr is mentioned in the obverse marginal formula as the issuer of the coins
(amara al-amīr Manṣūr bi-al-ʿadl). Lowick tentatively identified this Manṣūr as either Manṣūr
b. al-Mahdī (g. Baṣra 196–200), or – perhaps more likely – Manṣūr b. Ziyād, a Barmakid protégé
“who held the position of Secretary for the Army under al-Rashīd and who deputized for al-
Faḍl”. A subordinate official, Bū Ḥasan (sic), is also mentioned on the coins. The coins carry
no mint name, but since they were found in relatively large numbers at Sīrāf, and lead coins
did usually not circulate outside of their city of origin, it is assumed here the coins were minted
at Sīrāf.
 Qut M 413 (without date or appointer). Copper coins in the name of ʿAbdallāh b. al-Mu-
sayyib from Shīrāz, dated 192: see Album 2011: 62–63, Shamma 1998: 262. From the noblest fam-
ily of the Banū Ḍabba, the Banū Ḍirār, he held governorships in Fārs, Egypt and al-Jazīra. His
father had been governor of Khurāsān for al-Mahdī (Qut M 413).
 Ṭab 8.424; Maq 6.108. Al-Faḍl and his brother al-Ḥasan were Zoroastrians from a village in
Iraq, and converted to Islam at the start of their carreers (Jahsh 255–256). Their grandfather’s
name points to their Iranian background.
 “From the mountains of Hamadhān to the mountains of Siqīnān (?) and Tibet in length,
and from the sea of Fārs and al-Hind to the sea of Daylam and Jurjān in width” (Ṭab 8.424).
 Ṭab 8.527.
 Waf 2.415. Al-Ḥasan b. Sahl retired in 202, after the assassination of his brother, so Wahb
must have been in Fārs and Kirmān sometime between 198 and 202.
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Fārs gov al-Wāthiq? Khurāsānian –
Ṭāhirid










































gov ? ? ?
 Copper coins in his name from mint Fārs, dated 214 and 220: Album 2011: 62–63.
 Known only from a copper coin in Tübingen, from Fasā 22x (Shamma 1998: 273).
 Yaʿq T 310; Ṭab 9.150, 9.183– 184. Killed in Fārs by his nephew Muḥammad b. Isḥāq b.
Ibrāhīm.
 Ṭab 9.176, 9.180, 9.183.
 Ṭab 9.183– 184.
 Ṭab 9.183– 184.
 Ṭab 9.183– 184.
 Yaʿq T 310; Ṭab 9.184.
 Mas M 3.480; Ṣaf 12.8; Ṣāb 47. His father had been in charge of the dīwān al-kharāj under al-
Maʾmūn and the kharāj of Damascus; al-Ḥasan himself had started his career as a young boy in
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the dīwān of al-Maʾmūn, and before becoming governor of Fārs and Ahwāz had been governor of
the Kuwar al-Jabal and Isfahan (Ibn ʿAsākir 1995–2001, 13.84, 13.88, 18.122).
 Yaʿq T 315; Ṭab 9.258.
 Yaʿq T 315. Killed in an uprising by the jund in Fārs.
 Yaʿq T 315; Ṭab 9.277. Brought Fārs back under control, but was killed in the next year dur-
ing a new uprising by the jund and the shākiriyya troops.
 Yaʿq T 315; Iṣṭ 144; Ṭab 9.409; Waf 6.405–407.
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Muslim Elites in the Early Islamic Jazīra:
The Qāḍīs of Ḥarrān, al-Raqqa, and
al-Mawṣil
Abstract: This paper investigates local and regional networks of power in the
province of al-Jazīra during the Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid period. Using a pro-
sopographical approach, it focuses on the office of the qāḍī as an intersection of
imperial and provincial authority, using the cities of Ḥarrān, al-Raqqa, and al-
Mawṣil as case studies. A comparative analysis of the individuals appointed to
the qāḍīship reveals some commonalities in their backgrounds, particularly re-
garding ḥadīth transmission, but also clear differences in the appointment pat-
terns identified for each city. For example, the office of the qāḍī of Ḥarrān
seems to have been a predominantly local affair, while Raqqan qāḍīs frequently
held transregional elite status. The judges of al-Mawṣil, on the other hand, fea-
ture local, regional, and transregional representatives. This variance is likely due
to political and administrative factors and emphasizes the complex dynamics
and hierarchies of governance in the early Islamic period.
Keywords: qāḍīs; Raqqa; al-Mawṣil; Ḥarrān; Islamic history; early Islamic Em-
pire; prosopography
Introduction
The ‘Islamic Empire at Work’ project seeks to re-assess the way the early caliph-
ate (c. 661–940) established, maintained, and negotiated its authority in the day-
to-day running of the empire. Early Muslim historical writing in particular fre-
quently gives a predominantly imperial view by focusing on the caliphal court
and capitals. This can oversimplify our understanding of imperial administration
and elite interactions: much modern scholarship has followed the primary sour-
ces in presenting a caliph-centered image of the early Islamic Empire that often
neglects the importance of regional power brokers. We aim to reverse the direc-
tion of study from a ‘top-down’ to a ‘bottom-up’ approach by investigating lower
levels of administration like the city, and from a ‘center-focused’ to a ‘province-
focused’ view through the analysis of regional and local office holders and net-
works of power. To that end, the project builds on scholarship on other
OpenAccess. © 2020 Hannah-Lena Hagemann, published by De Gruyter. This work is li-
censed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
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provinces¹ and pursues the in-depth study of five key regions in the early Islamic
period. Among them is the Jazīra.
The Jazīra, or Northern Mesopotamia, was one of the most diverse regions of
the early Islamic Empire. In the pre-Islamic period, it was divided between the
Sasanian and the Byzantine Empires. Its eastern part mostly fell under the Irani-
an sphere of influence until the collapse of the Sasanian Empire in the wake of
the Arab-Muslim conquests of the mid-7th century, while the western part was
more or less controlled by Byzantium. The two empires’ centuries-long rivalry
led to the frequent reassignment of ‘Jazīran’ territory to the domain of one or an-
other player,² with no clearly defined border between Byzantine and Sasanian
lands.³
The region was inhabited by a great variety of religious, ethnic, tribal, lin-
guistic, and political communities, some of whom enjoyed significant autonomy
in both pre-Islamic times and the early Islamic period – perhaps one of the rea-
sons the Jazīra was plagued by frequent revolts. Some of these were quite suc-
cessful and led to the establishment of local and regional elite families who gov-
erned the region with various degrees of independence from (and not
infrequently in opposition to) the caliphal courts.⁴ The region’s heterogeneity,
evidenced also in its geographical features and the resulting range of settlement
types and economic strategies,⁵ was already present in Late Antiquity⁶: Jews,
Christians, Zoroastrians, ‘Sabeans’ (and later Muslims of various denomina-
tions); nomads, pastoralists, and settled people of different tribes;⁷ Arabs, Persi-
ans, Armenians, Greeks, and others all inhabited the ‘Jazīra’.
Throughout the early Islamic period, Muslims remained a minority within
the region, which housed a large (but not uniform) Christian population. Jazīran
Christianity was mainly divided into two factions: the Syrian Orthodox Church
(the ‘Jacobites’), whose center was al-Ruhā (Edessa) and whose adherents
were predominant in the province’s western subdivision (Diyār Muḍar) and the
 Egypt, for instance, the study of which is blessed with an enormous reservoir of papyri from
the 7th century onward. See Sijpesteijn 2009 and 2013.
 See e.g. Decker 2007, 220; Hirt 2008, passim; Schmitt 2001, 201–204.
 Lilie 2005, 13.
 The most famous example of this in the early Islamic period are the Ḥamdānids, who control-
led large parts of the Jazīra in the 10th century. See Canard 1953; Bikhazi 1981.
 Robinson, C. 2017, 21–23; Robinson, C. 2000, 34.
 See e.g. Hirt 2008, 58–59; Posner 1988, 43; Robinson, C. 2000, 34–35.
 The main Jazīran tribes on the eve of the Muslim conquest were the Banū Taghlib, the Iyād,
and al-Namir. The Taghlib in particular continued to play an important role in the region; the
Ḥamdānids belonged to that tribe. See Schmitt 2001, 223–224.
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northern mountain range of the Ṭūr ʿAbdīn;⁸ and the Church of the East (the
‘Nestorians’), which was particularly active in the eastern subdivision (Diyār
Rabīʿa), especially along the Tigris, in al-Mawṣil, and in Naṣībīn.⁹ Communities
of Chalcedonian Christians (‘Melkites’) were also dispersed throughout the Ja-
zīra, mostly in the Diyār Muḍar because of its proximity to (formerly) Byzantine
territory. The Arab conquerors left existing church structures mostly undistur-
bed;¹⁰ the Church of the East, for instance, continued to be an influential player
under Muslim rule, serving as an administrative body and mediator of local in-
terests and imperial demands, especially after the move of the seat of its patri-
archate to Baghdād in 775.¹¹ Indeed, both the Syrian Orthodox and the Church
of the East benefited from the Islamic conquests, as they were able to extend
their influence—and their rivalry—beyond the old Byzantine-Sasanian frontiers.¹²
The province of al-Jazīra was situated between the two imperial core regions
of the early Islamic Empire, al-Shām and al-ʿIrāq, making it a major communi-
cation line and key transit region of its own.¹³ The region’s fertility, anchored
in the great river systems of the Euphrates and the Tigris, turned it into the ca-
liphal capital’s bread-basket, especially in the early ʿAbbāsid period.¹⁴ It was
also the seat of government of at least two caliphs, the Umayyad Marwān II (r.
744–749/50; based at Ḥarrān) and the ʿAbbāsid Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–809;
based at al-Raqqa in 796–808).
Despite the region’s relative significance, we know little about the internal
workings of the Jazīra—its administration, the interplay of the various religious
and political groups, or the day-to-day processes of governing the province.
High-ranking members of both the Umayyad and the ʿAbbāsid family were con-
nected to the region through governorships and/or as (major) landowners, but
even here the extant sources record comparatively little of their activities. Both
 Hage 1966, 11, 12, 16. See also his map of Syrian Orthodox bishoprics.
 Wilmshurst 2011.
 Hage 1966, 68.
 Wilmshurst 2011, 115.
 See e.g.Wilmshurst 2011, 466–469, for the expansion of the Church of the East from the late
6th to the 13th century.
 Pace C. Robinson, who considers the Jazīra a “peripheral area” at least in the period of the
Rāshidūn and Umayyads; Robinson, C. 2000, viii. For evidence of the Jazīra’s prosperity in the 7th
and 8th century, see e.g. Eger 2015, 155– 156 (specifically challenging Robinson’s assertions);
Bartl 1993– 1994.
 Robinson, C. 2017, 24, 26, 27–28; Kennedy 2011, 196, 197; Heidemann 2011, 48–55. This also
meant that the Jazīra declined when these centers were no longer as prosperous and their de-
mand for foodstuffs and other goods diminished, on which see Heidemann 2011, 55–56.
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in the primary sources and in scholarship, the history of the province is largely
overshadowed by that of al-Shām, al-ʿIrāq, Egypt, and Khurāsān.
This lack of information is partly due to the fact that non-Muslims are often
invisible in the Islamic sources. For a Christian-majority province like the Jazīra,
this causes a noticeable problem. Christians (like other non-Muslims) were clear-
ly involved in administration and tax collection, trade, education, and even po-
licing, but the Islamic tradition remains mostly silent on their activities. Only al-
Raqqa and al-Mawṣil have been the subject of more detailed study,¹⁵ but there is
a dearth of primary information compared to what is available for some of the
cities of al-Shām, al-ʿIrāq, or Khurāsān. The great cities of pre-Islamic Northern
Mesopotamia, like Edessa (al-Ruhā) or Nisibis (Naṣībīn), are mostly absent from
the Islamic sources and thus from scholarship. The study of the early Islamic
Jazīra is therefore fraught with difficulty: “writing a history of the Jazira is writing
almost ex nihilo.”¹⁶
How, then, to proceed, especially regarding issues such as the interactions of
regional elites with the imperial government that are difficult to trace in the Is-
lamic source material for the Jazīra? Non-Muslim sources are one promising ave-
nue of research. Many can be dated to the 7th and 8th century, before the bulk of
early Islamic sources was put down in written form. They offer insight into as-
pects of local daily life barely covered elsewhere, such as landownership and
non-Muslim jurisdiction,¹⁷ and unlike the early Islamic tradition, a substantial
portion of the Christian scholarship produced in the Jazīra is extant today.¹⁸
This survival provides an insight into conditions within this province otherwise
difficult to attain.¹⁹ Indeed, in some ways it would be easier to write a history of
the Christian Jazīra in the early Islamic period.²⁰ There are also cases in which
the Christian tradition preserves snippets of the Jazīra’s Muslim history that
 On al-Mawṣil, see al-Dawaykhī 1982 and Robinson, C. 2000. On al-Raqqa, see Becker / Hei-
demann 2003; Ḥabbāb 2010.Western scholarship on al-Raqqa has mostly focused on archaeol-
ogy and material culture.
 Robinson, C. 2000, ix.
 See e.g. Sachau 1907–1914.
 See e.g. the Book of Governors by Thomas of Marga in Budge 1893; a fragment of John bar
Penkāyē’s work in Brock 1987; the Chronicle of Zuqnīn in Harrak 1999; the partial reconstruction
of the work of Theophilus of Edessa in Hoyland 2011.
 Of course, non-Muslim sources are neither unquestionably reliable nor entirely independent
from the Arab-Islamic tradition, and as with every piece of (historical) writing, their authors pur-
sue their own agendas.
 See e.g. Fiey 1977; Ishaq 1992; Drijvers 1992; Debié 2016; and Philip Wood’s contribution to
this volume.
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has all but disappeared from the written Islamic tradition (although sometimes
these fragments are still visible in the numismatic record).²¹
Prosopography is another promising approach to studying the changing
composition of early Islamic elites,²² and the one adopted here. As it is the ob-
jective of this paper and indeed this project as a whole to break down the grand
narratives of center and province, I will focus on city officials. Originally, this
contribution was meant to look at the governors of Naṣībīn in an attempt to
broaden our knowledge of the city’s early Islamic history. However, a detailed
and prolonged search unearthed only a handful of figures, too far apart chrono-
logically and with backgrounds and careers too unclear to detect patterns and
allow for meaningful conclusions. Similar problems exist for other Jazīran cities
in the early Islamic period, even al-Raqqa, with the exception of al-Mawṣil whose
governors have already been investigated.²³ While it is certainly possible to ex-
pand upon the existing studies, this paper will instead examine an important
but hitherto neglected category of early Islamic Jazīran officials: the qāḍīs of
the region.
Within the scope of this paper, I will focus on the judges of three major cit-
ies: al-Raqqa, al-Mawṣil, and Ḥarrān. Partial lists of these cities’ qāḍīs already
exist,²⁴ but with very few exceptions the individuals in question have not been
examined further.²⁵ These lists were expanded using the digital search tool
Jedli, which was developed within the framework of the ‘Islamic Empire at
Work’ project and allows for a much more comprehensive and rapid investiga-
tion of Arabic texts compared to a manual search.²⁶ The present paper thus con-
stitutes a step towards narrowing the gap in our knowledge of Jazīran history by
bringing to light those who made up the fabric of Muslim provincial society in
the early Islamic period.
In what follows, I will provide an overview of the qāḍīs of the individual cit-
ies. The emphasis here is not primarily on their religious teachings or professio-
nal responsibilities,²⁷ but rather on questions of background, career, social and
 For instance, Bar Hebraeus and Elias of Nisibis transmit relatively detailed reports on a num-
ber of Arab notables that held Naṣībīn, Raʾs al-ʿAyn, Kafartūthā, and other Jazīran settlements in
the early 9th century following Hārūn’s death. See Ilisch 1986.
 On the importance of prosopography for early Islamic history, see e.g. Crone 1980, 16– 17;
Cooperson 2000; Jaques 2007; Robinson, M. 2013.
 See e.g. Forand 1969; Kennedy 1981; Robinson, C. 2000, passim.
 See Forand 1969, 102; Juynboll 1983, appendix III; Tsafrir 2004, 81, 86.
 See e.g. on the qāḍī of al-Raqqa, Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (d. 805), Khadduri 1966; Bonner
2001; Sadeghi 2010. On the qāḍīs of al-Mawṣil, see the brief remarks in Kennedy 1981, 29–30.
 On Jedli, see Haro Peralta/Verkinderen 2016 and 2016b.
 For the office of the qāḍī in the early Islamic period, see e.g. Tillier 2009 and 2015.
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professional mobility, and interaction with other regional or imperial officials
(appointments, dismissals, and so forth).²⁸ The evidence for qāḍīs in the early
Islamic period is rather limited both due to the modest survival of early source
material in general and because biographies of qāḍīs only began to be compiled
in the 9th century.²⁹ This is exacerbated by the fact that most of the available evi-
dence regarding early Islamic judges focuses on regions other than the Jazīra.
The survival of biographical dictionaries featuring the qāḍīs of the Arabian Pen-
insula, al-ʿIrāq, and Egypt has caused the latter two provinces in particular to
dominate the scholarly discourse on early Islamic legal history.³⁰ While under-
standable, this has led to generalizations concerning the office of the qāḍī in
the early Islamic period that potentially distort our understanding of it. For in-
stance, it has been argued that the presence of mawālī among qāḍīs of the
Umayyad and early ʿAbbāsid period was exceptional.³¹ As we shall see, this
does not hold true for the three Jazīran cities considered here.
This paper will focus primarily on the (admittedly scarce) material dealing
with judges within the Jazīra. Via the comparative analysis of Ḥarrān, al-
Raqqa, and al-Mawṣil, it seeks to discern similarities and differences in the
local power structures and elite composition of these cities that will improve
upon our understanding of early Islamic administration and the Jazīra’s position
as one node in the imperial network of the early caliphate.
The Qāḍīs of Ḥarrān
Ḥarrān (Roman Carrhae) was a major settlement in the Diyār Muḍar, the western-
most part of the Jazīra. Located in the fertile plain watered by the Jullāb, a trib-
utary of the Balīkh that joined that river at Ḥarrān, it was close to Edessa/al-
Ruhā as well as al-Raqqa, the great city in the Balīkh delta. Ḥarrān was the cen-
ter of the Sabian community, who lived there relatively undisturbed until the
early 11th century. The city served as a seat of the governor of the Jazīra. It was
the capital of the last Umayyad caliph, Marwān II, and thus briefly the capital
of the early Islamic Empire in the 740s, the period in which Ḥarrān’s first mosque
may have been built. Over time Ḥarrān developed into a Ḥanbalī stronghold, and
it was one of the centers of the translation movement during the early ʿAbbāsid
 See Tillier 2011 for a similar approach to the qāḍīs of Egypt.
 Tillier 2014, 119– 120; Judd 2015, 45.
 Al-ʿIrāq and Arabia: Wakīʿ 1947; Egypt: al-Kindī 2003.
 Bligh-Abramski 1992, 54.
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period.³² Until the construction of al-Rāfiqa in 772, Ḥarrān’s political importance
and economic prosperity probably surpassed that of al-Raqqa.³³ Even after
changing settlement patterns reduced the city’s status, Ḥarrān might have re-
tained some of its economic and military significance into the early 10th centu-
ry.³⁴
Information on the qāḍīs of Ḥarrān is rather sketchy compared to the other
two cities investigated in this paper. This is not entirely surprising: the history of
the city in general is relatively poorly documented in the extant written sources.
While Ḥarrān was Marwān II’s capital, it never attained the size and significance
of al-Raqqa and al-Mawṣil in their heydays. Moreover, much of the information
on city qāḍīs provided by the Arabic sources deals with the period of ʿAbbāsid
prime from the caliphate of al-Manṣūr (r. 754–775) until the death of al-
Maʾmūn in 833, when Ḥarrān began to lose importance.
My search produced twelve individuals who apparently served as qāḍīs of
the city, although it is likely that only nine were actually judges of Ḥarrān. Juyn-
boll names a set of three brothers who flourished in the late Umayyad/early ʿAb-
bāsid period as qāḍīs of the city,³⁵ but the primary sources in fact only mention
one brother, Sulaymān b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿUlātha (d. 750/51), in that capacity.³⁶ His
brothers Muḥammad and Ziyād are exclusively listed as judges of ʿAskar al-
Mahdī (referring either to al-Ruṣāfa or east Baghdād) for the ʿAbbāsid caliph
al-Mahdī; uncommonly, Muḥammad seems to have shared the office with anoth-
er qāḍī.³⁷ The family was of Ḥarrānī origin and thus represents a good—albeit,
for the qāḍīs of Ḥarrān, unusual—example of the mobility of early Muslim elites.
As the focus here is on those individuals who were judges of Ḥarrān itself, only
Sulaymān is included in the following analysis. Another uncertain case is that of
Hārūn b. Ibrāhīm (d. 939/40)—while he is relatively well-known as qāḍī of Egypt
 For the history of Ḥarrān, see Mez 1892; Lloyd/Brice 1951; EI2, “Ḥarrān” (G. Fehérvári).
 Heidemann 2011, 49.
 Heidemann 2003, 41–46.
 Juynboll 1983, appendix III, ‘Ḥarrān.’
 See e.g. Ibn Saʿd 1990, 7:335; Ibn Abī Ḥātim 1952– 1953, 4:126; Wakīʿ 1947, 1:217–219; Ibn al-
Athīr 1972, 2:365.
 The EI2 entry on the “Ḳāḍī” (E. Tyan/Gy. Káldy Nagy) states that jurisdiction was exclusively
“exercised by a single ḳāḍī.” See also Tillier 2017, 124. For Muḥammad b. ʿUlātha, see e.g. Ibn
Saʿd 1990, 7:234; Ibn Abī Ḥātim 1952– 1953, 7:302; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1997, 3:7–9; Wakīʿ
1947, 3:251–253; for Ziyād b. ʿUlātha, see e.g. Ibn Saʿd 1990, 7:335; Wakīʿ 1947, 3:252; Ibn Abī
Ḥātim 1952– 1953, 3:437; al-Mizzī 1980, 9:490–492.
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and Baghdād, only Ibn al-Nadīm mentions him as judge of Ḥarrān,³⁸ so he will
also not be considered in what follows.
As already indicated, most of the evidence pertains to the late Umayyad/
early ʿAbbāsid period. Of the nine remaining judges, three were in office during
the late Umayyad and possibly into the early ʿAbbāsid period. Three qāḍīs served
in early ʿAbbāsid times; two individuals, among them the eminent Ḥarrānī
ḥadīth scholar Abū ʿArūba (d. 930), held the office in the middle ʿAbbāsid period.
The last judge is unidentified, but we can assume that he was qāḍī of Ḥarrān,
probably before the death of Wakīʿ (d. 917/18) whose Akhbār al-Quḍāt is the
only source to mention him.³⁹
There is a large gap between the qāḍīs of the late Umayyad/early ʿAbbāsid
and those of the middle ʿAbbāsid period. No judges are mentioned between
the deaths of al-Mughīra b. Siqlāb in 817/18 and Muḥammad b. ʿUbaydallāh
al-Qarduwānī⁴⁰ in 881. Only one qāḍī is explicitly mentioned as an appointee
of a member of the ruling house: Sulaymān b. ʿAbdallāh was reportedly appoint-
ed over Ḥarrān and the cities of the Jazīra by ʿAbd al-Malik b. Marwān II b. Mu-
ḥammad, who held the Jazīra for his father after the murder of al-Walīd II.⁴¹ The
ʿAbbāsid-era qāḍīs were in all likelihood appointed by the caliph or (later) his
chief judge, but the sources do not tell us this directly.
Statistics aside, what can we learn about the composition and careers of Ḥar-
rān’s juridical elite? To begin with, the qāḍīs of Ḥarrān generally appear to have
been part of a well-integrated local network of religious scholars with few ties
beyond the city and even fewer outside the Jazīra.⁴² All of them seem to have
come from Ḥarrānī families and from various Arab tribes or were connected to
the latter asmawālī.⁴³ There is no explicit evidence that they held positions with-
in the imperial administration outside Ḥarrān.
 Ibn al-Nadīm 1997, 1:398. For Hārūn as qāḍī of Egypt and Baghdād, see e.g. al-Kindī 2003,
1:344–345; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ 1965–1983, 5:362–363; Ibn Ḥajar 1998, 1:127.
 Wakīʿ 1947, 3:216.
 Or al-Qurdawānī. On him, see e.g. al-Dhahabī 1948–49, 20:121; Ibn Ḥajar 1907– 1909, 9:325;
Ibn Abī Yaʿlā 1952, 1:302–304.
 Al-Ṭabarī 1967, 7:296. The wording does not clarify whether he was appointed as judge or gov-
ernor of Ḥarrān and the Jazīra, although the former is at least likely in the case of Ḥarrān.
 As already mentioned, Sulaymān b. ʿAbdallāh’s brothers were qāḍīs of ʿAskar al-Mahdī, but
he died about 30 years before them (unless the date is a copyist’s error perpetuated by later
sources) so the extent to which he was connected outside Ḥarrān and the Jazīra is questionable.
 Four of them were mawālī, although it is not clear whether the term refers to the qāḍīs them-
selves or to their ancestors: ʿUthmān (b. ʿAmr) b. Sāj al-Ḥarrānī (fl. 757; mawlā Quraysh or B.
Umayya); al-Jarrāḥ b. al-Minhāl al-Jazarī (d. 784; mawlā B. ʿĀmir); Muḥammad b. ʿUbaydallāh
al-Qarduwānī (d. 881; mawlā Shaybān); Abū ʿArūba (d. 930; mawlā B. Sulaym).
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Most of the city’s qāḍīs were known as reliable ḥadīth transmitters.⁴⁴ The
local Ḥarrānī and Jazīran factor is noticeable: many of the authorities from
and to whom our judges transmitted ḥadīth carry Jazīran nisbas (al-Ruhāwī,
al-Ḥarrānī, al-Mawṣilī, al-Raqqī, al-Jazarī, and the like). There is a lot of overlap
between the qāḍīs regarding these authorities.⁴⁵ Many judges are specifically
mentioned as having received and passed on traditions within their families,⁴⁶
and it is not unexpected that some qāḍīs of Ḥarrān served as ḥadīth authorities
for their successors in office.⁴⁷ There is little evidence of educational or profes-
sional mobility: Abū ʿArūba al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad (d. 930), chronologically
the last judge considered here, is the only one said to have engaged in ṭalab
al-ʿilm.⁴⁸ He apparently studied with many eminent scholars in al-Shām, the
Thughūr, the Ḥijāz, and al-ʿIrāq; his erudition attracted many students, who vis-
ited him in Ḥarrān.⁴⁹
There seems to have been little imperial involvement in the judgeship of
Ḥarrān beyond the acts of appointment and dismissal. The relevant entries in
the biographical dictionaries and other sources are often basic and provide
few details on the date or length of an appointment, the qāḍī’s responsibilities
and rulings, or his communication and interaction (or lack thereof) with impe-
 The one exception is al-Jarrāḥ b. al-Minhāl al-Jazarī, who reportedly lied in ḥadīth and was
rather partial to both khamr and nabīdh. See Ibn Ḥibbān 1976, 1:218–219; Ibn Abī Ḥātim 1952–
1953, 2:523; al-Subkī 1992, 3:234. Other qāḍīs nevertheless transmitted from him.
 Compare e.g. the transmitters mentioned in the entries on al-Khaṭṭāb b. Qāsim (al-Bukhārī
1941– 1959, 3:201; al-Mizzī 1980, 8:258; al-Dhahabī 1948–49, 12:77); Yūnus b. Rāshid al-Ḥarrānī
(al-Bukhārī 1941– 1959, 8:412; Ibn Ḥibbān 1973, 9:289; Ibn Abī Ḥātim 1952– 1953, 9:239); and Mu-
ḥammad b. ʿUbaydallāh al-Qarduwānī (Ibn Ḥajar 1907–1909, 9:325; Ibn Abī Yaʿlā 1952, 1:302–
304).
 See e.g. ʿUthmān (b. ʿAmr) b. Sāj al-Ḥarrānī (Ibn Abī Ḥātim 1952–1953, 6:162; Ibn Ḥajar
1907–1909, 7:144–145) and Sulaymān b. ʿAbdallāh (Ibn al-Athīr 1972, 2:365; Ibn Abī Ḥātim
1952– 1953, 4:126, 9:269–271; al-Samʿānī 1952–1982, 9:410; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1997, 8:479–
481 [on Sulaymān’s brothers and father]). The transmission of ḥadīth between family members
was a very common feature of early Islamic learning, but it also intensified the local ‘flavor’ of
Ḥarrānī networks.
 E.g., al-Mughīra b. Siqlāb (d. 817/18) transmitted from al-Jarrāḥ b. al-Minhāl al-Jazarī (d. 784);
see Ibn ʿAdī 1997, 2:406–408. Abū ʿArūba (d. 930) transmitted from al-Qarduwānī (d. 881); see
Ibn Ḥajar 1907– 1909, 9:325.
 A second example might be case of al-Jarrāḥ b. al-Minhāl (d. 784), but the evidence is sket-
chy. See Ibn Ḥibbān 1976, 1:218–219; Ibn ʿAdī 1997, 2:406–408.
 See e.g. Abū Yaʿlā al-Khalīlī 1989, 1:458–459; Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 6:2780–2781; al-Dhahabī
1948– 1949, 23:409–410.
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rial officials.⁵⁰ The small number of judges mentioned for Ḥarrān might indicate
that they tended to remain in office for extended periods of time, but that is con-
jecture. However, the judges’ comprehensive entrenchment in the city will have
allowed them to build up lasting networks of loyalty and support that would pro-
tect them in the event of conflict with the imperial order. As far as we can tell, the
qāḍīs of Ḥarrān were thus a decidedly local elite whose power and influence
were primarily founded on the city and its hinterland. The composition of this
elite group probably did not undergo any significant changes from the late
Umayyad to the middle ʿAbbāsid period. Ḥarrānī origins, membership in an
Arab tribe, and affiliation with a local and regional (Jazīran) network of transmit-
ters were the defining features of these officials. Their power, security, and effec-
tiveness were primarily guaranteed by their fellow Ḥarrānīs rather than caliphal
patronage or a transregional economic power base, although a combination of
regional and transregional factors was certainly possible—as we will see below.
The Qāḍīs of al-Raqqa
The city of al-Raqqa is situated in the Balīkh delta at the river’s confluence with
the Euphrates. It was the capital of the Diyār Muḍar, the western subdivision of
the Jazīra.⁵¹ While al-Raqqa was an important stronghold in the Umayyad period,
the city reached the pinnacle of its prosperity and political importance under the
early ʿAbbāsids, who used the city as a base from which to counter the perpetual
strife in al-Shām.⁵² The period witnessed extensive building activities in al-
Raqqa. Its companion city al-Rāfiqa was built from 771–772 onwards on the or-
ders of al-Manṣūr, apparently to further secure al-Raqqa by stationing a Khur-
asānī garrison there.⁵³ Together, the twin cities constituted the largest urban
complex in Northern Mesopotamia and al-Shām, probably second only to
Baghdād. Al-Raqqa’s prime culminated with Hārūn al-Rashīd’s choice to relocate
the imperial capital there in 796 and the caliph’s concomitant investments in an
extensive construction program. Al-Raqqa remained Hārūn’s seat of power until
his death in 809, upon which the court was moved back to Baghdād. Thereafter,
al-Raqqa was the seat of the governor of the Jazīra, a position that had in the
 One exception is again Sulaymān b. ʿAbdallāh: Wakīʿ (1947, 1:217–219) preserves some of his
alleged rulings, mostly on the subject of slaves.
 For the history of al-Raqqa, see EI2, “al-Raqqa” (M. Meinecke) in addition to the references
noted above.
 Tsafrir 2004, 82.
 Tsafrir 2004, 82.
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past been occupied by Ḥarrān. The city gradually lost its political significance
over the course of the 9th century but remained famous for its religious scholars,
some of whom will be discussed below. Al-Raqqa retained an active Christian
and Jewish population well into the 12th century, but the Muslim presence in
the city increased significantly with the city’s flowering in the early ʿAbbāsid pe-
riod. It appears that it was home to a sizeable number of ʿAlīd sympathizers,with
many of the proto-Sunnīs leaning towards the teachings of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal in
the late 9th and 10th century.⁵⁴ Ḥanafism also came to play a role in al-Raqqa, as
we will see shortly.
Turning to the qāḍīs of al-Raqqa, the volume of evidence is on a very differ-
ent scale compared to what survives for Ḥarrān. The sources preserve the names
of 24 judges of the city, although four cannot be securely identified as qāḍīs of al-
Raqqa.⁵⁵ Further research did not reveal any additional information about these
individuals, so they were excluded from the following analysis. Another four
judges are essentially unknown other than by their service as qāḍī,⁵⁶ leaving
us with 16 better-known (and in some cases eminent) individuals over a period
of roughly 200 years, from the reign of ʿUmar II (the earliest point of reference)
until the death of the qāḍī Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan in 926–927. As in the
case of Ḥarrān, most of the available information pertains to qāḍīs of the early
ʿAbbāsid period. Half of the 14 cases that explicitly mention the caliph under
whom a judge served can be matched to the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–
809), who not only made al-Raqqa his capital but whose reign also saw admin-
istrative reforms that contributed to the gradual formalization of the office of
(chief) qāḍī,⁵⁷ and to the caliphate of al-Maʾmūn (r. 813–833). Only two judges
are listed for the Umayyad period; one reportedly served under ʿUmar II (r.
717–720).⁵⁸
The composition of the juridical elite of al-Raqqa differs from that of its
Ḥarrānī counterpart in some respects. While the judges of al-Raqqa also all ap-
 Tsafrir 2004, 84.
 These four either carry the nisba al-Qāḍī and are in some way connected with al-Raqqa with-
out being mentioned explicitly as judges of the city, or the evidence concerning them is ambig-
uous (e.g., they are described as al-qāḍī bi-l-Raqqa but there are no other details available on
the individuals in question and their potential qāḍīship in al-Raqqa).
 These are Dāwūd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd, Muḥammad b. Bulbul, Aḥmad b. Mūsā al-Anṣārī
(fl. 922–923), and Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad.
 Bligh-Abramski 1992, 41, 56–59.
 Maymūn b. Mihrān (d. 735–36) and Sābiq b. ʿAbdallāh. The latter was qāḍī of al-Raqqa at an
unspecified date, but as he met ʿUmar II in person and took part in campaigns during the reign
of Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-Malik (r. 715–717), his time in office can be dated to the mid- to late-
Umayyad period. See Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 9:4063–4076; al-Qushayrī 1998, 144– 146.
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pear to stem from or be connected to Arab tribes, with seven mawālī among the
group, only four can securely be identified as Raqqīs. Five individuals hail from
al-ʿIrāq, one from Mecca, and one from Ḥarrān.⁵⁹ Three out of the four qāḍīs with
a Raqqī origin belong to the same family: ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan b. Ḥarb (d. 837) and his
two sons al-Ḥasan (d. 914) and Muḥammad (d. 926–927), members of a promi-
nent and long-established Ḥanafī family whose ancestor al-Ḥasan b. Ḥarb had
been sent by his Christian father to study with the famous Muḥammad al-
Shaybānī (d. 805, also qāḍī of al-Raqqa).⁶⁰ For reasons due at least in part to im-
perial politics, al-Raqqa’s juridical elite cannot be considered a largely closed
system of local notables like that of Ḥarrān. This is confirmed by a closer look
at the scholarly networks of Raqqan judges as well as their professional and ed-
ucational mobility.
As in the case of Ḥarrān, most of the judges of al-Raqqa were known as
ḥadīth transmitters and scholars of fiqh. However, a number of them had
mixed or bad reputations.⁶¹ Transmission within families was widespread,⁶²
which is again not surprising as education was largely a family affair. However,
unlike the Ḥarrānī qāḍīs, only three of the 16 individuals about whom we are rel-
atively well informed are mentioned as part of a Jazīran network of transmitters,
and even they are also said to have studied with authorities beyond the Jazīra.⁶³
Several qāḍīs of al-Raqqa also studied with eminent personalities such as al-
Zuhrī, Sufyān al-Thawrī, or Abū Ḥanīfa.⁶⁴ Of course, as already mentioned al-
most a third of the known judges were from non-Raqqī and even non-Jazīran
 No information is available on the origin of the remaining qāḍīs.
 On this family and the confusion over ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan’s name, see al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī
1997, 3:285–286; Ibn ʿAsākir 1995–2000, 8:354; Tsafrir 2004, 83 (and the references assembled
there). ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ṣakhr and his son ʿAbd al-Salām (d. 861 or 863) are another example
of the qāḍī office being passed down in the same family.
 See e.g. ʿAbdallāh b. al-Muḥarrar or al-Muḥarrir (d. 767/77; al-Qushayrī 1998, 134; Ibn ʿAdī
1997, 5:213–220); ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Isḥāq (d. 846/47;Wakīʿ 1947, 3:283); or Zakariyyāʾ b. Manẓūr
(Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 8:3816–3826).
 See e.g. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ṣakhr (al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1997, 11:52–54; Ibn Abī Ḥātim
1952– 1953, 5:246); Aḥmad b. al-ʿĀlāʾ (d. 887/88 or 889/90; Ibn ʿAsākir 1995–2000, 5:120–
126); or Zakariyyāʾ b. Manẓūr (Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 8:3816–3826).
 For the Umayyad period, see the information on Sābiq b. ʿAbdallāh al-Raqqī in al-Qushayrī
1998, 144– 146, and the reports in Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 9:4063–4076. For the ʿAbbāsid period, see
Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan (d. 926/27; al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1997, 3:285–286) and Zakariyyāʾ
b. Manẓūr (Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 8:3816–3826).
 For instance, the qāḍīs Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (d. 805; Ibn Saʿd 1990, 7:242; al-Ṣaymarī
1985, 1:125– 133), ʿAbdallāh b. Bishr (Ibn Abī Ḥātim 1952– 1953, 5:14; al-Dhahabī 1963, 2:397–
398), Sābiq b. ʿAbdallāh al-Raqqī (al-Qushayrī 1998, 144– 146; Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 9:4063–
4076), and Ismāʿīl b. Ḥammād b. Abī Ḥanīfa (d. 827).
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families. On that basis alone it is already a certainty that their profiles were more
diverse than those of the Ḥarrānīs. There is some evidence for Raqqan judges
transmitting ḥadīth from each other,⁶⁵ but little in the way of overlap between
them regarding local ḥadīth authorities from al-Raqqa or the Jazīra.
In total, 13 out of the 16 better-known qāḍīs are examples of the mobility of
some early Islamic elites. Not only did most of them study with non-Jazīran au-
thorities, but six qāḍīs of al-Raqqa were also judges elsewhere. Four held one of
the qāḍīships of Baghdād, emphasizing the connection between the two imperial
centers of the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, while two also served in neighbouring al-
Shām. Abū Ḥanīfa’s grandson, Ismāʿīl b. Ḥammād (d. 827), served as qāḍī of
east Baghdād, al-Baṣra, and al-Raqqa.⁶⁶ Hārūn b. ʿAbdallāh al-Zuhrī l-Qurashī
(d. 846/47 in Sāmarrāʾ), from a Meccan family, held the judgeship of no less
than four cities and provinces—al-Maṣṣiṣa, al-Raqqa, east Baghdād, and finally
Egypt—during the reign of al-Maʾmūn, who had appointed him in person. Hār-
ūn’s son ʿAbd al-Raḥmān was qāḍī of Mecca for al-Muʿtaḍid, as was Hārūn’s
grandson Yaḥyā b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān in the caliphate of al-Muqtadir.⁶⁷
The example of Hārūn b. ʿAbdallāh points to another difference between
these qāḍīs and those of Ḥarrān (with the exception of Abū ʿArūba): some of
al-Raqqa’s judges were of eminent stature and influential well beyond the Jazīra.
This applies to both judges known from the Umayyad period, Sābiq b. ʿAbdallāh
al-Raqqī and Maymūn b. Mihrān (d. 735/36). Sābiq, who hailed from Ḥarrān and
whose reputation as an authority of ḥadīth was still alive and well within the
city’s scholarly networks in the mid-9th century,⁶⁸ was a transmitter and poet;
he was acquainted with ʿUmar II and apparently recited his poems in the caliph’s
presence. He led (or accompanied) a military campaign in the time of Sulaymān
b. ʿAbd al-Malik and spent a lot of time in al-Shām,where he was renowned as a
ḥadīth scholar. He was perhaps a mawlā of the Umayyad house, either of ʿUmar
II or of al-Walīd (presumably al-Walīd I).⁶⁹
 Maymūn b. Mihrān (d. 735/36) transmitted from Sābiq b. ʿAbdallāh; as stated above, ʿAlī b.
al-Ḥasan (d. 837) had studied with al-Shaybānī.
 See the editor’s note in al-Mizzī 1980, 3:68, which also lists the available primary sources on
Ismāʿīl.
 Ibn Ḥazm 1983, 135– 136; Ibn Ḥajar 1998, 447–455; al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ 1965–1983, 3:353–356.
 Al-Qushayrī 1998, 145. The father of the Ḥarrānī qāḍī al-Qarduwānī (d. 881) was among those
who transmitted from Sābiq as well as from ʿUthmān (b. ʿAmr) b. Sāj (fl. 757), another judge of
Ḥarrān, again emphasizing the enduring close-knitted nature of Ḥarrānī networks. See ibid.; al-
ʿAynī 2006, 2:287.
 Ibn al-ʿAdīm 1988, 9:4063–4076; al-Qushayrī 1998, 144– 146.
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Maymūn b. Mihrān grew up in al-Kūfa and relocated to the Jazīra in 701, be-
coming one of al-Raqqa’s leading scholars and the most influential jurist of the
Jazīra in his time—his students, who came from all over the empire, carried the
nisba al-Maymūnī. He was an administrator for the Umayyads and allegedly had
a close relationship with ʿUmar II. The two praised each other’s piety and wis-
dom, and Maymūn was put in charge over jurisdiction and tax collection in
the Jazīra by ʿUmar II, who also appointed him as qāḍī of al-Raqqa.⁷⁰ He re-
mained in office during Yazīd II’s reign. Maymūn also administered the treasury
of Ḥarrān for Muḥammad b. Marwān, ʿAbd al-Malik’s brother and governor of
the Jazīra (692–709/10), and he was still one of the notables of Ḥarrān in the ca-
liphate of Hishām; he led (or accompanied) an army to Cyprus in 724/25 (or a
year later), reportedly in the company of Hishām’s son Muʿāwiya.⁷¹ Maymūn’s
son ʿAmr (d. 762) ran the dīwān for ʿUmar II.⁷²
From the ʿAbbāsid period, we have similar examples. The families of ʿAlī b.
al-Ḥasan, whose son al-Ḥasan b. ʿAlī was also deputy qāḍī of al-Baṣra at one
point, and Hārūn b. ʿAbdallāh have already been mentioned. The most promi-
nent judge of al-Raqqa in the early ʿAbbāsid period, however, was Muḥammad
b. al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 805), the great jurist who studied with Abū Ḥanīfa
and Hārūn al-Rashīd’s chief judge Abū Yūsuf. He too grew up in al-Kūfa and set-
tled in Baghdād, where he studied and taught ḥadīth and fiqh.We cannot go into
detail here regarding his illustrious career and prominence in the classical jurid-
ical tradition,⁷³ but it is important for our purposes to note that Hārūn al-Rashīd
called al-Shaybānī to al-Raqqa in 796, the year in which the caliph made the city
his imperial capital.⁷⁴ There Hārūn appointed him as qāḍī,⁷⁵ a position subordi-
nate probably only to the chief judgeship and one that al-Shaybānī retained until
803.While the relationship between the caliph and the qāḍī was not always cor-
dial, al-Shaybānī was an important source of counsel for Hārūn.⁷⁶ When al-
 Until at least the early ʿAbbāsid period, the office of the qāḍī was not formalized. Incum-
bents often served different functions that did not need to be judicial in character, as in the
case of Maymūn. See Bligh-Abramski 1992, 41, 44, and passim.
 Reports of involvement in military activity are restricted to the two qāḍīs from the Umayyad
period, perhaps indicating a change regarding the office or the office holder’s profile.
 The primary sources on Maymūn are conveniently collected and summarized in EI2, “May-
mūn b. Mihrān” (F. Donner). See also Tsafrir 2004, 84.
 See EI2, “al-Shaybānī” (E. Chaumont) in addition to the references at note 25.
 Tsafrir 2004, 82.
 Other reports state that al-Shaybānī was instead appointed by the chief qāḍī Abū Yūsuf, but
it is clear that in any case his appointment was mandated by the highest authority. See Tsafrir
2004, 83.
 Tsafrir 2004, 82.
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Shaybānī died in al-Rayy while accompanying Hārūn on his first journey there,
apparently on the same day as the grammarian al-Kasāʾī who had also made the
journey with them, the caliph is said to have exclaimed in sorrow, “today I laid to
rest both language and law.”⁷⁷
We have seen that the juridical elite of al-Raqqa differed substantially from
its Ḥarrānī equivalent. The sources contain plenty of accounts of imperial in-
volvement with the city’s judges both in the Umayyad and the ʿAbbāsid period.
The close ties between some judges and caliphs are apparent in the frequent
mentions of caliphs and/or chief qāḍīs appointing, dismissing, consulting, and
occasionally interfering with the judges of the city. This difference is undoubted-
ly connected to the status of al-Raqqa as an important imperial center, particu-
larly under the early ʿAbbāsids. The sources generally preserve a good amount of
material for al-Raqqa, but the qāḍīship of the city also seems to have required
incumbents of a certain caliber.
Tsafrir has argued that the ʿAbbāsids had a predilection for the teachings of
Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 767) that influenced their choice of several of his adherents as
judges of al-Raqqa. The appointment of al-Shaybānī either by Hārūn al-Rashīd
or his chief qāḍī Abū Yūsuf (d. 798) has been understood as an imperial project
aimed at spreading Ḥanafism, especially as al-Shaybānī was succeeded by a
number of fellow Ḥanafīs (most of them from Baghdād).⁷⁸ However, Ḥanafism,
like the other madhāhib, was not yet fully formed as a ‘school’ of law; this did
not occur until the 10th century as the result of a complex process.⁷⁹ This
makes it difficult to speak of a concerted imperial effort to spread the legal doc-
trines associated with Ḥanafism in its later, classic form. However, the appoint-
ment of proto-Ḥanafīs to an important judgeship such as al-Raqqa seems to con-
firm Tillier’s view that the caliphs from al-Manṣūr onwards sought to increase
their influence on both the office of the qāḍī and the office holders themselves
as against the established practice of leaving the decision up to local elites.⁸⁰
The attempt to impose proto-Ḥanafīs as qāḍīs on the part of the early ʿAbbāsids
frequently met with resistance,⁸¹ and it is probably no coincidence that al-Raqqa
 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1997, 2:178.
 Tsafrir 2004, 82–83.
 See e.g. Melchert 2004; Hurvitz 2000.
 Tillier 2013, 189– 190, 192, 193–196. This could also have the effect of weakening the provin-
cial and city governors, who had hitherto mainly appointed the judges, as well as the local elites
by undermining their ties with each other and their influence on the office of the qāḍī. See ibid.
193, 201–203.
 Tillier 2013, 198–200.
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only saw the appointment of such individuals to the judgeship following its el-
evation to imperial capital by Hārūn al-Rashīd.
The selection of individuals from outside al-Raqqa or the Jazīra as qāḍīs of
the city also points to a different dynamic in the interaction between city nota-
bles and the caliphal court. Many of the judges will not have been able to fall
back on the same kind of local network of support and loyalty as their colleagues
in Ḥarrān and were thus more dependent on caliphal authority to maintain their
standing in office. Unfortunately, we usually do not know how long the qāḍīs of
al-Raqqa remained in office,⁸² but even those who served longer terms probably
relied on the caliph more than was necessary for Ḥarrān’s qāḍīs. This granted the
early ʿAbbāsids more control over an important elite segment within the empire’s
second center and a stronger position during potential regional conflicts. The
judges of al-Raqqa hence represent a largely transregional elite that had strong
ties to the empire’s other core regions, in particular al-ʿIrāq. The Raqqī qāḍī fam-
ily of ʿAlī b. al-Ḥasan b. Ḥarb is an important exception to this pattern that illus-
trates the overlapping of different categories of elite status in both individuals
and groups.
The Qāḍīs of al-Mawṣil
Al-Mawṣil occupies a special place in the history of the early Islamic Jazīra.⁸³ The
city was an important settlement throughout the period investigated here: it “in-
herited Nineveh’s enviable position astride the Tigris, became an administrative
and military center early on, and, by the end of the 8th century, had established
itself as an entrepôt for riverine trade to the heart of the empire.”⁸⁴ Al-Mawṣil
sometimes served as the capital of Diyār Rabīʿa, the eastern subdivision of the
province, but at times it also operated independently from the Jazīra and consti-
tuted a province of its own. The numismatic record indicates that after 693, al-
Mawṣil was part of a separate administrative sphere also comprising the distinct
provinces al-Jazīra, Armīniya, Arrān, and Adharbayjān. This formation, which
has been termed the “Umayyad North”, continued largely uninterrupted until
the end of the Umayyad period.⁸⁵ The relationship between al-Jazīra and al-
 Al-Shaybānī was in office for seven years, and ʿAbd al-Salām b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (d. 861 or
863) served two terms of undetermined length.
 On the early Islamic history of al-Mawṣil, see Robinson, C. 2000; Forand 1969; EI2, “al-
Mawṣil” (E. Honigmann/C. E. Bosworth).
 Robinson, C. 2000, ix.
 Spellberg 1988; Bates 1989.
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Mawṣil in the ʿAbbāsid period is not entirely clear, especially after the death of
Hārūn al-Rashīd in 809 and the weakening of the imperial order in the city and
elsewhere. The earliest partially extant history of al-Mawṣil, composed by the
city’s qāḍī Abū Zakariyyāʾ Yazīd b. Muḥammad al-Azdī (d. 944/45), is ambiguous
on that point.⁸⁶
Most of the Mosuli tribal elite apparently belonged to Yaman; there was con-
tinuous conflict between the Yamanī groups of Azd and Hamdān over the city’s
leadership, and the situation deteriorated further after Hārūn’s death.⁸⁷ Al-
Mawṣil also had a reputation for its rebellious inhabitants and sympathies
with the ‘Khārijite’ rebels who roamed the towns and countryside of the eastern
Jazīra.⁸⁸ Several governors sent by the caliphs were denied entrance to the city,
and on a number of occasions both Umayyads and ʿAbbāsids had to dispatch
troops to deal—not always successfully—with Mosuli opposition. The massacre
carried out in al-Mawṣil just after the takeover of the ʿAbbāsids, apparently
caused by the pro-Umayyad stance expressed by a segment of the city’s popula-
tion, did not endear the new ruling house to the Mosulis either. However, both
Umayyads and ʿAbbāsids also invested heavily in the city, building palaces, pav-
ing streets, and paying for irrigation; the often fragile nature of al-Mawṣil’s rela-
tionship with the imperial court was at times offset by caliphal policies aimed at
courting the Mosuli elites. It appears, for instance, that al-Manṣūr invested the
office of the qāḍī in al-Mawṣil with certain privileges in an effort to strengthen
ties between city and capital.⁸⁹
Thanks to al-Azdī, we know quite a bit more about the qāḍīs of the city than
about most of their counterparts in Ḥarrān and even al-Raqqa. The extant part of
his Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil covers the period 719/20–838/39 and mentions 14 qāḍīs of
the city; an extended search brought up an additional seven names. Of these 21
judges, only one cannot be securely identified as qāḍī of al-Mawṣil.⁹⁰ 19 of the
remaining 20 judges served in the ʿAbbāsid period; the sole office holder from
the Umayyad period, Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā al-Ghassānī (d. 751 or 753), was apparently
 Al-Azdī 1967, 226. See on this issue in general Forand 1969; Rotter 1974, 167, 189; Blankinship
1994, 50–57.
 Tsafrir 2004, 80.
 In many cases, however, it is not entirely clear what the Khārijism of these ‘rebels’ actually
entailed. It was likely not (primarily) related to questions of faith or doctrine in many of the re-
ported cases. See e.g. Robinson, C. 2016. For the need to reassess the established understanding
of Khārijism, see Hagemann/Verkinderen (forthcoming).
 Robinson, C. 2000, 158.
 Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Juzūʿī (?) is called qāḍī l-Mawṣil bi-Baghdād. See Ibn al-Athīr
1997, 6:542. Perhaps he was appointed as judge of al-Mawṣil but chose to remain in Baghdād,
sending a deputy in his place. I could find no further information on him.
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appointed by ʿUmar II, whose reign is once again the earliest point of reference
for the qāḍīship of a Jazīran city.⁹¹ As in the case of Ḥarrān and especially al-
Raqqa, the evidence is best for the early ʿAbbāsid period; the last two qāḍīs listed
by al-Azdī served under al-Maʾmūn, but he provides almost no information on
the last one. We do not even know how long this last qāḍī was in office. Five
of the seven judges retrieved from the extended search served in the period
after al-Maʾmūn’s death and thus do not appear in the extant fragment of
Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil, but the two who seem to have been in office under the early
ʿAbbāsids are not mentioned by al-Azdī. The last qāḍī of al-Mawṣil considered
here is al-Azdī himself, who died in the mid-10th century.
The composition of the juridical elite of al-Mawṣil displays similarities and
differences with both Ḥarrān and al-Raqqa, combining aspects of both to illus-
trate a third variant of early Islamic elite structure. The qāḍīs of al-Mawṣil
were of Arab tribal backgrounds, with three mawālī among them—a relatively
lower number compared to the other two cities. As seems to have been common,
most of the qāḍīs were ḥadīth transmitters and sometimes also scholars of fiqh.
Echoing the case of Ḥarrān, we can observe the existence of a tight network of
local authorities.⁹² Family transmission was commonplace, and occasionally
judges served as authorities for their future successors. At least two of al-Ma-
wṣil’s qāḍīs belonged to local elite families.⁹³ Descendants of several of the
city’s qāḍīs remained in al-Mawṣil as scholars and transmitters, some of them
serving as authorities for al-Azdī;⁹⁴ the sons of ʿAlī b. Ibrāhīm, who served as
qāḍī of al-Mawṣil during the reign of al-Mutawakkil,⁹⁵ appear in a cluster of sev-
eral Mosuli/Jazīran transmitters, along with al-Qāsim b. Mūsā b. al-Ḥasan b.
Mūsā al-Ashyab, whose grandfather held the judgeship of al-Mawṣil under al-
Maʾmūn.⁹⁶
However, contrary to what the sources preserve regarding the qāḍīs of Ḥar-
rān, the judges of al-Mawṣil were also well connected to the empire at large.
Many of them transmitted from non-Mosuli ḥadīth scholars, and in several
 There is a variant report according to which Yaḥyā was already appointed by Sulaymān b.
ʿAbd al-Malik and only confirmed by ʿUmar II (Ibn Ḥibbān 1993, 2:76), but most other sources
state that the latter appointed Yaḥyā himself. See e.g. al-Nawawī 1977, 2:160; al-Dhahabī
1948–49, 8:380; Ibn Ḥajar 1907– 1909, 11:299–300.
 See e.g. the entries on Maʿmar (or Muʿammar) b. Muḥammad (d. 762; al-Azdī 1967, 173); ʿAlī
b. Mushir (d. 805; al-Azdī 1967, 148); ʿAmr b. Mihrān (al-Azdī 1967, 324).
 Robinson, C. 2000, 88–89, 131.
 E.g., the descendants of Bakkār b. Shurayḥ, qāḍī of al-Mawṣil in the caliphates of al-Manṣūr
and al-Mahdī. See Robinson, C. 2000, 131.
 Al-Shābushtī 1951, 1:44.
 Al-Mizzī 1980, 15:236; al-Dhahabī 1948–49, 23:127.
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cases educational and professional mobility can be observed. Our sources explic-
itly state that six judges came from outside al-Mawṣil: four were from al-ʿIrāq,
one hailed from Damascus, and one was of Khurāsānī origins.⁹⁷ While we can
probably assume that most of the remaining qāḍīs were from al-Mawṣil, we
are told this directly only in four cases. Qāḍīs of al-Mawṣil travelled to study
with eminent authorities, mostly in al-ʿIrāq, or they relocated to the city to
take up office. Two were also qāḍīs elsewhere, neither of them from the native
Mosuli elite: ʿAlī b. Mushir al-Qurashī l-Kūfī (d. 805) was also judge of Armīniya
after serving in al-Mawṣil, and he returned to his hometown al-Kūfa after his
term in Armīniya; al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Ashyab (d. 824) had Khurāsānī roots
and served as qāḍī of Ḥimṣ before being appointed over al-Mawṣil by Hārūn
or al-Maʾmūn. Afterwards, he was appointed qāḍī of Ṭabaristān, but apparently
died on his way there in al-Rayy.⁹⁸
In addition to ʿAlī b. Mushir and al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā, a number of al-Mawṣil’s
other judges were well-known personalities both within and outside the city’s
boundaries, a feature they share with some of their colleagues in al-Raqqa.
For instance, Yaḥyā b. Yaḥyā al-Ghassānī (d. 751 or 753), whose family came
from Damascus, was renowned as a Qurʾān reciter and transmitter. He travelled
widely to collect ḥadīth, heard directly from ʿUrwa b. al-Zubayr and Makḥūl, and
was considered the foremost scholar of al-Shām.⁹⁹ Al-ʿAbbās b. al-Faḍl (d. 802), a
poet and scholar of the Qurʾān, studied with Nāfiʿ mawlā Ibn ʿUmar as a child
and was among the Mosuli nobles who rode out to meet with the chief qāḍī
Abū Yūsuf (who had accompanied Hārūn al-Rashīd on his punitive expedition
to al-Mawṣil).¹⁰⁰ Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAmmār (d. 856/57) was one of
 Pace Robinson, C. 2000, 160, who suggested the qāḍīship was held exclusively by locals.
Kennedy 1981, 30, speaks of only 11 judges extracted from al-Azdī, and there is some confusion
regarding the name of a qāḍī of apparently non-Mosuli origin, who is identified by Kennedy as
ʿAbdallāh b. Khālid al-Kūfī. However, Ḥabība’s 1967 edition renders his name as ʿAbdallāh b. al-
Khalīl al-Karkhī or al-Karjī, and as far as I can see the nisba is the only indication of possible
non-Mosuli origin. See al-Azdī 1967, 288, 302 (and note 2), 312. It should be noted that al-
Azdī’s Taʾrīkh al-Mawṣil is largely silent on the judges’ non-Mosuli origin, which was determined
on the basis of other sources. Compare e.g. the entries on Ismāʿīl b. Abī Ziyād al-Duʾalī (fl. 796/
97) in al-Azdī 1967, 274–276, 279–283, 288, with al-Mizzī 1980, 3:96–97, and al-Dhahabī
1948–49, 11:19–20.
 On ʿAlī b. Mushir, see Ibn Ḥajar 1907–1909, 7:383–384; al-Dhahabī 1948–49, 12:172– 173. On
al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā, see e.g. Ibn Saʿd 1990, 7:243; al-Azdī 1967, 335, 360–361; al-Mizzī 1980, 6:328–
333.
 See e.g. Ibn Saʿd 1990, 7:323; Ibn Ḥibbān 1993, 2:76; al-Nawawī 1977, 2:160; Ibn Ḥajar 1907–
1909, 11:299–300.
 Al-Azdī 1967, 285; Ibn al-Jazarī 1933– 1937, 1:353–354; Ibn Ḥajar 1907–1909, 5:126– 127.
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the city’s great transmitters and scholars; he was a merchant whose business
trips took him to Baghdād, where he studied with the city’s learned authorities.
According to one report, he went to Sāmarrāʾ to complain about al-Zubayrī, the
otherwise unidentified qāḍī of al-Mawṣil at the time. Because of his erudition,
the people flocked to him, prompting the caliph to inquire about him. When
he was told about al-Zubayrī’s misconduct, the caliph dismissed him in favor
of Muḥammad b. ʿAbdallāh.¹⁰¹
Again thanks to al-Azdī, we also know the (approximate) length of term of
each qāḍī appearing in his work. Nine of the 14 judges he mentions were in office
for more than two years, some for extended periods of time. This no doubt rein-
forced their status as local and regional authorities in law and administration.
The caliphal government seems to have made only limited attempts to impose
its own choice of judge on the city’s population despite, or perhaps because
of, the recalcitrance of the Mosuli notables. Contrary to the situation in al-
Raqqa, there was also only one proto-Ḥanafī qāḍī who could be identified in
al-Mawṣil: the above-mentioned ʿAlī b. Mushir al-Qurashī l-Kūfī (d. 805) who
served as judge of Armīniya after his term in the city.¹⁰² According to Tsafrir,
this indicates that al-Mawṣil’s qāḍīs “were apparently mainly local non-Hanafis
who enjoyed the support of the leading families of Mosul”¹⁰³ rather than proto-
Ḥanafī outsiders dependent on caliphal backing. Tsafrir emphasizes this repeat-
edly and quite forcefully, but it seems prudent to urge caution here: the reason
for the apparent ʿAbbāsid preference for Abū Ḥanīfa’s teachings, and thus the
precise logic inherent in the appointment of proto-Ḥanafī qāḍīs in certain cities
and regions, still requires significant investigation.¹⁰⁴ The apparent lack of proto-
Ḥanafī judges in al-Mawṣil could also be due to the sparse information included
in the sources, which often do not mention affiliation with a particular madhhab.
If the majority of Mosuli judges were indeed from local families, the situation
was likely similar to that in Ḥarrān: a strong juridical elite supported by local
power networks rather than largely dependent on caliphal support. The relatively
long terms in office the judges enjoyed would act as a counterweight to the fre-
quent change in governors typical of the early Islamic Empire, providing some
much-needed stability and continuity.¹⁰⁵ This also further strengthened the
qāḍī’s local power vis-à-vis imperial authority, especially the continuous at-
 Ibn Manẓūr 1984, 22:283–284.
 Tsafrir 2004, 77.
 Tsafrir 2004, 79.
 Tillier 2013, 195.
 Robinson, C. 2000, 158, 161.
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tempts on the part of caliphs and governors to exert influence over the judge-
ship.¹⁰⁶ At the same time, the judges of al-Mawṣil had strong connections within
and outside the Jazīra, representing a hybrid form of elite status that combined
local, regional, and transregional networks of power and influence.
Conclusion
This paper represents a first step towards disentangling and illuminating the ad-
ministrative and political history of the early Islamic Jazīra. The qāḍīs, officials
whose importance to the smooth administration of early Muslim cities some-
times surpassed that of the governors, constitute a fitting case study for a proso-
pographical study. The preceding analysis shows that the judges of the three cit-
ies shared some characteristics, such as Arab background (or clientage) and the
predominance of ḥadīth transmitters. Robinson has argued with regard to al-
Mawṣil that this predominance indicated “the office [having] something of a
role to play in the nascent ḥadīth industry of the second-century town”,¹⁰⁷ but
this was a geographically and temporally much more widespread phenomenon
related to the qāḍīship, in the Jazīra and beyond.¹⁰⁸
However, we could also observe differing patterns in the three cities regard-
ing the composition of their juridical elites: while Ḥarrān’s judges represent a
local elite, the qāḍīs of al-Raqqa were primarily transregional; the judges of al-
Mawṣil, on the other hand, counted among their number representatives of
local, regional, and transregional elite status. For the most part, this variance
is probably due to political and administrative factors, emphasizing that the
study of a province, let alone an empire, needs to take into account regional
and local differences if it seeks to do justice to the complex dynamics and hier-
archies of governance in the early Islamic period.
This paper focused on prosopography rather than the responsibilities of the
judgeship as an office, but the collected material nevertheless provides some in-
sight into the latter. The appointment of the qāḍī seems to have been the prerog-
ative of the caliph in the ʿAbbāsid period. Judging from the few pieces of evi-
dence we have, in the Jazīra this apparently occurred already in the Umayyad
period when elsewhere “a large majority of qāḍīs was [still] appointed by provin-
 For the limits imposed on the qāḍīs’ judicial authority during the Umayyad period, see Judd
2015. For the ʿAbbāsid period, see Tillier 2014. Regarding competing claims to judicial authority
among governors and caliphs, see Tillier 2014 and 2015.
 Robinson, C. 2000, 161.
 For the Umayyad period, see Judd 2015, 52, on qāḍīs from Egypt and al-ʿIrāq.
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cial or city governors.”¹⁰⁹ Tillier has stated that rare cases of direct caliphal ap-
pointment of judges in the Umayyad period are known exclusively from Egypt,¹¹⁰
but the evidence from Umayyad al-Mawṣil and al-Raqqa, as limited as it may be,
qualifies this statement.
Caliphal or imperial authorities also intervened in the judges’ affairs if the
situation required it: a qāḍī of al-Mawṣil was dismissed after participating in a
rebellion;¹¹¹ Hārūn al-Rashīd had to intervene drastically in a conflict over
money when the responsible judge of al-Raqqa was unable to enforce his rul-
ing;¹¹² and the chief qāḍī Yaḥyā b. Aktham once dismissed another judge of
al-Raqqa, claiming he was clueless about fiqh, although the Raqqans were
happy with him.¹¹³
However, the material also suggests that the qāḍīs of the early Islamic Jazīra
were often relatively independent actors whose responsibilities reflected a broad
understanding of the dispensing of justice. Two of the judges of al-Mawṣil and
one qāḍī of al-Raqqa were also in charge of taxation, for instance. Much to
the displeasure of Church officials, Muslim qāḍīs also interacted with non-Mus-
lim segments of the population—for instance, al-Ḥasan b. Mūsā al-Ashyab de-
clined the petition of Mosuli Christians to rebuild a church that had been de-
stroyed, arguing that it had been built after the conquest and thus constituted
a violation of the peace agreement.¹¹⁴ Whether or not we accept the historicity
of the incident or line of argument,¹¹⁵ the episode illustrates that the qāḍī’s au-
thority was widely recognized, especially considering the usually short terms in
office of provincial and city governors.While there is much less evidence for the
city of Ḥarrān, the regional character of its judges is a particularly good example
of the fact that in the early Islamic period, state control was frequently imposed
by local elites. All three cities thus exemplify the ‘politics of notables’,¹¹⁶ which
was based on local elites serving as intermediaries between the imperial admin-
istration and the provincial populations.
 Tillier 2014, 121.
 Tillier 2014, 121.
 Robinson, C. 2000, 161– 162.
 Al-Nahrawānī 2005, 222.
 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1997, 11:52–54.
 Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī 1997, 7:438–441. On the issue of Christian recourse to non-ecclesias-
tical judicial authority in the early Islamic period and the reaction of Church leaders, see e.g.
Simonsohn 2009 and 2011; Weitz 2018.
 The same episode, but naming the caliph al-Mahdī instead of al-Ḥasan and taking place
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Philip Wood
Christian Elite Networks in the Jazīra,
c.730–850
Abstract: A major survival from the Roman Near East that endured within the
caliphate was the episcopal and monastic networks making up the different
Christian denominations. This article draws on the Chronicle of Michael the Sy-
rian to illustrate how the caliphate became an increasingly hostile environment
for Christian landed lay elites, incentivizing powerful families to take roles in the
state’s administration or within the church. Using examples from the Jacobite
church, I argue that the state became increasingly involved in church gover-
nance, by publicly endorsing the patriarch and his ability to raise revenues
from Christians, and by supporting him with state troops against rival clerics.
Keywords: Caliphate; Jacobite; patriarchate; Jazīra; Edessa; taxation; elites
Introduction
Chris Wickham defines aristocrats in the period 300–800 by their ability to re-
member their ancestry; their control of land and official position; their expensive
lifestyles; their mutual recognition; and their ability to control Königsnähe (prox-
imity to royal influence).¹ The relative importance of these characteristics ebbed
and flowed with the importance of the state: for example, official position and
court influence were particularly important for Roman aristocracies but dwin-
dled in value in the weaker states of the post-Roman West.² The manner through
which later aristocrats demonstrated their elite status also differed markedly: the
cultural capital of the elite of the early medieval West became much less literary
and more military.³
The caliphate differed from other post-Roman polities in its maintenance of
a Muslim monopoly over military service. Crucial means of signalling Christians’
subordinate status included their obligation to pay the jizya and a ban on their
This paper is an initial exploration of ideas that I intend to develop into a monograph. I am very
grateful to Stefan Heidemann and Hannah Hagemann for the invitation to the conference in
Hamburg in 2016 for which I wrote an initial version of this paper.
 Wickham 2005, 154.
 Wickham 2005, 156– 162, 176.
 Halsall 2007, 495–497.
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riding horses or bearing arms.⁴ Christian elites were therefore denied military ex-
perience and this restricted their potential to challenge the state. They were also
deprived of the forms of masculine display typical of many of their ancestors.⁵
For some this deprivation may have been an incentive to convert to Islam.⁶
However, one important similarity between the caliphate and other post-
Roman states was the retention of episcopal and monastic networks. We should
see the episcopal network in particular as a survival of the Roman administra-
tion, or (in the case of the Sasanian world) as an imitation of it. Church institu-
tions had developed in the context of an intrusive bureaucratic government,⁷ and
its members both served as agents of the state and were empowered to resist its
demands.
I focus in this paper on the Jazīra, defined here as the lands between Amida,
Aleppo and Mosul, with occasional glances south-west to Syria and south-east to
Takrit and Baghdad. This geographical perspective is drawn from the Syriac
chronicles of Michael the Syrian and Bar Hebraeus, whose works preserve quo-
tations from earlier chronicles. Where we can isolate his testimony within these
later works, the history of Dionysius of Tel-Mahre (Jacobite patriarch of Antioch,
d. 846) is particularly important.⁸ Though we must always be careful not to take
his words at face value, his interest in elite lineage (including his own), in rela-
tions with Muslim authorities and in the repetition of patterns in church politics
makes the medieval compilations that used his history a significant source for
any investigation of political networks in this period.
 Wood 2015, 39–40. Arab Christians did, however, participate in the early conquests: Donner
2010, 192. Noth 2004, 13, argues that restrictions on Christians bearing arms were not a signifi-
cant handicap since most Christians were city-dwellers. I strongly disagree: this reads back the
effects of this kind of restriction as a ‘natural’ characteristic of Christians in the region. For the
military values of Sasanian Christians in the 7th century, see Walker 2006. For the post-conquest
period, see Cobb 2001, 114– 116 (on Mount Lebanon); Thomas of Marga, Book of Governors,V. xiii
(294/523 ff.) (on the warlike village of Zarn in northern Iraq); Chronicle of Zuqnin, 196/171 ff. (on
the raising of Christian war-bands in the Jazīra during the ʿAbbāsid revolution).
 Wood 2015, 43–47.
 An important category of early converts were prisoners of war, who thus retained a position
where they could put their military skills to use. The classic example are the asāwira, the elite
cavalry of the Sasanian army, who became members of the Banū Tamīm: Morony 1983, 271–272;
Zakeri 1995, 190.
 Chamberlain 1994.
 The reconstruction of Dionysius’ Chronicle is part of an on-going project by Peter Van Nuffelen
and Maria Conterno at Ghent, and I have benefited greatly from the preliminary results of their
project.
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Christian Confessions and Episcopal Structures
Three major Christian confessions were active in the Near East at the time of the
Arab conquests.
The Chalcedonians (the so-called Melkites) were approved by the Roman
Empire and in communion with Catholic Christians in Western Europe. They
originally used Greek as a liturgical language, but were the first confession to
switch to an Arabic liturgy.⁹
The Miaphysites were concentrated in rural Syria, Mesopotamia and Egypt.
They differed from the Chalcedonians on important points of doctrine, but never
uniformly condemned the authority of the Roman emperor. In the 6th century at
least they should be seen as an orthodoxy in waiting, gradually distancing them-
selves from the memory of Roman authority and Roman imperial support.¹⁰ By
the 7th century they employed Syriac in their liturgy and religious writing,¹¹ but
this is more a consequence of Miaphysite displacement into rural areas where
Greek was not spoken than deliberate policy on the part of church leaders.¹²
This 6th-century displacement also meant it was the Miaphysites rather than
the Chalcedonians¹³ who were active as missionaries on the frontiers of the
Roman world; most notably in the Arabian Peninsula,¹⁴ Iraq¹⁵ and the Jazīra.¹⁶
Within this group, I differentiate between two factions, the Jacobites and Julian-
ists, who were still present under the caliphate. Of these the Jacobites were by far
the larger and more powerful.
Finally, the Church of the East, sometimes problematically referred to as the
Nestorian church,¹⁷ was the chief Christian organization within the Sasanian Em-
pire. They too employed Syriac, which served as a Christian high-dialect for
speakers of various forms of Aramaic across the Fertile Crescent.¹⁸ Though the
Church of the East shared many traditions with the Miaphysites, they were stark-
ly different in their theology, a difference that became ever more exaggerated
from the start of the 7th century.¹⁹
 Griffith 2008, 138; Griffith 1998.
 Wood 2010, 256.
 van Rompay 2008; Hage 1996, 57–58.
 Wood 2010, 173–175.
 Ivanov 2015.
 Wood forthcoming.
 Fiey 1970a, 127.
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Both the Roman and Sasanian empires were interventionist bureaucratic
states. This shaped the experience and expectations of the Christian episcopate.
Church institutions came to mirror the bureaucracy of the secular state, most ex-
plicitly in the Roman Empire, where the episcopate was an extension of the im-
perial bureaucracy (if a sometimes independent-minded one).²⁰ The empire ac-
corded bishops roles as arbitrators and gave church councils the force of
imperial law.²¹ Bishops also played a role in wider networks of secular elites,
both military figures and bureaucrats. Letter collections show them interceding
for friends and clients to obtain patronage²² and petitioning for tax remissions
for individuals, cities and monasteries.²³ While bishops never had a state-sanc-
tioned role as judges in the Sasanian world, they aspired to this role (if only for
Christian communities)²⁴ and occupied it in practice after the collapse of Sasa-
nian authority in the 640s.²⁵
Christian Lay Elites and the Caliphate
In some parts of the early caliphate, the Jazīra in particular, the Arab conquests
generated an ‘Indian summer’ because the new regime was much less intrusive
than the Sasanian and Roman states that preceded it.²⁶ The weakness of the Su-
fyānid state in this region meant increased leeway for regional magnates, such
as the shahregan of Marga, to accumulate massive wealth. Some of these figures
were Christians and spent fortunes on founding a swathe of new monasteries in
northern Iraq between 580 and 720.²⁷ The same period saw a similar burst in the
construction of Jacobite churches and monasteries in the Ṭūr ʿAbdīn, though
probably on a rather smaller scale.²⁸
 Jones 1964, chp. 22; Liebeschuetz 2001, 139– 140 and 145– 155.
 Humfress 2005.
 Schor 2011; Brown 1992, 106–109.
 Rapp 2005, 261 (on Cyrene); Brown 1992, 144 (on Sohag), 151 (on peasants near Antioch).
 Payne 2015, chp. 3; Wood 2013, chp. 4.
 Payne 2014.
 Robinson 2000, 50–62.
 Wood 2017. These monastic foundations are the subject of an archaeological survey by Karel
Novaček et al. at Prague University.
 Palmer 1990, 186– 187, notes the prosperity of the monasteries in contrast to the villages and
suggests that this may stem from tax exemptions as well as elite protection. For the distribution
of these churches and monasteries, and dating using architectural features, see Keser-Kayaalp
2013; Keser-Kayaalp 2016.
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The hagiographic collection of Thomas of Marga, written in the 840s, repre-
sents the Umayyad period as a time of contest between these Christian lay elites
and the monasteries that they founded. Some of the monastic hagiography set in
this period can be read as statements on the ideal autonomy of monasteries and
the secondary status of the men who founded them. Such statements were nec-
essary because founding aristocrats were not always ready to relinquish control.
The tightening of the state under the ʿAbbāsids is represented as a catastro-
phe for the shahregan as a class.²⁹ However, Christians with different kinds of
skills and cultural capital benefited greatly from the expansion of the state.
Even as the rural peasantry suffered from the application of the poll tax,³⁰ the
Christian administrative class was employed in implementing the new taxation
systems, drawing on skills developed during the Roman and Sasanian period.
Sarjūn b. Manṣūr (fl. 690s), father of John of Damascus, and Athanasius bar Gu-
maye (fl. 690s), an ancestor of the Jacobite patriarch Dionysius of Tel-Mahre (r.
818–845), are good early examples of Christians in charge of tax collection on
behalf of the caliph. Service for the state brought great rewards for both men,
channelled into investment in his home-town (in the case of Athanasius) and po-
litical influence deployed in regional competition between Christian confessions
(in the case of Sergius).³¹
The drift of the administration towards the use of Arabic, even if it was in-
tended to disempower non-Arab administrators, probably had the effect of accel-
erating a change in Christian language use away from Greek (and to a lesser ex-
tent Syriac) and towards Arabic.³² Arabic became the language of young men
aspiring to a role in government, and educational establishments followed
suit. Vollandt argues that this switch began first in Melkite Palestine, where
the Sabaite monasteries were early adopters of Arabic education in the 8th cen-
tury.³³ ‘Nestorian’ centres near Baghdad followed suit from the 9th century. Jaco-
bites, who were located further from longstanding centres of caliphal power,
were the last to adopt the new language. However, we can further divide the Ja-
 E.g. Thomas of Marga, Book of Governors, III. iii (150/307 ff.) for the fall-out from the impo-
sition of ʿAbbāsid government. See Robinson 2000, 82–83. Cf. Robinson 2016.
 Chronicle of Zuqnin, 154/147, for the census of ʿAbd al-Malik. Later sections of the Chronicle
provides rich evidence for the imposition of taxes and a census in the Abbasid period.
 Debié 2016. The Manṣūr family are accused of denouncing Athanasius to the caliph and of
facilitating the promotion of Chalcedonians in Syria by getting the local governor to ban an ad-
dition to the Trisagion prayer used by Miaphysites and Maronites. Chronicle of Michael the Sy-
rian (MS) XI. 20 (IV 248/II 492).
 For the a wider discussion of the relative fates of Greek, Aramaic, Arabic and Coptic: Hoy-
land 2003; Papaconstantinou 2012; Wasserstein 2003.
 Leeming 2003; Griffith 1989; Griffith 1998.
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cobites between the eastern Jacobites,with their centre at Takrit, and the western
Jacobites, with significant centres in the Ṭūr ʿAbdīn and in Edessa and Amida.
Proximity to large sites of Arab settlement in Iraq meant that the eastern Jaco-
bites adopted Arabic much faster, and eastern Jacobites were producing philos-
ophy in Arabic by the early 9th century. ³⁴
Thus there were regional exceptions to the general trend towards the Chris-
tian use of Arabic by Christians and the importance of Christian ‘middle-class’
professions. In Marga, even in the ʿAbbāsid period, the shahregan continued
to expect to dominate episcopal elections³⁵ and to fund monasteries out of per-
sonal wealth and have them named after them.³⁶ And even at the end of the Book
of Governors, one gets the impression that Arabs were present in this region only
in small numbers and that knowledge of Arabic by Christians was exceptional.
Likewise, the region of Edessa that is described by Dionysius of Tel-Mahre
does not seem to have produced the dominant class of secretaries or physicians
in the 9th century that occur in Mārī b. Sulaymān’s description of Baghdad.³⁷ One
Jacobite patriarch, George of Beltan (d. 790), a native of Emesa, suffered for his
inability to communicate in Arabic at court, and his faux-pas of swearing in
Greek before the caliph is said to have led to his imprisonment.³⁸
Monopoly of Access and the Clerical Hierarchy
Christian episcopal structures in the Roman world operated in hierarchies based
on provincial organization. Patriarchs, metropolitans, archbishops and bishops
occupied successive ranks within this hierarchy, which was signalled publically
by the laying on of hands at a candidate’s consecration to a new rank and by the
reading out of the names of bishops during the liturgy. But there was always ten-
sion in this ranked system. What right did a patriarch have to intervene in the
 Vollandt 2015, 27–33.
 See Thomas of Marga, Book of Governors, IV.v–vi, for their refusal to accept Ishoyahb of
Marga as metropolitan of Adiabene after he is appointed by Timothy the patriarch.
 Thomas of Marga, Book of Governors, V.ii (for the Hiran ascetic Shubhalisho and his founda-
tion of Beth Habba) and VI.Xii (for the naming of a monastery after Nerab Barzai, who funded a
nearby cistern). Thomas has little sympathy with monks who resent these acts of charity as un-
warranted external interference.
 Cf. Cabrol 2012; Cabrol 2000.
 MS XI. 26 (IV, 476/II, 528). For professional opportunities for Christians in Baghdad, see Put-
man 1975.
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consecration of bishops by his archbishops?³⁹ And what right did citizens of a
town have to refuse the imposition of a bishop?⁴⁰
At the same time, clerical hierarchies also had an ambiguous relationship to
parallel monastic and lay hierarchies. In the Roman Empire, the emperor had
convened the great councils of the church to agree on orthodox doctrine and
the excommunication of dissenters. This legacy left churches within the caliph-
ate uncertain who could legitimately convene a council, especially in conditions
where there were multiple claimants to the patriarchate or no sitting patriarch.
The history of the Jacobite church as an organization that evolved an episco-
pal structure during rural exile also gave monasteries a close relationship to the
patriarchate. Monasteries such as Qenneshre, Qartmin and Gubba Barraya were
traditionally nurseries of the patriarchate and could prove hotbeds of opposition
to patriarchs who did not come from this background.⁴¹
The relatively decentralized and rural composition of the Jacobite church
meant that bishops could find it hard to maintain their prerogatives according
to church canons. 9th-century canonists condemned the practice of laypeople
going to those other than bishops for judgement, whether those chosen were
monks⁴² or powerful laymen (the laymen in question may have been Christian
magnates or local Muslim leaders). ⁴³ Other canons further condemned those
who appealed to laymen to intervene in theological quarrels⁴⁴ or excommunicat-
ed members of the lower clergy who ask Muslim leaders to overturn decisions.⁴⁵
It is worth stressing that the concern of these canons was to insulate Christians
from Muslim jurisdiction while also asserting the rights of the clergy over lay and
monastic rivals. Both the division of society according to religion and the cleric-
 E.g. MS XI.22 (IV, 466/II, 508), where bishop Bacchus of Nineveh and the monks of Mar Mat-
tai were condemned at the council of Reshaina for ordaining bishops without the consent of the
metropolitan of Takrit.
 E.g. MS XII. 5 (IV, 489/III, 19), for the rejection of Cyriacus’ candidate for Cyrrhus (with com-
ments of Oez 2012, II, 48). See Norton 2007, 34, 63–66, for comparisons to the late Roman peri-
od.
 The appendix to MS gives the training and places of ordination for all the Jacobite patriarchs,
which makes the dominance of these monasteries in the 6th–9th centuries very clear. Also note
Chronicle of Zuqnin, 244–245/217–218, for his comments on the arrogance of bishops drawn
from ‘famous monasteries’. See here the comments of Oez 2012, II, 38.
 Synod of Dionysius II, canons 8 and 10 (Vööbus 1976, 60–61/64–65).
 Synod of Ignatios, canon 4 (Vööbus 1976, 53/57).
 Synod of Cyriacus canon 14 (Vööbus 1976, 21/23).
 Synod of Dionysius of Tel-Mahre, canon 4 (Vööbus 1976, 29/32). Parallels occur in the Church
of the East at the synod of Henanisho II in 778 (Chabot 1902, 245–250/515–521).
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alisation of leadership within dhimmī communities should seen as important
features of ʿAbbāsid society.⁴⁶
Such shrill condemnations indicate the church’s reliance on symbolic power.
Bishops could impose bans on communion or acts of penance, but their ability
to enforce such penalties was limited.⁴⁷ There were occasions where bishops
acted on behalf of the caliph and were empowered to act as judges,⁴⁸ but
even then the authority of a given bishop relied on other Christians agreeing
to his decisions. A patriarch who regularly required coercive backup from the
state would not have been seen as an effective manager of his co-religionists.
If we conceive of Muslim and Christian governance structures as independ-
ent hierarchies, then it was in the interests of a patriarch to monopolise interac-
tions between those two hierarchies and to ensure he alone spoke on behalf of
the caliphal government before his co-religionists. Wherever his subordinates
were able to secure the support of a local emir, or worse still the caliph, his abil-
ity to guarantee his judgements or secure patronage was diluted.
A good example of the chaos that might emerge when a patriarch lost his
monopoly of access to Muslim authority is the period around 740–750. This pe-
riod was dominated by Athanasius Sandalaya, the metropolitan of Maypherkat,
and characterized by the use of royal influence by figures other than the patri-
arch. For instance, one Cyriacus of Segestan, together with a doctor named
Bar Salta of Reshaina, composed an apocalypse foretelling the rule of the de-
scendants of Marwān II.⁴⁹ Marwān rewarded this act of sycophancy by proclaim-
ing Cyriacus bishop of Ṭūr ʿAbdīn, although it contravened the rules against the
transfer of episcopal sees and the rights of the higher bishops to fill the see.⁵⁰ It
was not possible to excommunicate Cyriacus until ‘the tyrant who protected him
had died’.⁵¹ The historian can only present his condemnation of Marwān and Cy-
riacus in such stark terms because of the collapse of the Umayyad dynasty with
the ʿAbbāsid revolution: in other circumstances commentators may have been
more circumspect.
 See Papaconstantinou 2008.
 Simonsohn 2010; Simonsohn 2011, 154– 155.
 Simonsohn 2011. Edelby 1951 remains important and useful. Note, for instance, the scene in
the Life of Theodota of Amida (§ 156) where the saint is made responsible for ‘the laws of the city
of Amida’ after being elected bishop. There is no sense, however, that this is an automatic func-
tion of his office, and in the Life as a whole the norm is for laymen bearing Greek names to hold
office on behalf of the caliph. Payne 2009, 407–408, and Papaconstantinou 2008, 145, observe
the predominance of lay elites in 7th-century Nisibis and Egypt respectively.
 MS XI. 22 (IV, 464/II, 507).
 Hage 1966, 35.
 MS XI. 22 (IV, 466/II, 507).
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The importance of courtly influence is even more apparent in the case of
Sandalaya himself, who enjoyed close links to Marwān’s government. Sanada-
laya accused the patriarch Iwannis of simony (the sale of ecclesiastical office)
to Marwān II, and was accused in turn of paying massive bribes to the caliph.
Sandalaya and six other bishops were subsequently excommunicated at a
synod at Ḥarrān (750) organized by the metropolitan David of Dārā. It is striking
that neither David nor the patriarch felt able to carry the other bishops and ap-
pealed to the caliph to send a neutral bishop to act as an arbitrator.⁵²
Michael’s Chronicle represents Sandalaya as temporarily humiliated at Ḥar-
rān, but he managed to restores his dominance by interceding with the caliph’s
brother ʿAbdallāh at a later synod at Tella (752). ʿAbdallāh also secured Sanda-
laya’s promotion as metropolitan of Maypherkat.⁵³ In canonical terms, this is es-
pecially striking because Maypherkat was not a metropolitanate: the city’s pres-
tige increased alongside Sandalaya’s. It may be that Sandalaya took this route
because Maypherkat was a power base for him personally (for unstated reasons
of family background or influence).⁵⁴ At any rate, Sandalaya’s promotion was fol-
lowed by his endowment of a major church at Maypherkat and a monastery at
Tell-Bashmai.⁵⁵
Exactly how the office generated this revenue is unclear. If we compare bish-
ops to highly ranked qāḍīs, then we might envisage that a role as a judge offered
opportunities for substantial bribes or influence.⁵⁶ One novelty in the ʿAbbāsid
period was that bishops were able to levy a tithe on their parishioners (though
the fair level of these tithes was a matter for debate).⁵⁷ Straightforward simony
may also have been a means of raising money or generating influence.⁵⁸ Sanda-
laya’s career as metropolitan (and briefly as patriarch) was characterized by at-
tempts to impose candidates on unwilling sees⁵⁹ and the division of sees into
 MS XI. 23 (IV, 468/II, 512).
 MS XI. 23 (IV, 469/II, 514).
 Hage 1966, 32.
 MS XI. 23 (IV, 469/II, 514); Chronicle of Zuqnin, 210/192.
 Wickham 2014.
 The first explicit references to church taxes are the accusations made against the patriarch
George by David of Dārā: MS XI. 26 (IV, 476/II, 526).
 Hage 1966, 35.
 MS XI. 15 (IV, 471/II, 520), for his division of the see of the Ṭūr ʿAbdīn between Gabriel of
Qartmin and Cyriacus of Segestan, in defiance of the will of the patriarch Ishaq. Iwannis’ at-
tempt to divide the disocese of Amida may have had a similar motivation (MS 467/509).
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smaller units,⁶⁰ both of which may represent attempts to pay back substantial
initial investments. The construction of the church at Maypherkat could also
be seen as the repayment of a (political) debt incurred in Sandalaya’s quest
for promotion.
Where a patriarch failed to inspire confidence in his bishops or monopolise
access to higher authorities, it opened the door to other bishops like Cyriacus of
Segestan or Athanasius Sandalaya to use their own contacts with Muslim leaders
to assure promotion. In so doing they damaged established conventions for
church governance and undermined the authority of the office of the patriarch.
Established Churches
If the patriarch aspired to monopolise contacts with the caliph and his agents,
we should remember that the caliph benefited from Christian governmental
structures that could be used to raise taxes or to ensure the regime had a mea-
sure of legitimacy for its Christian population (which was probably in the major-
ity in many regions at this time, including the Jazīra). Individual caliphs also
used the higher clergy for their distinctive skills: for their diplomatic connections
to Christian states such as Byzantium⁶¹ and Nubia;⁶² to intervene in the gover-
nance of Christian populations in other provinces;⁶³ and for their mastery of ar-
cane knowledge (such as alchemy).⁶⁴ In addition, the presence of the patriarch at
court also served to legitimize the caliph as a just ruler before his Muslim sub-
 MS XI. 15 (IV, 471/II, 520), for his consecration of new bishops for Sinjār and Samosata as
well as the Ṭūr ʿAbdīn. Cyriacus of Segestan’s consecration in the Ṭūr ʿAbdīn was obviously con-
troversial, given his earlier career.
 MS XII. 5 (IV, 487/III, 18). The patriarch Cyriacus of Takrit is accused of being a Roman col-
laborator because he had funded church-building across the border. These contacts would have
been diplomatically advantageous to the caliph in some circumstances. Also note MS XII. 9 (IV,
500/III, 36) for the rebel Naṣr b. Shabath using a Christian secretary to write to the Byzantines.
 MS XII. 19 (IV, 530/III, 190– 191), for the Nubian embassy to al-Raqqa that met Dionysius. For
Sasanian precedents for the use of Christian bishops as diplomats, see Sako 1986.
 MS XII. 13 (IV, 516/III, 63), for Dionysius’ visit to Egypt. Caliphs also employed ‘Nestorian’
Christians to destroy the churches of other confessions in Egypt and Palestine: Meinardus 1967.
 MS XI. 25 (IV, 473/II, 523), for the election of Ishaq of Ḥarrān because of his presumed knowl-
edge of alchemy on the recommendation of Akhi, emir of the Jazīra. For the wider appeal of
Christian specialists in medicine, philosophy and the translation of the Greek classics: Gutas
1998; Tannous 2010.
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jects, a sign of his toleration of the ahl al-kitāb, in accordance with Qurʾānic prin-
ciples, and the universal reach of his empire.⁶⁵
Caliphal attitudes towards the Jacobite patriarchs never took an interven-
tionist stance regarding points of theology, perhaps because Jacobite theology
never had the political salience of Chalcedonianism as the state religion of the
Byzantine Empire.⁶⁶ But the period covered here does see the disappearance
of confessional groups and the dominance of three Christian confessions (the
Church of the East, Chalcedonianism, and Jacobitism) as the orthodox Christian-
ities of the Islamicate world, to the exclusion of others. For instance, when the
patriarch of the Church of the East, Timothy I (r. 780–823), issued a general
statement on the unity of the faith, he stressed the common beliefs of the Church
of the East, the Melkites and the Jacobites in the resurrection and in the saving
power of Christ. He passed over in silence other groups that might have called
themselves Christian, such as the Marcionites⁶⁷ or the Julianists.
Relations between the Julianists and the Jacobites are a good example of the
trend towards the consolidation of Christians into three main confessions. Julian
of Halicarnassus was a Miaphysite theologian who had disagreed with Severus,
the Miaphysite patriarch of Antioch, in the 520s.⁶⁸ His followers persisted as a
distinct group and launched missions from Syria and Egypt into Armenia,
South Arabia and Iraq. In other words, they subscribed to an alternative version
of the Miaphysite theology from the Jacobites and formed an independent church
(though we do not know much of its internal details).
Major efforts towards the reconciliation of the Julianists were made by the
patriarch Cyriacus of Takrit at a synod in 798. Gabriel, the Julianist leader, “rec-
ognised the stupidity of the doctrine of Julian and agreed to follow the things
that we confess”. Michael the Syrian reports that Gabriel agreed to include Seve-
rus in the diptychs and even accept his anti-Julianist writings, though he would
not anathematize Julian himself. Cyriacus and Gabriel then agreed that the
names of both men would be proclaimed in the churches and that whoever out-
 Compare the cosmopolitan self-fashioning of Sasanian shāhs: Payne 2016.
 For Marwān’s intervention in favour of Theophylact bar Qanbara, and his actions against
supporters of the Trisagion prayer (probably Maronites in this context), see MS XI. 22 (IV, 467/
III, 511). Also note Signes-Codoñer 2014, 396–397, for the extent of communication between By-
zantium and the Melkite patriarchates of the east.
 For the earlier history of the Marcionites in the time of Ephrem, see Bundy 1988. For the pres-
ence of Marcionites in the east, see Fiey 1970b.
 Menze 2008, 152.
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lived the other would reign as sole patriarch. Following this agreement, Cyriacus
and Gabriel received communion from one another.⁶⁹
This meeting seems to have been a magnanimous arrangement by Cyriacus
to resolve a longstanding separation. However, he faced problems from his own
intransigent bishops, who demanded that Gabriel anathematize Julian. Gabriel
responded that while he was willing to anathematize Julian, he did not feel
that his followers would be prepared to accept this. The Jacobite bishops pressed
the point, which ultimately prompted Gabriel to break off negotiations.⁷⁰
One reason for the opposition to reconciliation with Gabriel was likely Cyria-
cus’ own position as an outsider (he was the first ‘easterner’ to reign as a Jaco-
bite patriarch) and a sense by Jacobite bishops that Gabriel’s succession would
further remove power from the monasteries that had traditionally produced the
patriarch.⁷¹ But even though the reconciliation with the Julianists failed, the fact
that Gabriel was receptive to Cyriacus’ overtures may also point to broader
changes within the Jacobite church that made union seem attractive at this
point. Takrit had become a wealthy trading centre with links to Egypt and the
Mediterranean, and a native of Takrit may have been able to tap into these net-
works in soliciting donations or receiving tithes.⁷² Tithing itself may have become
more accepted and systematized as well at this stage: Cyriacus is accused of ex-
cessive tithing, suggesting that the process was becoming more regularized.⁷³ We
get an indication of Cyriacus’ more centralized and proactive governance
through his organization of five synods and his investigations into the theology
employed at a parish level.⁷⁴ Cyriacus is also the first patriarch for whom Michael
the Syrian is able to give a full list of all the bishops he consecrated (86 in total),
which suggests that his reign was a threshold for major administrative reforms.⁷⁵
The improved organization and wealth of the Jacobite church may have been
an incentive to other Miaphysites to seek union. The appointment of Cyriacus
himself, an easterner and probably an Arabic speaker, may have sent signals
that a compromise was possible; if not on a theological level, then at least for
 MS XII. 4 (IV, 485/III, 13).
 MS XII. 4 (IV, 486–7/III, 14–15). One long-term result for Cyriacus was periodic suspicion
that he was himself a Julianist: MS XII. 7 (IV, 492/III, 25).
 For the dominance of Mesopotamia in patriarchal elections, see Hage 1966, 11.
 Fiey 1969; Immerzeel 2004. The Takritians had permanent colonies in Mosul, al-Raqqa, Ni-
sibis and Egypt: Fiey 1959, 27 note 2.
 MS XII. 4 (IV, 487/III, 18). The complaints of the Gubbaye monks imply that they had been
stripped of an informal exemption from tithes.
 MS XII. 8 (IV, 496/III, 33).
 MS Appendix III, 450–53.
370 Philip Wood
the incorporation of men outside a narrow clique from what had been Roman
Mesopotamia.
The Use of Diplomas
A major mechanism that caliphs used to promote the authority of their Christian
appointees, and sometimes to make them independent of local emirs, was the
issuing of royal diplomas. These pertained to the right to hold office as patriarch,
the right to build new churches and the tax exemptions of individual cities or
monasteries.
Michael the Syrian’s flagship example of the construction of a new church is
the one that was built at the entrance of the patriarch Elias into Antioch, when
he came to consecrate the first Jacobite church in the city in 732. It was only con-
structed thanks to a diploma from Yazīd II. This was a major coup: Antioch was
the titular see of the Jacobite patriarch but there had not been a Miaphysite in-
cumbent since the patriarch Severus (d. 538).⁷⁶ It was one of the first signs of
public recognition of the Jacobites by the Arab authorities. Other examples of di-
plomas for church building in this period allowed for the restoration of churches
in Edessa, Ḥarrān and Amida and the construction of new churches in Takrit,
Mosul, Edessa and Maypherkat.⁷⁷
The construction of new churches was theoretically forbidden according to
the shurūṭ ʿUmar imposed upon the dhimmī. These rules were only disseminated
under the caliph al-Mutawakkil, but individual parts of this code had been im-
posed locally before this point, depending on local circumstances.⁷⁸ At several
points in Michael’s history, Muslim emirs destroy churches built after the Arab
conquests. This may be a sign that such rules were promoted by some sections
of the Muslim population, perhaps in part because the destruction of churches
could be a source of revenue or building materials.⁷⁹
 MS XI. 19 (IV, 456/II, 491).
 Hage 1966, 59–61. See also Timothy’s intercession with al-Hādī to get churches rebuilt: Fiey
1980, 49, citing Letter 39.
 Levy-Rubin 2011. There is an on-going debate on the origins and application of the shurūṭ in
the 7th and 8th century, for which see Yarbrough 2016 and Levy-Rubin 2016 on ʿUmar II, as well as
Noth 2004 and Cohen 1999 on the Rāshidūn and the Umayyad context for discriminatory legis-
lation more generally.
 Chronicle to 1234, II (10/6) for Ibrāhīm, emir of Ḥarrān, being informed about new church
buildings in Edessa by the pagan population of Ḥarrān; MS IV, 478/III, 3, for Mohtasib’s destruc-
tion of new churches; MS XII. 13 (IV, 513/III, 60–61), for Yaqdan’s destruction of churches in Tak-
rit and Edessa, especially targeting new buildings. See also al-Azdī’s description of how a Mus-
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In an environment where Christian authorities felt threatened by local Mus-
lims wishing to destroy churches and where the destruction of new churches was
seen as legitimate, caliphal intervention constituted a suspension of normal
rules of behaviour. As has been observed in other authoritarian societies, the pri-
macy of the caliph was underscored by his ability to overturn expected law or
custom, in this instance in response to intercession from a patriarch or bishop.⁸⁰
In so doing the caliph confirmed the importance of the patriarch to his flock, and
more importantly his own primacy in both the Muslim and Christian hierarchies.
The use of diplomas to confirm tax exemptions had good precedents in the
Roman world. Gaining diplomas depended on bishops’ diplomatic skills and al-
lowed them to provide wider protection from taxation or political advantage to
the towns and monasteries that funded and supported them. There are examples
of this from our period from Takrit,⁸¹ Edessa⁸² and Mosul,⁸³ as well as from the
monastery of Gubba Barraya near Cyrrhus.⁸⁴
One important difference of these later, Islamic-period diplomas was that
they frequently purported to be 7th century historical documents dating back
to the Arab conquests. This meant that Muslim authorities could not reject
these Christian claims out of hand. The image of the good Muslim ruler included
their ability to protect the dhimmī and to respect the treaties concluded by their
‘pious forebears’ who had conquered the Near East.⁸⁵ And there was sufficient
ignorance of the precise details of early conquest treaties that the claims of
Christian archives in some cities (Edessa in particular) might be taken seriously
during debates over taxation.⁸⁶
Nevertheless, we should also remember that in order for these claims to be
convincing, bishops were forced to use a Muslim script. This meant they had to
themselves relay a story in which the Muslim conquest was legitimate and Chris-
tians (and bishops in particular) collaborated in the conquest of the cities of the
Near East. In other words, producing these ‘ancient treaties’ as proof also meant
accepting the terms and validity of the Muslim futūḥ, according to which resis-
lim mob in Mosul destroyed a church that had taken over a piece of land owned by a mosque
(Fiey 1956, 20–21), and MS XII. 6 (IV, 490/III, 2) for the lucrative destruction of ancient churches
in Jerusalem and Aleppo.
 Brown 1992, 3; Kelly 2004.
 Bar Hebraeus, Ecclesiastical History, III, 123– 126.
 Chronicle to 1234, II (3/1).
 MS XII.14 (IV, 520/III, 69). Note the comments of Robinson 2000, 12.
 MS XII. 12 (IV, 510/III, 57).
 Borrut 2005; Khalek 2011, 48.
 Calder 1993, 121–138.
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tance was futile and Muslim rule natural. In telling a story whereby bishops fa-
cilitated the Muslim conquest, these documents also justified a present in which
bishops acted on behalf of the Muslim state and obscured alternative histories
where local Christian populations supported the Romans or Sasanians.
The use of diplomas to mark the patriarchal office itself is first referred to in
the reign of Iwannis, who is said to have received it by offering a bribe to Marwān
II after his election by his fellow bishops. His controversial successors David of
Dārā, John of Callinicum, Ishaq of Ḥarrān and Athanasius Sandalaya also held
patriarchal diplomas from Marwān II or from al-Manṣūr.⁸⁷ But it is clear that pos-
session of a diploma did not necessarily guarantee a patriarch the obedience of
his flock. For instance, Iwannis was unable to force his metropolitans to accept
the popular election of one Dionysius as bishop of Ṭūr ʿAbdīn and was then
placed in an embarrassing position when his patron Marwān tried to impose
his own candidate Cyriacus of Segestan.⁸⁸ Likewise, Sandalaya may have pre-
sumed that his possession of a diploma qualified him to put forward his own
candidate for bishop, one Abdani, on the independent-minded see of Ḥarrān. In-
stead Sandalaya was strangled by the town’s citizens.⁸⁹
On the other hand, by the end of the 750s possession of a diploma was a
crucial prerequisite for raising tithes. The raising of tithes without a diploma
was the key accusation made by David of Dārā against the patriarch George of
Beltan, which resulted in George’s imprisonment and David’s own appointment
as patriarch.⁹⁰ The implication is that church tithes were raised in the caliph’s
name and represented an extension of the symbolic power of the state to its
agent the patriarch.
The controversial period between 740–760 was filled with a number of
short-lived patriarchs, whom Michael the Syrian often presents as illegitimate.
This was a transitional period. Bishops and Christian notables were not yet ac-
customed to the intervention of the state in elections or the state’s endorsement
of the rights of the patriarch to raise tithes. At the same time, caliphs sought to
impose individual bishops (Cyriacus of Segestan) or patriarchs (the ‘alchemist’
Ishaq of Ḥarrān) upon the Jacobites, with little long-term success. A more lais-
sez-faire attitude was expressed by al-Maʾmūn when he ordered that a diploma
be given to “whoever the Jacobites agree upon”: this may recognize that the pat-
riarch’s effectiveness would be compromised if he interfered unnecessarily with
 Hage 1966, 20, 67.
 MS XI. 14 (IV, 464–5/II, 506–507).
 MS XI. 25 (IV, 473/II, 523).
 MS XI. 25 (IV, 477/II, 528).
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the structures of church governance. The elections of Cyriacus of Takrit and Di-
onysius of Tel-Mahre as patriarch seem to have been much more smooth than
their predecessors as a result.⁹¹
The Emirs, Muslim Citizens and the Bishops
If the caliphs had a vested interest in patriarchal authority, the same cannot al-
ways be said of other Muslim elites, whether government appointees or local ar-
istocracies.⁹²
We first hear of an emir of the Jazīra in the Chronicle of Michael the Syrian
when one named Muhammad crucifies local Christian notables in the 690s. This
was probably part of a state drive to increase revenue by making prominent ex-
amples of elites who resisted tax demands.⁹³ His successors Mūsā b. Muṣʿab and
Mūsā b. Sulaymān ruled the Jazīra and Qennesrin in the 770s and were also as-
sociated with the violent collection of taxes: the Chronicle of Zuqnin reports
Mūsā’s ruthless pursuit of the poll tax after conducting a detailed census and au-
dits even during a time of famine and plague.⁹⁴ Precise knowledge of estate
yields and accumulated wealth was crucial for governors to extract taxes and
for caliphs to monitor how much revenue eventually found its way to Baghdad.
Chase Robinson has suggested that the relentless squeezing of the peasantry
(both Christians and more recently settled Arab Muslims) was a consequence
of the demands of a Baghdad government that took no account of local volatility
in prices and production but needed to pay a large standing army in coin rather
than kind.⁹⁵
Later governors continued to be effective and much-resented seekers after
tax revenue. Dionysius, for example, complains about the agents sent by
Hārūn al-Rashīd to find the fabled wealth of the Rusafaye family (of which he
was a descendant): he protests, probably falsely, that the riches have long
been frittered away.⁹⁶ Dionysius also narrates the zealous acts of governors
such as Yaqdan of Edessa, who forced the citizens to free their slaves in order
to make them Muslims,⁹⁷ or Ali of Damascus, who targeted the sons of rich
 MS XII. 12 (IV, 511/III, 57).
 For these two groups in Mosul, see Kennedy 1981.
 MS XI. 16 (IV, 447/II, 473).
 MS XI. 26 (IV, 476/II, 526).
 Robinson 2016.
 MS XII. 4 (IV, 485/III, 13).
 MS XII. 13 (IV, 514/III, 62).
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men who had recently died and accused them of patricide.⁹⁸ Dionysius places
this ‘injustice’ against a background of an expanding infrastructure of gover-
nance; he describes, as though writing of a novelty, the installation of a judge
(“called a qadi”) at al-Raqqa who oversaw taxes, supported by a prefect and a
courier system.⁹⁹
Here it is worth stressing the difference in perspective between Dionysius
and the Chronicle of Zuqnin. The Chronicle of Zuqnin presents the suffering inflict-
ed by Mūsā b. Muṣʿab as universal: it is a mark of the apocalypse and afflicts
people of all religions and classes.¹⁰⁰ Dionysius is more concerned with the
fates of noble families and their wealth. As a member of the elite families of
the Gumaye and Rusafaye, one of the purposes of his Chronicle is to retell his
own family history (interwoven with the history of the church), both to legitimize
his family’s importance and to evoke sympathy for its misfortunes.
The government appetite for effective tax information may have made elite
families much more vulnerable to those who would inform against them. In
other words, as a consequence of a newly intrusive state local elites had a vested
interest in social solidarity that they might not have a generation before. One ex-
ample of this comes in a scene just after the ʿAbbāsid revolution, when a Persian
denied lodging by the Gumaye at Baghdad accused them of Manichaeism. This
religion was banned by the caliphate, as it was by the Romans, and the accusa-
tion was always a good claim to make against any intellectual or cultural elite.¹⁰¹
That this kind of denunciation was a serious threat indicates the ease with which
information flowed between the capital and the Jazīra. This in turn may point to
the interlinking of provincial social networks in the aftermath of the revolution.
The flow of information to the capital was, however, a negative development
for elites whose status and interests were not at that stage sustained by service to
the state. In other words, while the ʿAbbāsid revolution facilitated the involve-
ment of Muslims of diverse origins in the state by giving them resources and in-
fluence, it also encouraged Christian elite families to re-fashion themselves as a
service elite whose links to court could protect them from the envious.
An increasingly common route for information to reach governors to the det-
riment of the Christian population was via their Muslim and pagan neighbours.
Muslims in Edessa reportedly encouraged looting by invading armies during the
 MS XII. 21 (IV, 539/III, 104).
 MS XII. 21 (IV, 538/III, 105). See further Silverstein 2007, ch. 2.
 Chronicle of Zuqnin, 316/273.
 Cf. Arjomand, 1994; Chokr 1993. For the accusations of human sacrifice made against Man-
icheans at Ḥarrān, see Chronicle of Zuqnin, 224–225/203.
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fourth fitna.¹⁰² Pagans in Ḥarrān (possibly a local majority) allegedly encouraged
the emir Ibrāhīm to destroy churches and synagogues.¹⁰³ And Ḥarrānian Mus-
lims raided Christian properties during Yaqdan’s actions against Christian
slave-owners in Edessa.¹⁰⁴ In these cases local non-Christian populations may
have been sources of information for emirs who were outside appointees, as
well as a physical support to any emir who wanted to penalize the Christian pop-
ulation.
In the event of a local emir treating the Christian population unfairly, it was
often possible for the patriarch to appeal to a higher-ranking governor or to the
caliph. For instance, when Yaqdan demolished Jacobite churches in Edessa and
freed the slaves of the Christians, Dionysius successfully appealed to ʿAbdallāh,
the governor of al-Raqqa and a relative of the caliph, to put a stop to it.¹⁰⁵ Dio-
nysius was able to use his influence at court to prevent further demolition, but he
could not do so by appealing to Yaqdan directly. Sponsorship and employment
by the caliph could mitigate but not eliminate the vulnerability of the Jacobites
of Edessa to a governor who was opposed to them. Indeed this vulnerability ex-
aggerated Dionysius’ dependency on the caliph and the ʿAbbāsid family.
Appeals by the patriarch or bishops to the administration could not work in
situations where the state was essentially taken over by kin-groups. An example
of this occurs with the exactions of one Aḥmad b. Abī Dāwūd, a member of the
Iyād tribe who abused his government position to make free Christians perform
corvée labour and overtaxed estates to force owners to sell to members of his
family.¹⁰⁶ In this case, Aḥmad’s obligations to his relatives may have motivated
him to use governmental structures in their interests, while the presence of large
numbers of the Iyād in his district acted as a disincentive to other state actors to
challenge his power. I suggest that tribal groups who had recently acquired roles
on behalf of the state were especially difficult for Christian leaders to negotiate
with. Incidentally, the inability of Dionysius to protect Christians from the Iyād in
the way he had from Yaqdan also points to a wider vulnerability of the ʿAbbāsid
state, whereby tribal groupings could circumvent the normal systems of reward
and censure.
 MS XII. 6 (IV, 492/III, 22).
 MS XII. 11 (IV, 505/III, 47).
 MS XII. 13 (IV, 514/III, 62).
 MS XII. 13 (IV, 514/III, 62).
 MS XII. 21 (IV, 540–2/III, 107– 111).
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Conclusions
I have suggested that episcopal and monastic networks represent a survival of
Roman-era notions of territoriality that endured under Muslim rule. Over time,
these Christian structures were incorporated into ʿAbbāsid imperial structures.
In the case of the Jacobites, the episcopacy remained vulnerable at a local
level. This intensified their reliance on the caliph.
Several turning points are apparent in the sources. The first is the dramatic
increase in the quantity and complexity of historical material available from the
740s (from the reign of Iwannis onwards). This may be a function of the transfer
of the caliphal capital to Ḥarrān under Marwān II, which provided much easier
access to the caliph. The move opened up new possibilities for advancement that
threatened the monopoly of the great monasteries (though it still tended to fa-
vour candidates from former Roman Mesopotamia over those from Syria or Tak-
rit). The need to legitimise or condemn the new practices of the time may have
themselves spurred a generation of historians.
The period 740–780 also sees the first use of caliphal diplomas. These pro-
vided licences to tithe parishioners, construct churches and call bishops to coun-
cil. We should see this as an instance of the Jacobite church mimicking (and
drawing on) the ability of the state to tax and coerce. It made the office of the
patriarch both more lucrative and effective.
The escalation of the powers of the patriarch occurs against a wider back-
ground of pressure against lay aristocrats, through regular state taxation by
the state, extortion by state servants acting in their own interests, or denuncia-
tions by local opponents. These phenomena seem to have accelerated markedly
after the ʿAbbāsid revolution, and I suggest that this led Christian elites to place
a higher premium on Königsnähe, in order to protect property from a variety of
threats. However, a critical difference that we should note between courtly influ-
ence in the Roman and ʿAbbāsid periods was that Christian clergy were increas-
ingly seen as the main representatives of their communities (even where others
held power behind the throne), and that clerical rank became a key means to
secure influence with Muslim rulers.
Dionysius’ history can be read as an example of how one aristocratic family
adapted to these changing circumstances by seeking a rank in the higher clergy.
He is at pains to stress his noble lineage back to the 6th century and draw on fam-
ily histories written by his ancestors to do so.¹⁰⁷ His inherited cultural capital, as
 E.g. MS XII. 4 (IV, 485/III, 13), for the story of how Hārūn al-Rashīd sent a tax collector to
seize the treasures of the Rusafaye and Gumaye families, both ancestors of Dionysius.
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a man schooled in Arabic and courtly speech¹⁰⁸ as well as in Syriac, made him
(at least in his own representation) such a suitable candidate for the patriarchate
that the other bishops elected him without his having been ordained (he was
only a monk of Qenneshre at the time).¹⁰⁹ Like Ambrose of Milan or Synesius
of Cyrene, his training and connections as an aristocrat were seen to be more
useful to the church than ascending the traditional ladder of promotion, in a
context where the patriarch had become part of al-Maʾmūn’s service elite.
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Establishing Local Elite Authority in Egypt
Through Arbitration and Mediation
Abstract: Using evidence from Arabic, Coptic and Greek papyri, this paper exam-
ines the role and organization of and individuals involved in mediation in the
four centuries following the mid-7th-century Muslim conquest of Egypt. Conflict
resolution, the actors involved therein and whether the process took place in
an institutional framework or in a more informal environment all inform us re-
garding changing power relations in the province. The effect of shifting power
dynamics between members of the local Egyptian elite and the incoming Muslim
rulers as well as the effect this had on social organization, the position of local
elites and their relations with their indigenous constituencies and the authorities
will be discussed. The paper also considers what this says about modifications in
Egyptian elite composition and how these modifications relate to developments
at the caliphal center. Finally, the question of how the role of local elites as ar-
bitrators can be connected to their position vis-à-vis the Egyptian population on
the one hand and the empire’s political center on the other is examined.
Keywords: Mediation; law; Egypt; bishops; Islamicization; Arabicization; excom-
munication
Introduction
In the 10th century, the bishop of al-Ashmūnayn in central Egypt sent an incensed
letter to the members of his community. Some thieves, he writes, entered the
house of the widowed mother of Sawep and took one artaba (irdabb) of corn,
six quarts of flax, two chickens and a cock.¹ The bishop calls upon the thief
or thieves, whether male or female, locals or strangers, to step forward, confess
their deed and return the stolen goods. If they do not, he threatens, “God will be
angry with them as He was with Sodom and Gomorra and He will bring upon
This work was supported by the European Research Council under the European Union’s Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme, grant number 683194.
 Crum 1909, no. 267. Also discussed by Mikhail 2013, 156. There are several of such letters ban-
ning thieves, all dating to the 10th century and written in Coptic and Arabic (e.g. Reinhardt 1897;
Steindorff 1892, 37–41).
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https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110669800-015
them the curses of the Apocalypse and the plagues of the book of Job and the
108th Psalm.” The threats are impressively thunderous.² But the calling down
of divine wrath also draws attention to the lack of other levers at his disposal.³
The instruments he is able to draw upon to deliver justice contrast sharply with
those of his contemporary Muslim counterparts, and for that matter those of his
ecclesial predecessors. Moreover, this relatively minor theft, though hardly im-
material for the victim, is not something a bishop would typically busy himself
with.
At the same time, it is worth asking what motivated Sawep’s mother to turn
to the bishop with a criminal case, technically a matter for the secular courts.
Her son’s name cannot be connected to a recognizable Coptic name; it seems
to be a transliteration of the Arabic Shuʿayb or Ṣaʿb. On the other hand, the let-
ter, which is written in Coptic, locates the complainant very clearly in a Christian
Egyptian context. The emphasis on religious punishment and the relative insig-
nificance of the theft suggest that this was foremost a local affair.Victim and per-
petrator belonged to the same community and responded to the same norms and
values; they would continue to occupy the same social space after this issue was
resolved. Restoration of a workable equilibrium was therefore more important
than retribution. Punishment of the thief seems to have been the goal of neither
the widow nor the bishop. Rather, the aim of the letter was the restitution of the
stolen goods, a confession from the culprit and the maintenance of stable rela-
tions and social order within the community.
In this context the bishop probably was the best person to turn to for a quick
and effective outcome. For the widow, his local prestige and personal authority
would have offset his lack of formal judicial power.While he had no apparatus of
practical enforcement, he had the weight and status of his traditional leadership
role. For the bishop, interceding successfully on the widow’s behalf could only
enhance his standing. This would have been a method of problem resolution fa-
miliar to all the actors involved.
Arbitration was a favored way to resolve private disputes between two civil
parties in Byzantine Egypt and it continued to be used in the Arab period.⁴ Local
 See Scheerlinck forthcoming for a discussion of the terminology used in Christian excommu-
nication letters.
 An inability to enforce their judgments was felt by both Jewish and Christian authorities under
Islam. Excommunication was their most effective and often their sole sanction (Simonsohn 2011,
141). Edmund Hayes has examined how excommunication was used by the Shīʿite imāms in re-
lation to the above-mentioned practices; I thank him for pointing me to the discussion on Jewish
and Christian excommunication.
 Gagos/van Minnen 1994.
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elites – the economic, social and religious authorities residing in the towns, re-
ligious settlements and agricultural estates – had always played a major role
therein. But whereas the notables of the estates and monasteries of Byzantine
Egypt had considerable powers of detention and punishment, in Muslim Egypt
force was more and more the exclusive preserve of the administration and
later the courts.⁵ The bishop of al-Ashmūnayn could threaten and enjoin, but
he could not arrest, try or sentence. The tradition of arbitration existed in paral-
lel to the formal judicial system, not in competition with it so much as in tan-
dem.⁶ This raises several questions. What does the handling of conflicts say
about changing power relations in the province? What does this tell us about
modifications in Egyptian elite composition, and how can these changes be
linked to developments at the caliphal center? How can the role of local elites
as arbitrators be connected to their position vis-à-vis the Egyptian population
on the one hand and to the empire’s political center on the other?
The process of dispute resolution has produced much documentary evidence
in Arabic, Coptic and Greek. Making use of documents from the first four centu-
ries of Arab rule, this article will use the linguistic conditions of the documents
as well as the identity of the addressees to explore the significance of the prac-
tice.
Papyri
The papyri and paper documents from Egypt are a uniquely rich source for the
study of the social make up of Egypt’s local elite and how its position, role and
composition changed in the early Muslim period. The Arabs used papyrus as
their main day-to-day writing material, shifting to paper only in the course of
the 9th–10th century. Most papyri are found in the uninhabitable deserts of
Egypt outside the main centers of occupation and government where continuous
habitation has disturbed or outright destroyed the archaeological record, making
excavations impossible today. Conversely, the absence of rain and habitation has
helped to protect the desert sites since they were abandoned some fifteen hun-
dred years ago. Papyrus documents have been found in Fusṭāṭ, but these remain
mostly unpublished. The main supplies remain the rubbish dumps of middle
Egyptian towns such as Edfū, Medīnat al-Fayyūm and al-Ashmūnayn. Hardly
 Sijpesteijn 2018.
 Tillier 2016. For a similar analysis of private and public (court-based) dispute resolution as
part of the same legal system in Roman Egypt, see Kelly 2011, chapter 7.
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any documents survive from the ‘wet’ Delta, although references to this area
occur.
The papyrus documents were never intended for preservation. They offer un-
usually direct access to the society that produced them, but the often-haphazard
conditions of their excavation and conservation also offer particular challenges.
The Greek, Coptic and Arabic documents can sometimes be ascribed a specific
provenance from internal evidence or (when it is known) where they were
found. Most of the time, though, documents were unearthed during unofficial ex-
cavations and can be ascribed no clear place of origin. Sometimes the year in
which the text was written appears at the end, or an identifiable individual is
mentioned who dates a document. In most cases, however, a papyrus is dated
solely on the basis of palaeographical criteria and the formulae it uses—a
rough method that divides the documents into large groups spanning several
centuries.
Because archaeological activities on mediaeval sites in Egypt have not been
systematic, let alone exhaustive, the chronological and geographic distribution
of papyri and paper documents is uneven. Some areas are over-represented
and others occur hardly at all. Documents can also inform us of places other
than where they were found through references or discussions mentioned in
them. In this paper the date and provenance of papyri are given when known,
but the documents have otherwise been treated as one source body. While this
might obscure some fine-grained differences, it offers enough detail to highlight
several long-term historical processes.
A final consideration in terms of evidence is the linguistic situation. Starting
directly after their arrival, the conquerors of Egypt used Arabic to communicate
with the inhabitants of the province, along with the other two administrative lan-
guages already in use, Coptic and Greek. Arabic documentation from the first
half-century of Arab rule in Egypt is, however, much less voluminous than the
Coptic and Greek material. Coptic and Greek continued to be used for internal
written communication outside the administration as well. With very few
Arabs settled in the Egyptian countryside, most events related to non-adminis-
trative activities of the Egyptian population were mainly recorded in Coptic or
Greek. Due to the lack of precise dates on non-official documents, however,
most Coptic and Greek papyri that have been assigned a firm date in the Arab
period originated in the chancery and its offices. Few ‘private’ documents
have been ascribed to the Arab period. In general, moreover, the Greek non-ad-
ministrative material has received much more attention than the Coptic or Ara-
bic.
Greek continued in use as an administrative language into the 9th century,
while the use of Coptic actually increased in the administrative domain under
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the Arabs, especially in the 8th century. The last Coptic legal documents and let-
ters from private contexts date to the 11th century. The use of Arabic had in-
creased dramatically by the 9th century, and many more Arabic documents are
preserved from then on.
The increase in the production of Arabic papyrus documents spanned legal,
private (i.e. commercial and personal) and administrative subjects. It is clear
that the number of consumers and producers of Arabic documents in the coun-
tryside (where most papyri in our collections originate) had increased funda-
mentally. That does not mean that all those using Arabic documents were also
speakers of Arabic. A group of Arabic legal documents from Ṭūṭūn in the
Fayyūm oasis dating to the 960s illustrates the difference. They record transac-
tions of property between Christian inhabitants of the town, set down according
to Islamic legal rules in Arabic. At the end of the documents an interesting con-
dition is added: that the seller agreed to the sale after the document was read to
him “and explained to him in Coptic (bi-l-ʿajamiyya).”⁷
In the 8th century, administrative structures in the countryside expanded, re-
sulting in an initial increase in the use of Coptic but eventually stimulating the
spread of Arabic as well. Muslim legal infrastructures evident from the late 8th–
early 9th centuries similarly promoted the use of Arabic. Merchants and others
were already active in the Egyptian countryside, but starting in the second
half of the 8th century, Arabic land-leases show Arabic speakers settling and get-
ting integrated in the countryside at a larger and more intensive scale. The in-
crease in the use of Arabic in documents was thus the result of the expansion
of Arab Muslim institutions such as administrative offices and legal structures,
an expansion that took place in response to the migration of Arabic-speaking
Muslims and non-Muslims from the garrisons into the countryside. As a result,
local Egyptians also began to switch to Arabic, first to interact with the new Ara-
bic-using individuals and institutions and later for internal communication.
The question of whether these Egyptian Arabic speakers also converted to
Islam, or conversely whether the increase in Arabic usage signals an expansion
of Islam, remains a vexing one. It is clear that converts did not automatically
switch to Arabic for their daily communications, and that in any case a linguistic
change to Arabic was not necessarily the result of conversion. The adoption of
Arabic, the Arabicization or even Islamicization of personal names and the
use of Arabic/Muslim or monotheist expressions also cannot automatically be
connected to conversion. On the contrary, documentary and material evidence
 Frantz-Murphy 1981, no. 1; Faḥmī 1972– 1973, no. 9. Frantz-Murphy 1981, no. 2 contains the
same expression, but the seller is a woman.
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suggests that the majority of Egypt’s population remained Christian far into the
medieval period, and that the area became mainly Muslim only in the 14th cen-
tury.⁸
Egyptian Administrators
The Arab conquerors entering Egypt in 639 initially left native administrative
structures and the personnel that staffed them largely in place.⁹ In the newly-
founded capital of Fusṭāṭ, Arabs did take control, filling the highest state func-
tions of governor, fiscal agent and chief judge (qāḍī). Additionally the governor,
who was only appointed for short intervals, was wholly dependent on his fellow
Arab wujūh. These were the descendants of the Arabs who had conquered Egypt
and now filled the other senior posts in the capital. However, army units and
military officials co-operated closely with local Egyptian administrators in the
rest of the province.¹⁰ Outside the capital, an overwhelming sense of continuity
prevailed, and administrative and legal offices continued to function more or
less as before.
The administrative organization of the province was also left intact. Five
eparchies were divided into some 30 pagarchies, all headed by members of
the local Christian Egyptian economic and social elite who had held similar of-
fices under the Byzantines. The pagarchs were responsible for fiscal and admin-
istrative matters in their district, relying on village headmen (Greek meizōn; Cop-
tic lashane) and other communal leaders to execute their orders at the
community level. Five dukes headed the eparchies. They stood in the administra-
tive hierarchy between the pagarchs and the governor’s office. Both the pagarchs
and the dukes had an administrative staff at their disposal.¹¹
Continuity also characterized the experience of locals accessing the systems
of redress. Local notables, administrative officers, bishops, abbots and large
landowners continued to be the first recourse for legal disputes amongst the
Egyptians.¹² Practically speaking, with very few Arabs residing outside Fusṭāṭ
there were not many alternative avenues for conflict resolution.¹³
 El-Leithy 2005.
 Sijpesteijn 2007; Sijpesteijn 2013.
 Such amīrs were in charge of military affairs and had administrative-financial tasks (Morelli
2010, introduction).
 Sijpesteijn 2013, 64 ff.; Legendre 2016.
 For the rise of Christian religious authorities in conflict resolution in the late Roman Near
East, see Brown 1992 and Lamoreaux 1995. See also the late 6th-century bishops Abraham and
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A Coptic papyrus dating to shortly after the arrival of the Arabs illustrates
how legal conflicts were typically resolved and the authorities involved. Its
more than 285 lines record the hearings regarding a family dispute over the own-
ership of part of a house in Edfū.¹⁴ The petitioning party calls upon “your illus-
trious lordships” as arbitrators, hoping they will judge him fairly because, as he
writes, “the fear of God resides in you, that you are not partial to (any) man, that
you observe justice onto us, so that the Lord, Jesus Christ, may preserve you and
your children for a long and peaceful time and that you end well in body, soul
and spirit.” The “lordships” belonged to the notables of the town and are also
called “the Great Men” in Greek and Coptic papyri.¹⁵
These Egyptian notables had fulfilled a crucial role in the legal, economic
and administrative organization of Egypt since Byzantine times.¹⁶ As estate-hold-
ers and otherwise economically powerful individuals they had taken over most
of the public functions from the administration, not so much in competition
with the central authorities but rather as a form of delegation. Bishops, estate-
holders and heads of villages presided over legal courts, operated prisons and
maintained private guards.¹⁷ While their jurisdiction extended generally over
the lands they owned, the authority of ecclesiastical office-holders also covered
their religious constituency. Under the Arabs both existing estate-holders and
clerical officials initially continued to play a role in the resolution of the legal
conflicts of the native Egyptian population, but over time that position changed.
A first step was taken under the Sufyānids (661–684), when changes in the
administrative organization of the caliphate had repercussions at the provincial
level in Egypt. From the 660s documents bear witness to the establishment of
semi-permanent Arab settlements in the Egyptian countryside.¹⁸ While interac-
tion between the local population and the Arab rulers continued to be rather lim-
ited, this new Arab presence was both the result and the catalyst of social
change. An increasingly centralized administration diminished the role of
Pesynthius, who played an essential role in the solving of disputes and conflicts, sometimes in
cooperation with village headmen (Dekker 2018).
 For the development of legal penal practice in early Islamic Egypt, see Sijpesteijn 2018 and
the references therein.
 Schiller 1968.
 Sijpesteijn 2013, 155 ff.
 Palme 2007; Schiller 1968, 89 n. 20. On the Great Men, see Sijpesteijn 2013, 152– 163.
 Sijpesteijn 2018.
 A government postal office was established by 669 in the Fayyūm (SB VI 9232). The earliest
Arabic debt acknowledgement is dated to 44 H/664–665 CE (Bruning 2015). The earliest com-
mercial letter dates to the 1st/7th century and originates in al-Ashmūnayn (Rāġib 1991).
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local officials, to the advantage of the higher-placed duke and governor.¹⁹ In gen-
eral the caliphal state was more present than the late Byzantine, directly de-
manding contributions in kind and personnel from Egyptian communities and
sending its representatives as far south as Edfū.²⁰
The Arab military officials (amīr) were removed at the level of the eparchies,
making dukes (still Christian and Egyptian at this time) the most important local
representatives of the Arab administration. Dukes received their orders from the
capital, often traveling there in person, but could also initiate administrative and
legal actions.²¹ Pagarchs—all still Christian Egyptians belonging to the
province’s social economic elite—were responsible for the local execution of
legal orders from the duke, the investigation of claims brought before the
duke and the making known of law-breaking in the district.²² Pagarchs could
also address legal issues that arose in their district directly after having been ap-
proached by local parties or at their own initiative.²³ Pagarchs could forward a
conflict to the duke, while claimants could turn to the duke as a form of appeal,
presumably when the treatment of the pagarch was unsatisfactory or in order to
circumvent the latter entirely.²⁴ Simultaneously, cases of private law were pre-
sented to local elite members; for example, the mother of four who writes a Cop-
 On the position of the duke, see Legendre 2016.
 Foss 2009.
 For attestations of the duke of Jēme deciding legal disputes, see P.KRU 10, dating to 722 CE;
P.KRU 25, dating to 722/723 CE, P.KRU 66 and 76 dating to before 722 CE. The duke of Edfū ap-
pears as a legal authority in PSI 15 1570, dating to 652, 667 or 682 CE. The duke of Fayyūm or
Ikhnās appears as judge in CPR VIII 84, dating to the 7th–8th century. But see the representatives
of the capital (moagaritai) sent to collect the money taxes and take care of other important mat-
ters (P.Apoll. 2). For the duke spending time in Fusṭāṭ, see P.Apoll. 6, 9, 20, 27, 28). Tillier char-
acterizes this period as “un système judiciaire centré sur le duché,” (“pagarche,” 22).
 See the order to the pagarch Papas to forward some adversaries of a claimant who had
turned to the duke’s office (P.Apoll. 18).
 For examples of pagarchs getting involved at their own initiative in legal conflicts from Edfū,
see the request from pagarch Platon to his colleague Papas to look into the conflict between a
female slave owner and her opponent concerning her slaves (P.Apoll. 37). Another example
shows the pagarch mediating in a case between a mother and her son (P.Apoll. 61. cited in Tillier
2013, 21 n. 8). See also the letter in which a plaintiff turns to Papas concerning a right he seems
to base on “a previously recorded document” (P.Apoll. 60). Other examples of pagarchs taking
charge of legal affairs all date to the 8th century and originate from different areas in the prov-
ince (see below).
 Tillier 2013, 21–22. For a similar case from the early 8th century in which villagers whose
complaint has been ignored twice by the local Arab administrator turned first to the pagarch
for help and then to the governor, see Sijpesteijn 2013, nos. 1, 6. Another group of villagers com-
plained to the governor about incorrectly imposed tax levels in the early 8th century (P.Lond. IV
1367, dating to 710 CE, provenance Ishqūh).
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tic letter in the second half of the 7th century asking the help of a highly-placed
individual in obtaining her yearly alimony of wheat, oil, wine, a dress and a coat
from her ex-husband directed probably at a religious functionary.²⁵
An Arabic letter sent in 65 H/684–685 CE from a higher official, probably the
governor, to a lower administrator (presumably located in al-Ashmūnayn where
the text was found) asks him to deal with a complaint raised by a Muslim woman
and illustrates how these changes in the administrative organization affected
certain types of litigation.²⁶ Although only fragmentary, the papyrus tells us
that by the end of the 7th century Muslims living in the Egyptian countryside
could reach the highest legal authorities in Egypt’s capital with their complaints.
Whether the Muslim plaintiff was purposely circumventing local authorities, ap-
pealing a case dealt with locally first or turning for help to an authority from her
own ethnic-religious background is not clear.²⁷ At the same time, the Arab Mus-
lim high official gives directions in this letter to his subordinate Christian Egyp-
tian pagarch about a local affair. In other words, the governor’s jurisdiction ex-
tended far into the Egyptian countryside, competing with that of local Christian
Egyptian authorities.
After the administrative reforms of the second half of the 7th century, local
Christian Egyptian officials and other authorities still dealt with most legal con-
flicts within their constituencies and domains, occasionally involving a higher
official such as the duke or directly cooperating with officials such as headmen
at the village level. However, especially important cases, for example those af-
fecting one of the few Arab Muslims living in the countryside, could reach the
highest authority and be dealt with by the governor himself.
The Arrival of the Arabs
Sometime after 694, the Arab Muslim pagarch ʿAṭīya b. Juʿayd (Gr. Attias) of the
Fayyūm, apparently in response to a woman’s complaint about maltreatment at
the hands of some village headmen, instructed the latter in a Greek letter: “Do
not mistreat the female letter carrier.”²⁸
 Till 1938, provenance not mentioned.
 Diem 1983.
 See Mathieu Tillier’s discussion of the different possible scenarios involving similar com-
plaints of Christian plaintiffs dealt with by the governor Qurra b. Sharīk (2015, 139– 141). See
below for a discussion of the Qurra letters.
 Morelli 2014.
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This papyrus is important for several reasons. First, it is the first example of
an Arab Muslim in the position of pagarch in the Egyptian countryside. Second-
ly, it demonstrates that Christian Egyptians began to turn to the Arab Muslim au-
thorities for help in local conflicts. These transactions took place in Greek and
Coptic, languages that continued to be used administratively, especially at the
local level. The fact that in this case the woman’s opponents were functionaries
in the Arab Muslim system of rural control might explain why she turned to a
representative of that same system rather than to a local Christian Egyptian no-
table. The papyrus bears witness to the new situation of the late 7th century,
whereby the relationship between Egyptian authorities and their local constitu-
encies as well as the Muslim rulers had altered significantly as the structures of
social control were increasingly centralized in Arab Muslim hands.
The net effect of the changes that took place in the organization and compo-
sition of Egypt’s administration at the end of the 7th and beginning of the 8th cen-
tury was greater centralization and bureaucratization, as well as increasing Ara-
bicization and Islamicization. These reforms were obviously connected to
empire-wide changes introduced under the Marwānid caliphs, reinforced by in-
creased Arab settlement in the countryside. The developments extended beyond
the Arab administration; in 109 H/727 CE a Greek document in the Upper Egyp-
tian town of al-Ashmūnayn was for the first time dated according to the hijra cal-
endar while referring to Arab Muslim authorities.²⁹
For the administration the main change concerned the ethnic-religious back-
ground of its executors. Arab Muslim administrators started to replace Christian
Egyptians in the position of duke and, somewhat later, of pagarch. These new
administrators acquired greater administrative and fiscal responsibilities and
rights than their Egyptian predecessors, including in the legal domain.³⁰ Arab
Muslim pagarchs dealt directly with the complaints and legal conflicts presented
to them,³¹ and papyri attest to their roles as legal investigators, mediators and
judges.
 SPP VIII 1184, for the date, see Morelli 2010, 57. The earliest known Coptic document bearing
a hijra calendar date dates to 116 H/734–735 CE (P.KRU 106 = MacCoull 2009, 166– 173).
 Sijpesteijn 2013, 102– 104, 200–211.
 For examples of pagarchs fulfilling the role of arbitrator or legal authority, see Sijpesteijn
2013, 132– 134. Cf. the pagarch supervises the settlement of a theft (P.KRU 52, dating to 733 or
735 CE, provenance Jēme); the pagarch Nājid b. Muslim (in office ca. 730) orders a lower admin-
istrator to supervise the access to water of the village that complained about having lost out on
water at the expense of another community (Sijpesteijn 2013, no. 16, dating to ca. 730 CE, prov-
enance al-Fayyūm).
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Like the woman mentioned above, who turned to the Arab Muslim pagarch
ʿAṭīya around 694, other Christian Egyptians found their way through the Arab
Muslim administrative system to receive the legal assistance they required. Dat-
ing from the first half of the 8th century, several Christian Egyptians residing in
Upper Egypt petitioned the governor Qurra b. Sharīk (in office 709–715) regard-
ing cases involving large sums of money or valuable property. The plaintiffs seem
to have all been members of Egypt’s socio-economic elite and thus able to access
the Arab Muslim authorities in the capital several hundred kilometers to the
north.³² Both the Christian and Jewish Egyptian plaintiffs and their Arab Muslim
mediators operated in the same socio-political milieu. Egypt’s indigenous elite
(regardless of religion) shared the same class interests as the dominant Arab
Muslims, and they co-operated with the new rulers in the administrative and
even military organization of the province. With the most to lose, their pragma-
tism generally prevailed over prejudice.
The extended jurisdiction and availability of the Arab Muslim officials as pa-
garchs in the Egyptian countryside soon made their services desirable at other
levels of Egyptian society. The pagarch Rāshid b. Khālid (who held offices in
Ihnās in 718–723), and al-Ashmūnayn (725–731), called up witnesses and ques-
tioned them in a dispute between two Christian Egyptians over a piece of land.³³
The pagarch ʿAbd al-Humar (who is otherwise unknown) not only ordered the
Christian Egyptian litigants in a disagreement over a house to come forward,
but also offered instructions on solving the conflict. As a result, a Coptic docu-
ment of settlement between the parties was drawn up in 725/6 in Jēme in the
presence of ʿAbd al-Humar.³⁴ Another pagarch in Jēme, a certain ʿAmr, also
got involved in a local property dispute on behalf of the claimant, ordering
her opponent to sell her half of a house that he had inherited.³⁵
All pagarchs fell directly under the responsibility of the governor and his fi-
nancial director in Fusṭāṭ. The main difference was that Arab Muslim pagarchs—
or their administrations—communicated directly and independently with indi-
vidual members of the local Egyptian population. Contemporary Christian Egyp-
tian pagarchs, on the other hand, had less latitude. Not only were most of them
removed from administrative posts at the local level, the authority and respon-
 Sijpesteijn 2013, 156.
 CPR IV 51, provenance not mentioned. For this pagarch, see Gonis 2004, 195.
 P.KRU 42 = MacCoull 2009, 127– 129.
 P.KRU 25, provenance Jēme, dating to 722/723 CE. Finally, in c.730 in the Fayyūm, the pa-
garch Nājid b. Muslim asks his subordinate ʿAbdallāh b. Asʿad to research a claim against
two brothers and send them to him so that he can do justice to the claimant. Sijpesteijn 2013,
no. 21.
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sibility of those who remained was significantly reduced. They received orders
from the capital on how to handle complaints, including criminal cases present-
ed to the governor such as theft, assault and mistreatment.³⁶
Alternative Markers of Authority
Christian Egyptian village notables, religious leaders and estate-holders contin-
ued to be influential local socio-economic players who fulfilled an important
role as executors of the administration at the village and local community
level. They transmitted and executed administrative orders, including those re-
lating to civil and penal legal cases.³⁷ They also collected and transferred
taxes and shipped goods and people demanded by the Arab Muslim authorities.
While functioning as brokers and agents for the Arab Muslim administration,
they additionally represented local communities upwards. They stood as guaran-
tors for taxpayers, debtors and the accused vis-à-vis the Arab Muslim authori-
ties.³⁸ In the Greek, Coptic and Arabic papyri of the first half of the 8th century
they are described as “solvent,” “powerful,” “strong,” “great” and “guarantors.”
Despite all this, when compared to the late Byzantine period or the first 50
years of Arab rule, the Christian Egyptian local elite’s responsibilities in the ad-
ministration can only be described as drastically diminished.³⁹ Their autonomy
was reduced, as they executed tasks rather than initiated them, and they must
inevitably have experienced this as an assault on their status and position.
Traces of their anxiety around such changes in status can be observed in the
documentary record. In the 8th century, the number of arbitration cases in which
Christian Egyptian notables function as judges increased dramatically according
to Coptic documents.⁴⁰ What seems to be happening is that members of the local
elite, whose position in the provincial hierarchy had been diminished with the
recent administrative restructuring but who maintained positions of prestige
within their own constituencies, used arbitration to compensate for their loss
of influence in the official organization of the country.⁴¹ Outside the administra-
 Sijpesteijn 2013, 210. Tillier 2013, 22–23.
 Sijpesteijn 2013, 202–203. For village headmen involved in legal cases, see Reinfandt 2010,
661 n. 36.
 For standing guarantor for prisoners, see Sijpesteijn 2018.
 Sijpesteijn 2013, 200ff.
 See the numerous examples in MacCoull 2009.
 Similar behavior has been observed amongst West-African tribal chiefs whose role in the law
courts was drastically reduced after national independence. As a result they increased their ac-
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tive framework, where as discussed above Arab Muslim pagarchs were called
upon to solve internal conflicts, Egyptians continued overwhelmingly to turn
to the existing leaders of their communities using the familiar languages of Cop-
tic and Greek.
The replacement of Christian and Jewish Egyptians as local administrators
with Arab Muslims did not mean that Christians and Jews stopped playing a
role in the administration. In fact the bulk of the administrative offices continued
to be filled with local specialists: scribes, secretaries, fiscal collectors and all
sorts of executive officers continued to be Egyptian, Christian and/or Jewish.
This continued role in the administration might even explain the increase in
the use of Coptic in the Muslim chancery in the 8th century, given the close rela-
tions between the religious institutions (such as the monasteries) where these of-
ficials were trained and the Muslim administration.⁴² In this way clerical leaders
continued to play an indirect role as well. Christians and Jews working in the
Muslim administration might play a significant intermediary role for their co-re-
ligionists, although this could on occasion backfire.⁴³ Such indirect involvement
through Christian and Jewish Egyptian administrators was, however, of a mark-
edly different order than the direct role that religious and local authorities had
played before.
An ʿAbbāsid Revolution?
Following the ʿAbbāsid takeover in 750 another set of changes in the administra-
tive, judicial and political organization of the province occurs in the documenta-
tion, and its repercussions for the Egyptian elite can also be seen in documents
dealing with conflict resolution and informal requests for help.
The first attestation of a functioning qāḍī in Fusṭāṭ is dated to 141 H/758–759
CE.⁴⁴ From then on references to Islamic law courts and infrastructures gradually
increase in both quantity and spread. An 8th-century Arabic papyrus records a
petition to a qāḍī in which he is asked to mediate in a conflict between several
tivities and responsibilities in arbitration, seemingly in an attempt to compensate for lost influ-
ence (I would like to thank David Ehrhardt for sharing this insight based on his current research
with me).
 Lajos Berkes made this argument in his lecture at the 7th International Society for Arabic
Papyrology congress in Berlin in 2018.
 Simonsohn 2011, 154– 155.
 Tillier 2013, 31 ff. For other attestations of qāḍīs in the papyri, see Sijpesteijn 2013, 403.
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siblings over their mother’s inheritance of a share in a house.⁴⁵ This is precisely
the kind of civil dispute that would previously have been dealt with before a
local authority figure. Other legal reforms were the introduction of the institution
of professional witnesses (ʿudūl) in 174 H/790 CE by qāḍī Mufaḍḍal b. Fuḍāla (in
office 174– 177 H/790–793 CE), which coincides with the appearance of hand-
written witness signatures at the end of Arabic legal documents. This indicates
the Muslim legal apparatus was beginning to operate beyond the capital.⁴⁶
Arbitration remained very important, especially in civil law cases, but the in-
creased presence of the Muslim court, with its more stable infrastructure and
mechanisms of enforcement such as prisons and guards, provided a powerful al-
ternative to local mediators.⁴⁷ While some domains, especially those involving
punishments under penal law,were removed from local elite jurisdiction entirely,
the Christian Egyptian population played a decisive part in undermining the
remnants of the old system as they progressively turned to Muslim legal instru-
ments and institutions to solve conflicts. On the other hand, a general preference
in some cases for private conflict resolution rather than a public treatment in
court did not disappear.⁴⁸
A shift is also visible in civil cases and requests for other kinds of help. Not
only were Islamic legal structures more readily available to Egyptian plaintiffs,
but a growing Arab Muslim population in the Egyptian countryside increased
the opportunities for interaction between the different populations in various do-
mains. This in its turn led to conversions amongst the local population, albeit at
this time still on a small scale. It is in this context that we can understand the 8th-
century Coptic papyrus in which Ibrāhīm, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Phiph, ʿAbd al-Bāth,
Joseph and Chael Kalthourte make a statement in front of Abū Saʿīd concerning a
donkey.⁴⁹ Abū Saʿīd, although not necessarily a Muslim, is apparently acculturat-
ed enough to have taken on an Arab kunya. The other parties involved carry par-
tially Arabic names, sometimes in combination with a Coptic one. The delibera-
tions concerning the conflict over the donkey were probably conducted in
 CPR XVI 3.
 Khan 1993, 173; El Shamsy 2013, 105–107. The earliest document with hand-written signa-
tures is a debt acknowledgement dated 178 H/795 CE (CPR XXVI 17, provenance not mentioned).
 But see also the opposite development, the increased popularity of arbitration as an alterna-
tive for a slowly operating court system in ʿAbbāsid Iraq (Tillier 2014).
 The prolonged time that cases could sometimes take in court once there were more Muslims
to use them seems to have motivated plaintiffs to turn to the more effective arbitration (Tillier
2014). Kelly lists the reasons why people turned to private conflict solution in Roman Egypt
(2011, chapter 7).
 P.KölnÄgyp II 56, provenance unknown.
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Coptic, as was the document that records the statement. Abū Saʿīd apparently
held some kind of position of authority, but no official title is mentioned.
From the same period comes an Arabic letter in which a request for financial
help is directed to an unnamed benefactor.⁵⁰
These two documents originate in two different ethnic-linguistic milieus and
show Arab Muslim patrons serving Arab Muslim petitioners and Egyptians help-
ing Egyptians, but a definite shift is detectable. Arabicized Muslim, Christian and
Jewish administrative and private authorities were increasingly involved in re-
solving civil and criminal conflicts amongst the Egyptian population.⁵¹
Turkish-Persian Influx
The 9th century shows a rapid increase in Arabic documentation at the expense
of Greek and to a lesser extent Coptic material. In this period, Arabic became the
vehicle of communication and it was in Arabic that Muslim, Christian and Jewish
Egyptians turned to mediators and patrons for help. Arabicization increased
through Arab settlements outside the garrison cities and an expanding Arab
Muslim administration encroaching on the countryside. The number of civil
and penal law cases involving both Muslims and non-Muslims—including
those concerning small properties—brought before the Muslim authorities conse-
quently grew. Moreover, the results of such cases were increasingly recorded in
Arabic.⁵²
While the daily use of Arabic grew in Egypt, other developments taking
place at the center of the empire led to a diminished position for Arab Egyptians.
The descendants of the conquerors had been in charge of the main administra-
tive positions in the capital Fusṭāṭ, gradually extending their presence and influ-
ence into the Egyptian countryside. An influx of Turkish-Persian administrators
and military leaders and the appointment of Arab high officials originating from
the caliphal center in Egypt eroded the position of Arab Egyptians in the prov-
ince.⁵³
 P.Ryl.Arab. I VI 8.
 See for example the unpublished Arabic papyrus AP 849, dating to the 8th century CE, which
records a request to oversee a failure in an exchange between three Jewish Egyptians in Arabic. I
am preparing this document for publication.
 See the petition sent by an orphaned heir, seemingly a Muslim, to the amīr Abū l-Ḥasan ask-
ing to retrieve his share of the inheritance of his father which a certain Elias, presumably a Chris-
tian, has taken (Grohmann 1952, 186– 188).
 Sijpesteijn 2016.
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The unrest following the death of caliph al-Rashīd in 809 was quelled and
ʿAbbāsid control secured by the general ʿAbdallāh b. Ṭāhir (d. 230 H/844 CE)
and his troops. His seizure of Egypt in 210 or 211 H/825–826 CE to 212 H/827
CE resulted in increased centralization and influence from the East. Egypt’s gov-
ernors were now appointed for longer periods of three to four years and therefore
more independent of local Arab elites. No longer forced to rely on locals when
filling the crucial positions of ṣāḥib al-shurṭa, ṣāḥib al-kharāj and qāḍī, gover-
nors appointed men to enact these roles from their own class of eastern military
leaders. Qāḍīs were still Arab, but arrived from the central lands of the empire.⁵⁴
The abolition of the dīwān in 218 H/833 CE by the caliph al-Maʾmūn put a formal
end to the privileged position of Arab Egyptians, but rather than a watershed this
event was the last stage in a drawn-out process that steadily undermined their
position and authority.⁵⁵
The new eastern officials appointed to top positions brought their own en-
tourages of officials to Egypt and these spread eastern practices into lower layers
of the administration. The deteriorating political and economic situation in the
capital Baghdad drove further Persian-trained administrators to Egypt in search
of employment, and documents show Persian-named officials appearing with
more frequency in the documentation. These officials introduced a more eastern
technical terminology into the bureaucracy, as the appearance of terms such as
jahbadh (cashier) or sulṭān (for the administration) show.⁵⁶ Certain scribal prac-
tices occur for the first time in Egypt, including authentication methods and
chancery scripts, and seem to be connected to customs current earlier in the east-
ern part of the empire.⁵⁷
The lost authority of Arab Egyptians vis-à-vis Turkish-Persian immigrants
found expression through different channels. The 9th-century local Egyptian his-
tory Futūḥ Miṣr seems partially to have been written to record the deeds of
Egypt’s wujūh.⁵⁸ Other texts show Egypt’s Muslim population developing region-
al affiliations as a result of local conversion and in reaction to the sidelining of
Arab Egyptians.⁵⁹ Al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 204 H/820 CE) canonization of Islamic law was
 Tillier 2012, 33.
 Sijpesteijn 2016.
 Frantz-Murphy 2001, 122. The earliest attestation of jahbadh dates to 259 H/874 CE (CPR XXI
61). The first attestation of sulṭān in an agricultural lease is dated 217 H/832 CE (Frantz-Murphy
2001, 36–39).
 Khan 1994; Khan 2006; Sijpesteijn 2012.
 Kennedy 1998, 66–80.
 Sijpesteijn 2011.
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a response to a loss of Arab exclusivity amongst Egypt’s expanding—through im-
migration and conversion—Muslim population.⁶⁰
The change in ethnic identity at the top echelons of the administration and
the consequent downgrading of the Arab Egyptian elite can be traced in the
documents and shows striking parallels with similar developments some hun-
dred years earlier. In the first part of the 8th century, Arab Egyptians had risen
to their prestigious position by replacing Christian Egyptians in the administra-
tion. A century later the Arab Egyptians were being replaced by Turkish-Persian
officials. In a 9th-century Arabic papyrus, a farmer turns to an amīr, presumably a
military functionary who has arrived with the troops from the east, to ask for
help paying his taxes after a bad harvest.⁶¹ In another Arabic papyrus, an immi-
grant (gharīb, “stranger”) asks another army leader identified as qāʾid for help in
getting settled in his new hometown.⁶² Finally, a Ṭūlūnid official is consulted by
a former chancery scribe concerning a marriage.⁶³
Contemporaneous to these letters directed to members of the new Turkish-
Persian military elite in their administrative functions are the numerous Arabic
letters containing informal requests for help directed to unidentified individu-
als.⁶⁴ As discussed above in the case of the Christian Egyptians, these informal
Arabic-language requests suggest that Arab notables expanded their presence in
the domain of private problem solving and dispute resolution when their role in
public administration was diminished.
Conclusion
Christian and Jewish Egyptian community leaders continued to play a role in pri-
vate dispute resolution. The letter quoted at the beginning of this article shows
how a bishop could still exert power through his religious authority over trans-
gressors in his community. The Geniza preserves plenty of examples of Jewish
authorities in Fusṭāṭ fulfilling similar functions into the medieval period. Cases
that threatened community norms were especially likely to be dealt with by me-
diators from that community. Moreover, mediation offered a strong alternative to
a complicated and expensive legal system. It was especially attractive as the
 El Shamsy 2013, chapter 4.
 P.Khalili I 16. See the contemporary petition directed to the amīr Abū l-Ḥasan asking for help
in retrieving part of an inheritance (Grohmann 1952, 186– 188).
 P.Ryl.Arab. I I 2.
 P.Khalili I 18.
 E.g. Grohmann 1952, 179– 180; 185– 186.
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court system developed in complexity and the official system became overloaded
with the growth of the Muslim population and a subsequent increase in court
cases.⁶⁵ Christian, Jewish and Muslim community leaders continued to serve
the need of their specific constituencies, but shifts can be observed.
A connection has been made in this paper between administrative status
and socio-economic elite membership. A diminished role in the administrative
hierarchy had repercussions for one’s social reputation and standing in the com-
munity. This becomes explicit in the way informal dispute resolution was organ-
ized and in whom the community chose as its arbitrators. An arbitrator’s author-
ity was based on a position of trust, respect and eminence in the community.
While religious leaders obtained their authority from their religious institution,
state officials and the infrastructure at their disposal were obvious mediators
as well.
Individuals without a title and official position needed to establish their au-
thority within society in other ways.With the loss of institutional backing as their
position in the Muslim administration was downgraded, the autonomy of their
religious institution was decreased or their independence lost to an increasingly
centralized state, the stage of private conflict solution becomes especially attrac-
tive as a way to build and maintain a reputation. In the face of the loss of a for-
mal position of prestige in society, an individual’s presence as a mediator may be
said to have increased.
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The Civilian Ruling Elite of the
Ṭūlūnid-Ikhshīdid Period
Abstract: This paper examines the participation of the civilian elite of the Ikhshī-
did period during the succession crises of 946 and 961. The discussion of these
events is preceded by a review of terminology referring to the elite and its com-
position.
Keywords: ʻaqd; al-Balawī; al-Kindī; Ibn Zūlāq; al-Maqrīzī; Roy P. Mottahedeh
Obscure Beginnings
One can argue that the Muslim elite in post-conquest Egypt evolved from the sev-
eral-thousand-strong Arab army that conquered the country and settled in Fu-
sṭāṭ. The most renowned of these conquerors was ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ who led the con-
quest of the country and later served as the governor of Egypt under ʿUmar I and
during the early years of ʿUthmān’s rule (r. 644–656).
In 28 H/648–649 CE ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ was apparently dismissed from the gov-
ernorship. His re-emergence on the political scene and return as governor of
Egypt (38 H/658–659 CE) was the result of what has been described by Nabia
Abbott as a deal made between him, his sons (ʿAbdallāh and Muḥammad)
and Wardān (the family’s protégé and confidant), and Muʿāwiya. Through it,
military and political support was traded for the governorship and revenues of
Egypt. After heavy fighting, ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ conquered Egypt with troops drafted
from Syria and took back the area’s governorship. Al-Kindī (897–961) writes that
Egypt became ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ’ personal source of income (ṭuʿma) and that he kept
its revenues for himself after paying the troops and covering other expenses in-
volved with ruling the country.¹
ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ governed Egypt until his death in 43 H/663–664 CE and was
briefly succeeded by his son ʿAbdallāh, whom Muʿāwiya immediately dismissed
and replaced with his own brother ʿUtba b. Abῑ Sufyān. This move marked the
return of Egypt from private patrimonial rule to the direct control of the ruling
family, or one should perhaps say its return to direct state control.
 Abbott 1972, III, 47–53; al-Kindῑ 1912, 28–9, 31, 34. For ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ’s self-enrichment, see
Lecker 1989, 24–37. CE dates are used when dating is securely established, while Hijrī dates
are used when events referred to in the sources are discussed.
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In 667, Muslama b. Mukhallad was appointed governor of Egypt and it seems
he fulfilled all of Muʿāwiya’s expectations for smooth and profitable governance
of the province. It is claimed that he made yearly payments to 40,000 people
who were entitled to cash stipends (ʿaṭā) and food allocations (arzāq). This num-
ber included troops and their families, of which 4,000 received the highest remu-
neration of 200 dīnārs. Muslama b. Mukhallad also maintained the military and
civilian administrative apparatus, shipped grain to Arabia, and transferred
600,000 dīnārs to the caliph, apparently on a yearly basis.²
Passing on to larger issues from the personal vicissitudes of people for
whom participation in the conquest was instrumental in amassing huge (though
occasionally short-lived) family fortunes, a question arises: what were the driving
forces behind the stratification process within the conquering society? A reason-
able conjecture would be that the process was driven by ownership of urban
and/or agricultural land, success in commerce, or appointments to posts in
the early Muslim state. 9th–10th-century sources depict the conquering society
as vast rentier class. Stipends were, however, paid according to certain criteria,
with some receiving as much as 200 dīnārs per year and most far less. This sys-
tem was known as dīwān and recipients of its benefits as ahl al-dīwān. One can
assume that the significance of the dīwān system diminished over time, especial-
ly as the payroll was constantly re-drawn to include new tribal and military
groups. The system was abolished in 833.³
Sources in the 9th and 10th centuries provide examples of lively discussions
regarding whether Egypt was conquered by force or treaty and the tax conse-
quences of the two different forms of conquest.⁴ The sources do agree that the
conquerors were not permitted to settle on Egyptian land and were instead main-
tained by the dīwān system.⁵ This depiction is highly schematic, and contradict-
ed by scattered references to settlement outside Fusṭāṭ and more frequent refer-
ences to efforts to gain access to land. One can, for example, only wonder at the
presence and subsequent history of 10,000 Arab troops in Kharibta in the Delta
on the western branch of the Nile in 37 H/657–658 CE. Al-Kindī refers to them as
wujūh ahl Miṣr, ashrāf, and ahl al-ḥifāẓ, which must be not taken literally but as
an indication of their status as a privileged veteran military group. Their entitle-
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam 1922, 102; al-Kindī 1912, 38–40; Ibn Zūlāq 2000, 90–91; al-Maqrīzī 1991,
VI, 410–411. For the caliph ʿUmar I’s financial demands on ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, see al-Maqrīzī 1991,
VII, 260–261.
 Al-Kindī 1912, 193.
 This subject has been extensively discussed by Noth 1994, 182–189.
 For the most explicit statement on this subject, see Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam 1922, 162.
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ment to cash stipends and food allocations is explicitly mentioned; they must
have participated in the conquest of Egypt.⁶
Grants of land are referred to by Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam (798–871) using the
term iqṭāʿ. Whether this meant full ownership of the land or merely enjoying
rights of usufruct remains vague. In Egypt, the first recorded grant of iqṭāʿ was
made by the caliph ʿUmar I (r. 634–644). Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam gives the impres-
sion that such grants were rare while other sources throw no additional light
on how widespread the practice was. Ibn Yūnus (894–958), for example,
notes that Muʿāwiya’s military and naval commander in Egypt received an
iqṭāʿ grant from the caliph.⁷ Urban grants of land were known as qaṭāʾiʿ and in-
volved full ownership. These played a role in the development of Fusṭāṭ after
Muʿāwiya’s reign.⁸
Another factor that drove urban development were direct investments made
by the Umayyad governors of Egypt and the caliphs. The governor ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz
(r. 685–705), the son of the caliph Marwān I (r. 684–685), built several covered
markets (qaysāriyyas). Each was dedicated to the trade of a specific product such
as honey, cloves, or robes and textiles. The caliph Hishām (r. 724–743) also built
a qaysāriyya in Fusṭāṭ in which textiles were traded or produced.⁹ It can be ar-
gued that these investments by members of the royal ruling family benefited
the local economy but were detrimental to the local financial elite and its oppor-
tunities for investment. That ownership of urban properties was widespread is
indicated by numerous references to familial pious endowments and other en-
dowments made for the benefit of Muslims in general or the poor in particular.¹⁰
Such pious endowments were often an instrument used to transfer property and
maintain wealth within a family.
Allusions to enrichment achieved through any type of local, trans-regional,
or international commerce are entirely absent in the literary sources. Papyrolog-
ical evidence indicates that a Muslim landowner in the Fayyūm of the 730s went
 Al-Kindī 1912, 20–21. For Arab settlement in the Egyptian countryside, see Sijpesteijn 2013,
81–85.
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam 1922, 136– 138; Ibn Yūnus 2000, I, 345–346, 470, 471.
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam 1922, 132– 133. For urban and rural qaṭāʾiʿ grants in Iraq, see Kennedy
2004, 13–29; Kennedy 2014, 159– 182.
 Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam 1922, 136– 137.
 For references to waqfs in favor of the Muslim community in Egypt, see Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam
1922, 89 (attributing the first waqf of this type to ʿUmar I), and 107, referring to the endowment of
ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ’s house in Fusṭāṭ. For familial waqfs, with and without charitable stipulations, see
Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam 1922, 100– 101, 104, 135– 136; Ibn Yūnus 2000, II, 138– 139, regarding an
early 9th-century familial waqf. For waqfs in early Muslim Egypt, see Bouderbala 2013, 37–56,
including French translations of some key accounts.
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on commercial trips to Alexandria, but how widespread commerce was along the
Nile in Upper and Lower Egypt remains unknown. Information about the salaries
of governors, tax officials, and scribes is also sparse. A documentary fragment
from 748 indicates that the monthly salary of one qāḍī was ten dīnārs. Salaries
of other qāḍīs increased to 30 dīnārs per month during the early ʿAbbāsid period,
but how this data relates to a broader picture of prices and salaries remains un-
known.¹¹
As important as stratification driven by economic forces might have been,we
know next to nothing regarding ʿilm (knowledge) as a factor in social and eco-
nomic mobility. How rewarding learning was in terms of social prestige and eco-
nomic position within society is rarely mentioned in the source material. The
most important information is provided by Ibn Yūnus’s account of the success
of the Iraqi storyteller Manṣūr b. ʿAmmār b. Kathīr al-Sulaymī, who practiced
his craft in 8th-century Fusṭāṭ for some time. He impressed the two most promi-
nent scholars of that time, Layth b. Saʿd (713–792) and Ibn Lahiʿa (715–791),
who bestowed land grants (iqṭāʿ) and money on him.¹² The inescapable though
unsurprising conclusion is that in this agricultural pre-modern society, access to
land was the main source of wealth and the underpinning factor in the fortunes
of any type of contemporary social elite.
Terminology
The sources for Egypt’s history during the 9th and 10th centuries offer abundant
information on the socio-political evolution of the country and the formation
and functions of civilian elites. A pre-requisite for any meaningful discussion
of these developments is an understanding of the reference terminology used.
Although the terms ‘elite’, ‘class’, and ‘social stratification’ reflect modern socio-
logical concepts, these notions were not foreign to medieval sages or common-
ers. However, medieval sociological terminology was not well-defined and
lacked precision. The notion of an elite group as expressed by the term khāṣṣa,
which meant a social class vital to the proper functioning of a state and society,
permeated medieval Muslim thinking about a social order which they viewed as
basically divided into the elite and the common people (ʿāmma). Social classes,
 Al-Kindī 1912, 354; Tillier 2012, 114, and al-Kindī 1912, 317, 377, 421, 435; al-Qadi 2009, 9– 10,
22, 28.
 For modest payments (three dīnārs per month) rendered to Qurʾān reciters in the early ʿAb-
bāsid period, see Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam 1922, 117. For Manṣūr b. ʿAmmār, see Ibn Yūnus 2000, II,
237–238. For both scholars, see Guest’s introduction (29–32) to his edition of al-Kindī 1912.
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or in modern parlance the notion of stratification, were referred to by terms such
as ṣinf (pl. aṣnāf), firqa (pl. firaq), and ṭāʾifa (pl. ṭawāʾif). The term firqa also had
a narrower meaning of ‘faction’, while ʿawwām (the plural form of ʿāmma) had
negative connotations of an unruly crowd or mob. Each of these terms had a
wide range of meanings and they were used loosely and dynamically, reflecting
place and time.
One of the most pertinent texts for the discussion of medieval sociological
terminology is the description of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn’s funeral by his 10th-century
biographer al-Balawī. This was an impressive and carefully staged event and
al-Balawī uses two terms (ṣinf/aṣnāf and firqa/firaq) to describe the various
groups that attended it. He states that the different groups (firaq) did not mingle
and that each group paraded separately and kept to itself (literally, “kept its
boundaries”). The different categories (aṣnāf) referred to by al-Balawī consisted
of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn’s military slaves, the officers of his army, the scribes, and var-
ious groups of people that served him. The presence of women at the funeral was
massive and somewhat surprising. Several female groups are mentioned, among
whomwere Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn’s womenfolk, the wives of the military commanders,
the wives of military slaves, the wives of scribes, and the wives of the people
close to him, with each group making a separate appearance. Black women
who were on a monthly pay-list of the deceased ruler also attended the funeral
as well as the urban poor of both genders on whom Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn had be-
stowed charity. In addition, people of the religious class (low- and high-ranking
ʿulamāʾ; literally, ṣaghīr and kabīr), qāḍīs, and court witnesses were also present
at the event.¹³
The recipients of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn’s charities and payments who attended the
funeral appear in the text in separate groups. The terminology that refers to the
poor is derived from the Qurʾān and involves terms such as fuqarāʾ,masākīn, and
ḍuʿafāʾ. Muslim jurists debated how to distinguish between the fuqarāʾ and
masākīn. They reached the conclusion that a faqīr is defined as a destitute per-
son, one who neither owns anything nor earns a livelihood, while miskīn is de-
fined as a poor person who has some possessions although not enough to sus-
tain himself. Other terms that are relevant for the discussion of poverty are sitr
and ahl al-sitr; the term sitr had a broad meaning referring to piety and denoted
adherence to a strict code of privacy, while ahl al-sitr referred to people living in
seclusion. In medieval Jewish Middle Eastern society the term ahl al-sitr alluded
to the “shame-faced poor” or the “deserving poor”, or in modern parlance the
conjectural poor in contrast to the structural poor. Both terms are widely used
 Al-Balawī 1939, 344–345.
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in discussions about the poor and poverty in medieval Europe and were intro-
duced into medieval Middle Eastern studies by Mark R. Cohen.¹⁴
To what extent al-Balawī’s terminology is a reflection of 10th-century ʿAbbā-
sid concepts of social stratification is difficult to assess. Roy P. Mottahedeh’s
study of the political life of ʿAbbāsid-Būyid Baghdād constitutes the most impor-
tant reference in studying it. Mottahedeh defines the term ṭabaqa as referring to
“a professional category”, but the term also had a broader meaning of a social
class or layer and a narrower meaning of a vertically stratified group of courtiers.
This term is rarely used by al-Balawī, who usually employs the terms firqa and
firaq. His use of these terms conveys no sense of hierarchy. According to Motta-
hedeh, the term ṣinf conveyed a loose meaning that referred to broad social cat-
egories and was also used when referring to ethnic groups.¹⁵ Medieval sociolog-
ical terminology was, however, flexible, and in documentary and literary sources
of the Mamlūk period the term ṭāʾifa was used when referring to European na-
tions.
Although al-Balawī’s use of the term ṭabaqa appears in a different context
from the one discussed by Mottahedeh, it retains the same meaning. Al-
Balawī states that Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn was fascinated by the ahl al-sitr, who are de-
scribed as upright poor men and women to whom the ruler gave large monthly
donations. In another section of al-Balawī’s text they are described as meritori-
ous religious people living according to a strict code and avoiding the impermis-
sible (waraʿ). Perhaps the most significant aspect of al-Balawī’s description of
Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn’s interest in this group is the fact that he regarded them as a
ṭabaqa. This means he saw them as a normative social class within the overall
social model, not as members of the pitiably wretched poor underclass. The me-
dieval notion of poverty, like that of the elite, was a nuanced concept referred to
by a number of terms that conveyed economic status but also referred to piety
and different modes of life.
A Local Elite: Meaning and Formation
Al-Kindī refers to the Arab elite of early Muslim Egypt by the term wujūh, a com-
mon appellation used for the elite in both Arabic and Hebrew. The term also ap-
pears in a military context. The Arab military force in Egypt is referred to by al-
 For al-Balawī’s references to Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn’s relations with ahl al-sitr, see 184. For other
9th- century luminaries who supported ahl al-sitr, see Bruning 2012, 102; Cohen 2005, 34–53,
70–71.
 Mottahedeh 1980, 105–106.
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Kindī using three terms: ahl al-dīwān, jund Miṣr, and ahl Miṣr, all of which allude
to the paid Arab military force stationed in Fusṭāṭ. For example, when referring to
the Coptic rebellion of 150 H/767 CE in the Ṣakhā area of the south-central Delta,
al-Kindī states that the Arab force dispatched from Fusṭāṭ (ahl al-dīwān) was led
by wujūh ahl Miṣr. This reference may be interpreted in two different ways. In a
broad sense, the phrase can be understood as meaning the force was command-
ed by elite members of the Arab population of Egypt and that such an unusual
mobilization reflected the gravity of the situation. But it can also be argued that
in this context the term ahl al-dīwān stands for ahl Miṣr and that the force was
led by high-ranking officers. The second interpretation is possible, since in al-
Kindī’s narrative the term wujūh appears mostly (if not exclusively) in a military
context. Al-Kindī, for example, describes the war of 65 H/684–685 CE, when the
force led by the caliph Marwān, fought Ibn al-Zubayr’s supporters in Egypt, as
having been fought between ahl Shām and ahl Miṣr and states that there were
many casualties among ahl al-qabāʾil min ahl Miṣr which reflected the tribal
composition of the force.¹⁶
The military also played a key role in the politics of the country, or to put it
differently, governors had to be attentive to their demands. In 141 H/758–759 CE,
for example, upon the arrival of a new governor (Mūsā b. Kaʿb) a power struggle
immediately unfolded between him and the wujūh al-jund, the force stationed in
Fusṭāṭ. In this context that means the prominent commanders of the jund. This
understanding of the term jund is supported by other references to wujūh al-
jund bi-Miṣr appearing in the description of the struggle between al-Maʾmūn
and al-Amīn and its impact on Egypt.¹⁷ Only once can the phrase wujūh ahl
Miṣr be understood as alluding to the local elite. In 137 H/754–755 CE, the gov-
ernor of Egypt went to Palestine with a number of wujūh ahl Miṣr (al-Kindī pro-
vides their names). This term can be considered as equivalent to ashrāf ahl Miṣr
(to whom al-Maʾmūn wrote seeking recognition and support).¹⁸
Going beyond terminology, Maged S. S. Mikhail has approached al-Kindī in
his search for prosopographical data about elite families in early Muslim Egypt
with some success. The Tujībī family, for example, held posts in the local govern-
ment from 655 to the 720s. From the 720s onwards members of the Fahm family
were frequently appointed to the post of ṣāḥib al-shurṭa in Fusṭāṭ, a military force
that combined the functions of the police and garrison. Al-Kindī’s text, however,
 Al-Kindī 1912, 44.
 Al-Kindī 1912, 107, 168.
 Al-Kindī 1912, 105, 148.
The Civilian Ruling Elite of the Ṭūlūnid-Ikhshīdid Period 413
yields little and neither the Tujībīs nor the Fahmis appear on the list of wujūh ahl
Miṣr for 137 H/754–755 CE.¹⁹
This discussion can be concluded by saying that although al-Kindī expands
our understanding of the terminology referring to the elite, he offers no insight
into the meaning and formation of Egypt’s local elite.
A Local Elite and the Politics of Succession
The information and insights into Egypt’s social history that al-Kindī fails to pro-
vide are to be found in other 10th-century chronicles of the Ṭūlūnid-Ikhshīdid pe-
riod which have been preserved and cited by Mamlūk historians. The civilian
elite of the Ṭūlūnid period consisted of administrators brought from Iraq, who
not only managed Egypt’s agricultural wealth but were also involved in the fi-
nancial affairs of Syria. They additionally maintained connections with the ʿAb-
bāsid court and viziers. The fortunes of these elite families are exemplified by the
Mādharāʾī family, which attained great wealth, displayed a considerable degree
of cohesion, and survived the political shifts that took place in Egypt during the
second half of the 9th century and the first half of the 10th century. The rise of this
family followed the demise of the powerful administrator Ibn al-Mudabbir,
whom Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn had killed in 270 H/883–884 CE.²⁰
The first member of the Mādharāʾī family to make a career in Egypt in the
service of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn was Abū Bakr al-Uṭrāsh. Another, Abū Zunbūr
(232–317 H/846–929 CE), served as a tax collector in Syria and eventually in
Egypt during the rule of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn. He survived the overthrow of the
Ṭūlūnid dynasty by the ʿAbbāsids.²¹ Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-Mādharāʾī
(258–345 H/871–956 CE) is perhaps the best-known member of his family and
signifies their pivotal role in Egypt. He became famous for his extraordinary
wealth, charities, and piety, all of which were symbolized by his twenty-two pil-
grimages to Arabia and the massive support he provided to commoners and
members of the elite in Mecca and Medina. His charitable deeds in Egypt were
no less extensive and involved the ransom of captives and the distribution of
 Mikhail 2014, 140-1. For other wujūh families in Umayyad Egypt, see Kennedy 1998, 86; Ken-
nedy 1981, 32.
 Al-Kutubī 1973, V, 132.
 The family’s history has been discussed by Gottschalk (1931, 22– 117), using a wide range of
sources. He was also the first to publish biographies of members of the family, using those
manuscripts of al-Maqrīzī’s Muqaffā available to him at that time. My references go to the fuller
1991 edition of the text. Al-Maqrīzī 1991, I, 343–344; III, 466–481.
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food, while his standing in local society and politics is illuminated by the events
that took place following Muḥammad b. Ṭughj’s death in 946.
The Ikhshīdid dynasty barely survived the death of its founder. Only the in-
volvement of the civilian elite in Fusṭāṭ during the succession ensured the
smooth transfer of rule to Unūjūr, Muḥammad b. Ṭughj’s sixteen-year-old son,
and the appointment of his uncle as regent. This disposition of power was shap-
ed in two consecutive meetings (5–6 Muḥarram 335 H/5–6 August 946 CE) and
formalized in a signed document (ʿaqd) that was in fact a pact between the var-
ious people and groups involved in the negotiations.
Al-Maqrīzī (1364–1442) states that the participants in the first meeting were
the vizier Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Muqātil, the people of the court (ahl al-dawla),
and wujūh al-balad. In this context (and in contrast to al-Kindī’s text), wujūh al-
balad unequivocally means the notables of Fusṭāṭ. The first meeting failed to
reach a decision on the implementation of the succession as envisioned by
Ibn Ṭughj; in 934 he had proclaimed that Unūjūr was his successor and added
his son’s name to the Friday sermons delivered in Egypt and Syria. The public
announcement of the intended succession was followed by a declaration of alle-
giance to Unūjūr by high-ranking officers (quwwād) when he was twelve years
old.
In the second meeting, which took place on 6 Muḥarram/6 August in the
presence of Abū Bakr Muḥammad, Unūjūr was proclaimed ruler and his uncle
installed as regent. The vizier was arrested and required to pay a sum of
money, Abū Bakr Muḥammad was recognized as the strong man in the state,
and his son Abū ʿAlī l-Ḥusayn was appointed vizier. Al-Maqrīzī provides a
long list of the people (referred to as wujūh al-nās bi-Miṣr wa-ahl al-raʾy) who wit-
nessed this and were most likely actively involved in the shaping of the ʿaqd.
These participants belonged to several clearly discernible groups, including
members of the three administrative families of the Ṭūlūnid-Ikhshīdid period
(the Madharāʾῑs, the Furāts, and the Rūdhabārῑs) as well as people belonging
to the two long-established Shīʿī families in Egypt (the Ṭabāṭabās and the
Rasῑs, referred to as ashrāf). Other individuals involved included the people of
the court (ahl al-dawla), the administrators (wujūh al-kuttāb), and the military
(referred to as ḥujariyya, i.e. the former cadets of the ḥujra [barracks] where mili-
tary slaves were trained).
Another group of people associated in some unspecified way with the ʿaqd
were the qāḍīs, among them the qāḍīs of Mecca and Fusṭāṭ who also served as
the qāḍīs of the towns of Ramla and Tiberias in Palestine. These qāḍīs remained
in Fusṭāṭ and sent representatives to the towns under their jurisdiction. Several
prominent members of the corps of witnesses associated with the qāḍī’s court in
Fusṭāṭ are also mentioned as involved in some way with the ʿaqd. The integration
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of the judicial system into the state structure was a typical medieval phenomen-
on. By that time, the position of qāḍī had acquired respectability and a religious
aura. Both were instrumental in bestowing legitimacy on the pact, which pre-
served both the political status quo and the vested interests of the groups and
people involved.
The disposition of power was publicly proclaimed on Friday when Unūjūr,
accompanied by his uncle Abū Bakr Muḥammad and his cousin the vizier,
marched in a procession to the Ancient Mosque in Fusṭāṭ. Meanwhile, letters an-
nouncing the political deal forged in Egypt were sent to Damascus. The most im-
portant endorsement came from the black eunuch Kāfūr, when he arrived in
Fusṭāṭ with the Ikhshīdid army from Damascus at the beginning of Ṣafar. Only
when this took place did Unūjūr feel secure enough to show himself to the peo-
ple, in a carefully orchestrated appearance attended by poets including the re-
nowned al-Mutanabbī, who was in Egypt at that time.²²
Following Unūjūr’s death in 961, rule was usurped by Kāfūr. He enjoyed the
cooperation of many but still relied on his private army. Upon Kāfūr’s death in
968, a new succession and disposition of power were arranged. These were for-
mulated in a document devised by the vizier Jaʿfar b. Faḍl b. al-Furāt and the
Shīʿῑ notable Abū Jaʿfar Musallam and signed by Kāfūr’s leading military
commanders. The document details the division of responsibilities among the
people involved and alludes to the exchange of oaths of obedience to God, to
His messenger, and to the Qurʾānic dictum of commanding good and forbidding
wrong. The document proclaims a political program promising to uphold justice,
help the oppressed against the oppressor, care for the holy cities in Arabia and
frontier towns, and conduct holy war. In practical terms the dynastic claims of
the Ikhshīdid family as the legitimate rulers of Egypt were acknowledged and
the minor Ikhshīdid prince Abū l-Fawāris Aḥmad installed as the nominal
ruler. Shamūl al-Ikhshīdī was vested with the command of the army and finan-
cial affairs entrusted to Jaʿfar b. al-Furāt.
The document also guaranteed the preservation of the vested interests of the
different military groups according to their ranks (ṭibāq). The composition of the
army was complex. While the main military groups consisted of the military
slaves (ghilmān) of the Ikhshīdid rulers, the army also included Kāfūr’s military
slaves and the infantry and cavalry. The ethnic factor in the composition of the
army must also be taken into account. The black servile infantry were lowest in
terms of military prestige and pay while the white-skinned servile cavalry were
 Al-Maqrīzī 1991, II, 313–314.
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highest in the military structure. Shamūl al-Ikhshīdī faced a tremendous chal-
lenge in his efforts to balance the interests of all these military factions.
Unsurprisingly, this elaborate disposition of power, shaped by the civilian
elite and endorsed by the military, failed in its implementation. Members of
the Ikhshīdid ruling family, the administrators, and the military factions re-
mained suspicious of each other. This suspicion turned into violence and the sit-
uation deteriorated into the chaos that led to many welcoming the Fāṭimid con-
quest of the country in 969.²³
A Local Elite: An Outsider’s View
The political arrangements shaped after Kāfūr’s death were observed and com-
mented upon by Sībawayhi the “wise fool”. Ibn Zūlāq’s History of Sībawayhi is
an important contemporary testimony; the work was modeled on Iraqi books de-
voted to “wise fools” (ʿuqalāʾ al-majānīn). Sībawayhi was very critical of the
nomination of Abū l-Fawāris Aḥmad as ruler and mocked his immaturity, defi-
cient education, and lack of military skills. One wonders how much of Ibn Zū-
lāq’s own voice and criticism is grafted upon Sībawayhi’s remarks (real or invent-
ed). That question can be expanded into the broader query of whether Ibn
Zūlāq’s work is a reflection of the views of the wider circles of the ʿulamāʾ
class observing the deals concluded between the military and the civilian
elite. To put it differently, was public opinion, subdued as it might have been,
echoed in the History of Sībawayhi?
Sībawayhi’s sarcastic remarks are directed at the main players in the politi-
cal drama unfolding before his eyes. He mocks the changing fortunes of the vi-
zier Jaʿfar b. al-Furāt, who had had to hide himself from the military (literally, the
Turks) that looted his house and humiliated him. Sībawayhi, however, saw him
at the moment of his triumph, marching in a parade accompanied by a large en-
tourage of his clerks with men and the army behind him, and expresses wonder
at the reconciliation between the vizier and the army. Other of his remarks focus
on the political program proclaimed in the ʿaqd document; Sībawayhi cynically
asks whether the army marching behind the vizier is marching to defend Islam or
protecting the Kaʿba sanctuary?²⁴
 Al-Maqrīzī 1991, I, 536–538. For a French translation of the text, see Bianquis 1974, 263–269,
esp. 264–265.
 Ibn Zūlāq 1933, 52–53. For quotes from Kitāb Akhbār Sībawayhi, see al-Ṣafadī 1979, XII, 119;
Bianquis 1972, 55–56. For the vicissitudes of the vizier, see al-Kutubī 1973,V, 293.While Sībaway-
hi was critical of the political scene, Abū Bakr b. ʿUtayba (d. after 957), who is described as be-
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Sībawayhi was a highly educated person, who in his youth received a com-
prehensive education in the traditional Arabic-Islamic sciences: Qurʾān, the Pro-
phetic tradition, jurisprudence, theology, and, of course, grammar. His nick-
name, derived from the great 8th-century grammarian Sībawayhi, testifies to
his linguistic skills. The purpose of the political program published by the re-
gime was to win over the ʿulamāʾ class, who were also the great protectors of Sī-
bawayhi from occasional persecutions by powerful members of the civilian elite.
Although Sībawayhi’s life oscillated between periods of clarity and delusion, he
clearly belonged to the ʿulamāʾ class with whom the civilian elite shared a set of
common religious and cultural values. The Ṭūlūnid and Ikhshīdid rulers also
shared this set of values, or to put it more cautiously, were not strangers to
them. Since the dividing line was drawn between the military and civilian
elite and the ʿulamāʾ class, it was up to the rulers to create working cohesion be-
tween them—and most of the time this was something that the Ṭūlūnid and
Ikhshīdid rulers did successfully.
Conclusions
Medieval Arabic terminology referring to social groups and classes is rich and
involves four basic terms: ṣinf (pl. aṣnāf), firqa (pl. firaq), ṭāʾifa (pl. ṭawāʾif),
and ṭabaqa (pl. ṭibāq). The meaning of these terms varies and must be ascer-
tained by context. Although the primary concept of society was polarized be-
tween khāṣṣa and ʿāmma, practically speaking terminology referring to the
elite and the common people consisted of several terms of which wujūh,
fuqarāʾ, masākīn (ḍuʿafāʾ), ahl al-sitr, and ʿawwām appear in the sources dis-
cussed in this paper. There are also other terms referring to the elite, common
people, the poor, and the underclass, not attested to in these sources but
quite common in other contexts.
The events discussed in this paper pertaining to the involvement of the civil-
ian elite in the political life of the Ikhshīdid period are narrated through al-Maq-
rīzī’s prism. It must be pointed out that the terminology he uses, such as ahl
al-dawla, wujūh al-balad, and wujūh al-nās bi-Miṣr wa-ahl al-raʾy, is his own,
a reflection of his understanding and interpretation of events and intended for
contemporary readers. It is not the terminology of the original 9th- and 10th-cen-
tury sources. The term ahl al-dawla, for example, is al-Maqrīzī’s understanding of
longing to ahl al-ʿilm wa-l-adab, served as go-between for the main political figures in Fusṭāṭ.
See al-Maqrīzī 1991, VII, 69–70.
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the Ikhshīdid dynasty and period as dawla and reflects a natural evolution of po-
litical-administrative vocabulary. The same applies to al-Maqrīzī’s creation of the
term wujūh al-balad; in al-Kindī’s narrative wujūh appears in a military context
in conjunction with jund.
Al-Maqrīzī’s modification of terminology does not undermine the value of
his narrative, which is rich in detail and derived from lost 10th-century works.
It must be read carefully, with an awareness of the problem of terminology,
but it depicts a rich socio-political world that became extinct under the far
more authoritarian Fāṭimid regime, when the imām’s claims to divine guidance
left no place for any other type of elite in the political life of the country.
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Connecting the Ibāḍī Network in North
Africa with the Empire (2nd–3rd/8th–9th
Centuries)
Abstract: At first sight, North African Ibāḍism emerged during the Berber upris-
ings against Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid rule and stayed at the margins of the em-
pire. The imamate of Tāhart even stood, in the posthumous memory of the
school, as an ideal counter-model of the caliphate. In fact, during the 8th and
9th centuries western Ibāḍism remained under the influence of its eastern strong-
holds, in particular Baṣra where the sectarian elite was well integrated into ʿAb-
bāsid culture. Intense scholarly exchange linked west and east thanks to inter-
mediary meeting points like Mecca and Fusṭāṭ. The Ibāḍī political opposition
of ‘Berber’ and ‘Arab’ ethnicity certainly worked against the imperial discourse,
but the Persian shuʿūbiyya shaped it. The Rustamid imamate came to be the sym-
bol of a Persian state in a Berber milieu and its capital and state apparatus un-
derwent a gradual orientalization. Trade also played a key role in connecting the
Ibāḍī network with the empire. Baṣra was a notorious emporium and Ibāḍī mer-
chants circulated widely between the ʿAbbāsid realm and its western fringes. The
Maghribīs owned stores in Fusṭāṭ and traveled as far as Baghdad and Sāmarrāʾ.
Trans-Saharan trade, including slaves and gold, also presumably saw its first de-
velopment thanks to imperial demand.
Keywords: Ibāḍism; North Africa; Rustamid state; shuʿūbiyya; cultural contacts;
trading networks
Introduction
The Ibāḍī cluster in North Africa emerged in the global revolutionary context that
characterized the last decade of the Umayyads. The first uprisings were mostly
lead by Ṣufrī leaders;¹ the Ibāḍīs did not engage in the struggle for the domina-
tion of Tripolitania before 131 H/748 CE. They formally declared their first ima-
mate in asserting leadership over the Warfajūma rival confederation in 141 H/
 Scholars such as Lewinstein 1992 have wondered what ṣufriyya really meant. In North Africa,
Sunni and Ibāḍī writers used this word to designate the khārijī hard line, in contrast with the
Ibāḍī openness to sectarian coexistence.
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758 CE. However, the first two imāms, Abū l-Khaṭṭāb al-Maʿāfirī and Abū Ḥātim
al-Malzūzī, failed at creating a lasting state and were unable to resist the ʿAbbā-
sid re-conquest of Ifrīqiya (144–156 H/761–772 CE).² Despite this, the daʿwa con-
tinued to fuel Berber rural settlements situated at the borders of the pro-ʿAbbā-
sid area. A new imamate was rooted further west in Tāhart (160 H/777 CE), not
far from a former late antique establishment that was already part of an auton-
omous Berber polity.³ The city soon became a flourishing commercial and cultur-
al hub, and relations between the ruling Rustamid dynasty and neighboring po-
lities, including the Aghlabids, stabilized.⁴
At first sight, the political and social structures of western Ibāḍism during
the 8th and 9th centuries seem to fully contradict the Umayyad and ʿAbbāsid im-
perial standards. The first writings of the sect, whether penned a few decades
after the ʿAbbāsid revolution or a century later in North Africa, emphasize the
imamate as a virtuous leadership opposed to the political hubris supposedly em-
bodied by the eastern caliphs. As an heir of the Khārijī nebula, Ibāḍism advocat-
ed for a collegial model of government based on an imām’s election, with the
consequent possibility of his overthrow if constant political and religious consul-
tations (shūra) deemed him unsatisfactory. Under this model, an accomplished
imām was a virtuous leader with an ascetic contempt for personal ambition
and enrichment.⁵ The first of the Rustamids, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustam, perfect-
ly epitomized this idealized figure.⁶
Early literature depicted the ‘Men in Black’ as persecutors and held dissent
(khurūj) to be a condition for the free ‘manifestation’ (ẓuhūr) of the imamate.⁷ The
Ibāḍī school of law thus legalized rebellion against the “tyrants” and the “imāms
of misguidance” but at the same time encouraged the qaʿada: living peacefully
with other Muslims and even concealing one’s true faith if necessary.⁸
When the paramount state of Tāhart fell to the Fāṭimids in 296 H/909 CE,
coexistence became vital.⁹ However, in reaction writings from the 11th century on-
ward further emphasized the dichotomy between the idealized model of the Rus-
 ʿAbd al–Razzāq 1985.
 Cadénat 1977– 1979; Cadénat 1988.
 Dangel 1977; Baḥāz 2010.
 Gaiser 2010; Aillet 2015b.
 Aillet 2011, 64–66, 68–73.
 See the apologia of Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 83, 95–99, 110–111, 121, 128– 129, and an
analysis in Aillet 2015a, 74–75.
 See for instance Ibn Dhakwān, Sīra, 144–145.
 Aillet 2016.
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tamid imamate and the oppressive power of the empire.¹⁰ It is no surprise, then,
that scholarly works mostly perceived the western Ibāḍī territories as marginal
lands alien to the imperial cultural, economic and political spheres, and hostile
to it. Abdallah Laroui, for instance, saw Khārijism in North Africa as a “national
schismatic movement”. He sharply opposed the Mediterranean coast, where em-
pire succeeded empire, to a free “Middle West” that always resisted foreign influ-
ence.¹¹
This essay aims to move beyond doctrinal opposition and binary ideological
construction by reconnecting the imperial center with the heterodox belt that
stretched from Tripolitania to the central African highlands. A promising path
for the study of the Maghrib lies in understanding how eastern or imperial influ-
ence affected local autonomies. A centralistic approach inherited from the colo-
nial and nation-state tradition sometimes fails to correctly explain local societies
by simply opposing the imperial state-civilization and the chaotic tribal patch-
work of the so-called ‘marginal’ lands—in Khaldūnian terms,ʿumrān and bada-
wiyya. Recently, an alternative vision of the empire has instead highlighted the
concepts of “polycentricity” and “connectivity”. This helps us to consider polit-
ical structuration as a multi-scalar process producing “layered” and “overlap-
ping” sovereignties and centralities.¹²
The study of imperial ‘elites’ is at the crossroad of these perspectives. Their
extreme mobility throughout the Islamic world and their natural inclination to
build professional and cultural networks contributed deeply to the globalization
of imperial culture. At the same time, indigenous or local elites competed with
the newcomers, who were qualified as ‘Arabs’ or ‘Oriental’. A whole set of social
strategies—from distinction to alliance, hybridization or fusion—was available to
either integrate the imperial elite or claim its insertion into a local Islamic con-
text.
What kind of ‘elites’ characterized Ibāḍī social organization? The egalitarian
and puritanical ethos of the school seems to exclude the use of such common-
place terms as al-khāṣṣa, al-kibār and al-aʿyān. The Ibāḍī dignitaries are rather
called shuyūkh, aṣḥāb and ʿulamā’, or a’imma if they are local religious leaders.
The advent of the Rustamid dynasty introduced new political and social distinc-
tions, and the early 10th-century chronicler Ibn Ṣaghīr (who was not an Ibāḍī but
lived in Tāhart) described local elites as kubarā’, wujūh or ru’asā’.¹³ The social
 Aillet 2011, 74–75.
 Laroui 1975, I, 67, 70, 81.
 Burbank/Cooper 2011; Nef/Tillier 2011.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 16– 17. See the introduction of this volume for a study of the terminol-
ogy referring to leading groups.
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structure of Tāhart was completely different from the highly urbanized and state-
controlled ʿIrāqī society, but once again, differences should not prohibit us from
looking for similarities.
This essay will try to comprehend what could link a seemingly marginal en-
tity with the empire,¹⁴ taking into consideration personal networks, economic re-
lations and cultural circulation. Sources are limited. Apart from well-known
Sunni examples of literature, few 9th-century western Ibāḍī sources survive;
most authors lived after the 10th century.¹⁵ As for material sources, they are
even scarcer.
The Baṣran Connection
In Ibāḍī canonical tradition, the ʿIrāqī emporium of al-Baṣra was the cradle and
headquarters of the sect, from which its revolutionary wave spread over various
provinces to North Africa.¹⁶ While the Baṣran influence over Ibāḍism is unques-
tionable, the diffusion of the daʿwa appears to have been much less centralized
than was supposed by later authors like the late 11th-century writer Abū Zakar-
iyyāʾ al-Wārjlānī.
The Baṣran and ʿIrāqī legacy deeply imbued Ibāḍī law with late Umayyad
and early ʿAbbāsid culture. Such prominent figures as ʿAbdallāh b. Masʿūd
and ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbbās ranked among the early authorities of the sect, and
the key figure of Jābir b. Zayd al-Azdī connected the school with the mainstream
thanks to his well-known master Ibn ʿAbbās, the famous arbitrator of the conflict
between ʿAlī and the ‘people of Nahrawān’. The “ocean of knowledge” (baḥr al-
ʿilm), as al-Shammākhī called him, had supposedly instructed the first imām of
al-Baṣra, Abū ʿUbayda Muslim b. Abī Karīma, and therefore linked the Ibāḍī im-
amology to a continuous line of transmission from the Prophet himself.¹⁷ The
Ibāḍī imamate also stemmed from Abū Bilāl Mirdās b. Udayya, a Janus figure
who first embodied a quietist attitude (qaʿada) towards the Umayyads before
choosing the way of the sacrifice (shirā’) by facing up to the governor ʿUbaydal-
 See the well-documented study of ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm 1990 on the relations between western and
eastern Ibāḍism and the essay of Dridi (in press).
 We have deliberately chosen to refer only to the oldest texts when later sources did not con-
tain relevant material for our purpose.
 Wilkinson 2010, 211–219.
 See for example al-Shammākhī, Kitāb al-Siyar, I, 182–189, and Wilkinson 2010, 163–164.
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lāh b. Ziyād (d. 67 H/686 CE) of al-Baṣra, whose army killed him during prayer.¹⁸
His martyrdom legitimized the first revolt of the Khawārij (61 H/680 CE) and Ibn
al-Ṣaghīr says that he was also a model for Maghribī Ibāḍism.¹⁹ His popularity as
a symbol of a pious resistance against tyranny even reached ʿAbbāsid litera-
ture.²⁰ Anti-Umayyad arguments circulated widely. In the Kitāb fīhi bad’ al-
Islām, compiled in Tripolitania around 273 H/886–887 CE, Ibn Sallām al-
Lawātī relies on traditions attributed to Ṣuhār al-ʿAbdī, a disciple of Jābir and
teacher of Abū ʿUbayda, to portray Yazīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik (101– 105 H/720–
724 CE). This sequence is almost identical to the black legend popularized by
the famous Baṣran polygrapher al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 H/869 CE) in his Bayān wa-l-
tabyīn.²¹
The Ibāḍī vulgate generally asserts that Abū ʿUbayda, who died during the
reign of al-Manṣūr (136– 158 H/754–775 CE), organized the propagation of the
faith thanks to the five ‘knowledge bearers’ (ḥamalat al-ʿilm) he trained secretly
in al-Baṣra. This team allegedly included two future imāms (Abū l-Khaṭṭāb al-
Maʿāfirī and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustam) and three minor Maghribī figures
(ʿAṣim al-Sadrātī, Ismāʿil b. Darrār and Abū Dāwūd al-Qiblī), and thus allego-
rized the geographical spread of the sect and the alliance between the east
and the west.²² Another ‘monolinear model’ of the sect’s origins shows the ob-
scure Salma b. Saʿīd leaving al-Baṣra for the Maghrib on the same camel as ʿIk-
rīma, the client of Ibn al-ʿAbbās who was supposed to represent the rival Ṣufrī
school.²³ This narrative does not reflect the revolutionary period, when the two
streams competed for control of Tripolitania. It rather echoes the political stabi-
lization of the twin states of Tāhart and Sijilmāsa. These two legendary tales,
never alluded to by Ibn Sallām, thus symbolize the close relationship between
eastern and western communities rather than describing a real process.
In the future, critical investigation should focus on the epistolary corpus be-
tween the ʿIrāqī imāms and the Maghribīs. A risāla on zakāt attributed to Abū
ʿUbayda was supposedly addressed to Abū l-Khaṭṭāb (140– 144 H/757–
761 CE),²⁴ and among the recently edited treaties of the Kūfī Ibāḍī scholar ʿAb-
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 110– 111; al-Darjīnī, Kitāb Ṭabaqāt, II, 22–34; Gaiser 2010,
89–92.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 13.
 See for example Ibn ʿAbd Rabbīh, al-ʿIqd, I, 182– 185, and al-Mubarrad, al-Kāmil, III, 77–82.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 100– 101.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī, Kitāb Siyar, 57–58.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī, Kitāb Siyar, 42–43.
 Francesca (in press).
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dallāh b. Yazīd al-Fazārī (d. after 179 H/795 CE) there may be an answer to the
Maghribī theological controversy against the competing Muʿtazilī school.²⁵
Ibn Sallām, a well-informed author whose grandfather was a Berber veteran
of the first revolts in North Africa and a companion of Abū l-Khaṭṭāb,²⁶ displays a
slightly different version of the daʿwa. Instead of focusing only on al-Baṣra, he
also alludes to its expansion to al-Kūfa, Makka and Madīna, Yaman and
ʿUmān, Khwārazm and Khurāsān. Local personalities, some in disagreement
with Abū ʿUbayda, are given equal mention in his book. Far from making al-
Baṣra the seat of a centralized structure, he rather conceives his stream as a mul-
tipolar organization headed by various autonomous circles of ‘companions’. He
insists, for example, on the Egyptian companions, who could have played a key
role in the propagation of the movement in the neighboring region of Tripolita-
nia.²⁷ The diffusion of the doctrine and the organization of the revolt must in this
version have been more dispersed and multi-focused than tradition asserts.
After the foundation of Tāhart in 160 H/777 CE and until the middle of the 9th
century, al-Baṣra was a major economic and cultural partner of the new city. The
cradle of a strong Ibāḍī community, the metropolis of southern al-ʿIrāq was also
a gateway to the prosperous ʿAbbāsid market. A famous tale transmitted by Ibn
al-Ṣaghīr is a reminder that the first Baṣran delegation arrived soon after the new
imām had been elected and contributed to finance Tāhart’s initial economic
takeoff. When the Baṣrans came back three years later, the city had already be-
come so prosperous it did not need further financing: the west had emancipated
itself from the east.²⁸
Relations with al-ʿIrāq continued to flourish under the reign of ʿAbd al-Wah-
hāb (168–208 H/784–823 CE), when Baṣran and Kūfan merchants built man-
sions in Tāhart.²⁹ Al-Rabīʿ b. Ḥabīb al-Azdī al-Farāhidī, the successor of Abū
ʿUbayda, was repeatedly asked for legal advice by the Maghribīs and was also
engaged in giving religious support to ʿAbd al-Wahhāb against his adversary
Yazīd b. Fandīn and the Nukkārī schismatic opposition.³⁰ His powerful influence
on Maghribī law is well reflected by the late compilation of his Musnad by Abū
Yaʿqūb al-Warjlānī under the name of Kitāb al-Tartīb.³¹ According to Ibn Sallām,
 ʿAbdallāh b. Yazīd al-Fazārī, Kitāb al-Qadar, in al-Salimi/Madelung, Early Ibāḍī Theology,
13–29.
 Aillet 2015a, 69.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 114– 115.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 10– 11, 13.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 13.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī, Kitāb Siyar, 93–94.
 Abū Yaʿqūb al-Warjlānī, Kitāb al-Tartīb.
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the Baṣran imām was also involved in trade between the east and the west, send-
ing his brother to Tāhart with commodities valued at 12,000 dinars (or dirhams,
the author is unclear).³² In his turn, ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was prepared to send 1,000
dinars to al-ʿIrāq for the purchase of books, but instead his coreligionists sent
him forty packs for free.³³
This close relationship was maintained under Abū Sufyān Maḥbūb b. al-
Raḥīl (d. c. 210 H/825 CE), the sixth and last imām of al-Baṣra, who presumably
moved to ʿUmān at the end of his life. Equally engaged in favour of the Rusta-
mids, he denounced the khalafī protest with other Oriental scholars.³⁴ Ibn Sal-
lām also recalls his notorious pilgrimage to Makka. Followed by 150 compan-
ions, he pitched his camp in a place called “Maḍārib Maḥbūb” near Minā and
offered hospitality to every member of the school, including the Maghribīs.³⁵
His memoir of the sect, the Kitāb Abī Sufyān, was very influential on western
Ibāḍī historiography.³⁶
Broader Eastern Connections
The Baghdādī geographer al-Yaʿqūbī, who visited Tāhart during the 880s, report-
ed that the city was “the ʿIrāq of the Maghrib”.³⁷ The ʿIrāqī-Rustamid connections
were not limited to al-Baṣra. Ibāḍī literature portrayed Baghdad as the headquar-
ters of the “tyrants” who sent the jund against Abū l-Khaṭṭāb and Abū Hātim
under the reign of Abū Jaʿfar al-Manṣūr, but a later anecdote suggests that the
capital was frequented by the western Ibāḍī elite. Under the reign of Aflaḥ
b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (208–258 H/824–875 CE), his opponent Naffāth b. Naṣr trav-
elled from Jabal Nafūsa to Baghdad and stayed there for a long time, surely while
trading. The tale says that al-Mutawakkil (232–247 H/847–861 CE) was subjugat-
ed by Naffāth b. Naṣr’s knowledge when he received him for a theological de-
bate. As a reward, he opened his library, where the complete dīwān of Jābir b.
Zayd was allegedly preserved, to his guest for one day and one night. Naffāth
b. Naṣr copied the nine volumes in that time thanks to a squad of scribes. Before
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 110.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī, Kitāb Siyar, 102–103.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī, Kitāb Siyar, 122– 123.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 109.
 Wilkinson 2010, 161– 162.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 141– 143.
The Ibāḍī Network 427
reaching Tripolitania, however, he hid this treasure in a secret place rather than
sharing it with his deviant contemporaries.³⁸
Another interesting episode is the captivity of Abū l-Yaqẓān Muḥammad
b. Aflah in Mashriq, about which Ibn al-Ṣaghīr gives a precise account while
Abū Zakariyyāʾ is almost silent. The prince was arrested during his pilgrimage
by the ʿAbbāsid authorities, who suspected him of preparing a rebellion against
them. He was imprisoned and in jail he met and sympathized with the ruling ca-
liph’s brother. When the caliph was overthrown, the brother was chosen to suc-
ceed him. The chronological context is not precise, but the story should likely be
situated around 250 H/864–865 CE, before imām Aflaḥ died. If we refer to the
ʿAbbāsid history, things become clearer: the ruling caliph was certainly al-Mu-
staʿīn (248–252 H/862–866 CE), who imprisoned his brother al-Muʿtazz in
Sāmarrāʾ before being himself overthrown by a powerful Turkish militia. He
was then replaced by al-Muʿtazz (252–255 H/866–869 CE). The new sovereign
proposed his former companion of captivity stay to govern a province, but the
young prince renounced wealth and decided to go home.
Despite the chaotic political life of Sāmarrā’ in these years, Abū l-Yaqẓān was
apparently fascinated by the strong army, courtly education (adab) and “firm
government” of the ʿAbbāsids. The chronicle reports that as soon as he was des-
ignated imām in 254 H/868–869 CE, he began to use an ʿIrāqī tent (sirdaq) for
official ceremonies, a political symbol his Berber subjects had never seen be-
fore.³⁹ This anecdote may hint at the gradual influence of the ʿAbbāsid model
on the imamate, itself corresponding to the assertion of central authority
through the adoption of standard institutions like the qāḍī, the shurṭa, the
ḥisba, the personal guard (al-ḥaras), the use of slave soldiers and ethnic division
in the army. It is noticeable that some decades before Abū l-Yaqẓān, the famous
singer Ziryāb introduced ʿIrāqī fashion in Cordoba, the capital of the Umayyads
who were themselves in good terms with the Rustamids. It is no surprise that
quotations from the ʿIrāqī polygraphs al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255 H/869 CE) and Ibn Qutayba
(d. 276 H/889 CE) were incorporated into Maghribī Ibāḍī literature.⁴⁰
In Tāhart, two of the most prominent traders of the 860s were a man from al-
Wāsiṭ, between Baghdad and al-Baṣra, and another from Sīrāf, the great port on
the northern shore of the Persian Gulf.⁴¹ There were also some contacts with
‘Khurāsānī’ elites who were possibly living in al-ʿIrāq. Abū Ghānim Bishr b. Ghā-
nim al-Khurāsānī reportedly led a delegation to imām ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in Tāhart.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī, Kitāb siyar, 139–142.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 27–30.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī (Kitāb Siyar, 44), relying on earlier sources.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 38–39.
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On his way back to Egypt, Abū Ghānim met the qāḍī ʿAmrūs b. Fatḥ in Jabal
Nafūsa and gave him a copy of the twelve volumes of his great juridical compi-
lation, called the Mudawwana.⁴² Conversely, a scholar named Abū ʿĪsā Ibrāhīm
b. Ismāʿīl al-Khurāsānī received a delegation from ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and de-
nounced his opponent Khalf b. al-Samḥ in an epistle.⁴³ We also know, thanks
to al-Yaʿqubī, that small communities of Khurāsānī Persians (ʿajam) were hosted
in Zawīla or Qayrawān.⁴⁴
It is no wonder that Tāhart was described by eastern travelers and geogra-
phers like Ibn Khurradādhbih around 232 H/845 CE, al-Yaʿqūbī in the 880s,
and al-Istakhrī a few years before the Fāṭimid conquest.⁴⁵ Western Ibāḍī elites
were culturally and economically well connected with the ʿAbbāsid realm and
ʿIrāqī traders had settled in the main urban centers. The first local dynasties
in the west were proud to display Oriental genealogies, and it is noticeable
that at roughly the same period the newly established ʿAlīd dynasty of the Idrī-
sids founded the city of ʿal-Baṣraʿ between Tangier and Fez.⁴⁶
Archaeological studies have recently outlined the artistic and material ex-
pressions of this relationship. The French archaeologist Chloé Capel has proved
that the local wadi of Sijilmāsa was in fact an important artificial canal created
to supply water to the Midrārid city, and which closely parallels contemporary
ʿIrāqī hydraulic structures.⁴⁷ Our research project on the archaeological site of
Sedrata also provides late evidence for these cultural contacts. Sedrata, or the
medieval city of Wārjlān, was a major Ibāḍī crossroads for Trans-Saharan
trade from the 10th to the 13th centuries, situated as it was eight kilometers
south of Wargla (Algeria). Patrice Cressier and Sophie Gilotte have shown,
using the work of Marguerite van Berchem, that the aesthetic program displayed
in the stucco panels of the so-called ‘palace’ at this site (one of the excavated
mansions) was mainly influenced by the art of Sāmarrāʾ and other ʿAbbāsid es-
tablishments in 9th-century al-ʿIrāq and western Iran. Although these panels
were probably not completed before the 11th century, their seemingly archaic pro-
gram could be explained by the Rustamid legacy.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, we know al-
 Al-Shammākhī, Kitāb al-Siyar, II, 369.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 138–139; al-Shammākhī, Kitāb al-Siyar, 293, 319.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 134– 138.
 Ibn Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-Masālik, 87–88; al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 141– 143, 149– 150;
al-Istakhrī, Kitāb al-Masālik, 39.
 Eustache 1955.
 Capel 2016.
 Cressier/Gilotte (in press).
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most nothing about the material culture of Tāhart, whose archaeological site is
still not correctly identified.⁴⁹
‘Persians’ in a Berber Land
Al-Baṣra and al-ʿIrāq were places where Iranian culture had been integrated into
the Islamic imperial structure, but also places where the new converts did not
necessarily identify with the Arabs and could combine adherence to Islam
with the assertion of a Persian identity. Since the end of the 7th century, the
Khārijī and Ibāḍī movements had advocated for precisely such a cultural distinc-
tion within the larger Islamic framework.While in Yaman, they stood with Qaḥ-
ṭān against ʿAdnān, in eastern provinces such as Fārs, Kirmān, Sīstān,
Khwārazm, Khurāsān, and others, they mainly supported the social and political
demands of the ‘Persians’ against the ‘Arabs’ or the ‘Quraysh’, who were accused
of imposing their own hegemony over Muslim converts. In this stream, shuʿūbī
discourse was a literary game,⁵⁰ but also a form of protest against caliphal
power.⁵¹
The first generation of Ibāḍī leaders in Maghrib was apparently affiliated
with Southern Arabian tribes, like most of their Baṣran fellows: Abū l-Khaṭṭāb
al-Maʿāfirī was a “Yamanī” and Abū Ḥātim al-Malzūzī a “Tujibī” and a mawla
of Kinda, according to al-Shammākhī.⁵² Yet the movement was soon associated
with the Berbers, and in his proselytizing treaty Ibn Sallām purposely placed the
‘Arabs’ of the jund (the ‘Men in Black’ or ʿAbbāsid party) in opposition to the
‘Muslims’ and the ‘Berbers’, whom he identified with the Ibāḍī community.
While the ‘Arabs’ were accused of corrupting Islam and tyrannizing over their
subjects, the Berbers were shown as legitimate owners of the country and sincere
Muslims.⁵³ This dichotomy, which became a leitmotif in early western Ibāḍī sour-
ces, echoed the well-known Oriental controversy against the Berbers. In the sec-
ond half of the 8th or early 9th centuries, the Ibāḍīs produced their own ḥadīths in
response to imperial dismissal of the Berbers as uncivilized subjects and false or
bad Muslims. This ‘black legend’ of the Berbers reflects the ideological struggle
led by the ʿIrāqī authority against the anti-caliphal Ibāḍī and Ṣufrī movements.
 See the first survey by Marçais/Dessus-Lamare 1946 and, among other references, the over-
view of Dangel 1977, 39–44.
 Mottahedeh 1976; Norris 1990; Enderwitz 1997.
 Gibb 1962, 69.
 Al-Shammākhī, Kitāb al-Siyar, II, 245, 258.
 Aillet 2015a, 77–79.
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Conversely, the ḥadīths compiled by Ibn Sallāmwere the counterpart of those cir-
culating in contemporary ʿAbbāsid literature.⁵⁴
A ḥadīth popularized by Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241 H/855 CE) shows how the Proph-
et anathematized the Berbers and accused them of hypocrisy. The final words
echo the final sentence against the Khawārij,⁵⁵ whose faith “will not pass be-
yond their throats”.⁵⁶
A man came and seated down close to the Prophet—God’s peace and blessings be upon
him—and the Messenger of God asked him: “Where do you come from?” He answered:
“I am a Berber.” Then, the Messenger of God—God’s peace and blessings be upon him—
gave him this order: “Go far from me!” and asked everybody around him to do the
same. After he stood up, the Messenger of God —God’s peace and blessings be upon him
—came to us and declared: “Their faith does not pass beyond their throats.”
Not surprisingly, the opposite side presents the Berbers very differently. Their
primitiveness is turned into ascetic purity and religious sincerity. They appear
as the new chosen people who will regenerate western Islam, as opposed to
the Arabs who are accused of creating the fitna and perverting the religion in
its native land.⁵⁷
One day, as she was seated with twelve members of the Muhājirūn and Anṣār, a Berber
came in. ʿĀʾisha stood up and stayed alone with him, while the others had to move out re-
luctantly. She gave answers (istafatā) to whatever the Berber needed and he went out. After
that, she sent someone to seek them out in their houses, so they came back to her. “Why
did you go away from me with anger?” she asked them. “We were angry against this man. A
Berber came to us, a man we all despise because we hate his group, but you gave your pref-
erence to him over us, and even to him over you,” they replied. “I gave him my preference
over you and me because the Prophet—God’s peace and blessings be upon him—told me
something about them,” ʿĀʾisha said. “And what did the Prophet of God tell you about
them?” they asked. “Do you know anybody from the Berbers?” she replied. “Yes, we do.”
Then ʿĀʾisha said: “I was seated with the Prophet one day when this Berber came to us,
with his face yellow and his eyeballs sunken. The Prophet of God—God’s peace and bless-
ings be upon him—stared at him and told him: “What is wrong with you? Do you have any
problems? Are you sick? Yesterday, when you went to bed your blood was pure and your
color sane, and now you seem to have awoken from the grave!” The Berber answered: “I
was preoccupied by a very serious concern.” “What concern?” the Prophet asked. “Yester-
day, you glanced at me in such a way that I feared a verse of God would descend.” Then he
told him—God’s peace and blessings be upon him: “Don’t be afraid, I looked at you yester-
day in such a manner because Jibrīl—peace upon him—came and told me: ‘Muḥammad,
 Analysis in Aillet 2015a, 77–78.
 Al–Sabiʿī 1999.
 Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, XIV, 402.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 121–122.
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you must only trust the fear of God (taqwā) and the Berbers!’ The Prophet said: ‘Then I
asked Jibrīl: Who are these Berbers?’ He said: ‘This group.’ He pointed at you, so I looked
and asked: ‘Why?’ He answered: ‘Because they will give a new life to the religion of God
after its death and revitalize it when it will be ruined. Oh Muḥammad! The religion of
God was born in the Ḥijāz and its cradle was in Medina. It was weak at its birth, but it
will strengthen and grow. It will become huge and give as many fruits as a tree does.
Then it will decay like the trees. At this time, the religion of God will have its crown in
North Africa, a heavy and high crown, while nothing will grow from the middle to the
roots of it. The crown will be the only part that will grow up.’
The reference to Berber nativeness was apparently not sufficient to support the
state-building project fostered by the Rustamids,who became the first lasting au-
tonomous dynasty in North Africa. According to Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, the first imām,
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, was chosen precisely because he was a stranger, foreign to
any local tribe or ʿaṣabiyya: this distance from local interests was thought to
be a condition for governing impartially.⁵⁸ The first imām was therefore a ‘Persi-
an’ in a Berber land. The Rustamids kept on claiming their Persian identity,⁵⁹ un-
like the Umayyads of Cordoba and the Idrīsids of Fez who chose to stress their
Arab origins. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustam was probably from al-ʿIrāq, like many
other Ibāḍī leaders. His nisba ‘al-Fārisī’ may also have meant that he came
from the province of Fārs,⁶⁰ where Khārijism was strong up until his time. Ac-
cording to al-Yaʿqūbī, his descendants were clearly labelled ‘Persians’ and con-
stituted the ruling elite in Tāhart.⁶¹ As for Ibn Khurradādhbih, he described the
imām as “a Persian whom they saluted like a caliph”.⁶² Nobody paid attention to
the name of the dynasty (Rustum or Rustam), which clearly refers to the legen-
dary Iranian hero who became a major protagonist of the 10th-century Persian
literary monument, the Shāhnāmeh.
This could be a detail if Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Wārjlānī and later authors had not
forged a mythical genealogy for the Rustamids, ⁶³ one reproduced with some var-
iations by the Andalusī writers Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456 H/1064 CE) and al-Bakrī
(d. 487 H/1094 CE).⁶⁴ In this pattern, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustam was made a de-
scendant of the pre-Islamic Persian ‘kings of kings’. This included the paradig-
matic imperial figures of Ardashīr, Sābūr, Bahrām, Yazdajird, Anūshirwān and
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 9.
 Aillet 2011, 68–73.
 First documented in Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 127.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 141– 143.
 Ibn Khurradādhbih, Kitāb al-Masālik, 87–88.
 Abū Zakariyyāʾ al-Warjlānī, Kitāb Siyar, 58–60.
 Ibn Ḥazm, Kitāb Jamharat, 511–512; al-Bakrī, Kitāb al-Masālik, 66–69.
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evidently Khosrow. In the Kitāb al-Siyar of Abū Zakariyyāʾ, this genealogy is as-
sociated with tales predicting the fall of the Sasanians, the advent of Islam and
the rebirth, some generations later, of a Persian dynasty. Evidently, this is an al-
lusion to the ‘manifestation’ of the imamate in Tāhart. The local and somewhat
marginal dynasty of the Rustamids is therefore transformed into the heir of the
glorious dynasty of Persia and thus given imperial ancestry.
In this construction, the fadā’il al-furs inherited from the eastern shuʿūbī tra-
dition are combined with the local formula of the fadā’il al-Barbar. This emer-
gence can be traced through Ibn Sallām. Tāhart and the imamate had been
founded thanks to an alliance between the indigenous population (the Berbers)
and the newcomers (the Persians), whose prestigious origin would later be ela-
borated upon.What is interesting for our purpose is that the shuʿūbī controversy,
which called for the reevaluation of political functions in Persian lands, was im-
ported to the Maghrib and hybridized with a Khārijite political discourse against
the domination of the ‘Arabs’.We lack early evidence to prove that the Rustamids
themselves developed this argument before their fall. Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, for instance,
does not mention it. However, other elements, like the cosmopolitan image of
Tāhart as a crossroads between the east and the west, the bilād al-Sūdān and
the Mediterranean,⁶⁵ or the above mentioned reference to the caliphal ambition
of the imāms by Ibn Khurradādhbih, could fit with this idea.
What is clear is that the Sasanian genealogy of the Rustamids reached al-An-
dalus during the first part of the 11th century, probably conveyed by the Ibāḍīs
themselves. Ibn Ḥazm was in touch with Wahbī and Nukkārī informers and al-
Bakrī used the former Kitāb Masālik Ifrīqiya wa-mamālikihā written by the Qayr-
awānī scholar Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Warrāq (d. 363 H/973–974 CE). Al-Warrāq
was well informed about Tāhart and the Ibāḍīs, and he also gave the Rustamids
a Sasanian genealogy.We can reasonably suppose that this discourse was forged
by the imamate itself during the 9th century, perhaps to reinforce the authority of
the rulers against internal opposition. This kind of political claim was certainly
not accepted by the whole Ibāḍī nebula—Ibn Sallām did not mention it, for in-
stance—and the earlier egalitarian and ascetic ethos of the school survived
through tales depicting ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Rustam as a humble meason of the
community.⁶⁶
What is suggestive for our purposes is how the Persian shuʿūbī argumenta-
tion was projected far to the west, inspiring the Berber shuʿūbiyya. The circula-
tion of such political and genealogical concepts was clearly facilitated by contact
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 13.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 10– 12.
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between the eastern and western branches of the movement. As al-Yaʿqūbī ob-
served during his travels, in their attempt to compete with the ‘Arab’ elites,
the Berbers—mostly part of Ibāḍism at this time—had the choice of various ge-
nealogical combinations. Indeed, among the Hawwāra the local genealogical
market included references to Qays ʿAylān as well as to Yamanī tribes.⁶⁷ The
western Ibāḍī combination of two shuʿūbiyyas was possibly intended to symbol-
ize the alliance of the greatest non-Arabic Muslim nations of the time. It is also a
good illustration of how social actors could hybridize imperial culture with local
structures to produce political autonomy.
Trading with the Empire
The intra-community circulation of persons and ideas between the east and the
west was itself embedded into a much wider relationship between the empire
and its western confines. Sectarian and ethnic distinctions did not prevent the
Ibāḍī from participating in a much larger economic network.
Historiographical tradition has mainly insisted on Tāhart as a bridgehead
between the Mediterranean and the Sahel.⁶⁸ Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, himself a local mer-
chant, describes the flourishing city opening “the roads to the land of the
Sūdān and to all the countries of east and west to trade and all kinds of
goods”.⁶⁹ Tāhart certainly contributed to the awakening or revival of commercial
relations between the Mediterranean and the Sūdān.
Ibn al-Ṣaghīr records the embassy led to the “king of Sūdān” by Muḥammad
b. ʿArfa, the right-hand man of imām Abū Bakr b. Aflaḥ (250–254 H/864–
868 CE), and the projected travel to Gao of Aflaḥ b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb.⁷⁰ He also
frequently alludes to the presence of slaves surrounding the imām, the wealthy
patricians and the tribal leaders of Tāhart, which thus clearly appears to be a
hub for this trade.⁷¹ The increase of commercial relations with the Sahel was it-
self a response to the huge economic demands created by the empire since the
8th century. In Ibn al-Ṣaghīr’s description of Tāhart, the Sahelian vocation of the
city is closely associated with its nodal function between the Maghrib and the
Mashriq.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 131– 135.
 Lewicki 1965.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 13.
 Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 31; al-Wisyānī, Siyar, II, 328.
 For example in Ibn al-Ṣaghīr, Akhbār, 13, 27, 48.
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Above all, Tāhart was in fact an emporium where various commercial roads
converged and fanned out again towards other markets, a pivotal place capital-
izing on its relations with the Western Maghrib (including Sijilmāsa), the Berber
hinterland, al-Andalus and Ifrīqiya.⁷² In brief, it connected the empire with its
western and Saharan confines.
During the 9th century, it seems that the Ibāḍī commercial network was still a
juxtaposition of segmented regional circuits magnetized by the Mediterranean
and eastern demand. What we know about the network developed by Tāhart
is enhanced by the information provided by the Kitāb fīhi bad’ al-Islam of Ibn
Sallām, which exclusively focuses on the eastern Ibāḍī network from Ifrīqiya
to the east. The author’s subjects mainly came from Surt and Jabal Nafūsa,
and practiced trade as well as intellectual exchange. Even if Ibn Sallām does
not mention it, the Nafūsīs were in contact with the Trans-Saharan road leading
to the cluster of oases of the Fazzān, and had possibly already reached the north-
ern shore of Lake Chad.⁷³ Al-Yaʿqubī refers to Zawīla as the main locations of the
slave trade and says that people from al-Baṣra, al-Kūfa and Khurāsān, three
areas where Ibāḍism was also rooted, had settled there.⁷⁴
Coming back to the personalities Ibn Sallām mentions, in the west their
business activity reached Ifrīqiya and the Jarīd and was in contact with the trad-
ing sphere of Tāhart. To the east, they mainly frequented Egypt and the Ḥijāz.
The first meeting place of the western Ibāḍīs and the imperial sphere was Qayr-
awān, where some of their wealthiest coreligionists lived. One of them owned a
street of stores along the Great Mosque, and another was based in the Sūq al-
Aḥad and traded in wheat, barley, olive oil, cotton and other crops with the Haw-
wāra Berbers.⁷⁵ The Ibāḍī merchant-scholars were also familiar with Fusṭāṭ,
where one of them supervised the Sūq al-Ẓuhr.⁷⁶ This Egyptian metropolis
formed the junction of the western and eastern Ibāḍī communities.
The pilgrimage to Makka provided another opportunity for commercial and
cultural contact. The western Ibāḍī elites showed their piety as well as their pros-
perity by repeatedly accomplishing the ḥajj.⁷⁷ Ibn Sallām gives precise informa-
tion on this. The Nafūsīs, for example, went assiduously. Later sources also de-
 Baḥāz 2010, 230–288.
 For other publications of the Fazzān project, see Mattingly 2013.
 Al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-Buldān, 134– 135.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 132– 135.
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 109–110, 114– 115.
 ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm 1990, 88–93.
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scribe the Nafūsīs coming to al-Ḥijāz in huge family processions;⁷⁸ one tale even
reports that during a single trip 800 male children were born.⁷⁹
This circulation reflected a precise economic system, regarding which we are
very poorly informed. The main question, naturally, is the role played by the
Ibāḍīs of the west in the supply of commodities from the bilād al-Sūdān to the
empire, namely gold, slaves, ivory and so on. In the 9th century, Ibāḍī and
Sunni sources mainly mention the slave trade without specifying its destination.
It is tempting to hypothesize that this specific commercial network corresponded
with the cartography of human circulation we have already sketched out. Some
clues seem to indicate that the Ibāḍīs of the west were among the most relevant
actors in the global trade in African slaves.⁸⁰ The Aghlabid army and some of the
great estates in Ifrīqiya were making use of black slaves,⁸¹ who also fought in the
special troops of Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn.⁸² As for al-Ḥijāz, it was a major market for Af-
rican slaves and a significant black minority worked in the mines there.⁸³ Finally,
the rebellion of the Zanj between 255 H–270 H/869–883 CE sheds light on the
massive use of black slaves in al-Baṣra and southern al-ʿIrāq, in particular for
agricultural tasks.⁸⁴ Even if the ethnonym ‘Zanj’ normally designates the popula-
tions from Eastern Africa, the close relationship between al-Baṣra and the Ibāḍī
realm in the Maghrib during the end of the 8th and the beginning of the 9th cen-
tury hints at the internal diversity of this poorly identified population. The Zanj
possibly included slaves supplied by the Ibāḍī network.
Conclusion
Anti-caliphal ideology certainly contributed to shape the Rustamid state of Tā-
hart, and above all its memory, as a counter-model. Yet the definition of western
Ibāḍism cannot be dismissed as marginal and its relationship with the imperial
sphere should be reexamined. Far from simply representing, as caliphal sources
claimed, the promotion of a ‘Berber’ ethnicity against an ‘Arab’ or imperial iden-
tity, western Ibāḍism was influenced by the eastern model of the Persian shuʿū-
 Ibn Sallām, Kitāb Ibn Sallām, 109–110.
 ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm 1990, 91.
 This issue deserves a specific study; this paper only formulates preliminary hypotheses that
illustrate how North African Ibāḍīsm was entangled with the imperial economic system.
 Talbi 1982, 212; Thiry 1995, 513; Trabelsi, 61–62.
 EI3, “Aḥmad b. Ṭūlūn” (M. Gordon).
 Power 2012, 142.
 Popovic 1999.
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biyya. The imamate itself thus came to symbolize a Persian state rooted in a Ber-
ber milieu. The city of Tāhart was hailed as the “ʿIrāq of the Maghrib” and the
local state apparatus even experimented with a gradual influx of ʿAbbāsid mod-
els. Trade and exchange also played a key role in connecting the Ibāḍī network
with the east, thanks to such nodal points as Qayrawān, Fusṭāṭ, Makka and al-
Baṣra. Thanks to the close relationship between Tāhart and al-Baṣra, Ibāḍī mer-
chants circulated widely between the ʿAbbāsid realm and its western fringes. The
Maghribīs owned stores in Fusṭāṭ and traveled as far as Baghdad and Sāmarrāʾ.
Trans-Saharan trade itself was probably additionally boosted by the imperial de-
mand for slaves. Connections with the empire therefore irrevocably shaped
‘transregional elites’ within the North African Ibāḍī milieu.
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